Proprioception contributes to the sense of agency during visual observation of hand movements: evidence from temporal judgments of action

Dissociative Symptoms and Interoceptive Integration

Dissociative symptoms and disorders of dissociation are characterised by disturbances in the experience of the self and the surrounding world, manifesting as a breakdown in the normal integration of consciousness, memory, identity, emotion, and perception. This paper aims to provide insights into dissociative symptoms from the perspective of interoception, the sense of the body's internal physiological state, adopting a transdiagnostic framework.Dissociative symptoms are associated with a blunting of autonomic reactivity and a reduction in interoceptive precision. In addition to the central function of interoception in homeostasis, afferent visceral signals and their neural and mental representation have been shown to shape emotional feeling states, support memory encoding, and contribute to self-representation. Changes in interoceptive processing and disrupted integration of interoceptive signals into wider cognition may contribute to detachment from the body and the world, blunted emotional experience, and altered subjective recall, as experienced by individuals who suffer from dissociation.A better understanding of the role of altered interoceptive integration across the symptom areas of dissociation could thus provide insights into the neurophysiological mechanisms underlying dissociative disorders. As new therapeutic approaches targeting interoceptive processing emerge, recognising the significance of interoceptive mechanisms in dissociation holds potential implications for future treatment targets.

Effect of Mirror Therapy on Post-Needling Pain Following Deep Dry Needling of Myofascial Trigger Point in Lateral Elbow Pain: Prospective Controlled Pilot Trial

Background: This prospective randomized, controlled pilot trial to explore the immediate effect of adding Mirror Visual Feedback Therapy on pain sensitivity and motor performance among subjects suffering from post-needling pain diagnosed as Lateral Elbow Pain. Methods: A total of 49 participants (23 female, 26 male) were enrolled and randomly allocated to either the experimental group, which received Deep Dry Needling in the m. Brachioradialis, Ischemic Compression, Cold Spray, Stretching, and Mirror Visual Feedback Therapy (n = 25), or a control group without Mirror Visual Feedback Therapy (n = 24). Pre- and post-treatment evaluations included assessments of post-needling pain intensity, pressure pain threshold, two-point discrimination threshold, and maximum hand grip strength. Results: Intergroup analysis revealed a statistically significant reduction in post-needling pain intensity favoring the experimental group (U = 188.00, p = 0.034). Additionally, intragroup analysis showed significant improvements in post-needling pain intensity (MD = 0.400, SEM = 0.271, W = 137.00, p = 0.047) and pressure pain threshold (MD = 0.148 Kg/cm2, SEM = 0.038, W = 262.00, p < 0.001) within the experimental group following the intervention. Conclusions: These findings suggest a potential benefit of integrating Mirror Visual Feedback Therapy into treatment protocols for individuals with Lateral Elbow Pain experiencing post-needling discomfort. Further research is necessary to fully elucidate the clinical implications of these findings.

Avatar error in your favor: Embodied avatars can fix users' mistakes without them noticing

In immersive Virtual Reality (VR), users can experience the subjective feeling of embodiment for the avatar representing them in a virtual world. This is known to be strongly supported by a high Sense of Agency (SoA) for the movements of the avatar that follows the user. In general, users do not self-attribute actions of their avatar that are different from the one they actually performed. The situation is less clear when actions of the avatar satisfies the intention of the user despite distortions and noticeable differences between user and avatar movements. Here, a within-subject experiment was condutected to determine wether a finger swap helping users to achieve a task would be more tolerated than one penalizing them. In particular, in a context of fast-paced finger movements and with clear correct or incorrect responses, we swapped the finger animation of the avatar (e.g. user moves the index finger, the avatar moves the middle one) to either automatically correct for spontaneous mistakes or to introduce incorrect responses. Subjects playing a VR game were asked to report when they noticed the introduction of a finger swap. Results based on 3256 trials (∼24% of swaps noticed) show that swaps helping users have significantly fewer odds of being noticed (and with higher confidence) than the ones penalizing users. This demonstrates how the context and the intention for motor action are important factors for the SoA and for embodiment, opening new perspectives on how to design and study interactions in immersive VR.

