Bonobos engage in joint commitment

Human and nonhuman norms: a dimensional framework

Human communities teem with a variety of social norms. In order to change unjust and harmful social norms, it is crucial to identify the psychological processes that give rise to them. Most researchers take it for granted that social norms are uniquely human. By contrast, we approach this matter from a comparative perspective, leveraging recent research on animal social behaviour. While there is currently only suggestive evidence for norms in nonhuman communities, we argue that human social norms are likely produced by a wide range of mechanisms, many of which we share with nonhuman animals. Approaching this variability from a comparative perspective can help norm researchers expand and reframe the range of hypotheses they test when attempting to understand the causes of socially normative behaviours in humans. First, we diagnose some of the theoretical obstacles to developing a comparative science of social norms, and offer a few basic constructs and distinctions to help norm researchers overcome these obstacles. Then we develop a six-dimensional model of the psychological and social factors that contribute to variability in both human and potential nonhuman norms. This article is part of the theme issue 'Social norm change: drivers and consequences'.

Bodies at play: the role of intercorporeality and bodily affordances in coordinating social play in chimpanzees in the wild

The comparative approach is a crucial method to gain a better understanding of the behavior of living human and nonhuman animals to then draw informed inferences about the behavior of extinct ancestors. One focus has been on disentangling the puzzle of language evolution. Traditionally, studies have predominantly focused on intentionally produced signals in communicative interactions. However, in collaborative and highly dynamic interactions such as play, underlying intentionality is difficult to assess and often interactions are negotiated via body movements rather than signals. This "lack" of signals has led to this dynamic context being widely ignored in comparative studies. The aim of this paper is threefold: First, we will show how comparative research into communication can benefit from taking the intentionality-agnostic standpoint used in conversation analysis. Second, we will introduce the concepts of 'intercorporeality' and 'bodily affordance', and show how they can be applied to the analysis of communicative interactions of nonhuman animals. Third, we will use these concepts to investigate how chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) initiate, end, and maintain 'contact social play'. Our results showed that bodily affordances are able to capture elements of interactions that more traditional approaches failed to describe. Participants made use of bodily affordances to achieve coordinated engagement in contact social play. Additionally, these interactions could display a sequential organization by which one 'move' by a chimpanzee was responded to with an aligning 'move', which allowed for the co-construction of the activity underway. Overall, the present approach innovates on three fronts: First, it allows for the analysis of interactions that are often ignored because they do not fulfil criteria of intentionality, and/or consist of purely body movements. Second, adopting concepts from research on human interaction enables a better comparison of communicative interactions in other animal species without a too narrow focus on intentional signaling only. Third, adopting a stance from interaction research that highlights how practical action can also be communicative, our results show that chimpanzees can communicate through their embodied actions as well as through signaling. With this first step, we hope to inspire new research into dynamic day-to-day interactions involving both "traditional" signals and embodied actions, which, in turn, can provide insights into evolutionary precursors of human language.

Interactive repair and the foundations of language

The robustness and flexibility of human language is underpinned by a machinery of interactive repair. Repair is deeply intertwined with two core properties of human language: reflexivity (it can communicate about itself) and accountability (it is used to publicly enforce social norms). We review empirical and theoretical advances from across the cognitive sciences that mark interactive repair as a domain of pragmatic universals, a key place to study metacognition in interaction, and a system that enables collective computation. This provides novel insights into the role of repair in comparative cognition, language development, and human-computer interaction. As an always-available fallback option and an infrastructure for negotiating social commitments, interactive repair is foundational to the resilience, complexity, and flexibility of human language.

Differences in the Social Motivations and Emotions of Humans and Other Great Apes

Humans share with other mammals and primates many social motivations and emotions, but they are also much more cooperative than even their closest primate relatives. Here I review recent comparative experiments and analyses that illustrate humans' species-typical social motivations and emotions for cooperation in comparison with those of other great apes. These may be classified most generally as (i) 'you > me' (e.g., prosocial sympathy, informative and pedagogical motives in communication); (ii) 'you = me' (e.g., feelings of mutual respect, fairness, resentment); (iii) 'we > me' (e.g., feelings of obligation and guilt); and (iv) 'WE (in the group) > me' (e.g., in-group loyalty and conformity to norms, shame, and many in-group biases). The existence of these species-typical and species-universal motivations and emotions provides compelling evidence for the importance of cooperative activities in the human species.

Zhuangzi and collaboration in animals: a critical conceptual analysis of shared intentionality

Shared intentionality is a specific form of shared agency where a group can be understood to have an intention. It has been conjectured that humans are better equipped for collaboration than other animals because humans but not other great apes share intentions. However, exporting shared intentionality from a debate about the ontology of mental state attributions like intentions to groups does not seamlessly lend itself to evolutionary science. To explore and de-center the implicit assumptions of Western conceptions of cooperation, I look at Zhuangzi's philosophy of (in)action. This philosophy treats the actions of individuals as always a form of co-action alongside other agencies to whom one must adapt. Thinking of collaboration as a product of skillful co-action, not shared intention, sidesteps asking about cooperation in "kinds" or levels. Instead, it directs attention to the know-how and behavioral flexibility needed to make our constant coordination adaptive.

