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Thompson KM, Badizadegan K. Review of Poliovirus Transmission and Economic Modeling to Support Global Polio Eradication: 2020-2024. Pathogens 2024; 13:435. [PMID: 38921733 PMCID: PMC11206708 DOI: 10.3390/pathogens13060435] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/25/2024] [Revised: 05/16/2024] [Accepted: 05/18/2024] [Indexed: 06/27/2024] Open
Abstract
Continued investment in the development and application of mathematical models of poliovirus transmission, economics, and risks leads to their use in support of polio endgame strategy development and risk management policies. This study complements an earlier review covering the period 2000-2019 and discusses the evolution of studies published since 2020 by modeling groups supported by the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) partners and others. We systematically review modeling papers published in English in peer-reviewed journals from 2020-2024.25 that focus on poliovirus transmission and health economic analyses. In spite of the long-anticipated end of poliovirus transmission and the GPEI sunset, which would lead to the end of its support for modeling, we find that the number of modeling groups supported by GPEI partners doubled and the rate of their publications increased. Modeling continued to play a role in supporting GPEI and national/regional policies, but changes in polio eradication governance, decentralized management and decision-making, and increased heterogeneity in modeling approaches and findings decreased the overall impact of modeling results. Meanwhile, the failure of the 2016 globally coordinated cessation of type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine use for preventive immunization and the introduction of new poliovirus vaccines and formulation, increased the complexity and uncertainty of poliovirus transmission and economic models and policy recommendations during this time.
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Kalkowska DA, Wassilak SGF, Wiesen E, F Estivariz C, Burns CC, Badizadegan K, Thompson KM. Complexity of options related to restarting oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) in national immunization programs after OPV cessation. Gates Open Res 2023; 7:55. [PMID: 37547300 PMCID: PMC10403636 DOI: 10.12688/gatesopenres.14511.1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 03/09/2023] [Indexed: 08/08/2023] Open
Abstract
Background: The polio eradication endgame continues to increase in complexity. With polio cases caused by wild poliovirus type 1 and circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses of all three types (1, 2 and 3) reported in 2022, the number, formulation, and use of poliovirus vaccines poses challenges for national immunization programs and vaccine suppliers. Prior poliovirus transmission modeling of globally-coordinated type-specific cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) assumed creation of Sabin monovalent OPV (mOPV) stockpiles for emergencies and explored the potential need to restart OPV if the world reached a specified cumulative threshold number of cases after OPV cessation. Methods: We document the actual experience of type 2 OPV (OPV2) cessation and reconsider prior modeling assumptions related to OPV restart. We develop updated decision trees of national immunization options for poliovirus vaccines considering different possibilities for OPV restart. Results: While OPV restart represented a hypothetical situation for risk management and contingency planning to support the 2013-2018 Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) Strategic Plan, the actual epidemiological experience since OPV2 cessation raises questions about what, if any, trigger(s) could lead to restarting the use of OPV2 in routine immunization and/or plans for potential future restart of type 1 and 3 OPV after their respective cessation. The emergency use listing of a genetically stabilized novel type 2 OPV (nOPV2) and continued evaluation of nOPV for types 1 and/or 3 add further complexity by increasing the combinations of possible OPV formulations for OPV restart. Conclusions: Expanding on a 2019 discussion of the logistical challenges and implications of restarting OPV, we find a complex structure of the many options and many issues related to OPV restart decisions and policies as of early 2023. We anticipate many challenges for forecasting prospective vaccine supply needs during the polio endgame due to increasing potential combinations of poliovirus vaccine choices.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Steven GF Wassilak
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Eric Wiesen
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Concepcion F Estivariz
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Cara C Burns
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, USA, Atlanta, GA, USA
