Contextual processing of abstract concepts reveals neural representations of nonlinguistic semantic content

The hippocampus supports the representation of abstract concepts: Implications for the study of recognition memory

Words, unlike images, are symbolic representations. The associative details inherent within a word's meaning and the visual imagery it generates, are inextricably connected to the way words are processed and represented. It is well recognised that the hippocampus associatively binds components of a memory to form a lasting representation, and here we show that the hippocampus is especially sensitive to abstract word processing. Using fMRI during recognition, we found that the increased abstractness of words produced increased hippocampal activation regardless of memory outcome. Interestingly, word recollection produced hippocampal activation regardless of word content, while the parahippocampal cortex was sensitive to concreteness of word representations, regardless of memory outcome. We reason that the hippocampus has assumed a critical role in the representation of uncontextualized abstract word meaning, as its information-binding ability allows the retrieval of the semantic and visual associates that, when bound together, generate the abstract concept represented by word symbols. These insights have implications for research on word representation, memory, and hippocampal function, perhaps shedding light on how the human brain has adapted to encode and represent abstract concepts.

The anatomical structure of sex differences in trust propensity: A voxel-based morphometry study

Trust is a key component of human relationships. Sex differences in trust behavior have been elucidated by parental investment theory and social role theory, attributing men's higher trust propensity to their increased engagement in physically and socially risky activities aimed at securing additional resources. Although sex differences in trust behavior exist and the neuropsychological signatures of trust are known, the underlying anatomical structure of sex differences is still unexplored. Our study aimed to investigate the anatomical structure of sex differences in trust behavior toward strangers (i.e., trust propensity, TP) by employing voxel-based morphometry (VBM) in a sample of healthy young adults. We collected behavioral data for TP as measured with participants in the role of trustors completing the one-shot trust game (TG) with anonymous partners as trustees. We conducted primary region of interest (ROI) and exploratory whole-brain (WB) VBM analyses of high-resolution structural images to test for the association between TP and regional gray matter volume (GMV) associated with sex differences. Confirming previous studies, our behavioral results demonstrated that men trusted more than women during the one-shot TG. Our WB analysis showed a greater GMV related to TP in men than women in the precuneus (PreC), whereas our ROI analysis in regions of the default-mode network (dorsomedial prefrontal cortex [dmPFC], PreC, superior temporal gyrus) to simulate the partner's trustworthiness, central-executive network (ventrolateral PFC) to implement a calculus-based trust strategy, and action-perception network (precentral gyrus) to performance cost-benefit calculations, as proposed by a neuropsychoeconomic model of trust. Our findings advance the neuropsychological understanding of sex differences in TP, which has implications for interpersonal partnerships, financial transactions, and societal engagements.

Experiential grounding of abstract concepts: Processing of abstract mental state concepts engages brain regions involved in mentalizing, automatic speech, and lip movements

concepts like mental state concepts lack a physical referent, which can be directly perceived. Classical theories therefore claim that abstract concepts require amodal representations detached from experiential brain systems. However, grounded cognition approaches suggest an involvement of modal experiential brain regions in the processing of abstract concepts. In the present functional magnetic resonance imaging study, we investigated the relation of the processing of abstract mental state concepts to modal experiential brain systems in a fine-grained fashion. Participants performed lexical decisions on abstract mental state as well as on verbal association concepts as control category. Experiential brain systems related to the processing of mental states, generating verbal associations, automatic speech as well as hand and lip movements were determined by corresponding localizer tasks. Processing of abstract mental state concepts neuroanatomically overlapped with activity patterns associated with processing of mental states, generating verbal associations, automatic speech and lip movements. Hence, mental state concepts activate the mentalizing brain network, complemented by perceptual-motor brain regions involved in simulation of visual or action features associated with social interactions, linguistic brain regions as well as face-motor brain regions recruited for articulation. The present results provide compelling evidence for the rich grounding of abstract mental state concepts in experiential brain systems related to mentalizing, verbal communication and mouth action.

Spatiotemporal dynamics of abstract and concrete semantic representations

Dual Coding Theories (DCT) suggest that meaning is represented in the brain by a double code: a language-derived code in the Anterior Temporal Lobe (ATL) and a sensory-derived code in perceptual and motor regions. Concrete concepts should activate both codes, while abstract ones rely solely on the linguistic code. To test these hypotheses, the present magnetoencephalography (MEG) experiment had participants judge whether visually presented words relate to the senses while we recorded brain responses to abstract and concrete semantic components obtained from 65 independently rated semantic features. Results evidenced early involvement of anterior-temporal and inferior-frontal brain areas in both abstract and concrete semantic information encoding. At later stages, occipital and occipito-temporal regions showed greater responses to concrete compared to abstract features. The present findings suggest that the concreteness of words is processed first with a transmodal/linguistic code, housed in frontotemporal brain systems, and only after with an imagistic/sensorimotor code in perceptual regions.

The impact of sociality and affective valence on brain activation: A meta-analysis

Thirty years of neuroimaging reveal the set of brain regions consistently associated with pleasant and unpleasant affect in humans-or the neural reference space for valence. Yet some of humans' most potent affective states occur in the context of other humans. Prior work has yet to differentiate how the neural reference space for valence varies as a product of the sociality of affective stimuli. To address this question, we meta-analyzed across 614 social and non-social affective neuroimaging contrasts, summarizing the brain regions that are consistently activated for social and non-social affective information. We demonstrate that across the literature, social and non-social affective stimuli yield overlapping activations within regions associated with visceromotor control, including the amygdala, hypothalamus, anterior cingulate cortex and insula. However, we find that social processing differs from non-social affective processing in that it involves additional cortical activations in the medial prefrontal and posterior cingulum that have been associated with mentalizing and prediction. A Bayesian classifier was able to differentiate unpleasant from pleasant affect, but not social from non-social affective states. Moreover, it was not able to classify unpleasantness from pleasantness at the highest levels of sociality. These findings suggest that highly social scenarios may be equally salient to humans, regardless of their valence.

