What Are Conspiracy Theories? A Definitional Approach to Their Correlates, Consequences, and Communication

Durably reducing conspiracy beliefs through dialogues with AI

Conspiracy theory beliefs are notoriously persistent. Influential hypotheses propose that they fulfill important psychological needs, thus resisting counterevidence. Yet previous failures in correcting conspiracy beliefs may be due to counterevidence being insufficiently compelling and tailored. To evaluate this possibility, we leveraged developments in generative artificial intelligence and engaged 2190 conspiracy believers in personalized evidence-based dialogues with GPT-4 Turbo. The intervention reduced conspiracy belief by ~20%. The effect remained 2 months later, generalized across a wide range of conspiracy theories, and occurred even among participants with deeply entrenched beliefs. Although the dialogues focused on a single conspiracy, they nonetheless diminished belief in unrelated conspiracies and shifted conspiracy-related behavioral intentions. These findings suggest that many conspiracy theory believers can revise their views if presented with sufficiently compelling evidence.

[Conspiracy theories, social polarization and crises]

OBJECTIVE

Social media facilitate the distribution of conspiracy theories. It is uncertain whether indeed the number of myths and also the number of those who appropriate myths has increased. Conspiracy theories have so far essentially been the subject of sociological and psychosociological research showing a general disposition to become infected irrespective of the topic of a myth. Are there specific psychopathological risk factors for becoming infected by conspiracy myths? Are there effective therapeutic or preventive measures?

METHODS

A systematic search was carried out in PubMed using the query "conspir*[title] AND review" followed by manual selection and appraisal only of publications addressing conspiracy theories in general, i.e. not limited to specific myths, with a focus on systematic reviews and meta-analyses. Moreover, the publications identified were manually screened for further meta-analyses.

RESULTS

The search resulted in 166 hits. The available evidence is essentially based on studies using questionnaires, which can clarify only associations but not causalities. The evidence suggests that the strongest correlates of conspiratorial ideation pertain to low cognitive abilities, nonanalytic style of thought resulting in reduced balancing of probabilities before deciding, feelings of loss of control, paranoia, schizotypy and the dark triad (narcissism, Machiavellianism, authoritarianism).

CONCLUSION

Specific psychological characteristics are risk factors for conspiratorial ideation. Current research approaches are unsuitable to clarify whether psychiatric disorders are overrepresented. Sociodemographic risk factors include male gender, low level of education, low income, social isolation and are non-specific. Group processes promote, again presumably nonspecifically, conspiracy theories thus contributing to social polarization. The genetic basis and neurobiological mechanisms are unknown. Conspiracy theories were and are used as an instrument of political contention. The enlightened democratic social contract requires free, unbiased thinking. Consequently, the risk factors identified so far facilitate conspiratorial ideation and question the very fundaments of the social contract by impairing unbiased evaluation and decision making. Therefore, prevention is warranted. .

Conspiracy beliefs and majority influence

Conspiracy beliefs (i.e. beliefs in specific conspiracy theories or the more general conspiracy mentality) are associated with a need for uniqueness and lower adherence to social norms. These findings suggest that conspiracy beliefs might be generally associated with less influence by majority opinions - absolutely and compared to minority opinions. In five experiments involving scenarios unrelated to conspiracy theories (overall N = 1669), participants were informed about the majority/minority opinion on a given issue (e.g. the building of a tunnel), afterward indicating their evaluation or voting intentions regarding the issue. We then tested whether the influence of a majority/minority opinion on evaluation or voting intentions is moderated by conspiracy beliefs. Across studies, we find no significant moderation. A meta-analysis confirms no correlation between conspiracy beliefs and susceptibility to majority influence. Taken together, our studies provide no evidence for the assumption that those holding conspiracy beliefs reject majority opinions per se.

Conspiracy mentality in autistic and non-autistic individuals

BACKGROUND

Belief in conspiracy theories has emerged across times and cultures. While previous accounts attributed conspiracy beliefs to mental health conditions, accumulating research suggests that conspiracy theories are common among the general population. In the present study we examined whether conspiracy mentality - that is, a general predisposition to believe conspiracy theories - differed between a group of autistic adults and a general population sample.

