Role for presupplementary motor area in inhibition of cognitive set interference

Set-Shifting Deficits: A Possible Neurocognitive Endophenotype for Tourette Syndrome Without ADHD

OBJECTIVE

Tourette syndrome (TS) can be associated with cognitive dysfunction. We assessed a range of cognitive abilities in adults with TS without comorbid disorders.

METHOD

Participants completed tests of sustained attention, verbal and non-verbal reasoning, comprehension, verbal fluency, working memory, inhibition, and set-shifting. We compared patients' task performance with that of healthy controls, and evaluated relationships between cognitive abilities and symptoms of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), ADHD, impulse control problems, and mood disorders.

RESULTS

Patients with TS exhibited impairments on four measures assessing response inhibition, fine motor control, set-shifting, and sustained attention. The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) discriminated best between patients and controls. Patients' deficits were not correlated with tic severity or symptoms related to OCD, ADHD, or mood disorders.

CONCLUSION

Deficits on the WCST could constitute a neurocognitive endophenotype for TS, reflecting dysfunction within neural networks involving basal ganglia, pre-supplementary motor area, and inferior prefrontal regions.

Alterations in the functional neural circuitry supporting flexible choice behavior in autism spectrum disorders

Restricted and repetitive behaviors, and a pronounced preference for behavioral and environmental consistency, are distinctive characteristics of autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Alterations in frontostriatal circuitry that supports flexible behavior might underlie this behavioral impairment. In an functional magnetic resonance imaging study of 17 individuals with ASD, and 23 age-, gender- and IQ-matched typically developing control participants, reversal learning tasks were used to assess behavioral flexibility as participants switched from one learned response choice to a different response choice when task contingencies changed. When choice outcome after reversal was uncertain, the ASD group demonstrated reduced activation in both frontal cortex and ventral striatum, in the absence of task performance differences. When the outcomes of novel responses were certain, there was no difference in brain activation between groups. Reduced activation in frontal cortex and ventral striatum suggest problems in decision-making and response planning, and in processing reinforcement cues, respectively. These processes, and their integration, are essential for flexible behavior. Alterations in these systems may therefore contribute to a rigid adherence to preferred behavioral patterns in individuals with an ASD. These findings provide an additional impetus for the use of reversal learning paradigms as a translational model for treatment development targeting the domain of restricted and repetitive behaviors in ASD.

A dual but asymmetric role of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex in response inhibition and switching from a non-salient to salient action

Response inhibition and salience detection are among the most studied psychological constructs of cognitive control. Despite a growing body of work, how inhibition and salience processing interact and engage regional brain activations remains unclear. Here, we examined this issue in a stop signal task (SST), where a prepotent response needs to be inhibited to allow an alternative, less dominant response. Sixteen adult individuals performed two versions of the SST each with 25% (SST25) and 75% (SST75) of stop trials. We posited that greater regional activations to the infrequent trial type in each condition (i.e., to stop as compared to go trials in SST25 and to go as compared to stop trials in SST75) support salience detection. Further, successful inhibition in stop trials requires attention to the stop signal to trigger motor inhibition, and the stop signal reaction time (SSRT) has been used to index the efficiency of motor response inhibition. Therefore, greater regional activations to stop as compared to go success trials in association with the stop signal reaction time (SSRT) serve to expedite response inhibition. In support of an interactive role, the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) increases activation to salience detection in both SST25 and SST75, but only mediates response inhibition in SST75. Thus, infrequency response in the dACC supports motor inhibition only when stopping has become a routine. In contrast, although the evidence is less robust, the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) increases activity to the infrequent stimulus and supports inhibition in both SST25 and SST75. These findings clarify a unique role of the dACC and add to the literature that distinguishes dACC and pre-SMA functions in cognitive control.

Predicting clinical outcome using brain activation associated with set-shifting and central coherence skills in Anorexia Nervosa

BACKGROUND

Patients with Anorexia Nervosa (AN) have neuropsychological deficits in Set-Shifting (SS) and central coherence (CC) consistent with an inflexible thinking style and overly detailed processing style, respectively. This study investigates brain activation during SS and CC tasks in patients with AN and tests whether this activation is a biomarker that predicts response to treatment.

METHODS

FMRI data were collected from 21 females with AN while performing an SS task (the Wisconsin Card Sort) and a CC task (embedded figures), and used to predict outcome following 16 weeks of treatment (either 16 weeks of cognitive behavioral therapy or 8 weeks cognitive remediation therapy followed by 8 weeks of cognitive behavioral therapy).

RESULTS

Significant activation during the SS task included bilateral dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and left anterior middle frontal gyrus. Higher scores on the neuropsychological test of SS (measured outside the scanner at baseline) were correlated with greater DLPFC and VLPFC/insula activation. Improvements in SS following treatment were significantly predicted by a combination of low VLPFC/insula and high anterior middle frontal activation (R squared = .68, p = .001). For the CC task, visual and parietal cortical areas were activated, but were not significantly correlated with neuropsychological measures of CC and did not predict outcome.

CONCLUSION

Cognitive flexibility requires the support of several prefrontal cortex resources. As previous studies suggest that the VLPFC is important for selecting context-appropriate responses, patients who have difficulties with this skill may benefit the most from cognitive therapy with or without cognitive remediation therapy. The ability to sustain inhibition of an unwanted response, subserved by the anterior middle frontal gyrus, is a cognitive feature that predicts favorable outcome to cognitive treatment. CC deficits may not be an effective predictor of clinical outcome.