Social semantics: the organization and grounding of abstract concepts

concepts, like justice and friendship, are central features of our daily lives. Traditionally, abstract concepts are distinguished from other concepts in that they cannot be directly experienced through the senses. As such, they pose a challenge for strongly embodied models of semantic representation that assume a central role for sensorimotor information. There is growing recognition, however, that it is possible for meaning to be 'grounded' via cognitive systems, including those involved in processing language and emotion. In this article, we focus on the specific proposal that social significance is a key feature in the representation of some concepts. We begin by reviewing recent evidence in favour of this proposal from the fields of psycholinguistics and neuroimaging. We then discuss the limited extent to which there is consensus about the definition of 'socialness' and propose essential next steps for research in this domain. Taking one such step, we describe preliminary data from an unprecedented large-scale rating study that can help determine how socialness is distinct from other facets of word meaning. We provide a backdrop of contemporary theories regarding semantic representation and social cognition and highlight important predictions for both brain and behaviour. This article is part of the theme issue 'Concepts in interaction: social engagement and inner experiences'.

Coexistence of the social semantic effect and non-semantic effect in the default mode network

Neuroimaging studies have found both semantic and non-semantic effects in the default mode network (DMN), leading to an intense debate on the role of the DMN in semantic processes. Four different views have been proposed: (1) the general semantic view holds that the DMN contains several hub regions supporting general semantic processes; (2) the non-semantic view holds that the semantic effects observed in the DMN (especially the ventral angular gyrus) are confounded by difficulty and do not reflect semantic processing per se; (3) the multifunction view holds that the same areas in the DMN can support both semantic and non-semantic functions; and (4) the multisystem view holds that the DMN contains multiple subnetworks supporting different aspects of semantic processes separately. Using an fMRI experiment, we found that in one of the subnetworks of the DMN, called the social semantic network, all areas showed social semantic activation and difficulty-induced deactivation. The distributions of two non-semantic effects, that is, difficulty-induced and task-induced deactivations, showed dissociation in the DMN. In the bilateral angular gyri, the ventral subdivisions showed social semantic activation independent of difficulty, while the dorsal subdivisions showed no semantic effect but difficulty-induced activation. Our findings provide two insights into the semantic and non-semantic functions of the DMN, which are consistent with both the multisystem and multifunction views: first, the same areas of the DMN can support both social semantic and non-semantic functions; second, similar to the multiple semantic effects of the DMN, the non-semantic effects also vary across its subsystems.

Meta-analytic evidence for a novel hierarchical model of conceptual processing

Conceptual knowledge plays a pivotal role in human cognition. Grounded cognition theories propose that concepts consist of perceptual-motor features represented in modality-specific perceptual-motor cortices. However, it is unclear whether conceptual processing consistently engages modality-specific areas. Here, we performed an activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analysis across 212 neuroimaging experiments on conceptual processing related to 7 perceptual-motor modalities (action, sound, visual shape, motion, color, olfaction-gustation, and emotion). We found that conceptual processing consistently engages brain regions also activated during real perceptual-motor experience of the same modalities. In addition, we identified multimodal convergence zones that are recruited for multiple modalities. In particular, the left inferior parietal lobe (IPL) and posterior middle temporal gyrus (pMTG) are engaged for three modalities: action, motion, and sound. These "trimodal" regions are surrounded by "bimodal" regions engaged for two modalities. Our findings support a novel model of the conceptual system, according to which conceptual processing relies on a hierarchical neural architecture from modality-specific to multimodal areas up to an amodal hub.

Academic training increases grounding of scientific concepts in experiential brain systems

Scientific concepts typically transcendent our sensory experiences. Traditional approaches to science education therefore assume a shift towards amodal or verbal knowledge representations during academic training. Grounded cognition approaches, in contrast, predict a maintenance of grounding of the concepts in experiential brain networks or even an increase. To test these competing approaches, the present study investigated the semantic content of scientific psychological concepts and identified the corresponding neural circuits using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in undergraduate psychology students (beginners) and in graduated psychologists (advanced learners). During fMRI scanning, participants were presented with words denoting scientific psychological concepts within a lexical decision task (e.g. "conditioning", "habituation"). The individual semantic property content of each concept was related to brain activity during abstract concept processing. In both beginners and advanced learners, visual and motor properties activated brain regions also involved in perception and action, while mental state properties increased activity in brain regions also recruited by emotional-social scene observation. Only in advanced learners, social constellation properties elicited brain activity overlapping with emotional-social scene observation. In line with grounded cognition approaches, the present results highlight the importance of experiential information for constituting the meaning of abstract scientific concepts during the course of academic training.

Task-Dependent Warping of Semantic Representations during Search for Visual Action Categories

Object and action perception in cluttered dynamic natural scenes relies on efficient allocation of limited brain resources to prioritize the attended targets over distractors. It has been suggested that during visual search for objects, distributed semantic representation of hundreds of object categories is warped to expand the representation of targets. Yet, little is known about whether and where in the brain visual search for action categories modulates semantic representations. To address this fundamental question, we studied brain activity recorded from five subjects (one female) via functional magnetic resonance imaging while they viewed natural movies and searched for either communication or locomotion actions. We find that attention directed to action categories elicits tuning shifts that warp semantic representations broadly across neocortex and that these shifts interact with intrinsic selectivity of cortical voxels for target actions. These results suggest that attention serves to facilitate task performance during social interactions by dynamically shifting semantic selectivity toward target actions and that tuning shifts are a general feature of conceptual representations in the brain.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The ability to swiftly perceive the actions and intentions of others is a crucial skill for humans that relies on efficient allocation of limited brain resources to prioritize the attended targets over distractors. However, little is known about the nature of high-level semantic representations during natural visual search for action categories. Here, we provide the first evidence showing that attention significantly warps semantic representations by inducing tuning shifts in single cortical voxels, broadly spread across occipitotemporal, parietal, prefrontal, and cingulate cortices. This dynamic attentional mechanism can facilitate action perception by efficiently allocating neural resources to accentuate the representation of task-relevant action categories.