METHODS

This study included an autistic sample (n = 682) and a general population sample (n = 4358). Participants' conspiracy mentality was measured using the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ).

RESULTS

A one-way ANCOVA (controlling for participants' age, gender, educational level, and ethnicity) revealed no difference in conspiracy mentality between an autism and a community sample.

CONCLUSIONS

The current study suggests that being autistic, or having more autistic traits, does not predict conspiracy mentality. These findings underscore that autism does not predispose people to conspiracy theories and suggest that autism is neither a risk factor for, nor a protective factor against, conspiracy mentality.

Insight in the Conspiracist's Mind

Academic AbstractThe motto of the conspiracist, "Do your own research," may seem ludicrous to scientists. Indeed, it is often dismissed as a mere rhetorical device that conspiracists use to give themselves the semblance of science. In this perspective paper, we explore the information-seeking activities ("research") that conspiracists do engage in. Drawing on the experimental psychology of aha experiences, we explain how these activities, as well as the epistemic experiences that precede (curiosity) or follow (insight or "aha" experiences) them, may play a crucial role in the appeal and development of conspiracy beliefs. Aha moments have properties that can be exploited by conspiracy theories, such as the potential for false but seemingly grounded conclusions. Finally, we hypothesize that the need for autonomous epistemic agency and discovery is universal but increases as people experience more uncertainty and/or feel epistemically excluded in society, hence linking it to existing literature on explaining conspiracy theories.

Thought contagion? Conspiracy beliefs boost paranoid thoughts

Conspiracy theories accusing specific groups of secret malevolent actions can foster a perception of the world as a dangerous place. In our research, we contend that both adherence and exposure to conspiracy beliefs can serve as a potential cause of certain psychological problems in the form of paranoid thoughts. This hypothesis was tested in three studies conducted among Polish and British participants. In Study 1 (longitudinal, N = 603), we found that conspiracy beliefs exerted a positive overtime effect on paranoid thoughts. Experimental studies 2 (N = 384) and 3 (N = 445), showed that being exposed to conspiracy theories (vs. control stimuli) heightened paranoid thoughts. In Study 3, we proposed a potential mechanism explaining this effect, according to which exposure to conspiracies increased paranoid thoughts via only negative intense emotions. Our work adds to the discussion on the consequences of conspiracy beliefs and has implications for mental health research, underlining the importance of designing interventions limiting the adverse effects of conspiracy beliefs.

"Trust me, do not trust anyone": how epistemic mistrust and credulity are associated with conspiracy mentality

Previous research shows that the propensity to endorse conspiracy theories is associated with disrupted forms of epistemic trust, i.e., the appropriate openness towards interpersonally communicated information. There are associations, first, with an increased mistrust in several actors and institutions responsible for the communication of information in society, and second, with a pronounced credulity in unreliable sources and implausible phenomena (e.g., superstition, astrology). This study aims to investigate whether these phenomena are associated with specific personality-related disruptions of epistemic trust. Based on selfreported data of 417 individuals (mean = 33.28; standard deviation = 11.11) from a UK population sampled online, the potential relationships between disruptions in epistemic trust and the endorsement of a conspiracy mentality are explored. The epistemic stances characterized by mistrust and credulity (independent variables) are measured with the epistemic trust, mistrust, and credulity questionnaire (ETMCQ), and conspiracy mentality (dependent variable) is measured with the conspiracy mentality questionnaire. In a multiple linear regression model, mistrust is associated with the endorsement of a conspiracy mentality, even when accounting for other contributing factors (e.g., individual narcissism, attachment avoidance and anxiety, authoritarianism, loneliness). In a bootstrapped mediation model controlling for other relevant predictors, the association between credulity and conspiracy mentality is fully mediated by mistrust. In future research, the impact of disrupted epistemic trust on conspiracy beliefs should be investigated in terms of the specific epistemic stances of mistrust and credulity. In this respect, the ETMCQ represents a highly promising instrument to assess individual differences in factors underpinning aspects of conspiracy endorsement.

