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Han Y, Fan LL, Xue Y. A sustainable balance between innovation and risk: How the "right to science" affects China's medical biotechnology regulatory policy. Comput Struct Biotechnol J 2024; 24:306-313. [PMID: 38681134 PMCID: PMC11052690 DOI: 10.1016/j.csbj.2024.04.027] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/03/2023] [Revised: 04/10/2024] [Accepted: 04/10/2024] [Indexed: 05/01/2024] Open
Abstract
Medical biotechnology is at the forefront of scientific progress, with humanity facing a critical juncture during the pandemic. However, to maximize these benefits, governments face the complex challenge of reconciling innovation and risk. A sustainable balance is critical, as extreme measures such as blanket bans on biotechnology research could hamper progress, while unfettered research could pose an existential threat. The need for effective regulation has become apparent in the context of recent controversies surrounding pharmaceutical biotechnology. Governments face the challenge of reconciling precaution with innovation, necessitating a dual strategy fostering both principles. This paper explores the delicate dynamics of innovation and risk in pharmaceutical biotechnology, focusing on the evolving landscape in Europe, the U.S., and, notably, China. At the same time, we delve into the regulatory landscape and examine the role of the "right to science" in shaping Chinese policy. This paper further applies the right to science that has received the interests of medical biotechnology regulatory policymakers: understanding the role of scientific claims in regulating emerging technologies and analyzing the impact of major regulations on the ability to sustainably balance innovation and risk. We believe that a comprehensive global effort is needed to harmonize these two principles, highlighting the imperative of responsible governance in steering the trajectory of this powerful scientific frontier. The insights gained from the Chinese experience offer valuable implications for global policymakers facing similar challenges.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yiping Han
- School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
| | | | - Yang Xue
- Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy, Tianjin University, Tianjin, China
- Law School, Tianjin University, Tianjin, China
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Eyal N, Leshabari M, Sarker M. Dual-use research and research using enhanced pathogens in high-income countries: whose business? mSphere 2024; 9:e0016824. [PMID: 38869288 PMCID: PMC11288023 DOI: 10.1128/msphere.00168-24] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/14/2024] Open
Abstract
U.S. regulation of dual-use research of concern and of research with enhanced pathogens of pandemic potential may alter soon. Much has been written on the best form for that regulation to take. Less was written on a procedural question: whose voices should shape that regulation? This commentary addresses the latter, the procedural question, regarding the appropriate parties to the deliberations and decisions on this matter. It proposes to U.S. virologists that it would be in the interests of their discipline and only appropriate if that regulation were shaped by many voices from outside the discipline and from outside the United States.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nir Eyal
- Center for Population-Level Bioethics (IFH), HBSP (SPH), and Philosophy (SAS), Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA
| | - Melkizedeck Leshabari
- School of Public Health and Social Sciences, Muhimbili University of Health and Allied Sciences, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
| | - Malabika Sarker
- BRAC James P Grant School of Public Health, BRAC University, Dhaka, Bangladesh
- Heidelberg Institute of Global Health, Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany
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Yoshizawa G, Shinomiya N, Kawamoto S, Kawahara N, Kiga D, Hanaki KI, Minari J. Limiting open science? Three approaches to bottom-up governance of dual-use research of concern. Pathog Glob Health 2024; 118:285-294. [PMID: 37791645 PMCID: PMC11234915 DOI: 10.1080/20477724.2023.2265626] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/05/2023] Open
Abstract
Governing dual-use research of concern (DURC) in the life sciences has become difficult owing to the diversification of scientific domains, digitalization of potential threats, and the proliferation of actors. This paper proposes three approaches to realize bottom-up governance of DURC from laboratory operation to institutional decision-making levels. First, a technological approach can predict and monitor the dual-use nature of the research target pathogens and their information. Second, an interactive approach is proposed in which diverse stakeholders proactively discuss and examine dual-use issues through research practice. Third, a personnel approach can identify the right persons involved in DURC. These approaches suggest that, going beyond self-governance by researchers, collaborative and networked governance involving diverse actors should become essential. This mode of governance can also be seen in light of the management of research use. Therefore, program design by funding agencies and publication screening by journal publishers continuously contribute to governance at the meso-level. Bottom-up governance may be realized by using an appropriately integrated design of these three approaches at the micro-level, such as dual-use prediction and monitoring, stakeholder dialogue, and background checks. Given that the term 'open science' has been promoted to the research community as part of top-down governance, paying due attention on site to research subjects, research practices, and persons involved in research will provide an opportunity to develop a more socially conscious open science.