The Illusion of Agency in Human–Computer Interaction

This article makes the case that our digital devices create illusions of agency. There are times when users feel as if they are in control when in fact they are merely responding to stimuli on the screen in predictable ways. After the introduction, the second section of the article offers examples of illusions of agency that do not involve human–computer interaction in order to show that such illusions are possible and not terribly uncommon. The third and fourth sections of the article cover relevant work from empirical psychology, including the cues that are known to generate the sense of agency. The fifth section of the article shows that our devices are designed to deliver precisely those cues. In the sixth section, the argument is completed with evidence that users frequently use their smartphones without the sort of intentional supervision involved in genuine agency. This sixth section includes the introduction of Digital Environmental Dependency Syndrome (DEDS) as a possible way of characterizing extended use of the smartphone without genuine agency. In the final section of the article, there is a discussion of questions raised by the main claim, including suggestions for reducing occurrences of illusions of agency through software design.

Perception of body shape and size without touch or proprioception: evidence from individuals with congenital and acquired neuropathy

The degree to which mental representations of the body can be established and maintained without somatosensory input remains unclear. We contrast two "deafferented" adults, one who acquired large fibre sensory loss as an adult (IW) and another who was born without somatosensation (KS). We compared their responses to those of matched controls in three perceptual tasks: first accuracy of their mental image of their hands (assessed by testing recognition of correct hand length/width ratio in distorted photographs and by locating landmarks on the unseen hand); then accuracy of arm length judgements (assessed by judgement of reaching distance), and finally, we tested for an attentional bias towards peri-personal space (assessed by reaction times to visual target presentation). We hypothesised that IW would demonstrate responses consistent with him accessing conscious knowledge, whereas KS might show evidence of responses dependent on non-conscious mechanisms. In the first two experiments, both participants were able to give consistent responses about hand shape and arm length, but IW displayed a better awareness of hand shape than KS (and controls). KS demonstrated poorer spatial accuracy in reporting hand landmarks than both IW and controls, and appears to have less awareness of her hands. Reach distance was overestimated by both IW and KS, as it was for controls; the precision of their judgements was slightly lower than that of the controls. In the attentional task, IW showed no reaction time differences across conditions in the visual detection task, unlike controls, suggesting that he has no peri-personal bias of attention. In contrast, KS did show target location-dependent modulation of reaction times, when her hands were visible. We suggest that both IW and KS can access a conscious body image, although its accuracy may reflect their different experience of hand action. Acquired sensory loss has deprived IW of any subconscious body awareness, but the congenital absence of somatosensation may have led to its partial replacement by a form of visual proprioception in KS.

Confusion within feedback control between cognitive and sensorimotor agency cues in self-other attribution

Self-other sensory attribution is necessary to realize feedback control because the self-attribution of sensations can drive feedback control. Some studies have suggested that self-other attribution is realized by the integration of both sensorimotor cues, including internal prediction and/or sensory feedback, and cognitive cues, such as knowledge or thought. However, in motor control, it remains unclear whether and how cognitive cues affect self-other attribution. In a feedback-control task, this study manipulated the movements (sensorimotor cue) and appearances (cognitive cue) of the cursor provided as visual feedback on participants' sinusoidal movement. Participants were required to make a self-other attribution regarding whether the cursor's movement reflected their actual movement without being confused by the cursor's appearance. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that participants made illusory self-other attributions within feedback control based on cursor appearance only when the information on cursor movement was reduced by causing the cursor to flicker at 8 Hz. However, in Experiment 3, in which the cursor flickering at 4 Hz reduced the information on cursor movement to a level too low for conscious self-other attribution, cursor appearance was not utilized. Our findings suggest that the effects of cognitive cues on self-other attribution are determined by the cue integration strategy selected for the given situation.

The boundaries of the self: The sense of agency across different sensorimotor aspects

The sense of agency (SoA) is the sensation of control over our actions. SoA is thought to rely mainly upon the comparison of predictions regarding the sensory outcomes of one's actions and the actual sensory outcomes. Previous studies have shown that when a discrepancy is introduced between one's actions and the sensory feedback, the reported SoA is reduced. Experimental manipulations of SoA are typically induced by introducing a discrepancy between a motor action and visual feedback of a specific sensorimotor aspect. For example, introducing a delay or a spatial deviation between the action and its sensory feedback reduces SoA. However, it is yet unclear whether the sensorimotor prediction processes underlying SoA are related between different aspects. Here in one exploratory and one preregistered experiment we tested the sense of agency across temporal, spatial, and anatomical aspects in a within-subject design. Using a novel virtual-reality task allowing the manipulation of the visual feedback of a motor action across different aspects, we show that the sensitivity of agency is different across aspects, agency judgments are correlated across aspects within subjects and bias toward attributing the viewed action to the self or to an external source is correlated as well. Our results suggest that sensorimotor prediction mechanisms underlying SoA are related between different aspects and that people have a predisposition for the directionality of agency judgments. These findings reveal the psychophysical attributes of SoA across sensorimotor aspects. Data and preregistration are available at https://goo.gl/SkbGrb.

