Geographic exposure risk of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in US blood donors: a risk-ranking model to evaluate alternative donor-deferral policies

Modeling US blood donor deferrals under a policy of individual risk assessment for HIV risk sexual behavior

BACKGROUND

In May 2023, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) released final guidance for blood donor eligibility that recommended the elimination of 3-month deferral for men who have sex with men (MSM) and the related deferral for women who have sex with MSM. In its place, FDA introduced an individual risk assessment policy of asking all presenting blood donors, regardless of sex or gender, if they have had a new partner or more than one sexual partner in the last 3 months and deferring those who also report anal sex (penile-anal intercourse) during this period. We modeled the possible impact of this policy on the US blood donor base.

STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS

We developed a computational model to estimate the percentage of blood donors who would be deferred under a policy of individual HIV risk assessment. The model incorporated demographic information about donors and national survey data on HIV risk behaviors and included age and sex distributions and dependencies.

RESULTS

Our model estimates that approximately 1.2% of US blood donors would be deferred under the individual HIV risk assessment paradigm.

DISCUSSION

The model predicts a relatively minor effect of replacing the time-based deferral for MSM with individual risk-based deferral for sexual behavior. As US blood centers implement this new policy, the effect may be mitigated by donor gains, which warrant further study. The new policy is unlikely to adversely affect the availability of blood and blood components.

Transmission of Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Through Blood Transfusion and Plasma-Derived Products: A Narrative Review of Observed and Modeled Risks

Secondary transmission of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) can occur through blood transfusion or receipt of plasma-derived products. However, published reviews on this topic are outdated, focused on a single country or product type, or did not comprehensively review modeling studies on the risk of transfusion-transmission. We reviewed existing data on observed and modeled risks of transfusion-transmission of vCJD. To date, five patients are suspected to have acquired clinical vCJD or a vCJD infection after receiving a blood or plasma-derived product from a donor who later developed clinical vCJD. All of these cases received a nonleukodepleted blood-derived product in the United Kingdom between 1994 and 1999. Thus, all transfusion-associated cases occurred before the adoption of universal leukodepletion in 1999, which supports the preferential tropism of vCJD for leukocytes. In descriptive cohort studies, no cases of clinical vCJD were observed over ∼13 years of follow-up. In modeling studies, the risk of collecting a contaminated donation was generally <23 per million donations, that of infection was generally <10 per million transfusions or doses, and that of clinical vCJD was generally <2 per million transfusions or doses. These low risk estimates and the two-decade long absence of new cases of transfusion-associated vCJD suggest vCJD poses minimal risks to the safety of the blood supply. Furthermore, despite concerns of a second wave driven by individuals harboring a non-MM genotype at codon 129 of PRNP, there has been only 1 autopsy-confirmed case of clinical vCJD in an MV individual in 2016. The current trend to reassess or (in some countries) fully withdraw the blood donation criteria related to vCJD therefore seems justified, safe, and may significantly expand the donor base.

Donor Screening and Deferral

The maintenance of an adequate and safe blood supply begins with choosing the right donor at the right time. The evolution of donor screening has been shaped by experience, donor satisfaction, and the ever-challenging emergence of relevant infectious diseases. Screening donors has been standardized over the past 6 decades to protect donor and recipient safety. In this review, we outline, define, and simplify the requirements to assess and defer donors with a focus on recent and ongoing changes to provide up to date information on donor qualification and current challenges in maintaining the blood supply.

Assessment of risk of variant creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) from use of bovine heparin

PURPOSE

In the late1990s, reacting to the outbreak of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in the United Kingdom that caused a new variant of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans, manufacturers withdrew bovine heparin from the market in the United States. There have been growing concerns about the adequate supply and safety of porcine heparin. Since the BSE epidemic has been declining markedly, the US Food and Drug Administration reevaluates the vCJD risk via use of bovine heparin.

METHODS

We developed a computational model to estimate the vCJD risk to patients receiving bovine heparin injections. The model incorporated information including BSE prevalence, infectivity levels in the intestines, manufacturing batch size, yield of heparin, reduction in infectivity by manufacturing process, and the dose-response relationship.

