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Zambonelli F, Bergenti F, Mariani S, Monica S. Islands of cooperation emerge by stigmergic interactions in iterated spatial games. PLoS One 2024; 19:e0306915. [PMID: 38995926 PMCID: PMC11244808 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0306915] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/02/2024] [Accepted: 06/25/2024] [Indexed: 07/14/2024] Open
Abstract
This article focuses on the emergence of cooperation in societies of self-interested agents. In particular, it introduces a mechanism based on indirect-stigmergic-interactions between agents moving in an environment, to express the likeliness of finding cooperative partners. On the one hand, agents that find themselves cooperating with others emit pheromones in their current location, expressing the presence of agents willing to cooperate. On the other hand, agents that sense pheromones tend to move towards regions with a higher pheromone concentration. Results show that this mechanism leads to the emergence of spatial regions where cooperation can be effectively sustained, and in which agents can overall get better payoffs than those agents not taking into account pheromones in their choices.
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Affiliation(s)
- Franco Zambonelli
- Dipartimento di Scienze e Metodi dell'Ingegneria, Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia, Reggio Emilia, Italy
- Istituto di Informatica e Telematica (IIT), Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerca, Pisa, Italy
| | - Federico Bergenti
- Dipartimento di Scienze Matematiche Fisiche e Informatiche, Università di Parma, Parma, Italy
| | - Stefano Mariani
- Dipartimento di Scienze e Metodi dell'Ingegneria, Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia, Reggio Emilia, Italy
| | - Stefania Monica
- Dipartimento di Scienze e Metodi dell'Ingegneria, Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia, Reggio Emilia, Italy
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Igwe K, Durrheim K. Using artificial agents to nudge outgroup altruism and reduce ingroup favoritism in human-agent interaction. Sci Rep 2024; 14:15850. [PMID: 38982070 PMCID: PMC11233637 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-024-64682-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/07/2024] [Accepted: 06/12/2024] [Indexed: 07/11/2024] Open
Abstract
Ingroup favoritism and intergroup discrimination can be mutually reinforcing during social interaction, threatening intergroup cooperation and the sustainability of societies. In two studies (N = 880), we investigated whether promoting prosocial outgroup altruism would weaken the ingroup favoritism cycle of influence. Using novel methods of human-agent interaction via a computer-mediated experimental platform, we introduced outgroup altruism by (i) nonadaptive artificial agents with preprogrammed outgroup altruistic behavior (Study 1; N = 400) and (ii) adaptive artificial agents whose altruistic behavior was informed by the prediction of a machine learning algorithm (Study 2; N = 480). A rating task ensured that the observed behavior did not result from the participant's awareness of the artificial agents. In Study 1, nonadaptive agents prompted ingroup members to withhold cooperation from ingroup agents and reinforced ingroup favoritism among humans. In Study 2, adaptive agents were able to weaken ingroup favoritism over time by maintaining a good reputation with both the ingroup and outgroup members, who perceived agents as being fairer than humans and rated agents as more human than humans. We conclude that a good reputation of the individual exhibiting outgroup altruism is necessary to weaken ingroup favoritism and improve intergroup cooperation. Thus, reputation is important for designing nudge agents.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kevin Igwe
- Department of Psychology, Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg, Bunting Road, Auckland Park, Johannesburg, 2092, South Africa
| | - Kevin Durrheim
- Department of Psychology, Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg, Bunting Road, Auckland Park, Johannesburg, 2092, South Africa.
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Schnell E, Muthukrishna M. Reply to Gross et al.: Indirect reciprocity undermines large-scale cooperation under realistic conditions. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2024; 121:e2410085121. [PMID: 38913903 PMCID: PMC11228519 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2410085121] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/26/2024] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Eric Schnell
- Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom
| | - Michael Muthukrishna
- Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom
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Gross J, Méder ZZ, Romano A, De Dreu CKW. Indirect reciprocity can foster large-scale cooperation. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2024; 121:e2409894121. [PMID: 38913888 PMCID: PMC11228482 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2409894121] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/26/2024] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Jörg Gross
- Department of Psychology, University of Zurich, Zurich 8050, Switzerland
| | - Zsombor Z Méder
- Faculty of Economics and Business, Groningen University, Groningen 9700AB, the Netherlands
| | - Angelo Romano
- Department of Psychology, Leiden University, Leiden 2333AK, the Netherlands
| | - Carsten K W De Dreu
- Faculty of Economics and Business, Groningen University, Groningen 9700AB, the Netherlands
- Faculty of Behavioral and Social Sciences, University of Groningen, Groningen 9712TS, the Netherlands
- Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology Unit, German Primate Center, Leibniz Institute for Primate Research, Göttingen 37077, Germany
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Romano A, Gross J, De Dreu CKW. The nasty neighbor effect in humans. SCIENCE ADVANCES 2024; 10:eadm7968. [PMID: 38924403 PMCID: PMC11204206 DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.adm7968] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/06/2023] [Accepted: 05/21/2024] [Indexed: 06/28/2024]
Abstract
Like other group-living species, humans often cooperate more with an in-group member than with out-group members and strangers. Greater in-group favoritism should imply that people also compete less with in-group members than with out-group members and strangers. However, in situations where people could invest to take other's resources and invest to protect against exploitation, we observed the opposite. Akin to what in other species is known as the "nasty neighbor effect," people invested more when facing an in-group rather than out-group member or stranger across 51 nations, in different communities in Kenya, and in representative samples from the United Kingdom. This "nasty neighbor" behavior is independent of in-group favoritism in trust and emerges when people perceive within-group resource scarcity. We discuss how to reconcile that humans exhibit nastiness and favoritism toward in-group members with existing theory on in-group favoritism.