The Interaction between Interoceptive and Action States within a Framework of Predictive Coding

The notion of predictive coding assumes that perception is an iterative process between prior knowledge and sensory feedback. To date, this perspective has been primarily applied to exteroceptive perception as well as action and its associated phenomenological experiences such as agency. More recently, this predictive, inferential framework has been theoretically extended to interoception. This idea postulates that subjective feeling states are generated by top-down inferences made about internal and external causes of interoceptive afferents. While the processing of motor signals for action control and the emergence of selfhood have been studied extensively, the contributions of interoceptive input and especially the potential interaction of motor and interoceptive signals remain largely unaddressed. Here, we argue for a specific functional relation between motor and interoceptive awareness. Specifically, we implicate interoceptive predictions in the generation of subjective motor-related feeling states. Furthermore, we propose a distinction between reflexive and pre-reflexive modes of agentic action control and suggest that interoceptive input may affect each differently. Finally, we advocate the necessity of continuous interoceptive input for conscious forms of agentic action control. We conclude by discussing further research contributions that would allow for a fuller understanding of the interaction between agency and interoceptive awareness.

Seeing virtual while acting real: Visual display and strategy effects on the time and precision of eye-hand coordination

Effects of different visual displays on the time and precision of bare-handed or tool-mediated eye-hand coordination were investigated in a pick-and-place-task with complete novices. All of them scored well above average in spatial perspective taking ability and performed the task with their dominant hand. Two groups of novices, four men and four women in each group, had to place a small object in a precise order on the centre of five targets on a Real-world Action Field (RAF), as swiftly as possible and as precisely as possible, using a tool or not (control). Each individual session consisted of four visual display conditions. The order of conditions was counterbalanced between individuals and sessions. Subjects looked at what their hands were doing 1) directly in front of them (“natural” top-down view) 2) in top-down 2D fisheye view 3) in top-down undistorted 2D view or 4) in 3D stereoscopic top-down view (head-mounted OCULUS DK 2). It was made sure that object movements in all image conditions matched the real-world movements in time and space. One group was looking at the 2D images with the monitor positioned sideways (sub-optimal); the other group was looking at the monitor placed straight ahead of them (near-optimal). All image viewing conditions had significantly detrimental effects on time (seconds) and precision (pixels) of task execution when compared with “natural” direct viewing. More importantly, we find significant trade-offs between time and precision between and within groups, and significant interactions between viewing conditions and manipulation conditions. The results shed new light on controversial findings relative to visual display effects on eye-hand coordination, and lead to conclude that differences in camera systems and adaptive strategies of novices are likely to explain these.

Getting nowhere fast: trade-off between speed and precision in training to execute image-guided hand-tool movements

Background

The speed and precision with which objects are moved by hand or hand-tool interaction under image guidance depend on a specific type of visual and spatial sensorimotor learning. Novices have to learn to optimally control what their hands are doing in a real-world environment while looking at an image representation of the scene on a video monitor. Previous research has shown slower task execution times and lower performance scores under image-guidance compared with situations of direct action viewing. The cognitive processes for overcoming this drawback by training are not yet understood.

Methods

We investigated the effects of training on the time and precision of direct view versus image guided object positioning on targets of a Real-world Action Field (RAF). Two men and two women had to learn to perform the task as swiftly and as precisely as possible with their dominant hand, using a tool or not and wearing a glove or not. Individuals were trained in sessions of mixed trial blocks with no feed-back.

Results

As predicted, image-guidance produced significantly slower times and lesser precision in all trainees and sessions compared with direct viewing. With training, all trainees get faster in all conditions, but only one of them gets reliably more precise in the image-guided conditions. Speed-accuracy trade-offs in the individual performance data show that the highest precision scores and steepest learning curve, for time and precision, were produced by the slowest starter. Fast starters produced consistently poorer precision scores in all sessions. The fastest starter showed no sign of stable precision learning, even after extended training.

Conclusions

Performance evolution towards optimal precision is compromised when novices start by going as fast as they can. The findings have direct implications for individual skill monitoring in training programmes for image-guided technology applications with human operators.