Differentiating paranoia and conspiracy mentality using a network approach

Although mostly considered distinct, conspiracy mentality and paranoia share conceptual similarities (e.g., persecutory content, resistance to disconfirming evidence). Using self-report data from a large and multinational online sample (N = 2510; from the UK, the US, Hong Kong, Germany, and Australia), we examined whether paranoia and conspiracy mentality represent distinct latent constructs in exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses. Utilising network analysis, we then explored common and unique correlates of paranoia and conspiracy mentality while accounting for their shared variance. Across sites, paranoia and conspiracy mentality presented distinct, yet weakly correlated (r = 0.26), constructs. Both were associated with past traumatic experiences, holding negative beliefs about the self and other people, sleep problems, and a tendency to worry. However, paranoia was related to increased negative affect (i.e., anxiety) and decreased social support, whereas the opposite pattern was observed for conspiracy mentality (i.e., decreased anxiety and depression, increased social support). Paranoia and conspiracy mentality are related but not the same constructs. Their similar and distinct correlates point to common and unique risk factors and underlying mechanisms.

News Waves: Hard News, Soft News, Fake News, Rumors, News Wavetrains

We discuss the spread of a piece of news in a population. This is modeled by SIR model of epidemic spread. The model can be reduced to a nonlinear differential equation for the number of people affected by the news of interest. The differential equation has an exponential nonlinearity and it can be approximated by a sequence of nonlinear differential equations with polynomial nonlinearities. Exact solutions to these equations can be obtained by the Simple Equations Method (SEsM). Some of these exact solutions can be used to model a class of waves associated with the spread of the news in a population. The presence of exact solutions allow to study in detail the dependence of the amplitude and the time horizon of the news waves on the wave parameters, such as the size of the population, initial number of spreaders of the piece of the news, transmission rate, and recovery rate. This allows for recommendations about the change of wave parameters in order to achieve a large amplitude or appropriate time horizon of the news wave. We discuss five types of news waves on the basis of the values of the transmission rate and recovery rate-types A, B, C, D, and E of news waves. In addition, we discuss the possibility of building wavetrains by news waves. There are three possible kinds of wavetrains with respect of the amplitude of the wave: increasing wavetrain, decreasing wavetrain, and mixed wavetrain. The increasing wavetrain is especially interesting, as it is connected to an increasing amplitude of the news wave with respect to the amplitude of the previous wave of the wavetrain. It can find applications in advertising, propaganda, etc.

Repetition could increase the perceived truth of conspiracy theories

Conspiracy theories can be encountered repeatedly, which raises the issue of the effect of their repeated exposure on beliefs. Earlier studies found that repetition increases truth judgments of factual statements, whether they are uncertain, highly implausible, or fake news, for instance. Would this "truth effect" be observed with conspiracy statements? If so, is the effect size smaller than the typical truth effect, and is it associated with individual differences such as cognitive style and conspiracy mentality? In the present preregistered study, we addressed these three issues. We asked participants to provide binary truth judgments to conspiracy and factual statements already displayed in an exposure phase (an interest judgment task) or that were new (displayed only in the truth judgment task). We measured participants' cognitive style with the three-item Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), and conspiracy mentality with the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ). Importantly, we found that repetition increased truth judgments of conspiracy theories, unmoderated by cognitive style and conspiracy mentality. Additionally, we found that the truth effect was smaller with conspiracy theories than with uncertain factual statements, and suggest explanations for this difference. The results suggest that repetition may be a simple way to increase belief in conspiracy theories. Whether repetition increases conspiracy beliefs in natural settings and how it contributes to conspiracism compared to other factors are important questions for future research.

Conspiracy thinking and the long historical shadow of Romanticism on authoritarian politics

Background

Similar effect sizes have been reported for the effects of conspiracy, pseudoscientific, and paranormal beliefs on authoritarian attitudes, which points to a conceptual problem at the heart of the conspiracy literature, namely lack of clarity as to what uniquely defines conspiracy beliefs and whether those unique elements contribute distinctly to authoritarian ideologies. To our knowledge, this is the first study to test empirically the predictive power of variance unique to each construct against covariance shared among these constructs when predicting authoritarian and anti-democratic attitudes.

Methods

Online survey was administered to 314 participants in 2021 that included a battery of demographic and psychological measures. Hierarchical factor models were used to isolate unique variance from shared covariance among responses to items representing conspiracy, paranormal and pseudoscientific beliefs. Structural equation models were used to test their unique and shared effects on authoritarian and anti-democratic attitudes.