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Kalkowska DA, Badizadegan K, Thompson KM. Modeling scenarios for ending poliovirus transmission in Pakistan and Afghanistan. RISK ANALYSIS : AN OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE SOCIETY FOR RISK ANALYSIS 2023; 43:660-676. [PMID: 35739080 PMCID: PMC9780402 DOI: 10.1111/risa.13983] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/09/2023]
Abstract
Pakistan and Afghanistan pose risks for international transmission of polioviruses as the last global reservoir for wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) and a reservoir for type 2 circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPV2s). Widespread transmission of WPV1 and cVDPV2 in 2019-2020 and resumption of intensive supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) in 2020-2021 using oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) led to decreased transmission of WPV1 and cVDPV2 as of the end of 2021. Using an established dynamic disease transmission model, we explore multiple bounding scenarios with varying intensities of SIAs using bivalent OPV (bOPV) and/or trivalent tOPV (tOPV) to characterize potential die out of transmission. This analysis demonstrates potential sets of actions that may lead to elimination of poliovirus transmission in Pakistan and/or Afghanistan. Some modeled scenarios suggest that Pakistan and Afghanistan could increase population immunity to levels high enough to eliminate transmission, and if maintained, achieve WPV1 and cVDPV2 elimination as early as 2022. This requires intensive and proactive OPV SIAs to prevent transmission, instead of surveillance followed by reactive outbreak response. The reduction of cases observed in 2021 may lead to a false sense of security that polio has already or soon will die out on its own, but relaxation of immunization activities runs the risk of lowering population immunity to, or below, the minimum die-out threshold such that transmission continues. Transmission modeling may play a key role in managing expectations and supporting future modeling about the confidence of no virus circulation in anticipation of global certification decisions.
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Jin Q, Raza SH, Yousaf M, Munawar R, Shah AA, Hassan S, Shaikh RS, Ogadimma EC. Ingraining Polio Vaccine Acceptance through Public Service Advertisements in the Digital Era: The Moderating Role of Misinformation, Disinformation, Fake News, and Religious Fatalism. Vaccines (Basel) 2022; 10:1733. [PMID: 36298598 PMCID: PMC9610005 DOI: 10.3390/vaccines10101733] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/24/2022] [Revised: 10/11/2022] [Accepted: 10/14/2022] [Indexed: 07/30/2023] Open
Abstract
Recently, misinformation and disinformation, as well as fake news, have become global threats to public health owing to their role in spreading viral health hazard information. The growing explosive religious fatalistic views presented on social media and widespread misinformation, disinformation, and fake news can result in detrimental outcomes in adopting protective behavior. The moderating implications of misinformation and religious fatalism can be severe, leading to adverse effects on polio vaccine acceptance. Consequently, this research provides brief empirical evidence on the efficacy of risk communication strategies to address polio vaccine reluctance in a digital age landscape, an area that remains understudied. This research argues that the spread of misinformation, disinformation, fake news, and religious fatalism is not solely the bane of the polio vaccine, but rather represents the absence of risk communication strategies. The study opines that polio vaccine acceptance can be improved using risk communication strategies. Recognizing these risk factors and counter-risk communication strategies, this research tested a theoretical model using the cross-sectional survey design. Overall, data was collected from 2160 parents with children aged below five years. The results, based on structural equation modeling, revealed that public service advertisements are an effective tool to counter the inverse impacts of misinformation, disinformation, fake news, and religious fatalism. Furthermore, the inverse moderating role of misinformation, disinformation, fake news, and religious fatalism has been verified to potentially diminish polio vaccine acceptance. These results suggest that healthcare providers must identify and address all forms of digitally disseminated information that encumbers public health behaviors. Accordingly, this research recognized the utilization of evidence-based strategic communication campaigns to cultivate and encourage the literacy necessary to counter health hazard information, including misinformation. This study's findings will benefit health and other concerned authorities in utilizing strategic communication on different media platforms to reduce or eradicate the polio endemic.