The Sense of Agency Is More Sensitive to Manipulations of Outcome than Movement-Related Feedback Irrespective of Sensory Modality

The sense of agency describes the ability to experience oneself as the agent of one's own actions. Previous studies of the sense of agency manipulated the predicted sensory feedback related either to movement execution or to the movement's outcome, for example by delaying the movement of a virtual hand or the onset of a tone that resulted from a button press. Such temporal sensorimotor discrepancies reduce the sense of agency. It remains unclear whether movement-related feedback is processed differently than outcome-related feedback in terms of agency experience, especially if these types of feedback differ with respect to sensory modality. We employed a mixed-reality setup, in which participants tracked their finger movements by means of a virtual hand. They performed a single tap, which elicited a sound. The temporal contingency between the participants' finger movements and (i) the movement of the virtual hand or (ii) the expected auditory outcome was systematically varied. In a visual control experiment, the tap elicited a visual outcome. For each feedback type and participant, changes in the sense of agency were quantified using a forced-choice paradigm and the Method of Constant Stimuli. Participants were more sensitive to delays of outcome than to delays of movement execution. This effect was very similar for visual or auditory outcome delays. Our results indicate different contributions of movement- versus outcome-related sensory feedback to the sense of agency, irrespective of the modality of the outcome. We propose that this differential sensitivity reflects the behavioral importance of assessing authorship of the outcome of an action.

Left-handers show no self-advantage in detecting a delay in visual feedback concerning an active movement

Right-handed people show an advantage in detecting a delay in visual feedback concerning an active movement of their right hand when it is viewed in a natural perspective compared to when it is seen as if viewing another person's hand (Hoover and Harris in Exp Brain Res 233:1053-1060, 2012. doi: 10.1007/s00221-014-4181-9 ; Exp Brain Res 222:389-397, 2015a. doi: 10.1007/s00221-012-3224-3 ). This self-advantage is unique to their dominant hand and may reflect an enhanced sense of ownership which contributes to how right-handed people relate to the world. Here we asked whether left-handers show the same pattern of performance for their dominant hand. We measured the minimum delay that could be detected by 29 left-handers when viewing either their dominant or non-dominant hand from 'self' or 'other' perspectives and compared their thresholds to an age-matched sample of 22 right-handers. Right-handers showed a significant signature self-advantage of 19 ms when viewing their dominant hand in an expected 'self' perspective compared to 'other' perspectives. Left-handers, however, showed no such advantage for either their dominant or non-dominant hand. This lack of self-advantage in detecting delayed visual feedback might indicate a less secure sense of body ownership amongst left-handers.

Sensory feedback by peripheral nerve stimulation improves task performance in individuals with upper limb loss using a myoelectric prosthesis

OBJECTIVE

Tactile feedback is critical to grip and object manipulation. Its absence results in reliance on visual and auditory cues. Our objective was to assess the effect of sensory feedback on task performance in individuals with limb loss.

APPROACH

Stimulation of the peripheral nerves using implanted cuff electrodes provided two subjects with sensory feedback with intensity proportional to forces on the thumb, index, and middle fingers of their prosthetic hand during object manipulation. Both subjects perceived the sensation on their phantom hand at locations corresponding to the locations of the forces on the prosthetic hand. A bend sensor measured prosthetic hand span. Hand span modulated the intensity of sensory feedback perceived on the thenar eminence for subject 1 and the middle finger for subject 2. We performed three functional tests with the blindfolded subjects. First, the subject tried to determine whether or not a wooden block had been placed in his prosthetic hand. Second, the subject had to locate and remove magnetic blocks from a metal table. Third, the subject performed the Southampton Hand Assessment Procedure (SHAP). We also measured the subject's sense of embodiment with a survey and his self-confidence.

MAIN RESULTS

Blindfolded performance with sensory feedback was similar to sighted performance in the wooden block and magnetic block tasks. Performance on the SHAP, a measure of hand mechanical function and control, was similar with and without sensory feedback. An embodiment survey showed an improved sense of integration of the prosthesis in self body image with sensory feedback.

SIGNIFICANCE

Sensory feedback by peripheral nerve stimulation improved object discrimination and manipulation, embodiment, and confidence. With both forms of feedback, the blindfolded subjects tended toward results obtained with visual feedback.

Disrupting Vestibular Activity Disrupts Body Ownership

People are more sensitive at detecting asynchrony between a self-generated movement and visual feedback concerning that movement when the movement is viewed from a first-person perspective. We call this the ‘self-advantage’ and interpret it as an objective measure of self. Here we ask if disruption of the vestibular system in healthy individuals affects the self-advantage. Participants performed finger movements while viewing their hand in a first-person (‘self’) or third-person (‘other’) perspective and indicated which of two periods (one with minimum delay and the other with an added delay of 33–264 ms) was delayed. Their sensitivity to the delay was calculated from the psychometric functions obtained. During the testing, disruptive galvanic vestibular stimulation (GVS) was applied in five-minute blocks interleaved with five minutes of no stimulation for a total of 40 min. We confirmed the self-advantage under no stimulation (31 ms). In the presence of disruptive GVS this advantage disappeared and there was no longer a difference in performance between perspectives. The threshold delay for the ‘other’ perspective was not affected by the GVS. These results suggest that an intact vestibular signal is required to distinguish ‘self’ from ‘other’ and to maintain a sense of body ownership.