Differential temporo-spatial pattern of electrical brain activity during the processing of abstract concepts related to mental states and verbal associations

Refined grounded cognition accounts propose that abstract concepts might be grounded in brain circuits involved in mentalizing. In the present event-related potential (ERP) study, we compared the time course of neural processing in response to semantically predefined abstract mental states and verbal association concepts during a lexical decision task. In addition to scalp ERPs, source estimates of underlying volume brain activity were determined to reveal spatio-temporal clusters of greater electrical brain activity to abstract mental state vs. verbal association concepts, and vice versa. Source estimates suggested early (onset 194 ms), but short-lived enhanced activity (offset 210 ms) to verbal association concepts in left occipital regions. Increased occipital activity might reflect retrieval of visual word form or access to visual conceptual features of associated words. Increased estimated source activity to mental state concepts was obtained in visuo-motor (superior parietal, pre- and postcentral areas) and mentalizing networks (lateral and medial prefrontal areas, insula, precuneus, temporo-parietal junction) with an onset of 212 ms, which extended to later time windows. The time course data indicated two processing phases: An initial conceptual access phase, in which linguistic and modal brain circuits rapidly process features depending on their relevance, and a later conceptual elaboration phase, in which elaborative processing within feature-specific networks further refines the concept. This study confirms the proposal that abstract concepts are based on representations in distinct neural circuits depending on their semantic feature content. The present research also highlights the importance of investigating sets of abstract concepts with a defined semantic content.

Personality Traits Induce Different Brain Patterns When Processing Social and Valence Information

This paper shows the brain correlates of Cloninger’s personality model during the presentation of social scenarios under positive or negative valence situations. Social scenarios were constructed when participants played the Dictator game with two confederates that had two opposites roles as the cooperator (Coop) and non-cooperator (NoCoop). Later the same day during a fMRI scanning session, participants read negative (Neg) and positive (Pos) situations that happened to confederates in the past. Participants were asked to think “how do you think those people felt during that situation?” A dissimilarity matrix between stimuli were obtained from fMRI results. Results shown that Harm Avoidance trait people make use of right middle frontal gyrus and left superior frontal gyrus to discriminate between Coop and NoCoop. Cooperation as a trait makes use of the right superior temporal gyrus and the right precuneus to discriminate between Coop and NoCoop in positive social scenarios. Finally, Self-directedness trait people make use of the right inferior parietal lobe to discriminate between Coop and NoCoop in negative social scenarios and the right precuneus to discriminate between Coop and Strangers. An intuitive link between discrimination findings and behavioral patterns of those personality traits is proposed.

Evidence for the Concreteness of Abstract Language: A Meta-Analysis of Neuroimaging Studies

The neural mechanisms subserving the processing of abstract concepts remain largely debated. Even within the embodiment theoretical framework, most authors suggest that abstract concepts are coded in a linguistic propositional format, although they do not completely deny the role of sensorimotor and emotional experiences in coding it. To our knowledge, only one recent proposal puts forward that the processing of concrete and abstract concepts relies on the same mechanisms, with the only difference being in the complexity of the underlying experiences. In this paper, we performed a meta-analysis using the Activation Likelihood Estimates (ALE) method on 33 functional neuroimaging studies that considered activations related to abstract and concrete concepts. The results suggest that (1) concrete and abstract concepts share the recruitment of the temporo-fronto-parietal circuits normally involved in the interactions with the physical world, (2) processing concrete concepts recruits fronto-parietal areas better than abstract concepts, and (3) abstract concepts recruit Broca's region more strongly than concrete ones. Based on anatomical and physiological evidence, Broca's region is not only a linguistic region mainly devoted to speech production, but it is endowed with complex motor representations of different biological effectors. Hence, we propose that the stronger recruitment of this region for abstract concepts is expression of the complex sensorimotor experiences underlying it, rather than evidence of a purely linguistic format of its processing.

In search of different categories of abstract concepts: a fMRI adaptation study

Concrete conceptual knowledge is supported by a distributed neural network representing different semantic features according to the neuroanatomy of sensory and motor systems. If and how this framework applies to abstract knowledge is currently debated. Here we investigated the specific brain correlates of different abstract categories. After a systematic a priori selection of brain regions involved in semantic cognition, i.e. responsible of, respectively, semantic representations and cognitive control, we used a fMRI-adaptation paradigm with a passive reading task, in order to modulate the neural response to abstract (emotions, cognitions, attitudes, human actions) and concrete (biological entities, artefacts) categories. Different portions of the left anterior temporal lobe responded selectively to abstract and concrete concepts. Emotions and attitudes adapted the left middle temporal gyrus, whereas concrete items adapted the left fusiform gyrus. Our results suggest that, similarly to concrete concepts, some categories of abstract knowledge have specific brain correlates corresponding to the prevalent semantic dimensions involved in their representation.

Modelling concrete and abstract concepts using brain-constrained deep neural networks

A neurobiologically constrained deep neural network mimicking cortical areas relevant for sensorimotor, linguistic and conceptual processing was used to investigate the putative biological mechanisms underlying conceptual category formation and semantic feature extraction. Networks were trained to learn neural patterns representing specific objects and actions relevant to semantically 'ground' concrete and abstract concepts. Grounding sets consisted of three grounding patterns with neurons representing specific perceptual or action-related features; neurons were either unique to one pattern or shared between patterns of the same set. Concrete categories were modelled as pattern triplets overlapping in their 'shared neurons', thus implementing semantic feature sharing of all instances of a category. In contrast, abstract concepts had partially shared feature neurons common to only pairs of category instances, thus, exhibiting family resemblance, but lacking full feature overlap. Stimulation with concrete and abstract conceptual patterns and biologically realistic unsupervised learning caused formation of strongly connected cell assemblies (CAs) specific to individual grounding patterns, whose neurons were spread out across all areas of the deep network. After learning, the shared neurons of the instances of concrete concepts were more prominent in central areas when compared with peripheral sensorimotor ones, whereas for abstract concepts the converse pattern of results was observed, with central areas exhibiting relatively fewer neurons shared between pairs of category members. We interpret these results in light of the current knowledge about the relative difficulty children show when learning abstract words. Implications for future neurocomputational modelling experiments as well as neurobiological theories of semantic representation are discussed.

