Testimonial injustice: discounting women's voices in health care priority setting

Epistemic Injustice and Nonmaleficence

Epistemic injustice has undergone a steady growth in the medical ethics literature throughout the last decade as many ethicists have found it to be a powerful tool for describing and assessing morally problematic situations in healthcare. However, surprisingly scarce attention has been devoted to how epistemic injustice relates to physicians' professional duties on a conceptual level. I argue that epistemic injustice, specifically testimonial, collides with physicians' duty of nonmaleficence and should thus be actively fought against in healthcare encounters on the ground of professional conduct. I do so by fleshing out how Fricker's conception of testimonial injustice conflicts with the duty of nonmaleficence as defined in Beauchamp and Childress on theoretical grounds. From there, I argue that testimonial injustice produces two distinct types of harm, epistemic and non-epistemic. Epistemic harms are harms inflicted by the physician to the patient qua knower, whereas non-epistemic harms are inflicted to the patient qua patient. This latter case holds serious clinical implications and represent a failure of the process of due care on the part of the physician. I illustrate this through examples taken from the literature on fibromyalgia syndrome and show how testimonial injustice causes wrongful harm to patients, making it maleficent practice. Finally, I conclude on why nonmaleficence as a principle will not be normatively enough to fully address the problem of epistemic injustice in healthcare but nevertheless may serve as a good starting point in attempting to do so.

Epistemic justice is the basis of shared decision making

BACKGROUND

There is little evidence that share decision-making (SDM) is being successfully implemented, with a significant gap between theory and clinical practice. In this article we look at SDM explicitly acknowledging its social and cultural situatedness and examine it as a set of practices (e.g. actions, such as communicating, referring, or prescribing, and decisions relating to them). We study clinicians' communicative performance as anchored in the context of professional and institutional practice and within the expected behavioural norms of actors situated in clinical encounters.

DISCUSSION

We propose to see conditions for shared decision-making in terms of epistemic justice, an explicit acknowledgment and acceptance of the legitimacy of healthcare users and their accounts and knowledges. We propose that shared decision-making is primarily a communicative encounter which requires both participants to have equal communicative rights. It is a process that is started by the clinician's decision and requires the suspension of their inherent interactional advantage.

CONCLUSION

The epistemic-justice perspective we adopt leads to at least three implications for clinical practices. First, clinical training must go beyond the development of communication skills and focus more on an understanding of healthcare as a set of social practices. Second, we suggest medicine develop a stronger relationship with humanities and the social sciences. Third, we advocate that shared decision-making has issues of justice, equity, and agency at its core.

Stigma, epistemic injustice, and "looked after children": The need for a new language

This article examines the processes that contribute to the stigmatization of a group of people typically identified as "children in care" or "looked after children." In particular, we will look at the ways that we (adults, professionals, and carers) interact with these children, based on their status as both children and members of a socially marginalized and disadvantaged group, and how these modes of interaction can inhibit dialogue-a dialogue that is needed if we are to base our conceptions regarding the needs of these children on a more accurate understanding of their experiences and perspective. The problem is particularly challenging because the very terminology we use in the care community to identify this group is a product of the damaging preconceptions that have affected our interactions with its members and, we argue, it serves to reinforce those preconceptions. Using Fricker's work on epistemic injustice, in conjunction with evidence regarding how accusations of abuse and neglect of these children have been addressed in numerous cases, we illustrate the problems we have in hearing the voices of members of this group and the harmful effects this has on their own ability to understand and articulate their experiences. These problems represent "barriers to disclosure" that need to be surmounted if we are to establish a more inclusive dialogue. Currently, dialogue between these children and those of us charged to "look after" them is too often characterized by a lack of trust: not only in terms of the children feeling that their word is not taken seriously, that their claims are not likely to be believed, but also in their feeling that they cannot trust those to whom they might disclose abuse or neglect. The goals of the paper are modest in that we aim simply to open up the debate on how to meet this epistemic challenge, noting that there are specific problems that extend beyond those already identified for hearing the voices of other victims of epistemic injustice. Explicitly recognizing the nature and extent of the problem still leaves us a long way from its solution, but it is a crucial start.

More than consent for ethical open-label placebo research

Recent studies have explored the effectiveness of open-label placebos (OLPs) for a variety of conditions, including chronic pain, cancer-related fatigue and irritable bowel syndrome. OLPs are thought to sidestep traditional ethical worries about placebos because they do not involve deception: with an OLP, patients or subjects are told outright that they are not given an active substance. As deception is framed as the primary hurdle to ethical placebo use, the door is ostensibly opened to ethical studies of OLPs. In this article, I suggest that even though OLPs seemingly do not involve deception, there are other ethical considerations in their clinical investigation and subsequent use. Research ethics often focusses on informed consent-of which, deception and honesty are a piece-as a means to justify research practices with human subjects. Yet, it is but one of the ethical considerations that should be taken into account. With research into placebo effects in particular, I argue that the history of clinical placebo use grounds special considerations for OLP research that go beyond respect for the autonomy of individual patients through informed consent and encompass structural concerns about the type of patient for whom a placebo has historically been thought appropriate.