Motor output variability, deafferentation, and putative deficits in kinesthetic reafference in Parkinson's disease

Parkinson’s disease (PD) is a neurodegenerative disorder defined by motor impairments that include rigidity, systemic slowdown of movement (bradykinesia), postural problems, and tremor. While the progressive decline in motor output functions is well documented, less understood are impairments linked to the continuous kinesthetic sensation emerging from the flow of motions. There is growing evidence in recent years that kinesthetic problems are also part of the symptoms of PD, but objective methods to readily quantify continuously unfolding motions across different contexts have been lacking. Here we present evidence from a deafferented subject (IW) and a new statistical platform that enables new analyses of motor output variability measured as a continuous flow of kinesthetic reafferent input. Systematic increasing similarities between the patterns of motor output variability in IW and the participants with increasing degrees of PD severity suggest potential deficits in kinesthetic sensing in PD. We propose that these deficits may result from persistent, noisy, and random motor patterns as the disorder progresses. The stochastic signatures from the unfolding motions revealed levels of noise in the motor output fluctuations of these patients bound to decrease the kinesthetic signal’s bandwidth. The results are interpreted in light of the concept of kinesthetic reafference ( Von Holst and Mittelstaedt, 1950). In this context, noisy motor output variability from voluntary movements in PD leads to a returning stream of noisy afference caused, in turn, by those faulty movements themselves. Faulty efferent output re-enters the CNS as corrupted sensory motor input. We find here that severity level in PD leads to the persistence of such patterns, thus bringing the statistical signatures of the subjects with PD systematically closer to those of the subject without proprioception.

Cultural background influences implicit but not explicit sense of agency for the production of musical tones

The sense of agency is suggested to occur at both low and high levels by the involvement of sensorimotor processes and the contribution of retrospective inferences based on contextual cues. In the current study, we recruited western and non-western participants and examined the effect of pleasantness of action outcomes on both feeling of control ratings and intentional binding which refers to the perceived compression of the temporal delay between actions and outcomes. We found that both western and non-western groups showed greater feeling of control ratings for the consonant (pleasant) compared to dissonant (unpleasant) outcomes. The intentional binding effect, on the other hand, was stronger for the consonant compared to dissonant outcomes in the western group only. We discuss the results in relation to how cultural background might differentially influence the effect of outcome pleasantness on low and high levels of the sense of agency.

Freedom, choice, and the sense of agency

The sense of agency is an intriguing aspect of human consciousness and is commonly defined as the sense that one is the author of their own actions and their consequences. In the current study, we varied the number of action alternatives (one, three, seven) that participants could select from and determined the effects on intentional binding which is believed to index the low-level sense of agency. Participants made self-paced button presses while viewing a conventional Libet clock and reported the perceived onset time of either the button presses or consequent auditory tones. We found that the binding effect was strongest when participants had the maximum number of alternatives, intermediate when they had medium level of action choice and lowest when they had no choice. We interpret our results in relation to the potential link between agency and the freedom to choose one’s actions.

The sense of agency is action-effect causality perception based on cross-modal grouping

Sense of agency, the experience of controlling external events through one's actions, stems from contiguity between action- and effect-related signals. Here we show that human observers link their action- and effect-related signals using a computational principle common to cross-modal sensory grouping. We first report that the detection of a delay between tactile and visual stimuli is enhanced when both stimuli are synchronized with separate auditory stimuli (experiment 1). This occurs because the synchronized auditory stimuli hinder the potential grouping between tactile and visual stimuli. We subsequently demonstrate an analogous effect on observers' key press as an action and a sensory event. This change is associated with a modulation in sense of agency; namely, sense of agency, as evaluated by apparent compressions of action-effect intervals (intentional binding) or subjective causality ratings, is impaired when both participant's action and its putative visual effect events are synchronized with auditory tones (experiments 2 and 3). Moreover, a similar role of action-effect grouping in determining sense of agency is demonstrated when the additional signal is presented in the modality identical to an effect event (experiment 4). These results are consistent with the view that sense of agency is the result of general processes of causal perception and that cross-modal grouping plays a central role in these processes.