Chimpanzees communicate to coordinate a cultural practice

Human culture thrives by virtue of communication, yet whether communication plays an influential role in the cultural lives of other animals remains understudied. Here, we investigated whether chimpanzees use communication to engage in a cultural practice by analysing grooming handclasp (GHC) interactions-a socio-cultural behaviour requiring interindividual coordination for successful execution. Previous accounts attributed GHC initiations to behavioural shaping, whereby the initiator physically moulds the partner's arm into the desired GHC posture. Using frame-by-frame analysis and matched-control methodology, we find that chimpanzees do not only shape their partner's posture (22%), but also use gestural communication to initiate GHC (44%), which requires an active and synchronized response from the partner. Moreover, in a third (34%) of the GHC initiations, the requisite coordination was achieved by seemingly effortless synchrony. Lastly, using a longitudinal approach, we find that for GHC initiations, communication occurs more frequently than shaping in experienced dyads and less in mother-offspring dyads. These findings are consistent with ontogenetic ritualization, thereby reflecting first documentation of chimpanzees communicating to coordinate a cultural practice. We conclude that chimpanzees show interactional flexibility in the socio-cultural domain, opening the possibility that the interplay between communication and culture is rooted in our deep evolutionary history.

A lineage explanation of human normative guidance: the coadaptive model of instrumental rationality and shared intentionality

This paper aims to contribute to the existing literature on normative cognition by providing a lineage explanation of human social norm psychology. This approach builds upon theories of goal-directed behavioral control in the reinforcement learning and control literature, arguing that this form of control defines an important class of intentional normative mental states that are instrumental in nature. I defend the view that great ape capacities for instrumental reasoning and our capacity (or family of capacities) for shared intentionality coadapted to each other and argue that the evolution of this capacity has allowed the representation of social norms and the emergence of our capacity for normative guidance.

Flexible signalling strategies by victims mediate post-conflict interactions in bonobos

Compared to other animals, humans supposedly excel at voluntarily controlling and strategically displaying emotional signals. Yet, new data shows that nonhuman great apes' emotion expressions may also be subject to voluntary control. A key context to further explore this is during post-conflict (PC) periods, where signalling by distressed victims may influence bystander responses, including the offering of consolation. To address this, our study investigates the signalling behaviour of sanctuary-living bonobo victims following aggression and its relation to audience composition and PC interactions. Results show that the production of paedomorphic signals by victims (regardless of age) increased their chances of receiving consolation. In adults, the production of such signals additionally reduced the risk of renewed aggression from opponents. Signal production also increased with audience size, yet strategies differed by age: while immatures reduced signalling in proximity of close-social partners, adults did so especially after receiving consolation. These results suggest that bonobos can flexibly adjust their emotion signalling to influence the outcome of PC events, and that this tendency has a developmental trajectory. Overall, these findings highlight the potential role that flexible emotion communication played in the sociality of our last common ancestor with Pan. This article is part of the theme issue 'Cognition, communication and social bonds in primates'.

Social tolerance and interactional opportunities as drivers of gestural redoings in orang-utans

Communicative repair is a fundamental and universal element of interactive language use. It has been suggested that the persistence and elaboration after communicative breakdown in nonhuman primates constitute two evolutionary building blocks of this capacity, but the conditions favouring it are poorly understood. Because zoo-housed individuals of some species are more social and more terrestrial than in the wild, they should be more likely to show gestural redoings (i.e. both repetition and elaboration) after communicative failure in the coordination of their joint activities. Using a large comparative sample of wild and zoo-housed orang-utans of two different species, we could confirm this prediction for elaboration, the more flexible form of redoings. Specifically, results showed that gestural redoings in general were best predicted by the specific social action context (i.e. social play) and interaction dyad (i.e. beyond mother-offspring), although they were least frequent in captive Bornean orang-utans. For gestural elaboration, we found the expected differences between captive and wild research settings in Borneans, but not in Sumatrans (the more socially tolerant species). Moreover, we found that the effectiveness of elaboration in eliciting responses was higher in Sumatrans, especially the captive ones, whereas effectiveness of mere repetition was influenced by neither species nor setting. We conclude that the socio-ecological environment plays a central role in the emergence of communicative repair strategies in great apes. This article is part of the theme issue 'Revisiting the human 'interaction engine': comparative approaches to social action coordination'.