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Affiliation(s)
- Angelo Romano
- Social, Economic and Organisational Psychology Department, Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands
| | - Jörg Gross
- Department of Psychology, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
| | - Carsten K. W. De Dreu
- Faculty of Behavioural and Social Science, University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands
- Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology Unit, German Primate Center, Leibniz Institute for Primate Research, Göttingen, Germany
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Schnell E, Muthukrishna M. Indirect reciprocity undermines indirect reciprocity destabilizing large-scale cooperation. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2024; 121:e2322072121. [PMID: 38683991 PMCID: PMC11087788 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2322072121] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/14/2023] [Accepted: 04/01/2024] [Indexed: 05/02/2024] Open
Abstract
Previous models suggest that indirect reciprocity (reputation) can stabilize large-scale human cooperation [K. Panchanathan, R. Boyd, Nature 432, 499-502 (2004)]. The logic behind these models and experiments [J. Gross et al., Sci. Adv. 9, eadd8289 (2023) and O. P. Hauser, A. Hendriks, D. G. Rand, M. A. Nowak, Sci. Rep. 6, 36079 (2016)] is that a strategy in which individuals conditionally aid others based on their reputation for engaging in costly cooperative behavior serves as a punishment that incentivizes large-scale cooperation without the second-order free-rider problem. However, these models and experiments fail to account for individuals belonging to multiple groups with reputations that can be in conflict. Here, we extend these models such that individuals belong to a smaller, "local" group embedded within a larger, "global" group. This introduces competing strategies for conditionally aiding others based on their cooperative behavior in the local or global group. Our analyses reveal that the reputation for cooperation in the smaller local group can undermine cooperation in the larger global group, even when the theoretical maximum payoffs are higher in the larger global group. This model reveals that indirect reciprocity alone is insufficient for stabilizing large-scale human cooperation because cooperation at one scale can be considered defection at another. These results deepen the puzzle of large-scale human cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Eric Schnell
- Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, LondonWC2A 2AE, United Kingdom
| | - Michael Muthukrishna
- Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, LondonWC2A 2AE, United Kingdom
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De Dreu CKW, Gross J, Romano A. Group Formation and the Evolution of Human Social Organization. PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2024; 19:320-334. [PMID: 37450408 PMCID: PMC10913362 DOI: 10.1177/17456916231179156] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 07/18/2023]
Abstract
Humans operate in groups that are oftentimes nested in multilayered collectives such as work units within departments and companies, neighborhoods within cities, and regions within nation states. With psychological science mostly focusing on proximate reasons for individuals to join existing groups and how existing groups function, we still poorly understand why groups form ex nihilo, how groups evolve into complex multilayered social structures, and what explains fission-fusion dynamics. Here we address group formation and the evolution of social organization at both the proximate and ultimate level of analysis. Building on models of fitness interdependence and cooperation, we propose that socioecologies can create positive interdependencies among strangers and pave the way for the formation of stable coalitions and groups through reciprocity and reputation-based partner selection. Such groups are marked by in-group bounded, parochial cooperation together with an array of social institutions for managing the commons, allowing groups to scale in size and complexity while avoiding the breakdown of cooperation. Our analysis reveals how distinct group cultures can endogenously emerge from reciprocal cooperation, shows that social identification and group commitment are likely consequences rather than causes of group cooperation, and explains when intergroup relations gravitate toward peaceful coexistence, integration, or conflict.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Jörg Gross
- Department of Psychology, University of Zurich
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Molenmaker WE, Gross J, de Kwaadsteniet EW, van Dijk E, de Dreu CKW. Discriminatory punishment undermines the enforcement of group cooperation. Sci Rep 2023; 13:6061. [PMID: 37055546 PMCID: PMC10101972 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-023-33167-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/27/2022] [Accepted: 04/07/2023] [Indexed: 04/15/2023] Open
Abstract
Peer punishment can help groups to establish collectively beneficial public goods. However, when humans condition punishment on other factors than poor contribution, punishment can become ineffective and group cooperation deteriorates. Here we show that this happens in pluriform groups where members have different socio-demographic characteristics. In our public good provision experiment, participants were confronted with a public good from which all group members benefitted equally, and in-between rounds they could punish each other. Groups were uniform (members shared the same academic background) or pluriform (half the members shared the same academic background, and the other half shared another background). We show that punishment effectively enforced cooperation in uniform groups where punishment was conditioned on poor contribution. In pluriform groups, punishment was conditioned on poor contribution too, but also partially on others' social-demographic characteristics-dissimilar others were punished more than similar others regardless of their contribution. As a result, punishment lost its effectiveness in deterring free-riding and maintaining public good provision. Follow-up experiments indicated that such discriminatory punishment was used to demarcate and reinforce subgroup boundaries. This work reveals that peer punishment fails to enforce cooperation in groups with a pluriform structure, which is rule rather than exception in contemporary societies.
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Affiliation(s)
- Welmer E Molenmaker
- Institute of Psychology, Leiden University, PO Box 9555, 2300 RB, Leiden, The Netherlands.
| | - Jörg Gross
- Institute of Psychology, Zurich University, Zurich, Switzerland
| | - Erik W de Kwaadsteniet
- Institute of Psychology, Leiden University, PO Box 9555, 2300 RB, Leiden, The Netherlands
| | - Eric van Dijk
- Institute of Psychology, Leiden University, PO Box 9555, 2300 RB, Leiden, The Netherlands
| | - Carsten K W de Dreu
- Institute of Psychology, Leiden University, PO Box 9555, 2300 RB, Leiden, The Netherlands
- Center for Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
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