Eye-hand synergy and intermittent behaviors during target-directed tracking with visual and non-visual information

Visual feedback and non-visual information play different roles in tracking of an external target. This study explored the respective roles of the visual and non-visual information in eleven healthy volunteers who coupled the manual cursor to a rhythmically moving target of 0.5 Hz under three sensorimotor conditions: eye-alone tracking (EA), eye-hand tracking with visual feedback of manual outputs (EH tracking), and the same tracking without such feedback (EHM tracking). Tracking error, kinematic variables, and movement intermittency (saccade and speed pulse) were contrasted among tracking conditions. The results showed that EHM tracking exhibited larger pursuit gain, less tracking error, and less movement intermittency for the ocular plant than EA tracking. With the vision of manual cursor, EH tracking achieved superior tracking congruency of the ocular and manual effectors with smaller movement intermittency than EHM tracking, except that the rate precision of manual action was similar for both types of tracking. The present study demonstrated that visibility of manual consequences altered mutual relationships between movement intermittency and tracking error. The speed pulse metrics of manual output were linked to ocular tracking error, and saccade events were time-locked to the positional error of manual tracking during EH tracking. In conclusion, peripheral non-visual information is critical to smooth pursuit characteristics and rate control of rhythmic manual tracking. Visual information adds to eye-hand synchrony, underlying improved amplitude control and elaborate error interpretation during oculo-manual tracking.

New frontiers in the neuroscience of the sense of agency

The sense that I am the author of my own actions, including the ability to distinguish my own from other people's actions, is a fundamental building block of our sense of self, on the one hand, and successful social interactions, on the other. Using cognitive neuroscience techniques, researchers have attempted to elucidate the functional basis of this intriguing phenomenon, also trying to explain pathological abnormalities of action awareness in certain psychiatric and neurological disturbances. Recent conceptual, technological, and methodological advances suggest several interesting and necessary new leads for future research on the neuroscience of agency. Here I will describe new frontiers for the field such as the need for novel and multifactorial paradigms, anatomically plausible network models for the sense of agency, investigations of the temporal dynamics during agentic processing and ecologically valid virtual reality (VR) applications.

Viewpoint (In)dependence of Action Representations: An MVPA Study

The discovery of mirror neurons—neurons that code specific actions both when executed and observed—in area F5 of the macaque provides a potential neural mechanism underlying action understanding. To date, neuroimaging evidence for similar coding of specific actions across the visual and motor modalities in human ventral premotor cortex (PMv)—the putative homologue of macaque F5—is limited to the case of actions observed from a first-person perspective. However, it is the third-person perspective that figures centrally in our understanding of the actions and intentions of others. To address this gap in the literature, we scanned participants with fMRI while they viewed two actions from either a first- or third-person perspective during some trials and executed the same actions during other trials. Using multivoxel pattern analysis, we found action-specific cross-modal visual–motor representations in PMv for the first-person but not for the third-person perspective. Additional analyses showed no evidence for spatial or attentional differences across the two perspective conditions. In contrast, more posterior areas in the parietal and occipitotemporal cortex did show cross-modal coding regardless of perspective. These findings point to a stronger role for these latter regions, relative to PMv, in supporting the understanding of others' actions with reference to one's own actions.

On the somatosensation of vision

The interconnection between vision and somatosensation is already well-established and is further supplemented by the evolutionary link between eyes and photoreceptors, and the functional connection between photosensation and thermoreception. However, our analysis shows that the relation between vision and somatosensation is much deeper and suggests that somatosensation may possibly be the basis of vision. Surprisingly, our photoreceptor itself needs somatosensory proteins for its functioning, and our entire visual pathway depends on somatosensory cues for its functioning.

The feeling of agency: empirical indicators for a pre-reflective level of action awareness

The sense of agency has been defined as the sense that I am the author of my own actions. This sense, however, is usually not reflected upon but instead pre-reflectively experienced. Experimental approaches usually measure the sense of agency by judgments or verbal reports, despite evidence that the sense of agency is not sufficiently assessed on such a reflective level. Here we sought to identify non-verbal measures of the sense of agency, particularly testing the relevance of physiological activity such as skin conductance and heart rate. Manipulating the visual feedback to an executed movement, we investigated how well physiological activity and other movement parameters differed between real and false feedback (i.e., between actual agency and non-agency), and how they related to accuracy of agency judgments. Skin conductance and heart rate did not differ between agency and non-agency situations; neither did they inform agency judgments. In contrast, movement onsets – particularly, discrepancies between feedback and movement onsets – were related to agency judgments. Overall, our results indicate weak visceral–somatic associations with the sense of agency. Thus, physiological activity did not prove to be an empirical indicator for the feeling of agency.