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Affiliation(s)
- Qiang Jin
- Intercultural Communication Research Center, Hebei University, Baoding 071000, China
| | - Syed Hassan Raza
- Institute of Media and Communication Studies, Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan 66000, Pakistan
| | - Muhammad Yousaf
- Centre for Media and Communication Studies, University of Gujrat, Gujrat 50700, Pakistan
| | - Rehana Munawar
- Department of Mass Communication, National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad 44000, Pakistan
| | - Amjad Ali Shah
- Institute of Media and Communication Studies, Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan 66000, Pakistan
| | - Saima Hassan
- District Headquarter Hospital, Multan 66000, Pakistan
| | - Rehan Sadiq Shaikh
- Centre for Applied Molecular Biology, University of the Punjab, Lahore 54000, Pakistan
| | - Emenyonu C. Ogadimma
- College of Communication, University of Sharjah, Sharjah P.O. Box 27272, United Arab Emirates
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Rahim S, Ahmad Z, Abdul-Ghafar J. The polio vaccination story of Pakistan. Vaccine 2021; 40:397-402. [DOI: 10.1016/j.vaccine.2021.11.095] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/22/2021] [Revised: 11/12/2021] [Accepted: 11/30/2021] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
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Kalkowska DA, Pallansch MA, Cochi SL, Thompson KM. Modeling Poliovirus Surveillance and Immunization Campaign Quality Monitoring Costs for Pakistan and Afghanistan for 2019-2023. Open Forum Infect Dis 2021; 8:ofab264. [PMID: 34295942 DOI: 10.1093/ofid/ofab264] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/07/2021] [Accepted: 05/19/2021] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Background The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) Strategic Plan for 2019-2023 includes commitments to monitor the quality of immunization campaigns using lot quality assurance sampling surveys (LQAS) and to support poliovirus surveillance in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Methods We analyzed LQAS and poliovirus surveillance data between 2016 and 2020, which included both acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) case-based detection and the continued expansion of environmental surveillance (ES). Using updated estimates for unit costs, we explore the costs of different options for future poliovirus monitoring and surveillance for Pakistan and Afghanistan. Results The relative value of the information provided by campaign quality monitoring and surveillance remains uncertain and depends on the design, implementation, and performance of the systems. Prospective immunization campaign quality monitoring (through LQAS) and poliovirus surveillance will require tens of millions of dollars each year for the foreseeable future for Pakistan and Afghanistan. Conclusions LQAS campaign monitoring as currently implemented in Pakistan and Afghanistan provides limited and potentially misleading information about immunization quality. AFP surveillance in Pakistan and Afghanistan provides the most reliable evidence of transmission, whereas ES provides valuable supplementary information about the extent of transmission in the catchment areas represented at the time of sample collection.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Mark A Pallansch
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Stephen L Cochi
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
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The impact of disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic on global polio eradication. Vaccine 2021; 41 Suppl 1:A12-A18. [PMID: 33962838 PMCID: PMC10045205 DOI: 10.1016/j.vaccine.2021.04.026] [Citation(s) in RCA: 21] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/16/2020] [Revised: 03/29/2021] [Accepted: 04/14/2021] [Indexed: 12/21/2022]
Abstract
In early 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic led to substantial disruptions in global activities. The disruptions also included intentional and unintentional reductions in health services, including immunization campaigns against the transmission of wild poliovirus (WPV) and persistent serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2). Building on a recently updated global poliovirus transmission and Sabin-strain oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) evolution model, we explored the implications of immunization disruption and restrictions of human interactions (i.e., population mixing) on the expected incidence of polio and on the resulting challenges faced by the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI). We demonstrate that with some resumption of activities in the fall of 2020 to respond to cVDPV2 outbreaks and full resumption on January 1, 2021 of all polio immunization activities to pre-COVID-19 levels, the GPEI could largely mitigate the impact of COVID-19 to the delays incurred. The relative importance of reduced mixing (leading to potentially decreased incidence) and reduced immunization (leading to potentially increased expected incidence) depends on the timing of the effects. Following resumption of immunization activities, the GPEI will likely face similar barriers to eradication of WPV and elimination of cVDPV2 as before COVID-19. The disruptions from the COVID-19 pandemic may further delay polio eradication due to indirect effects on vaccine and financial resources.