An ALE meta-analytical review of the neural correlates of abstract and concrete words

Several clinical studies have reported a double dissociation between abstract and concrete concepts, suggesting that they are processed by at least partly different networks in the brain. However, neuroimaging data seem not in line with neuropsychological reports. Using the ALE method, we run a meta-analysis on 32 brain-activation imaging studies that considered only nouns and verbs. Five clusters were associated with concrete words, four clusters with abstract words. When only nouns were selected three left activation clusters were found to be associated with concrete stimuli and only one with abstract nouns (left IFG). These results confirm that concrete and abstract words processing involves at least partially segregated brain areas, the IFG being relevant for abstract nouns and verbs while more posterior temporoparietal-occipital regions seem to be crucial for processing concrete words, in contrast with the neuropsychological literature that suggests a temporal anterior involvement for concrete words. We investigated the possible reasons that produce different outcomes in neuroimaging and clinical studies.

Rapid microstructural plasticity in the cortical semantic network following a short language learning session

Despite the clear importance of language in our life, our vital ability to quickly and effectively learn new words and meanings is neurobiologically poorly understood. Conventional knowledge maintains that language learning—especially in adulthood—is slow and laborious. Furthermore, its structural basis remains unclear. Even though behavioural manifestations of learning are evident near instantly, previous neuroimaging work across a range of semantic categories has largely studied neural changes associated with months or years of practice. Here, we address rapid neuroanatomical plasticity accompanying new lexicon acquisition, specifically focussing on the learning of action-related language, which has been linked to the brain’s motor systems. Our results show that it is possible to measure and to externally modulate (using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of motor cortex) cortical microanatomic reorganisation after mere minutes of new word learning. Learning-induced microstructural changes, as measured by diffusion kurtosis imaging (DKI) and machine learning-based analysis, were evident in prefrontal, temporal, and parietal neocortical sites, likely reflecting integrative lexico-semantic processing and formation of new memory circuits immediately during the learning tasks. These results suggest a structural basis for the rapid neocortical word encoding mechanism and reveal the causally interactive relationship of modal and associative brain regions in supporting learning and word acquisition.

This combined neuroimaging and brain stimulation study reveals rapid and distributed microstructural plasticity after a single immersive language learning session, demonstrating the causal relevance of the motor cortex in encoding the meaning of novel action words.

Thematic and other semantic relations central to abstract (and concrete) concepts

In this article, we discuss multiple types of meaningful (semantic) relations underlying abstract (as compared to concrete) concepts. We adopt the viewpoint that words act as cues to meaning (Elman in Ment Lexicon 6(1):1-34, 2011; Lupyan and Lewis in Lang Cogn Neurosci 34(10):1319-1337, 2019), which is dependent on the dynamic contents of a comprehender's mental model of the situation. This view foregrounds the importance of both linguistic and real-world context as individuals make sense of words, flexibly access relevant knowledge, and understand described events and situations. We discuss theories of, and experimental work on, abstract concepts through the lens of the importance of thematic and other semantic relations. We then tie these findings to the sentence processing literature in which such meaningful relations within sentential contexts are often experimentally manipulated. In this literature, some specific classes/types of abstract words have been studied, although not comprehensively, and with limited connection to the literature on knowledge underlying abstract concepts reviewed herein. We conclude by arguing that the ways in which humans understand relatively more abstract concepts, in particular, can be informed by the careful study of words presented not in isolation, but rather in situational and linguistic contexts, and as a function of individual differences in knowledge, goals, and beliefs.

Different types of abstract concepts: evidence from two neurodegenerative patients

The observation of neurological patients showing selective impairments for specific conceptual categories contributed in the development of semantic memory theories. Here, we studied two patients (P01, P02), affected, respectively, by the semantic variant of Primary Progressive Aphasia (sv-PPA) and Cortico-Basal Syndrome (CBS). An implicit lexical decision task, including concrete (animals, tools) and abstract (emotions, social, quantity) concepts, was administered to patients and healthy controls.P01 and P02 showed an abolished priming effect for social and quantity-related concepts, respectively. This double dissociation suggests a role of different brain areas in representing specific abstract categories, giving insights for current semantic memory theories.

Intangible features extraction in the processing of abstract concepts: Evidence from picture-word priming

Over the last decade, hypotheses ranging from linguistic symbol processing to embodiment have been formulated to account for the content and mechanisms responsible for the representation of abstract concepts. Results of recent studies have suggested that abstract concepts, just like concrete ones, can benefit from knowledge of real-world situational context, but that they can also be processed based on abstract pictures devoid of such situational features. This paper presents two semantic priming experiments to explore such mechanisms further. The first experiment replicates Kuipers, Jones, and Thierry (2018) in a cross-linguistic setting which shows that abstract concepts can be processed from abstract pictures devoid of tangible features. In the second experiment, we studied extraction mechanisms that come into play when participants are presented with abstract and concrete pictures that provide situational information to illustrate target abstract concepts. We expected this facilitatory effect to be limited to concrete picture primes. Our data analysed with both Bayesian and Frequentist tests showed however that even when presented with tangible situational information, the extraction of features still occurred for abstract pictures. We discuss the implications of this with respect to future avenues for studying the processing of abstract concepts.

The multidimensionality of abstract concepts: A systematic review

The neuroscientific study of conceptual representation has largely focused on categories of concrete entities (biological entities, tools…), while abstract knowledge has been less extensively investigated. The possible presence of a categorical organization of abstract knowledge is a debated issue. An embodied cognition framework predicts an organization of the abstract domain into different dimensions, grounded in the brain regions engaged by the corresponding experience. Here we review the types of experience that have been proposed to characterize different categories of abstract concepts, and the evidence supporting a corresponding organization derived from behavioural, neuroimaging (i.e., fMRI, MRI, PET, SPECT), EEG, and neurostimulation (i.e., TMS) studies in healthy and clinical populations. The available data provide substantial converging evidence in favour of the presence of distinct neural representations of social and emotional knowledge, mental states and magnitude concepts, engaging brain systems involved in the corresponding experiences. This evidence is supporting an extension of embodied models of semantic memory organization to several types of abstract knowledge.

Assessing abstract thought and its relation to language with a new nonverbal paradigm: Evidence from aphasia

In recent years, language has been shown to play a number of important cognitive roles over and above the communication of thoughts. One hypothesis gaining support is that language facilitates thought about abstract categories, such as democracy or prediction. To test this proposal, a novel set of semantic memory task trials, designed for assessing abstract thought non-linguistically, were normed for levels of abstractness. The trials were rated as more or less abstract to the degree that answering them required the participant to abstract away from both perceptual features and common setting associations corresponding to the target image. The normed materials were then used with a population of people with aphasia to assess the relationship of abstract thought to language. While the language-impaired group with aphasia showed lower overall accuracy and longer response times than controls in general, of special note is that their response times were significantly longer as a function of a trial's degree of abstractness. Further, the aphasia group's response times in reporting their degree of confidence (a separate, metacognitive measure) were negatively correlated with their language production abilities, with lower language scores predicting longer metacognitive response times. These results provide some support for the hypothesis that language is an important aid to abstract thought and to metacognition about abstract thought.