Cognitive and neural components of the phenomenology of agency

A primary aspect of the self is the sense of agency – the sense that one is causing an action. In the spirit of recent reductionistic approaches to other complex, multifaceted phenomena (e.g., working memory; cf. Johnson &Johnson, 2009), we attempt to unravel the sense of agency by investigating its most basic components, without invoking high-level conceptual or 'central executive' processes. After considering the high-level components of agency, we examine the cognitive and neural underpinnings of its low-level components, which include basic consciousness and subjective urges (e.g., the urge to breathe when holding one's breath). Regarding urges, a quantitative review revealed that certain inter-representational dynamics (conflicts between action plans, as when holding one's breath) reliably engender fundamental aspects both of the phenomenology of agency and of 'something countering the will of the self'. The neural correlates of such dynamics, for both primordial urges (e.g., air hunger) and urges elicited in laboratory interference tasks, are entertained. In addition, we discuss the implications of this unique perspective for the study of disorders involving agency.

Spatiotemporal tuning of the facilitation of biological motion perception by concurrent motor execution

The execution of motor behavior influences concurrent visual action observation and especially the perception of biological motion. The neural mechanisms underlying this interaction between perception and motor execution are not exactly known. In addition, the available experimental evidence is partially inconsistent because previous studies have reported facilitation as well as impairments of action perception by concurrent execution. Exploiting a novel virtual reality paradigm, we investigated the spatiotemporal tuning of the influence of motor execution on the perception of biological motion within a signal-detection task. Human observers were presented with point-light stimuli that were controlled by their own movements. Participants had to detect a point-light arm in a scrambled mask, either while executing waving movements or without concurrent motor execution (baseline). The temporal and spatial coherence between the observed and executed movements was parametrically varied. We found a systematic tuning of the facilitatory versus inhibitory influences of motor execution on biological motion detection with respect to the temporal and the spatial congruency between observed and executed movements. Specifically, we found a gradual transition between facilitatory and inhibitory interactions for decreasing temporal synchrony and spatial congruency. This result provides evidence for a spatiotemporally highly selective coupling between dynamic motor representations and neural structures involved in the visual processing of biological motion. In addition, our study offers a unifying explanation that reconciles contradicting results about modulatory effects of motor execution on biological motion perception in previous studies.

Leg muscle vibration modulates bodily self-consciousness: integration of proprioceptive, visual, and tactile signals

Behavioral studies have used visuo-tactile conflicts between a participant's body and a visually presented fake or virtual body to investigate the importance of bodily perception for self-consciousness (bodily self-consciousness). Illusory self-identification with a fake body and changes in tactile processing—modulation of visuo-tactile cross-modal congruency effects (CCEs)—were reported in previous findings. Although proprioceptive signals are deemed important for bodily self-consciousness, their contribution to the representation of the full body has not been studied. Here we investigated whether and how self-identification and tactile processing (CCE magnitude) could be modified by altering proprioceptive signals with 80-Hz vibrations at the legs. Participants made elevation judgments of tactile cues (while ignoring nearby lights) during synchronous and asynchronous stroking of a seen fake body. We found that proprioceptive signals during vibrations altered the magnitude of self-identification and mislocalization of touch (CCE) in a synchrony-dependent fashion: we observed an increase of self-identification and CCE magnitude during asynchronous stroking. In a second control experiment we studied whether proprioceptive signals per se, or those from the lower limbs in particular, were essential for these changes. We applied vibrations at the upper limbs (which provide no information about the position of the participant's body in space) and in this case observed no modulation of bodily self-consciousness or tactile perception. These data link proprioceptive signals from the legs that are conveyed through the dorsal column-medial lemniscal pathway to bodily self-consciousness. We discuss their integration with bodily signals from vision and touch for full-body representations.