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Kalkowska DA, Pallansch MA, Cochi SL, Thompson KM. Updated characterization of poliovirus transmission in Pakistan and Afghanistan and the impacts of different outbreak response vaccine options. J Infect Dis 2021; 224:1529-1538. [PMID: 33885734 PMCID: PMC8083227 DOI: 10.1093/infdis/jiab160] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/27/2021] [Accepted: 03/19/2021] [Indexed: 12/17/2022] Open
Abstract
Background Pakistan and Afghanistan remain the only reservoirs of wild poliovirus transmission. Prior modeling suggested that before the COVID-19 pandemic, plans to stop the transmission of serotype 1 wild poliovirus (WPV1) and persistent serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2) did not appear on track to succeed. Methods We updated an existing poliovirus transmission and Sabin-strain oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) evolution model for Pakistan and Afghanistan to characterize the impacts of immunization disruptions and restrictions on human interactions (i.e., population mixing) due to the COVID-19 pandemic. We also consider different options for responding to outbreaks and for preventive supplementary immunization activities (SIAs). Results The modeling suggests that with some resumption of activities in the fall of 2020 to respond to cVDPV2 outbreaks and full resumption on January 1, 2021 of all polio immunization activities to pre-COVID-19 levels, Pakistan and Afghanistan would remain off-track for stopping all transmission through 2023 without improvements in quality. Conclusions Using trivalent OPV (tOPV) for SIAs instead of serotype 2 monovalent OPV (mOPV2) offers substantial benefits for ending the transmission of both WPV1 and cVDPV2, because tOPV increases population immunity for both serotypes 1 and 2 while requiring fewer SIA rounds, when effectively delivered in transmission areas.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Mark A Pallansch
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Stephen L Cochi
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Kimberly M Thompson
- Kid Risk, Inc., Orlando, FL, USA
- Please address correspondence to: Dr. Kimberly Thompson, Kid Risk, Inc., 7512 Dr. Phillips Blvd. #50-523, Orlando, FL 32819, USA,
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Thompson KM. Modeling and Managing Poliovirus Risks: We are Where we are…. RISK ANALYSIS : AN OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE SOCIETY FOR RISK ANALYSIS 2021; 41:223-228. [PMID: 33590520 PMCID: PMC7894995 DOI: 10.1111/risa.13668] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/25/2020] [Accepted: 08/28/2020] [Indexed: 05/07/2023]
Abstract
This introduction for the third special issue on modeling poliovirus risks provides context for the current status of global polio eradication efforts and gives an overview of the individual papers included in the issue. Although risk analysis continues to support the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI), efforts to finish the job remained off track at the beginning of 2020 and prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, as discussed in the special issue. The disruptions associated with COVID-19 occurring now will inevitably change the polio eradication trajectory, and future studies will need to characterize the impacts of these disruptions on the polio endgame.
