Cooperation and control: the Tobacco Institute of Australia

Local Nordic tobacco interests collaborated with multinational companies to maintain a united front and undermine tobacco control policies

OBJECTIVE

To analyse how local tobacco companies in the Nordic countries, individually and through National Manufacturers' Associations, cooperated with British American Tobacco and Philip Morris in denying the health hazards of smoking and undermining tobacco control.

METHODS

Analysis of tobacco control policies in the Nordic countries and tobacco industry documents.

RESULTS

Nordic countries were early adopters of tobacco control policies. The multinational tobacco companies recognised this fact and mobilised to oppose these policies, in part because of fear that they would set unfavourable precedents. Since at least 1972, the Nordic tobacco companies were well informed about and willing to participate in the multinational companies activities to obscure the health dangers of smoking and secondhand smoke and to oppose tobacco control policies. Cooperation between multinational companies, Nordic national manufacturer associations and local companies ensured a united front on smoking and health issues in the Nordic area that was consistent with the positions that the multinational companies were taking. This cooperation delayed smoke-free laws and undermined other tobacco control measures.

CONCLUSIONS

Local tobacco companies worked with multinational companies to undermine tobacco control in distant and small Nordic markets because of concern that pioneering policies initiated in Nordic countries would spread to bigger market areas. Claims by the local Nordic companies that they were not actively involved with the multinationals are not supported by the facts. These results also demonstrate that the industry appreciates the global importance of both positive and negative public health precedents in tobacco control.

"A good personal scientific relationship": Philip Morris scientists and the Chulabhorn Research Institute, Bangkok

BACKGROUND

This paper examines the efforts of consultants affiliated with Philip Morris (PM), the world's leading transnational tobacco corporation, to influence scientific research and training in Thailand via the Chulabhorn Research Institute (CRI). A leading Southeast Asian institute for environmental health science, the CRI is headed by Professor Dr. Her Royal Highness Princess Chulabhorn, the daughter of the King of Thailand, and it has assumed international significance via its designation as a World Health Organization (WHO) Collaborating Centre in December 2005.

METHODS AND FINDINGS

This paper analyses previously confidential tobacco industry documents that were made publicly available following litigation in the United States. PM documents reveal that ostensibly independent overseas scientists, now identified as industry consultants, were able to gain access to the Thai scientific community. Most significantly, PM scientist Roger Walk has established close connections with the CRI. Documents indicate that Walk was able to use such links to influence the study and teaching of environmental toxicology in the institute and to develop relations with key officials and local scientists so as to advance the interests of PM within Thailand and across Asia. While sensitivities surrounding royal patronage of the CRI make public criticism extremely difficult, indications of ongoing involvement by tobacco industry consultants suggest the need for detailed scrutiny of such relationships.

CONCLUSIONS

The establishment of close links with the CRI advances industry strategies to influence scientific research and debate around tobacco and health, particularly regarding secondhand smoke, to link with academic institutions, and to build relationships with national elites. Such strategies assume particular significance in the national and regional contexts presented here amid the globalisation of the tobacco pandemic. From an international perspective, particular concern is raised by the CRI's recently awarded status as a WHO Collaborating Centre. Since the network of WHO Collaborating Centres rests on the principle of "using national institutions for international purposes," the documents presented below suggest that more rigorous safeguards are required to ensure that such use advances public health goals rather than the objectives of transnational corporations.

Tobacco industry issues management organizations: creating a global corporate network to undermine public health

Background

The global tobacco epidemic claims 5 million lives each year, facilitated by the ability of transnational tobacco companies to delay or thwart meaningful tobacco control worldwide. A series of cross-company tobacco industry "issues management organizations" has played an important role in coordinating and implementing common strategies to defeat tobacco control efforts at international, national, and regional levels. This study examines the development and enumerates the activities of these organizations and explores the implications of continuing industry cooperation for global public health.

Methods

Using a snowball sampling strategy, we collected documentary data from tobacco industry documents archives and assembled them into a chronologically organized case study.

Results

The International Committee on Smoking Issues (ICOSI) was formed in 1977 by seven tobacco company chief executives to create common anti-tobacco control strategies and build a global network of regional and national manufacturing associations. The organization's name subsequently changed to INFOTAB. The multinational companies built the organization rapidly: by 1984, it had 69 members operating in 57 countries. INFOTAB material, including position papers and "action kits" helped members challenge local tobacco control measures and maintain tobacco-friendly environments. In 1992 INFOTAB was replaced by two smaller organizations. The Tobacco Documentation Centre, which continues to operate, distributes smoking-related information and industry argumentation to members, some produced by cross-company committees. Agro-Tobacco Services, and now Hallmark Marketing Services, assists the INFOTAB-backed and industry supported International Tobacco Growers Association in advancing claims regarding the economic importance of tobacco in developing nations.

Conclusion

The massive scale and scope of this industry effort illustrate how corporate interests, when threatened by the globalization of public health, sidestep competitive concerns to coordinate their activities. The global network of national and regional manufacturing associations created and nurtured by INFOTAB remains active, particularly in relation to the recently negotiated global health treaty, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Policymakers should be aware that although these associations claim to represent only national or regional interests, they are allied to and coordinated with a confederation of transnational tobacco companies seeking to protect profits by undermining public health.

Perceptions of industry responsibility and tobacco control policy by US tobacco company executives in trial testimony

OBJECTIVE

Trial testimony from the United States provides a unique opportunity to examine strategies of the American tobacco industry. This paper examines congruence between the arguments for tobacco control policy presented by representatives of the American tobacco industry at trial and the stages of responsibility associated with corporate social responsibility principles in other industries.