Proprioceptive pathways to posterior parietal areas MIP and LIPv from the dorsal column nuclei and the postcentral somatosensory cortex

The posterior parietal cortex (PPC) serves as an interface between sensory and motor cortices by integrating multisensory signals with motor-related information. Sensorimotor transformation of somatosensory signals is crucial for the generation and updating of body representations and movement plans. Using retrograde transneuronal transfer of rabies virus in combination with a conventional tracer, we identified direct and polysynaptic somatosensory pathways to two posterior parietal areas, the ventral lateral intraparietal area (LIPv) and the rostral part of the medial intraparietal area (MIP) in macaque monkeys. In addition to direct projections from somatosensory areas 2v and 3a, respectively, we found that LIPv and MIP receive disynaptic inputs from the dorsal column nuclei as directly as these somatosensory areas, via a parallel channel. LIPv is the target of minor neck muscle-related projections from the cuneate (Cu) and the external cuneate nuclei (ECu), and direct projections from area 2v, that likely carry kinesthetic/vestibular/optokinetic-related signals. In contrast, MIP receives major arm and shoulder proprioceptive inputs disynaptically from the rostral Cu and ECu, and trisynaptically (via area 3a) from caudal portions of these nuclei. These findings have important implications for the understanding of the influence of proprioceptive information on movement control operations of the PPC and the formation of body representations. They also contribute to explain the specific deficits of proprioceptive guidance of movement associated to optic ataxia.

First-rank symptoms in schizophrenia: reexamining mechanisms of self-recognition

Disturbances of self are a common feature of schizophrenic psychopathology, with patients reporting that their thoughts and actions are controlled by external forces, as shown in first-rank symptoms (FRS). One widely accepted explanatory model of FRS suggests a deficiency in the internal forward model system. Recent studies in the field of cognitive sciences, however, have generated new insights into how complex sensory and motor systems contribute to the sense of self-recognition, and it is becoming clear that the forward model conceptualization does not have unique access to representations about the self. We briefly evaluate the forward model explanation of FRS, reassess the distinction made between the sense of agency and body ownership, and outline recent developments in 4 domains of sensory-motor control that have supplemented our understanding of the processes underlying the sense of self-recognition. The application of these findings to FRS will open up new research directions into the processes underlying these symptoms.

Illusory movements of a phantom hand grade with the duration and magnitude of motor commands

The senses of limb movement and position are critical for accurate control of movement. Recent studies show that central signals of motor command contribute to the sense of limb position but it is not clear whether such signals influence the distinctly different sense of limb movement. Nine subjects participated in two experiments in which we inflated a cuff around their upper arm to produce an ischaemic block, paralysing and anaesthetising the forearm, wrist and hand. This produces an experimental phantom wrist and hand. With their arm hidden from view subjects were asked to make voluntary efforts with their blocked wrist. In the first experiment, efforts were 20 and 40% of maximum and were 2 and 4 s in duration. The second experiment used 1 and 5 s efforts of 5 and 50% of maximum. Subjects signalled perceived movements of their phantom wrist using a pointer. All subjects reported clear perceptions of movement of their phantom hand for all levels and durations of effort. On average, subjects perceived their phantom wrist to move between 16.4 +/- 3.3 deg (mean +/- 95% confidence interval (CI)) and 30.2 +/- 5.4 deg in the first experiment and between 10.3 +/- 3.5 and 38.6 +/- 6.7 deg in the second. The velocity of the movements and total displacement of the phantom graded with the level of effort, and the total displacement also graded with duration. Hence, we have shown that motor command signals have a novel proprioceptive role in the perception of movement of human joints.

The "sense of agency" and its underlying cognitive and neural mechanisms

The sense of agency is a central aspect of human self-consciousness and refers to the experience of oneself as the agent of one's own actions. Several different cognitive theories on the sense of agency have been proposed implying divergent empirical approaches and results, especially with respect to neural correlates. A multifactorial and multilevel model of the sense of agency may provide the most constructive framework for integrating divergent theories and findings, meeting the complex nature of this intriguing phenomenon.

I move, therefore I am: a new theoretical framework to investigate agency and ownership

The neurocognitive structure of the acting self has recently been widely studied, yet is still perplexing and remains an often confounded issue in cognitive neuroscience, psychopathology and philosophy. We provide a new systematic account of two of its main features, the sense of agency and the sense of ownership, demonstrating that although both features appear as phenomenally uniform, they each in fact are complex crossmodal phenomena of largely heterogeneous functional and (self-)representational levels. These levels can be arranged within a gradually evolving, onto- and phylogenetically plausible framework which proceeds from basic non-conceptual sensorimotor processes to more complex conceptual and meta-representational processes of agency and ownership, respectively. In particular, three fundamental levels of agency and ownership processing have to be distinguished: The level of feeling, thinking and social interaction. This naturalistic account will not only allow to "ground the self in action", but also provide an empirically testable taxonomy for cognitive neuroscience and a new tool for disentangling agency and ownership disturbances in psychopathology (e.g. alien hand, anarchic hand, anosognosia for one's own hemiparesis).