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Thompson KM, Kalkowska DA. An Updated Economic Analysis of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative. RISK ANALYSIS : AN OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE SOCIETY FOR RISK ANALYSIS 2021; 41:393-406. [PMID: 33590521 PMCID: PMC7894996 DOI: 10.1111/risa.13665] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/13/2020] [Revised: 08/25/2020] [Accepted: 08/28/2020] [Indexed: 05/20/2023]
Abstract
Despite a strong global commitment, polio eradication efforts continue now more than 30 years after the 1988 World Health Assembly resolution that established the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI), and 20 years after the original target of the year 2000. Prior health economic analyses estimated incremental net benefits of the GPEI of 40-50 billion in 2008 U.S. dollars (US$2008, equivalent to 48-59 billion US$2019), assuming the achievement of polio eradication by 2012. Given the delays in achieving polio eradication and increased costs, we performed an updated economic analysis of the GPEI using an updated integrated global model, and considering the GPEI trajectory as of the beginning of 2020. Applying similar methods and assuming eradication achievement in 2023, we estimate incremental net benefits of the GPEI of 28 billion US$2019, which falls below the prior estimate. Delays in achieving polio eradication combined with the widescale introduction of relatively expensive inactivated poliovirus vaccine significantly increased the costs of the GPEI and make it less cost-effective, although the GPEI continues to yield expected incremental net benefits at the global level when considered over the time horizon of 1988-2029. The overall health and financial benefits of the GPEI will depend on whether and when the GPEI can achieve its goals, when eradication occurs, the valuation method applied, and the path dependence of the actions taken. Reduced expected incremental net benefits of the GPEI and the substantial economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic pose large financial risks for the GPEI.
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Kalkowska DA, Pallansch MA, Wilkinson A, Bandyopadhyay AS, Konopka-Anstadt JL, Burns CC, Oberste MS, Wassilak SGF, Badizadegan K, Thompson KM. Updated Characterization of Outbreak Response Strategies for 2019-2029: Impacts of Using a Novel Type 2 Oral Poliovirus Vaccine Strain. RISK ANALYSIS : AN OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE SOCIETY FOR RISK ANALYSIS 2021; 41:329-348. [PMID: 33174263 PMCID: PMC7887065 DOI: 10.1111/risa.13622] [Citation(s) in RCA: 35] [Impact Index Per Article: 11.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/24/2020] [Revised: 10/08/2020] [Accepted: 10/16/2020] [Indexed: 05/06/2023]
Abstract
Delays in achieving the global eradication of wild poliovirus transmission continue to postpone subsequent cessation of all oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) use. Countries must stop OPV use to end all cases of poliomyelitis, including vaccine-associated paralytic polio (VAPP) and cases caused by vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs). The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) coordinated global cessation of all type 2 OPV (OPV2) use in routine immunization in 2016 but did not successfully end the transmission of type 2 VDPVs (VDPV2s), and consequently continues to use type 2 OPV (OPV2) for outbreak response activities. Using an updated global poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution model, we characterize outbreak response options for 2019-2029 related to responding to VDPV2 outbreaks with a genetically stabilized novel OPV (nOPV2) strain or with the currently licensed monovalent OPV2 (mOPV2). Given uncertainties about the properties of nOPV2, we model different assumptions that appear consistent with the evidence on nOPV2 to date. Using nOPV2 to respond to detected cases may reduce the expected VDPV and VAPP cases and the risk of needing to restart OPV2 use in routine immunization compared to mOPV2 use for outbreak response. The actual properties, availability, and use of nOPV2 will determine its effects on type 2 poliovirus transmission in populations. Even with optimal nOPV2 performance, countries and the GPEI would still likely need to restart OPV2 use in routine immunization in OPV-using countries if operational improvements in outbreak response to stop the transmission of cVDPV2s are not implemented effectively.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Mark A. Pallansch
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Amanda Wilkinson
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | | | - Jennifer L. Konopka-Anstadt
- Division of Viral Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Cara C. Burns
- Division of Viral Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - M. Steven Oberste
- Division of Viral Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Steven G. F. Wassilak