Building semantic memory from embodied and distributional language experience

Humans seamlessly make sense of a rapidly changing environment, using a seemingly limitless knowledgebase to recognize and adapt to most situations we encounter. This knowledgebase is called semantic memory. Embodied cognition theories suggest that we represent this knowledge through simulation: understanding the meaning of coffee entails reinstantiating the neural states involved in touching, smelling, seeing, and drinking coffee. Distributional semantic theories suggest that we are sensitive to statistical regularities in natural language, and that a cognitive mechanism picks up on these regularities and transforms them into usable semantic representations reflecting the contextual usage of language. These appear to present contrasting views on semantic memory, but do they? Recent years have seen a push toward combining these approaches under a common framework. These hybrid approaches augment our understanding of semantic memory in important ways, but current versions remain unsatisfactory in part because they treat sensory-perceptual and distributional-linguistic data as interacting but distinct types of data that must be combined. We synthesize several approaches which, taken together, suggest that linguistic and embodied experience should instead be considered as inseparably entangled: just as sensory and perceptual systems are reactivated to understand meaning, so are experience-based representations endemic to linguistic processing; further, sensory-perceptual experience is susceptible to the same distributional principles as language experience. This conclusion produces a characterization of semantic memory that accounts for the interdependencies between linguistic and embodied data that arise across multiple timescales, giving rise to concept representations that reflect our shared and unique experiences. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Language Neuroscience > Cognition Linguistics > Language in Mind and Brain.

Images of the unseen: extrapolating visual representations for abstract and concrete words in a data-driven computational model

Theories of grounded cognition assume that conceptual representations are grounded in sensorimotor experience. However, abstract concepts such as jealousy or childhood have no directly associated referents with which such sensorimotor experience can be made; therefore, the grounding of abstract concepts has long been a topic of debate. Here, we propose (a) that systematic relations exist between semantic representations learned from language on the one hand and perceptual experience on the other hand, (b) that these relations can be learned in a bottom-up fashion, and (c) that it is possible to extrapolate from this learning experience to predict expected perceptual representations for words even where direct experience is missing. To test this, we implement a data-driven computational model that is trained to map language-based representations (obtained from text corpora, representing language experience) onto vision-based representations (obtained from an image database, representing perceptual experience), and apply its mapping function onto language-based representations for abstract and concrete words outside the training set. In three experiments, we present participants with these words, accompanied by two images: the image predicted by the model and a random control image. Results show that participants' judgements were in line with model predictions even for the most abstract words. This preference was stronger for more concrete items and decreased for the more abstract ones. Taken together, our findings have substantial implications in support of the grounding of abstract words, suggesting that we can tap into our previous experience to create possible visual representation we don't have.

Prediction of trust propensity from intrinsic brain morphology and functional connectome

Trust forms the basis of virtually all interpersonal relationships. Although significant individual differences characterize trust, the driving neuropsychological signatures behind its heterogeneity remain obscure. Here, we applied a prediction framework in two independent samples of healthy participants to examine the relationship between trust propensity and multimodal brain measures. Our multivariate prediction analyses revealed that trust propensity was predicted by gray matter volume and node strength across multiple regions. The gray matter volume of identified regions further enabled the classification of individuals from an independent sample with the propensity to trust or distrust. Our modular and functional decoding analyses showed that the contributing regions were part of three large‐scale networks implicated in calculus‐based trust strategy, cost–benefit calculation, and trustworthiness inference. These findings do not only deepen our neuropsychological understanding of individual differences in trust propensity, but also provide potential biomarkers in predicting trust impairment in neuropsychiatric disorders.

Challenges and Opportunities for Grounding Cognition

According to the grounded perspective, cognition emerges from the interaction of classic cognitive processes with the modalities, the body, and the environment. Rather than being an autonomous impenetrable module, cognition incorporates these other domains intrinsically into its operation. The Situated Action Cycle offers one way of understanding how the modalities, the body, and the environment become integrated to ground cognition. Seven challenges and opportunities are raised for this perspective: (1) How does cognition emerge from the Situated Action Cycle and in turn support it? (2) How can we move beyond simply equating embodiment with action, additionally establishing how embodiment arises in the autonomic, neuroendocrine, immune, cardiovascular, respiratory, digestive, and integumentary systems? (3) How can we better understand the mechanisms underlying multimodal simulation, its functions across the Situated Action Cycle, and its integration with other representational systems? (4) How can we develop and assess theoretical accounts of symbolic processing from the grounded perspective (perhaps using the construct of simulators)? (5) How can we move beyond the simplistic distinction between concrete and abstract concepts, instead addressing how concepts about the external and internal worlds pattern to support the Situated Action Cycle? (6) How do individual differences emerge from different populations of situational memories as the Situated Action Cycle manifests itself differently across individuals? (7) How can constructs from grounded cognition provide insight into the replication and generalization crises, perhaps from a quantum perspective on mechanisms (as exemplified by simulators).

Time course of brain activity during the processing of motor- and vision-related abstract concepts: flexibility and task dependency

Grounded cognition theories assume that conceptual processing depends on modality-specific brain systems in a context-dependent fashion. Although the relation of abstract concepts to modality-specific systems is less obvious than for concrete concepts, recent behavioral and neuroimaging studies indicated a foundation of abstract concepts in vision and action. However, due to their poor temporal resolution, neuroimaging studies cannot determine whether sensorimotor activity reflects rapid access to conceptual information or later conceptual processes. The present study therefore assessed the time course of abstract concept processing using event-related potentials (ERPs) and compared ERP responses to abstract concepts with a strong relation to vision or action. We tested whether possible ERP effects to abstract word categories would emerge in early or in later time windows and whether these effects would depend on the depth of the conceptual task. In Experiment 1, a shallow lexical decision task, early feature-specific effects starting at 178 ms were revealed, but later effects beyond 300 ms were also observed. In Experiment 2, a deep conceptual decision task, feature-specific effects with an onset of 22 ms were obtained, but effects again extended beyond 300 ms. In congruency with earlier neuroimaging work, the present feature-specific ERP effects suggest a grounding of abstract concepts in modal brain systems. The presence of early and late feature-specific effects indicates that sensorimotor activity observed in neuroimaging experiments may reflect both rapid conceptual and later post-conceptual processing. Results furthermore suggest that a deep conceptual task accelerates access to conceptual sensorimotor features, thereby demonstrating conceptual flexibility.