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Affiliation(s)
- Go Yoshizawa
- Innovation System Research Center, Kwansei Gakuin University, Hyogo, Japan
| | | | - Shishin Kawamoto
- Graduate School of Science, Hokkaido University, Hokkaido, Japan
| | - Naoto Kawahara
- Center for Clinical and Translational Research, Kyushu University Hospital, Fukuoka, Japan
| | - Daisuke Kiga
- Center for Advanced Biomedical Sciences, School of Advanced Science and Engineering, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan
| | - Ken-Ichi Hanaki
- Management Department of Biosafety, Laboratory Animal, and Pathogen Bank, National Institute of Infectious Diseases, Tokyo, Japan
| | - Jusaku Minari
- Uehiro Research Division for iPS Cell Ethics, Center for iPS Cell Research and Application, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan
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Lipsitch M, Inglesby TV, Cicero A, Relman DA. Public role in research oversight. J Virol 2024; 98:e0006124. [PMID: 38477584 PMCID: PMC11019949 DOI: 10.1128/jvi.00061-24] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 03/14/2024] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Marc Lipsitch
- Departments of Epidemiology and Immunology and Infectious Diseases, Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics, Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, Boston, Massachusetts, USA
| | - Thomas V. Inglesby
- Center for Health Security, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, Maryland, USA
| | - Anita Cicero
- Center for Health Security, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, Maryland, USA
| | - David A. Relman
- Department of Medicine, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, California, USA
- Center for International Security and Cooperation, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, Stanford, California, USA
- Department of Microbiology and Immunology, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, California, USA
- Infectious Diseases Section, Veterans Affairs Palo Alto Health Care System, Palo Alto, California, USA
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Lerner A, Eyal N. Future pandemics and the urge to 'do something'. JOURNAL OF MEDICAL ETHICS 2024:jme-2023-109791. [PMID: 38286591 DOI: 10.1136/jme-2023-109791] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/04/2023] [Accepted: 12/27/2023] [Indexed: 01/31/2024]
Abstract
Research with enhanced potential pandemic pathogens (ePPP) makes pathogens substantially more lethal, communicable, immunosuppressive or otherwise capable of triggering a pandemic. We briefly relay an existing argument that the benefits of ePPP research do not outweigh its risks and then consider why proponents of these arguments continue to confidently endorse them. We argue that these endorsements may well be the product of common cognitive biases-in which case they would provide no challenge to the argument against ePPP research. If the case against ePPP research is strong, the views of professional experts do little to move the needle in favour of ePPP research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Adam Lerner
- Center for Population-Level Bioethics, Rutgers The State University of New Jersey, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA
| | - Nir Eyal
- Center for Population-Level Bioethics, Department of Philosophy (SAS) and Department of HBSP (SPH), Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA
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Millett P, Alexanian T, Brink KR, Carter SR, Diggans J, Palmer MJ, Ritterson R, Sandbrink JB, Wheeler NE. Beyond Biosecurity by Taxonomic Lists: Lessons, Challenges, and Opportunities. Health Secur 2023; 21:521-529. [PMID: 37856148 PMCID: PMC10733751 DOI: 10.1089/hs.2022.0109] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/20/2023] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Piers Millett
- Piers Millett, PhD, is Executive Director, International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science, Washington, DC
| | - Tessa Alexanian
- Tessa Alexanian is Safety and Security Program Officer, iGEM Foundation, Paris, France
| | - Kathryn R. Brink
- Kathryn R. Brink, PhD, is a Postdoctoral Fellow, Center for International Security and Cooperation, at Stanford University, Stanford, CA
| | - Sarah R. Carter
- Sarah R. Carter, PhD, is Principal, Science Policy Consulting LLC, Arlington, VA
| | - James Diggans
- James Diggans, PhD, is Head of Biosecurity, Twist Bioscience, San Francisco, CA
| | - Megan J. Palmer
- Megan J. Palmer, PhD, is Executive Director of Bio Policy & Leadership Initiatives and an Adjunct Professor, Department of Bioengineering; at Stanford University, Stanford, CA
| | - Ryan Ritterson
- Ryan Ritterson, PhD, is Executive Vice President of Research, Gryphon Scientific LLC, Takoma Park, MD
| | - Jonas B. Sandbrink
- Jonas B. Sandbrink is a Doctoral Researcher, Nuffield Department of Medicine, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
| | - Nicole E. Wheeler
- Nicole E. Wheeler, PhD, is a Turing Fellow, Institute of Microbiology and Infection, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom
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