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
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Kalkowska DA, Pallansch MA, Cochi SL, Kovacs SD, Wassilak SGF, Thompson KM. Updated Characterization of Post-OPV Cessation Risks: Lessons from 2019 Serotype 2 Outbreaks and Implications for the Probability of OPV Restart. RISK ANALYSIS : AN OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE SOCIETY FOR RISK ANALYSIS 2021; 41:320-328. [PMID: 32632925 PMCID: PMC7814395 DOI: 10.1111/risa.13555] [Citation(s) in RCA: 28] [Impact Index Per Article: 9.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/01/2020] [Revised: 06/15/2020] [Accepted: 06/22/2020] [Indexed: 05/06/2023]
Abstract
After the globally coordinated cessation of any serotype of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), some risks remain from undetected, existing homotypic OPV-related transmission and/or restarting transmission due to several possible reintroduction risks. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) coordinated global cessation of serotype 2-containing OPV (OPV2) in 2016. Following OPV2 cessation, the GPEI and countries implemented activities to withdraw all the remaining trivalent OPV, which contains all three poliovirus serotypes (i.e., 1, 2, and 3), from the supply chain and replace it with bivalent OPV (containing only serotypes 1 and 3). However, as of early 2020, monovalent OPV2 use for outbreak response continues in many countries. In addition, outbreaks observed in 2019 demonstrated evidence of different types of risks than previously modeled. We briefly review the 2019 epidemiological experience with serotype 2 live poliovirus outbreaks and propose a new risk for unexpected OPV introduction for inclusion in global modeling of OPV cessation. Using an updated model of global poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution with and without consideration of this new risk, we explore the implications of the current global situation with respect to the likely need to restart preventive use of OPV2 in OPV-using countries. Simulation results without this new risk suggest OPV2 restart will likely need to occur (81% of 100 iterations) to manage the polio endgame based on the GPEI performance to date with existing vaccine tools, and with the new risk of unexpected OPV introduction the expected OPV2 restart probability increases to 89%. Contingency planning requires new OPV2 bulk production, including genetically stabilized OPV2 strains.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Mark A. Pallansch
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory, Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Stephen L. Cochi
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Stephanie D. Kovacs
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Steven G. F. Wassilak
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
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Thompson KM, Kalkowska DA. Reflections on Modeling Poliovirus Transmission and the Polio Eradication Endgame. RISK ANALYSIS : AN OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE SOCIETY FOR RISK ANALYSIS 2021; 41:229-247. [PMID: 32339327 PMCID: PMC7983882 DOI: 10.1111/risa.13484] [Citation(s) in RCA: 24] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/02/2019] [Revised: 03/27/2020] [Accepted: 03/27/2020] [Indexed: 05/06/2023]
Abstract
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) partners engaged modelers during the past nearly 20 years to support strategy and policy discussions and decisions, and to provide estimates of the risks, costs, and benefits of different options for managing the polio endgame. Limited efforts to date provided insights related to the validation of the models used for GPEI strategy and policy decisions. However, modeling results only influenced decisions in some cases, with other factors carrying more weight in many key decisions. In addition, the results from multiple modeling groups do not always agree, which supports selection of some strategies and/or policies counter to the recommendations from some modelers but not others. This analysis reflects on our modeling, and summarizes our premises and recommendations, the outcomes of these recommendations, and the implications of key limitations of models with respect to polio endgame strategy. We briefly review the current state of the GPEI given epidemiological experience as of early 2020, which includes failure of the GPEI to deliver on the objectives of its 2013-2018 strategic plan despite full financial support. Looking ahead, we provide context for why the GPEI strategy of global oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) cessation to end all cases of poliomyelitis looks infeasible given the current state of the GPEI and the failure to successfully stop all transmission of serotype 2 live polioviruses within four years of the April-May 2016 coordinated cessation of serotype 2 OPV use in routine immunization.