The multifaceted abstract brain

concepts play a central role in human behaviour and constitute a critical component of the human conceptual system. Here, we investigate the neural basis of four types of abstract concepts, examining their similarities and differences through neuroimaging meta-analyses. We examine numerical and emotional concepts, and two higher-order abstract processes, morality judgements and theory of mind. Three main findings emerge. First, representation of abstract concepts is more widespread than is often assumed. Second, representations of different types of abstract concepts differ in important respects. Each of the domains examined here was associated with some unique areas. Third, some areas were commonly activated across domains and included inferior parietal, posterior cingulate and medial prefrontal cortex. We interpret these regions in terms of their role in episodic recall, event representation and social-emotional processing. We suggest that different types of abstract concepts can be represented and grounded through differing contributions from event-based, interoceptive, introspective and sensory-motor representations. The results underscore the richness and diversity of abstract concepts, argue against single-mechanism accounts for representation of all types of abstract concepts and suggest mechanisms for their direct and indirect grounding.This article is part of the theme issue 'Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain'.

Moving beyond the distinction between concrete and abstract concepts

From the perspective of the situated conceptualization framework, the primary purpose of concepts is for categorizing and integrating elements of situations to support goal-directed action (including communication and social interaction). To the extent that important situational elements are categorized and integrated properly, effective goal-directed action follows. Over time, frequent patterns of co-occurring concepts within situations become established in memory as situated conceptualizations, conditioning the conceptual system and producing habitual patterns of conceptual processing. As a consequence, individual concepts are most basically represented within patterns of concepts that become entrained with specific kinds of physical situations. In this framework, the concrete versus abstract distinction between concepts is no longer useful, with two other distinctions becoming important instead: (i) external versus internal situational elements, (ii) situational elements versus situational integrations. Whereas concepts for situational elements originate in distributed neural networks that provide continual feeds about components of situations, concepts for situational integrations originate in association areas that establish temporal co-occurrence relations between situational elements, both external and internal. We propose that studying concepts in the context of situated action is necessary for establishing complete accounts of them, and that continuing to study concepts in isolation is likely to provide relatively incomplete and distorted accounts.This article is part of the theme issue 'Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain'.

Metacognition and abstract concepts

The problem of how concepts can refer to or be about the non-mental world is particularly puzzling for abstract concepts. There is growing evidence that many characteristics beyond the perceptual are involved in grounding different kinds of abstract concept. A resource that has been suggested, but little explored, is introspection. This paper develops that suggestion by focusing specifically on metacognition—on the thoughts and feelings that thinkers have about a concept. One example of metacognition about concepts is the judgement that we should defer to others in how a given concept is used. Another example is our internal assessment of which concepts are dependable and useful, and which less so. Metacognition of this kind may be especially important for grounding abstract concepts.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain’.

A Peircean account of concepts: grounding abstraction in phylogeny through a comparative neuroscientific perspective

The nature of concepts has always been a hotly debated topic in both philosophy and psychology and, more recently, also in cognitive neuroscience. Different accounts have been proposed of what concepts are. These accounts reflect deeply different conceptions of how the human mind works. In the last decades, two diametrically opposed theories of human cognition have been discussed and empirically investigated: the Computational Theory of Mind, on the one hand (Fodor 1983 The modularity of mind: an essay on faculty psychology; Pylyshyn 1984 Computation and cognition: toward a foundation for cognitive science), and Embodied Cognition (Barsalou 2008 Annu. Rev. Psychol.59, 617-645. (doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093639); Gallese & Lakoff 2005 Cogn. Neuropsychol.22, 455-479 (doi:10.1080/02643290442000310); Shapiro 2011 Embodied cognition), on the other hand. The former proposes that concepts are abstract and amodal symbols in the language of thought, while the latter argues for the embodied nature of concepts that are conceived of as grounded in actions and perception. The embodiment of both concrete and abstract concepts has been challenged by many (e.g. Mahon & Caramazza 2008 J. Physiol.102, 59-70. (doi:10.1016/j.jphysparis.2008.03.004); Caramazza et al 2014 Annu. Rev. Neurosci.37, 1-15. (doi:10.1146/annurev-neuro-071013-013950)). These challenges will be here taken seriously and addressed from a comparative perspective. We will provide a phylogenetic and neurobiologically inspired account of the embodied nature of both abstract and concrete concepts. We will propose that, although differing in certain respect, they both might have a bodily foundation. Commonalities between abstract and concrete concepts will be explained by recurring to the Peircean notions of icon and abductive inference (CP 2.247). According to Peirce, icons are the kind of signs on which abductive inferences rest (Peirce CS 1931 in Collected papers of Charles S. Peirce, Hartshorne C, Weiss P, Burks AW. (eds), 40; Peirce CS 1997 In The 1903 Harvard lectures on pragmatism (ed. A. Turrisi)). It will be claimed that the mechanism of Embodied Simulation (Gallese & Sinigaglia 2011 Trends Cogn. Sci.15, 512-519. (doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.09.003)) can be described as an icon (Cuccio V & Caruana F. 2015 Il corpo come icona. Abduzione, strumenti ed Embodied Simulation. Versus, n. 119, 93-103), and it will then be suggested that on these, basic natural signs rest, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically, the capacity to conceptualize.This article is part of the theme issue 'Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain'.