Blocking of irrelevant memories by posterior alpha activity boosts memory encoding

In our daily lives, we are confronted with a large amount of information. Because only a small fraction can be encoded in long-term memory, the brain must rely on powerful mechanisms to filter out irrelevant information. To understand the neuronal mechanisms underlying the gating of information into long-term memory, we employed a paradigm where the encoding was directed by a "Remember" or a "No-Remember" cue. We found that posterior alpha activity increased prior to the "No-Remember" stimuli, whereas it decreased prior to the "Remember" stimuli. The sources were localized in the parietal cortex included in the dorsal attention network. Subjects with a larger cue-modulation of the alpha activity had better memory for the to-be-remembered items. Interestingly, alpha activity reflecting successful inhibition following the "No-Remember" cue was observed in the frontal midline structures suggesting preparatory inhibition was mediated by anterior parts of the dorsal attention network. During the presentation of the memory items, there was more gamma activity for the "Remember" compared to the "No-Remember" items in the same regions. Importantly, the anticipatory alpha power during cue predicted the gamma power during item. Our findings suggest that top-down controlled alpha activity reflects attentional inhibition of sensory processing in the dorsal attention network, which then finally gates information to long-term memory. This gating is achieved by inhibiting the processing of visual information reflected by neuronal synchronization in the gamma band. In conclusion, the functional architecture revealed by region-specific changes in the alpha activity reflects attentional modulation which has consequences for long-term memory encoding.

What makes the dorsomedial frontal cortex active during reading the mental states of others?

The dorsomedial frontal part of the cerebral cortex is consistently activated when people read the mental states of others, such as their beliefs, desires, and intentions, the ability known as having a theory of mind (ToM) or mentalizing. This ubiquitous finding has led many researchers to conclude that the dorsomedial frontal cortex (DMFC) constitutes a core component in mentalizing networks. Despite this, it remains unclear why the DMFC becomes active during ToM tasks. We argue that key psychological and behavioral aspects in mentalizing are closely associated with DMFC functions. These include executive inhibition, distinction between self and others, prediction under uncertainty, and perception of intentions, all of which are important for predicting others' intention and behavior. We review the literature supporting this claim, ranging in fields from developmental psychology to human neuroimaging and macaque electrophysiology. Because perceiving intentions in others' actions initiates mentalizing and forms the basis of virtually all types of social interaction, the fundamental issue in social neuroscience is to determine the aspects of physical entities that make an observer perceive that they are intentional beings and to clarify the neurobiological underpinnings of the perception of intentionality in others' actions.

Functional imaging of brain responses to different outcomes of hypothesis testing: revealed in a category induction task

Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was used to examine differences in brain activation that occur when a person receives the different outcomes of hypothesis testing (HT). Participants were provided with a series of images of batteries and were asked to learn a rule governing what kinds of batteries were charged. Within each trial, the first two charged batteries were sequentially displayed, and participants would generate a preliminary hypothesis based on the perceptual comparison. Next, a third battery that served to strengthen, reject, or was irrelevant to the preliminary hypothesis was displayed. The fMRI results revealed that (1) no significant differences in brain activation were found between the 2 hypothesis-maintain conditions (i.e., strengthen and irrelevant conditions); and (2) compared with the hypothesis-maintain conditions, the hypothesis-reject condition activated the left medial frontal cortex, bilateral putamen, left parietal cortex, and right cerebellum. These findings are discussed in terms of the neural correlates of the subcomponents of HT and working memory manipulation.

The what and how components of cognitive control

In daily life, people show remarkable flexibility in adapting to novel circumstances. Although there is general agreement on which brain areas are involved in cognitive flexibility, little is known about the precise representational content of these cognitive control areas in different sub-processes involved in cognitive control. In the present study, we used an adaptation approach to differentiate the brain areas selectively representing the what and the how components of cognitive control in task preparation. When selectively repeating the task goal (the what component) without repeating the stimulus-response (S-R) mapping (the how component), task goal preferential adaptation was found in the left lateral prefrontal cortex, the medial prefrontal cortex and the left posterior parietal cortex. Within these areas, task goal specific adaptation was found in the left inferior frontal gyrus, the posterior part of the left inferior parietal lobule and the precuneus. Selectively repeating the S-R mapping, by contrast, resulted in S-R mapping preferential adaptation in the bilateral pre-central gyrus extending bilaterally to the intra-parietal lobule, indicating representation of the how component in these areas. Adaptation general to both task goal and S-R mapping was only found in Broca's area extending to the inferior frontal junction, suggesting that the what and the how components of cognitive control are similarly represented in this part of the brain.

A neuroanatomical model of prefrontal inhibitory modulation of memory retrieval

Memory of past experience is essential for guiding goal-related behavior. Being able to control accessibility of memory through modulation of retrieval enables humans to flexibly adapt to their environment. Understanding the specific neural pathways of how this control is achieved has largely eluded cognitive neuroscience. Accordingly, in the current paper I review literature that examines the overt control over retrieval in order to reduce accessibility. I first introduce three hypotheses of inhibition of retrieval. These hypotheses involve: (i) attending to other stimuli as a form of diversionary attention, (ii) inhibiting the specific individual neural representation of the memory, and (iii) inhibiting the hippocampus and retrieval process more generally to prevent reactivation of the representation. I then analyze literature taken from the White Bear Suppression, Directed Forgetting and Think/No-Think tasks to provide evidence for these hypotheses. Finally, a neuroanatomical model is developed to indicate three pathways from PFC to the hippocampal complex that support inhibition of memory retrieval. Describing these neural pathways increases our understanding of control over memory in general.