Results

We found that our combined measurement model of paranormal thinking, conspiracism, and pseudoscience exhibited exceptional model fit, and that each construct was strongly predictive of both SDO and RWA (r = 0.73-0.86). Once the shared covariance was partitioned into a higher order factor, the residual uniqueness in each first order factors was either negatively related or unrelated to authoritarian and anti-democratic attitudes. Moreover, the higher order factor explained the gross majority of variance in conspiracy (R2 = 0.81) paranormal (R2 = 0.81) and pseudoscientific (R2 = 0.95) beliefs and was a far stronger predictor (β = 0.85, p < 0.01) of anti-democratic attitudes than political partisanship (β = 0.17, p < 0.01). Strong partisan identifiers of both parties showed much higher romanticism scores than party moderates.

Conclusion and limitations

When predicting authoritarian and anti-democratic attitudes, we found no empirically unique contributions of conspiracy beliefs. Instead, we found that a shared factor, representing a 'romantic' mindset was the main predictor of authoritarian and anti-democratic attitudes. This finding potentially explains failures of interventions in stopping the spread of misinformation and conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theory researchers should refocus on the shared features that conspiracy thinking has with other unwarranted epistemic beliefs to better understand how to halt the spread of misinformation, conspiracy thinking, anti-science attitudes, and even global authoritarianism.

From Conspiracy to Hesitancy: The Longitudinal Impact of COVID-19 Vaccine Conspiracy Theories on Perceived Vaccine Effectiveness

The embrace of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) vaccine conspiracies has been linked to vaccine hesitancy. This study aimed to investigate the relationship between COVID-19 vaccine conspiracy theories and perceived vaccine effectiveness. The study utilized a longitudinal follow-up study in which adults in Chile completed surveys in December 2020 (T1) and May 2021 (T2). The psychometric properties of the five-item instrument on conspiracy theories for the COVID-19 vaccine were evaluated using data from T1 (n = 578). A confirmatory one-factor structure with suitable indicators of reliability was found. The longitudinal analysis (n = 292) revealed that conspiracy theories about the COVID-19 vaccine in T1 were associated with lower beliefs in its effectiveness in T2. However, no significant association was found between beliefs in effectiveness in T1 and conspiracy theories in T2. The study suggests that beliefs in conspiracy theories may temporally precede beliefs in vaccine effectiveness for COVID-19. The results have implications for strategies to address vaccine conspiracy beliefs and their implementation at the public policy level.

What is so special about conspiracy theories? Conceptually distinguishing beliefs in conspiracy theories from conspiracy beliefs in psychological research

In psychological research, conspiracy theories are often defined as explanations of events involving the hidden action of a malevolent group. Such a definition raises a false negative problem, as it does not capture conspiracy theories that are not about events. It also raises a false positive problem because it categorises any conspiracy-based explanation as a conspiracy theory, even though distinguishing conspiracy theories from other conspiracy claims is at the core of many attempts to define this notion. Based on more elaborated definitions and a conceptual reengineering approach, we propose that conspiracy theories can be defined as claims that the public is being pervasively lied to regarding some aspect(s) of reality, to allow some group(s) to enact a harmful, self-serving agenda. Compared to other definitions, ours has the advantage of not taking a position regarding the truth value of conspiracy theories, making it highly operative for psychological research.

Do conspiracy theorists think too much or too little?

Conspiracy theories explain distressing events as malevolent actions by powerful groups. Why do people believe in secret plots when other explanations are more probable? On the one hand, conspiracy theorists seem to disregard accuracy; they tend to endorse mutually incompatible conspiracies, think intuitively, use heuristics, and hold other irrational beliefs. But by definition, conspiracy theorists reject the mainstream explanation for an event, often in favor of a more complex account. They exhibit a general distrust of others and expend considerable effort to find 'evidence' supporting their beliefs. In searching for answers, conspiracy theorists likely expose themselves to misleading information online and overestimate their own knowledge. Understanding when elaboration and cognitive effort might backfire is crucial, as conspiracy beliefs lead to political disengagement, environmental inaction, prejudice, and support for violence.