The concreteness of abstract language: an ancient issue and a new perspective

This paper addresses the debated issue of abstract language in the framework of embodiment. First, we discuss the notion of abstractness in the light of the Western philosophical thought, with a focus on the English empiricist tradition. Second, we review the most relevant psychological models and neuroscientific empirical findings on abstract language. It turns out that abstract words are not such, because their meaning is "far from experience", but, because of the high complexity of the attached experiential clusters. Finally, we spell out the consequences of this understanding of abstractness in relation to the neural mechanisms subserving abstract language processing. If abstract words, as compared to concrete ones, imply an increasing complexity of the associated experiential clusters, then the processing of abstract language relies on the recruitment of several neural substrates coding for those experiences. We forward that, at the neural level, this complexity is coded by means of three main mechanisms: (1) the recruitment of the motor representations of different biological effectors (abstract meaning as effector-unspecific); (2) the recruitment of different systems, including sensory, motor, and emotional ones (abstract meaning as multi-systemic); (3) the recruitment of neural substrates coding for social contexts and levels of self-relatedness (abstract meaning as dynamic). As compared to the current approaches in the literature on abstract language that combine embodiment with some a-modal aspects, our proposal is fully embodied and rules out additional aspects. Our proposal may spur future empirical research on abstract language in the embodied approach.

The role of experience for abstract concepts: Expertise modulates the electrophysiological correlates of mathematical word processing

Embodied theories assign experience a crucial role in shaping conceptual representations. Supporting evidence comes mostly from studies on concrete concepts, where e.g., motor expertise facilitated action concept processing. This study examined experience-dependent effects on abstract concept processing. We asked participants with high and low mathematical expertise to perform a lexical decision task on mathematical and nonmathematical abstract words, while acquiring event-related potentials. Analyses revealed an interaction of expertise and word type on the amplitude of a fronto-central N400 and a centro-parietal late positive component (LPC). For mathematical words, we found a trend for a lower N400 and a significantly higher LPC amplitude in experts compared to nonexperts. No differences between groups were found for nonmathematical words. The results suggest that expertise affects the processing stages of semantic integration and memory retrieval specifically for expertise-related concepts. This study supports the generalization of experience-dependent conceptual processing mechanisms to the abstract domain.

The Semantic Content of Abstract Concepts: A Property Listing Study of 296 Abstract Words

The relation of abstract concepts to the modality-specific systems is discussed controversially. According to classical approaches, the semantic content of abstract concepts can only be coded by amodal or verbal-symbolic representations distinct from the sensory and motor systems, because abstract concepts lack a clear physical referent. Grounded cognition theories, in contrast, propose that abstract concepts do not depend only on the verbal system, but also on a variety of modal systems involving perception, action, emotion and internal states. In order to contribute to this debate, we investigated the semantic content of abstract concepts using a property generation task. Participants were asked to generate properties for 296 abstract concepts, which are relevant for constituting their meaning. These properties were categorized by a coding-scheme making a classification into modality-specific and verbal contents possible. Words were additionally rated with regard to concreteness/abstractness and familiarity. To identify possible subgroups of abstract concepts with distinct profiles of generated features, hierarchical cluster analyses were conducted. Participants generated a substantial proportion of introspective, affective, social, sensory and motor-related properties, in addition to verbal associations. Cluster analyses revealed different subcategories of abstract concepts, which can be characterized by the dominance of certain conceptual features. The present results are therefore compatible with grounded cognition theories, which emphasize the importance of linguistic, social, introspective and affective experiential information for the representation of abstract concepts. Our findings also indicate that abstract concepts are highly heterogeneous requiring the investigation of well-specified subcategories of abstract concepts, for instance as revealed by the present cluster analyses. The present study could thus guide future behavioral or imaging work further elucidating the representation of abstract concepts.

The case of CAUSE: neurobiological mechanisms for grounding an abstract concept

How can we understand causal relationships and how can we understand words such as 'cause'? Some theorists assume that the underlying abstract concept is given to us, and that perceptual correlation provides the relevant hints towards inferring causation from perceived real-life events. A different approach emphasizes the role of actions and their typical consequences for the emergence of the concept of causation and the application of the related term. A model of causation is proposed that highlights the family resemblance between causal actions and postulates that symbols are necessary for binding together the different partially shared semantic features of subsets of causal actions and their goals. Linguistic symbols are proposed to play a key role in binding the different subsets of semantic features of the abstract concept. The model is spelt out at the neuromechanistic level of distributed cortical circuits and the cognitive functions they carry. The model is discussed in light of behavioural and neuroscience evidence, and questions for future research are highlighted. In sum, taking causation as a concrete example, I argue that abstract concepts and words can be learnt and grounded in real-life interaction, and that the neurobiological mechanisms realizing such abstract semantic grounding are within our grasp.This article is part of the theme issue 'Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain'.

Abstract concepts, language and sociality: from acquisition to inner speech

The problem of representation of abstract concepts, such as 'freedom' and 'justice', has become particularly crucial in recent years, owing to the increased success of embodied and grounded views of cognition. We will present a novel view on abstract concepts and abstract words. Since abstract concepts do not have single objects as referents, children and adults might rely more on input from others to learn them; we, therefore, suggest that linguistic and social experience play an important role for abstract concepts. We will discuss evidence obtained in our and other laboratories showing that processing of abstract concepts evokes linguistic interaction and social experiences, leading to the activation of the mouth motor system. We will discuss the possible mechanisms that underlie this activation. Mouth motor system activation can be due to re-enactment of the experience of conceptual acquisition, which occurred through the mediation of language. Alternatively, it could be due to the re-explanation of the word meaning, possibly through inner speech. Finally, it can be due to a metacognitive process revealing low confidence in the meaning of our concepts. This process induces in us the need to rely on others to ask/negotiate conceptual meaning. We conclude that with abstract concepts language works as a social tool: it extends our thinking abilities and pushes us to rely on others to integrate our knowledge.This article is part of the theme issue 'Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use, and representation in the brain'.

Abstract images and words can convey the same meaning

Intuitively, deriving meaning from an abstract image is a uniquely human, idiosyncratic experience. Here we show that, despite having no universally recognised lexical association, abstract images spontaneously elicit specific concepts conveyed by words, with a consistency akin to that of concrete images. We presented a group of naïve participants with abstract picture-word pairs construed as 'related' or 'unrelated' according to a preliminary norming procedure conducted with different participants. Surprisingly, the naïve participants with no prior exposure to the abstract images or any hints regarding their possible meaning, displayed a reaction time priming effect for 'related' versus 'unrelated' picture-word pairs. Critically, this behavioural priming effect, and an associated decrease in N400 mean amplitude indexing semantic priming, both correlated significantly with the degree of relatedness established in the preliminary norming procedure. Given that ratings and electrophysiological measures were obtained in different groups of individuals, our results show that abstract images evoke consistent meaning across observers, as has been shown in the case of music.

