Disease control through voluntary vaccination decisions based on the smoothed best response

Exploring epidemic voluntary vaccinating behavior based on information-driven decisions and benefit-cost analysis

A complex dynamic interplay exists between epidemic transmission and vaccination, which is significantly influenced by human behavioral responses. We construct a research framework combining both the function modeling of the cumulative global COVID-19 information and limited individuals' information processing capacity employing the Gompertz model for growing processes. Meanwhile, we built a function representing the decision to get vaccinated following benefit-cost analysis considered the choices made by people in each scenario have an influence from altruism, free-riding and immunity escaping capacity. Through the mean-field calculation analysis and using a fourth-order Runge-Kutta method with constant step size, we obtain plots from numerical simulations. We found that only when the total number of infectious individuals proves sufficient to reach and exceed a certain level will the individuals face a better trade-off in determining whether to get vaccinated against the diseases based on that information. Besides, authoritative media have a higher decisive influence and efforts should be focused on extending the duration of vaccine protection, which is beneficial to inhibit the outbreaks of epidemics. Our work elucidates that reducing the negative payoff brought about by the free-riding behavior for individuals or improving the positive payoff from the altruistic motivation helps to control the disease in cultures that value social benefits, vaccination willingness is generally stronger. We also note that at a high risk of infection, the decision of vaccination is highly correlated with global epidemic information concerning COVID-19 infection, while at times of lower risk, it depends on the game theoretic vaccine strategy. The findings demonstrate that improving health literacy, ensuring open and transparent information on vaccine safety and efficacy as a public health priority can be an effective strategy for mitigating inequalities in health education, as well as alleviating the phenomenon that immunity escaping abilities is more likely to panic by populations with high levels of education. In addition, prosocial nudges are great ways to bridge these immunity gaps that can contribute to implementing government public health control measures, creating a positive feedback loop.

Almost periodic solutions for a SVIR epidemic model with relapse

This paper is devoted to a nonautonomous SVIR epidemic model with relapse, that is, the recurrence rate is considered in the model. The permanent of the system is proved, and the result on the existence and uniqueness of globally attractive almost periodic solution of this system is obtained by constructing a suitable Lyapunov function. Some analysis for the necessity of considering the recurrence rate in the model is also presented. Moreover, some examples and numerical simulations are given to show the feasibility of our main results. Through numerical simulation, we have obtained the influence of vaccination rate and recurrence rate on the spread of the disease. The conclusion is that in order to control the epidemic of infectious diseases, we should increase the vaccination rate while reducing the recurrence rate of the disease.

Behavioral incentives in a vaccination-dilemma setting with optional treatment

Social dilemmas are situations wherein individuals choose between selfish interest and common good. One example of this is the vaccination dilemma, in which an individual who vaccinates at a cost protects not only himself but also others by helping maintain a common good called herd immunity. There is, however, a strong incentive to forgo vaccination, thus avoiding the associated cost, all the while enjoying the protection of herd immunity. To analyze behavioral incentives in a vaccination-dilemma setting in which an optional treatment is available to infected individuals, we combined epidemiological and game-theoretic methodologies by coupling a disease-spreading model with treatment and an evolutionary decision-making model. Extensive numerical simulations show that vaccine characteristics are more important in controlling the treatment adoption than the cost of treatment itself. The main effect of the latter is that expensive treatment incentivizes vaccination, which somewhat surprisingly comes at a little cost to society. More surprising is that the margin for a true synergy between vaccine and treatment in reducing the final epidemic size is very small. We furthermore find that society-centered decision making helps protect herd immunity relative to individual-centered decision making, but the latter may be better in establishing a novel vaccine. These results point to useful policy recommendations as well as to intriguing future research directions.

Behavioural change models for infectious disease transmission: a systematic review (2010-2015)

We review behavioural change models (BCMs) for infectious disease transmission in humans. Following the Cochrane collaboration guidelines and the PRISMA statement, our systematic search and selection yielded 178 papers covering the period 2010-2015. We observe an increasing trend in published BCMs, frequently coupled to (re)emergence events, and propose a categorization by distinguishing how information translates into preventive actions. Behaviour is usually captured by introducing information as a dynamic parameter (76/178) or by introducing an economic objective function, either with (26/178) or without (37/178) imitation. Approaches using information thresholds (29/178) and exogenous behaviour formation (16/178) are also popular. We further classify according to disease, prevention measure, transmission model (with 81/178 population, 6/178 metapopulation and 91/178 individual-level models) and the way prevention impacts transmission. We highlight the minority (15%) of studies that use any real-life data for parametrization or validation and note that BCMs increasingly use social media data and generally incorporate multiple sources of information (16/178), multiple types of information (17/178) or both (9/178). We conclude that individual-level models are increasingly used and useful to model behaviour changes. Despite recent advancements, we remain concerned that most models are purely theoretical and lack representative data and a validation process.

Voluntary vaccination strategy and the spread of sexually transmitted diseases

In this work, we investigate the spread and control of sexually transmitted diseases when a game-theory based vaccination strategy is involved. An individual's decision on vaccination uptake may follow a cost-benefit analysis since the individual obtains immunity against the disease from the vaccination and, at the same time, may have some perceived side effects. Evolutionary game theory is integrated into the epidemic model to reveal the relationship between individuals' voluntary decisions on vaccination uptake and the spread and control of such diseases. We show that decreasing the perceived cost of taking vaccine or increasing the payoff from social obligation is beneficial to controlling the disease. It is also shown how the "degree of rationality" of males and females affects the disease spread through the net payoff of the game. In particular, individual awareness of the consequences of the disease on the infectives also contributes to slowing down the disease spread. By analyzing an asymmetric version of our evolutionary game, it is shown that the disease is better controlled when individuals are more sensitive to fitness differences when net payoff is positive than when it is negative.

Imitation dynamics of vaccine decision-making behaviours based on the game theory

Based on game theory, we propose an age-structured model to investigate the imitation dynamics of vaccine uptake. We first obtain the existence and local stability of equilibria. We show that Hopf bifurcation can occur. We also establish the global stability of the boundary equilibria and persistence of the disease. The theoretical results are supported by numerical simulations.