The coordination of attention and action in great apes and humans

Great apes can discern what others are attending to and even direct others' attention to themselves in flexible ways. But they seemingly do not coordinate their attention with one another recursively—understanding that the other is monitoring their attention just as they are monitoring hers—in acts of joint attention, at least not in the same way as young human children. Similarly, great apes collaborate with partners in many flexible ways, but they seemingly do not coordinate with others to form mutually obligating joint goals and commitments, nor regulate the collaboration via acts of intentional communication, at least not in the same way as young human children. The hypothesis defended here is that it is precisely in their capacities to coordinate attention and action with others—that is, in their capacities for shared intentionality—that humans are most clearly distinguished from other great apes.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘Revisiting the human ‘interaction engine’: comparative approaches to social action coordination’.

Revisiting the human 'interaction engine': comparative approaches to social action coordination

The evolution of language was likely facilitated by a special predisposition for social interaction, involving a set of communicative and cognitive skills summarized as the 'interaction engine'. This assemblage seems to emerge early in development, to be found universally across cultures, and to enable participation in sophisticated joint action through the addition of spoken language. Yet, new evidence on social action coordination and communication in nonhuman primates warrants an update of the interaction engine hypothesis, particularly with respect to the evolutionary origins of its specific ingredients. However, one enduring problem for comparative research results from a conceptual gulf between disciplines, rendering it difficult to test concepts derived from human interaction research in nonhuman animals. The goal of this theme issue is to make such concepts accessible for comparative research, to promote a fruitful interdisciplinary debate on social action coordination as a new arena of research, and to enable mutual fertilization between human and nonhuman interaction research. In consequence, we here consider relevant theoretical and empirical research within and beyond this theme issue to revisit the interaction engine's shared, convergently derived and uniquely derived ingredients preceding (or perhaps in the last case, succeeding) human language. This article is part of the theme issue 'Revisiting the human 'interaction engine': comparative approaches to social action coordination'.

Every product needs a process: unpacking joint commitment as a process across species

Joint commitment, the feeling of mutual obligation binding participants in a joint action, is typically conceptualized as arising by the expression and acceptance of a promise. This account limits the possibilities of investigating fledgling forms of joint commitment in actors linguistically less well-endowed than adult humans. The feeling of mutual obligation is one aspect of joint commitment (the product), which emerges from a process of signal exchange. It is gradual rather than binary; feelings of mutual obligation can vary in strength according to how explicit commitments are perceived to be. Joint commitment processes are more complex than simple promising, in at least three ways. They are affected by prior joint actions, which create precedents and conventions that can be embodied in material arrangements of institutions. Joint commitment processes also arise as solutions to generic coordination problems related to opening up, maintaining and closing down joint actions. Finally, during joint actions, additional, specific commitments are made piecemeal. These stack up over time and persist, making it difficult for participants to disengage from joint actions. These complexifications open up new perspectives for assessing joint commitment across species. This article is part of the theme issue 'Revisiting the human 'interaction engine': comparative approaches to social action coordination'.

Evidence of joint commitment in great apes' natural joint actions

Human joint action seems special, as it is grounded in joint commitment-a sense of mutual obligation participants feel towards each other. Comparative research with humans and non-human great apes has typically investigated joint commitment by experimentally interrupting joint actions to study subjects' resumption strategies. However, such experimental interruptions are human-induced, and thus the question remains of how great apes naturally handle interruptions. Here, we focus on naturally occurring interruptions of joint actions, grooming and play, in bonobos and chimpanzees. Similar to humans, both species frequently resumed interrupted joint actions (and the previous behaviours, like grooming the same body part region or playing the same play type) with their previous partners and at the previous location. Yet, the probability of resumption attempts was unaffected by social bonds or rank. Our data suggest that great apes experience something akin to joint commitment, for which we discuss possible evolutionary origins.

Assessing joint commitment as a process in great apes

Many social animals interact jointly, but only humans experience a specific sense of obligation toward their co-participants, a joint commitment. However, joint commitment is not only a mental state but also a process that reveals itself in the coordination efforts deployed during entry and exit phases of joint action. Here, we investigated the presence and duration of such phases in N = 1,242 natural play and grooming interactions of captive chimpanzees and bonobos. The apes frequently exchanged mutual gaze and communicative signals prior to and after engaging in joint activities with conspecifics, demonstrating entry and exit phases comparable to those of human joint activities. Although rank effects were less clear, phases in bonobos were more moderated by friendship compared to phases in chimpanzees, suggesting bonobos were more likely to reflect patterns analogous to human “face management”. This suggests that joint commitment as process was already present in our last common ancestor with Pan.

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Great apes exchange signals and gaze before entering and exiting joint actions

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Joint action structure of both ape species resembles that of humans

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Coordinated joint action phases indicate an underlying joint commitment

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Social bonds affect joint action structure more in bonobos than in chimpanzees