Abstract Concepts and Pictures of Real-World Situations Activate One Another

concepts typically are defined in terms of lacking physical or perceptual referents. We argue instead that they are not devoid of perceptual information because knowledge of real-world situations is an important component of learning and using many abstract concepts. Although the relationship between perceptual information and abstract concepts is less straightforward than for concrete concepts, situation-based perceptual knowledge is part of many abstract concepts. In Experiment 1, participants made lexical decisions to abstract words that were preceded by related and unrelated pictures of situations. For example, share was preceded by a picture of two girls sharing a cob of corn. When pictures were presented for 500 ms, latencies did not differ. However, when pictures were presented for 1,000 ms, decision latencies were significantly shorter for abstract words preceded by related versus unrelated pictures. Because the abstract concepts corresponded to the pictured situation as a whole, rather than a single concrete object or entity, the necessary relational processing takes time. In Experiment 2, on each trial, an abstract word was presented for 250 ms, immediately followed by a picture. Participants indicated whether or not the picture showed a normal situation. Decision latencies were significantly shorter for pictures preceded by related versus unrelated abstract words. Our experiments provide evidence that knowledge of events and situations is important for learning and using at least some types of abstract concepts. That is, abstract concepts are grounded in situations, but in a more complex manner than for concrete concepts. Although people's understanding of abstract concepts certainly includes knowledge gained from language describing situations and events for which those concepts are relevant, sensory and motor information experienced during real-life events is important as well.

Learning and Using Abstract Words: Evidence from Clinical Populations

It has been shown that abstract concepts are more difficult to process and are acquired later than concrete concepts. We analysed the percentage of concrete words in the narrative lexicon of individuals with Williams Syndrome (WS) as compared to individuals with Down Syndrome (DS) and typically developing (TD) peers. The cognitive profile of WS is characterized by visual-spatial difficulties, while DS presents with predominant impairments in linguistic abilities. We predicted that if linguistic abilities are crucial to the development and use of an abstract vocabulary, DS participants should display a higher concreteness index than both Williams Syndrome and typically developing individuals. Results confirm this prediction, thus supporting the hypothesis of a crucial role of linguistic processes in abstract language acquisition. Correlation analyses suggest that a maturational link exists between the level of abstractness in narrative production and syntactic comprehension.

Neural Representations of Belief Concepts: A Representational Similarity Approach to Social Semantics

The present experiment identified neural regions that represent a class of concepts that are independent of perceptual or sensory attributes. During functional magnetic resonance imaging scanning, participants viewed names of social groups (e.g. Atheists, Evangelicals, and Economists) and performed a one-back similarity judgment according to 1 of 2 dimensions of belief attributes: political orientation (Liberal to Conservative) or spiritualism (Spiritualist to Materialist). By generalizing across a wide variety of social groups that possess these beliefs, these attribute concepts did not coincide with any specific sensory quality, allowing us to target conceptual, rather than perceptual, representations. Multi-voxel pattern searchlight analysis was used to identify regions in which activation patterns distinguished the 2 ends of both dimensions: Conservative from Liberal social groups when participants focused on the political orientation dimension, and spiritual from Materialist groups when participants focused on the spiritualism dimension. A cluster in right precuneus exhibited such a pattern, indicating that it carries information about belief-attribute concepts and forms part of semantic memory—perhaps a component particularly concerned with psychological traits. This region did not overlap with the theory of mind network, which engaged nearby, but distinct, parts of precuneus. These findings have implications for the neural organization of conceptual knowledge, especially the understanding of social groups.

For a cognitive neuroscience of concepts: Moving beyond the grounding issue

Cognitive neuroscience research on conceptual knowledge often is discussed with respect to "embodiment" or "grounding." We tried to disentangle at least three distinct claims made using these terms. One of these, the view that concepts are entirely reducible to sensory-motor representations, is untenable and diminishing in the literature. A second is the view that concepts and sensory-motor representations "interact," and a third view addresses the question of how concepts are neurally organized-the neural partitions among concepts of different kinds, and where these partitions are localized in cortex. We argue that towards the second and third issues, much fruitful research can be pursued, but that no position on them is specifically related to "grounding." Furthermore, to move forward on them, it is important to precisely distinguish different kinds of representations-conceptual vs. sensory-motor-from each other theoretically and empirically. Neuroimaging evidence often lacks such specificity. We take an approach that distinguishes conceptual from sensory-motor representations by virtue of two properties: broad generality and tolerance to the absence of sensory-motor associations. We review three of our recent experiments that employ these criteria in order to localize neural representations of several specific kinds of nonsensory attributes: functions, intentions, and belief traits. Building on past work, we find that neuroimaging evidence can be used fruitfully to distinguish interesting hypotheses about neural organization. On the other hand, most such evidence does not speak to any clear notion of "grounding" or "embodiment," because these terms do not make clear, specific, empirical predictions. We argue that cognitive neuroscience will proceed most fruitfully by relinquishing these terms.

The Calgary semantic decision project: concrete/abstract decision data for 10,000 English words

Psycholinguistic research has been advanced by the development of word recognition megastudies. For instance, the English Lexicon Project (Balota et al., 2007) provides researchers with access to naming and lexical-decision latencies for over 40,000 words. In the present work, we extended the megastudy approach to a task that emphasizes semantic processing. Using a concrete/abstract semantic decision (i.e., does the word refer to something concrete or abstract?), we collected decision latencies and accuracy rates for 10,000 English words. The stimuli were concrete and abstract words selected from Brysbaert, Warriner, and Kuperman's (2013) comprehensive list of concreteness ratings. In total, 321 participants provided responses to 1,000 words each. Whereas semantic effects tend to be quite modest in naming and lexical decision studies, analyses of the concrete/abstract semantic decision responses show that a substantial proportion of variance can be explained by semantic variables. The item-level and trial-level data will be useful for other researchers interested in the semantic processing of concrete and abstract words.