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Thompson KM, Kalkowska DA. Potential Future Use, Costs, and Value of Poliovirus Vaccines. RISK ANALYSIS : AN OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE SOCIETY FOR RISK ANALYSIS 2021; 41:349-363. [PMID: 32645244 PMCID: PMC7984393 DOI: 10.1111/risa.13557] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/01/2020] [Accepted: 06/22/2020] [Indexed: 05/06/2023]
Abstract
Countries face different poliovirus risks, which imply different benefits associated with continued and future use of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) and/or inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV). With the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) continuing to extend its timeline for ending the transmission of all wild polioviruses and to introduce new poliovirus vaccines, the polio vaccine supply chain continues to expand in complexity. The increased complexity leads to significant uncertainty about supply and costs. Notably, the strategy of phased OPV cessation of all three serotypes to stop all future incidence of poliomyelitis depends on successfully stopping the transmission of all wild polioviruses. Countries also face challenges associated with responding to any outbreaks that occur after OPV cessation, because stopping transmission of such outbreaks requires reintroducing the use of the stopped OPV in most countries. National immunization program leaders will likely consider differences in their risks and willingness-to-pay for risk reduction as they evaluate their investments in current and future polio vaccination. Information about the costs and benefits of future poliovirus vaccines, and discussion of the complex situation that currently exists, should prove useful to national, regional, and global decisionmakers and support health economic modeling. Delays in achieving polio eradication combined with increasing costs of poliovirus vaccines continue to increase financial risks for the GPEI.
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Kalkowska DA, Thompson KM. Health and Economic Outcomes Associated with Polio Vaccine Policy Options: 2019-2029. RISK ANALYSIS : AN OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE SOCIETY FOR RISK ANALYSIS 2021; 41:364-375. [PMID: 33590519 PMCID: PMC7895457 DOI: 10.1111/risa.13664] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/13/2020] [Accepted: 12/04/2020] [Indexed: 05/08/2023]
Abstract
The polio endgame remains complicated, with many questions about future polio vaccines and national immunization policies. We simulated possible future poliovirus vaccine routine immunization policies for countries stratified by World Bank Income Levels and estimated the expected costs and cases using an updated integrated dynamic poliovirus transmission, stochastic risk, and economic model. We consider two reference cases scenarios: one that achieves the eradication of all wild polioviruses (WPVs) by 2023 and one in which serotype 1 WPV (WPV1) transmission continues. The results show that the addition of inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) to routine immunization in all countries substantially increased the expected costs of the polio endgame, without substantially increasing its expected health or economic benefits. Adding a second dose of IPV to the routine immunization schedules of countries that currently include a single IPV dose further increases costs and does not appear economically justified in the reference case that does not stop WPV transmission. For the reference case that includes all WPV eradication, adding a second IPV dose at the time of successful oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) cessation represents a cost-effective option. The risks and costs of needing to restart OPV use change the economics of the polio endgame, although the time horizon used for modeling impacts the overall economic results. National health leaders will want to consider the expected health and economic net benefits of their national polio vaccine strategies recognizing that preferred strategies may differ.
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Thompson KM, Kalkowska DA. Review of poliovirus modeling performed from 2000 to 2019 to support global polio eradication. Expert Rev Vaccines 2020; 19:661-686. [PMID: 32741232 PMCID: PMC7497282 DOI: 10.1080/14760584.2020.1791093] [Citation(s) in RCA: 30] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/28/2020] [Accepted: 06/22/2020] [Indexed: 01/03/2023]
Abstract
INTRODUCTION Over the last 20 years (2000-2019) the partners of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) invested in the development and application of mathematical models of poliovirus transmission as well as economics, policy, and risk analyses of polio endgame risk management options, including policies related to poliovirus vaccine use during the polio endgame. AREAS COVERED This review provides a historical record of the polio studies published by the three modeling groups that primarily performed the bulk of this work. This review also systematically evaluates the polio transmission and health economic modeling papers published in English in peer-reviewed journals from 2000 to 2019, highlights differences in approaches and methods, shows the geographic coverage of the transmission modeling performed, identified common themes, and discusses instances of similar or conflicting insights or recommendations. EXPERT OPINION Polio modeling performed during the last 20 years substantially impacted polio vaccine choices, immunization policies, and the polio eradication pathway. As the polio endgame continues, national preferences for polio vaccine formulations and immunization strategies will likely continue to change. Future modeling will likely provide important insights about their cost-effectiveness and their relative benefits with respect to controlling polio and potentially achieving and maintaining eradication.
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