Doctors' duty to declare their interests should be enforced, says GMC

International comparison of pharmaceutical industry payment disclosures in the UK and Japan: implications for self-regulation, public regulation, and transparency

BACKGROUND

Self-regulation of payment disclosure by pharmaceutical industry trade groups is a major global approach to increasing transparency of financial relationships between drug companies and healthcare professionals and organisations. Nevertheless, little is known about the relative strengths and weaknesses of self-regulation across countries, especially beyond Europe. To address this gap in research and stimulate international policy learning, we compare the UK and Japan, the likely strongest cases of self-regulation of payment disclosure in Europe and Asia, across three dimensions of transparency: disclosure rules, practices, and data.

RESULTS

The UK and Japanese self-regulation of payment disclosure had shared as well unique strengths and weaknesses. The UK and Japanese pharmaceutical industry trade groups declared transparency as the primary goal of payment disclosure, without, however, explaining the link between the two. The rules of payment disclosure in each country provided more insight into some payments but not others. Both trade groups did not reveal the recipients of certain payments by default, and the UK trade group also made the disclosure of some payments conditional on recipient consent. Drug company disclosure practices were more transparent in the UK, allowing for greater availability and accessibility of payment data and insight into underreporting or misreporting of payments by companies. Nevertheless, the share of payments made to named recipients was three times higher in Japan than in the UK, indicating higher transparency of disclosure data.

CONCLUSIONS

The UK and Japan performed differently across the three dimensions of transparency, suggesting that any comprehensive analysis of self-regulation of payment disclosure must triangulate analysis of disclosure rules, practices, and data. We found limited evidence to support key claims regarding the strengths of self-regulation, while often finding it inferior to public regulation of payment disclosure. We suggest how the self-regulation of payment disclosure in each country can be enhanced and, in the long run, replaced by public regulation to strengthen the industry's accountability to the public.

Improving medical research in the United Kingdom

Poor quality medical research causes serious harms by misleading healthcare professionals and policymakers, decreasing trust in science and medicine, and wasting public funds. Here we outline underlying problems including insufficient transparency, dysfunctional incentives, and reporting biases. We make the following recommendations to address these problems: Journals and funders should ensure authors fulfil their obligation to share detailed study protocols, analytical code, and (as far as possible) research data. Funders and journals should incentivise uptake of registered reports and establish funding pathways which integrate evaluation of funding proposals with initial peer review of registered reports. A mandatory national register of interests for all those who are involved in medical research in the UK should be established, with an expectation that individuals maintain the accuracy of their declarations and regularly update them. Funders and institutions should stop using metrics such as citations and journal's impact factor to assess research and researchers and instead evaluate based on quality, reproducibility, and societal value. Employers and non-academic training programmes for health professionals (clinicians hired for patient care, not to do research) should not select based on number of research publications. Promotions based on publication should be restricted to those hired to do research.