RESULTS

The model estimates a median risk of vCJD infection from a single intravenous dose (10 000 USP units) of heparin made from US-sourced bovine intestines to be 6.9 × 10^-9 (2.5-97.fifth percentile: 1.5 × 10^-9 -4.3 × 10^-8 ), a risk of 1 in 145 million, and 4.6 × 10^-8 (2.5-97.fifth percentile: 1.1 × 10^-8 -2.6 × 10^-7 ), a risk of 1 in 22 million for Canada-sourced products. The model estimates a median risk of 1.4 × 10^-7 (2.5-97.fifth percentile: 2.9 × 10^-8 -9.3 × 10^-7 ) and 9.6 × 10^-7 (2.5-97.fifth percentile: 2.1 × 10^-7 -5.6 × 10^-6 ) for a typical treatment for venous thromboembolism (infusion of 2-4 doses daily per week) using US-sourced and Canada-sourced bovine heparin, respectively.

CONCLUSIONS

The model estimates the vCJD risk from use of heparin when appropriately manufactured from US or Canadian cattle is likely small. The model and conclusions should not be applied to other medicinal products manufactured using bovine-derived materials.

Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and blood transfusion safety

Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) are untreatable, fatal neurologic diseases affecting mammals. Human disease forms include sporadic, familial and acquired Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD). While sporadic CJD (sCJD) has been recognized for near on 100 years, variant CJD (vCJD) was first reported in 1996 and is the result of food-borne transmission of the prion of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, 'mad cow disease'). Currently, 230 vCJD cases have been reported in 12 countries, the majority in the UK (178) and France (27). Animal studies demonstrated highly efficient transmission of natural scrapie and experimental BSE by blood transfusion and fuelled concern that sCJD was potentially transfusion transmissible. No such case has been recorded and case-control evaluations and lookback studies indicate that, if transfusion transmission occurs at all, it is very rare. In contrast, four cases of apparent transfusion transmission of vCJD infectivity have been identified in the UK. Risk minimization strategies in response to the threat of vCJD include leucodepletion, geographically based donor deferrals and deferral of transfusion recipients. A sensitive and specific, high-throughput screening test would provide a potential path to mitigation but despite substantial effort no such test has yet appeared. The initial outbreak of vCJD appears to be over, but concern remains about subsequent waves of disease among those already infected. There is considerable uncertainty about the size of the infected population, and there will be at least a perception of some continuing risk to blood safety. Accordingly, at least some precautionary measures will remain in place and continued surveillance is necessary.

Essentials of the Production of Safe and Efficacious State-of-the-Art Polyclonal IgG Concentrates

Severe noninfectious adverse events (AEs) and transmission of pathogens by plasma-derived protein concentrates from the very beginning of their clinical use were threats for recipients (see Chap. 10.1007/978-3-319-68038-5_11 for additional information). “Standard IgG” preparations were the first available for clinical use. They were produced by the cold-ethanol fractionation methods and did not make an exception. Noninfectious severe AEs occurred while infectious AEs were rarely reported. Indeed, prior to the introduction of mass screening for infection markers of plasma donations, inadvertent transmission of HIV to recipients of factor VIII and factor IX concentrates did occur, while IgG concentrates obtained from the same plasma pool did rarely transmit HIV (Morgenthaler 2001). Rare transmissions were restricted to products not exposed to low pH. The very few incidences of HIV and some incidences of HCV transmission by IgG concentrates in the early 1990s together with many cases of coagulation factor concentrates transmitted viral disease clearly demonstrated the need to establish standardized measures to render plasma products pathogen safe. In the second half of the 1990s, authorities shifted regulatory emphasis from a scientific review of the processes to a focus on compliance to current good manufacturing practice (cGMP). The focus on cGMP compliance was applied to all aspects of plasma fractionation and the clinical use of plasma products. Court injunctions and warning letters were the consequences of this paradigm shift by authorities. This in turn resulted in a paradigm shift how the modern plasma industry operates (Steinhardt 1998).