DATA SOURCES

Trial testimony collected and coded by the Deposition and Trial Testimony Archive (DATTA).

STUDY SELECTION

All available testimony was gathered from representative senior staff from major tobacco companies: Brown & Williamson, Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds, and Liggett.

DATA EXTRACTION

Transcripts from each witness selected were collected and imported in text format into WinMax, a qualitative data program. The documents were searched for terms relating to tobacco control policies, and relevant terms were extracted. A hand search of the documents was also conducted by reading through the testimony. Inferred responsibility for various tobacco control policies (health information, second-hand smoking, youth smoking) was coded.

DATA SYNTHESIS

The level of responsibility for tobacco control policy varied according to the maturity of the issue. For emerging issues, US tobacco company representatives expressed defensiveness while, for more mature issues, such as youth smoking, they showed increased willingness to deal with the issue. This response to social issues is consistent with corporate social responsibility strategies in other industries.

CONCLUSION

While other industries use corporate social responsibility programmes to address social issues to protect their core business product, the fundamental social issue with tobacco is the product itself. As such, the corporate nature of tobacco companies is a structural obstacle to reducing harm caused by tobacco use.

ARTIST (Asian regional tobacco industry scientist team): Philip Morris' attempt to exert a scientific and regulatory agenda on Asia

OBJECTIVE

To describe how the transnational tobacco industry has collaborated with local Asian tobacco monopolies and companies to promote a scientific and regulatory agenda.

METHODS

Analysis of previously secret tobacco industry documents.

RESULTS

Transnational tobacco companies began aggressively entering the Asia market in the 1980s, and the current tobacco industry in Asia is a mix of transnational and local monopolies or private companies. Tobacco industry documents demonstrate that, in 1996, Philip Morris led an organisation of scientific representatives from different tobacco companies called the Asian Regional Tobacco Industry Science Team (ARTIST), whose membership grew to include monopolies from Korea, China, Thailand, and Taiwan and a company from Indonesia. ARTIST was initially a vehicle for PM's strategies against anticipated calls for global smoke-free areas from a World Health Organization secondhand smoke study. ARTIST evolved through 2001 into a forum to present scientific and regulatory issues faced primarily by Philip Morris and other transnational tobacco companies. Philip Morris' goal for the organisation became to reach the external scientific and public health community and regulators in Asia.

CONCLUSION

The Asian tobacco industry has changed from an environment of invasion by transnational tobacco companies to an environment of participation with Philip Morris' initiated activities. With this participation, tobacco control efforts in Asia face new challenges as Philip Morris promotes and integrates its scientific and regulatory agenda into the local Asian tobacco industry. As the local Asian tobacco monopolies and companies can have direct links with their governments, future implementation of effective tobacco control may be at odds with national priorities.

Smoking, disease, and obdurate denial: the Australian tobacco industry in the 1980s

OBJECTIVE

To contrast the Australian tobacco industry's awareness of the diseases caused by smoking with their aggressive public denial on the relation between smoking and disease in the 1980s.

DESIGN

Analysis of 325 industry documents from the world wide web.

RESULTS

In the 1980s Australian cigarette manufacturers were informed constantly by the international industry of the medical consensus that smoking caused disease. In addition Philip Morris (Australia) Limited received reports of Philip Morris' international biological research programme and visited its Richmond research facility; and WD&HO Wills part funded, co-managed, and contributed research to the British American Tobacco groups' biological research programme. Despite this knowledge, the Australian manufacturers had a policy of arguing to their employees, decision makers, and the general public that questions of smoking and disease were unresolved. The industry catalogued the literature, developed arguments against the main claims made by health groups, and attacked public health advocates who made statements linking smoking to death and disease. Industry studies suggested that a 20-30% minority of the Australian public agreed with the industry on smoking and disease, diminishing across the decade.

CONCLUSION

Australian manufacturers were clearly negligent in the 1980s, deliberately working to undermine Australians' understandings of the diseases caused by smoking despite their own private knowledge. Continuing scepticism about smoking and disease, corresponding with the industry's deceptions, exists in Australian smokers today, suggesting that their actions may have slowed the rate of decline in smoking prevalence. These revelations provide important evidence for Australian litigation and advocacy.

From legitimate consumers to public relations pawns: the tobacco industry and young Australians

OBJECTIVE

To document the Australian tobacco industry's activities regarding youth smoking to support tobacco control.

METHOD

492 industry documents from primary and secondary websites were abstracted and analysed.

RESULTS

Australian legislation and rhetoric on youth and tobacco has changed dramatically over the last 50 years, from an unproblematic association of teenagers and smoking in the 1960s, through the industry's aggressive attacks and denials in the 1980s, to the 1990s, when industry became newly compliant with "societal expectations" and youth became a dominant bargaining issue in the industry's public relations strategy. The industry's current policy is to simultaneously blame others for underage smoking, frame the industry as socially responsible via voluntary marketing codes, youth access programmes, and school education, and market actively to young adults.

CONCLUSIONS

The arbitrary distinction between 17 and 18 year olds is, particularly in Australia's dark market, a liability for tobacco control and an opportunity for the industry, which is attempting to claim the high moral ground traditionally occupied by tobacco control on the youth issue. The current review of Australia's Tobacco Advertising Prohibition Act of 1992 should prohibit all forms of industry communication targeting young people, including retail access and schools programmes and below-the-line marketing. Tobacco control advocacy should highlight the industry's attempts to use the youth issue in its own favour while laying the blame elsewhere.