Seeing without knowing: neural signatures of perceptual inference in the absence of report

No electrophysiological evidence for semantic processing during inattentional blindness

A long-standing question concerns whether sensory input can reach semantic stages of processing in the absence of attention and awareness. Here, we examine whether the N400, an event related potential associated with semantic processing, can occur under conditions of inattentional blindness. By employing a novel three-phase inattentional blindness paradigm designed to maximise the opportunity for detecting an N400, we found no evidence for it when participants were inattentionally blind to the eliciting stimuli (related and unrelated word pairs). In contrast, participants noticed the same task-irrelevant word pairs when minimal attention was allocated to them, and a small N400 became evident. When the same stimuli were fully attended and relevant to the task, a robust N400 was observed. In addition to univariate ERP measures, multivariate decoding analyses were unable to classify related from unrelated word pairs when observers were inattentionally blind to the words, with decoding reaching above-chance levels only when the words were (at least minimally) attended. By comparison, decoding reached above-chance levels when contrasting word pairs with non-word stimuli, even when participants were inattentionally blind to these stimuli. Our results also replicated several previous studies by finding a "visual awareness negativity" (VAN) that distinguished task-irrelevant stimuli that participants noticed compared with those that were not perceived, and a P3b (or "late positivity") that was evident only when the stimuli were task relevant. Together, our findings suggest that semantic processing might require at least a minimal amount of attention.

Preserved recognition of basic visual features despite lack of awareness of shape: Evidence from a case of neglect

Human visual experience of objects comprises a combination of visual features, such as color, position, and shape. Spatial attention is thought to play a role in creating a coherent perceptual experience, integrating visual information coming from a given location, but the mechanisms underlying this process are not fully understood. Deficits of spatial attention in which this integration process does not occur normally, such as neglect, can provide insights regarding the mechanisms of spatial attention in visual object recognition. In this study, we describe a series of experiments conducted with an individual with neglect, DH. DH presents characteristic lack of awareness of the left side of individual objects, evidenced by poor object and face recognition, and impaired word reading. However, he exhibits intact recognition of color within the boundaries of the same objects he fails to recognize. Furthermore, he can also report the orientation and location of a colored region on the neglected left side despite lack of awareness of the shape of the region. Overall, DH shows selective lack of awareness of shape despite intact processing of basic visual features in the same spatial location. DH's performance raises intriguing questions and challenges about the role of spatial attention in the formation of coherent object percepts and visual awareness.

The perceptual timescape: Perceptual history on the sub-second scale

There is a high-capacity store of brief time span (∼1000 ms) which information enters from perceptual processing, often called iconic memory or sensory memory. It is proposed that a main function of this store is to hold recent perceptual information in a temporally segregated representation, named the perceptual timescape. The perceptual timescape is a continually active representation of change and continuity over time that endows the perceived present with a perceived history. This is accomplished primarily by two kinds of time marking information: time distance information, which marks all items of information in the perceptual timescape according to how far in the past they occurred, and ordinal temporal information, which organises items of information in terms of their temporal order. Added to that is information about connectivity of perceptual objects over time. These kinds of information connect individual items over a brief span of time so as to represent change, persistence, and continuity over time. It is argued that there is a one-way street of information flow from perceptual processing either to the perceived present or directly into the perceptual timescape, and thence to working memory. Consistent with that, the information structure of the perceptual timescape supports postdictive reinterpretations of recent perceptual information. Temporal integration on a time scale of hundreds of milliseconds takes place in perceptual processing and does not draw on information in the perceptual timescape, which is concerned with temporal segregation, not integration.

Experiencing without knowing? Empirical evidence for phenomenal consciousness without access

Can one have a phenomenal experience to which one does not have access? That is, can you experience something without knowing? The dissociation between phenomenal (P) and access (A) consciousness is widely debated. A major challenge to the supporters of this dissociation is the apparent inability to experimentally demonstrate that P-without-A consciousness exists; once participants report having a P-experience, they already have access to it. Thus, all previous empirical support for this dissociation is indirect. Here, using a novel paradigm, we create a situation where participants (Experiment 1, N = 40) lack online access to the stimulus yet are nevertheless able to retrospectively form judgements on its phenomenal, qualitative aspects. We further show that their performance cannot be fully explained by unconscious processing or by a response to stimulus offset (Experiment 2, N = 40). This suggests that P and A consciousness are not only conceptually distinct, but might also be teased apart empirically. STATEMENT OF RELEVANCE: A critical question in the scientific quest towards solving the problem of consciousness focuses on the ability to isolate conscious experiences at their purity, without any accompanying cognitive processes. This challenge has been augmented by a highly influential - yet controversial - dissociation suggested by the philosopher Ned Block between Phenomenal consciousness, or the "what it is like" to have an experience, and Access consciousness, indexing the ability to report that one has that experience. Critically, these two types of consciousness most typically go together, making it highly difficult - if not impossible - to isolate Phenomenal consciousness. Our work shows that the dissociation between phenomenal and access consciousness is not merely conceptual, but can also be empirically demonstrated. It further opens the gate to future studies pinpointing the neural correlates of the two types of consciousness.

The role of awareness in shaping responses in human visual cortex

The visual cortex contains information about stimuli even when they are not consciously perceived. However, it remains unknown whether the visual system integrates local features into global objects without awareness. Here, we tested this by measuring brain activity in human observers viewing fragmented shapes that were either visible or rendered invisible by fast counterphase flicker. We then projected measured neural responses to these stimuli back into visual space. Visible stimuli caused robust responses reflecting the positions of their component fragments. Their neural representations also strongly resembled one another regardless of local features. By contrast, representations of invisible stimuli differed from one another and, crucially, also from visible stimuli. Our results demonstrate that even the early visual cortex encodes unconscious visual information differently from conscious information, presumably by only encoding local features. This could explain previous conflicting behavioural findings on unconscious visual processing.

Consensus Goals in the Field of Visual Metacognition

Despite the tangible progress in psychological and cognitive sciences over the last several years, these disciplines still trail other more mature sciences in identifying the most important questions that need to be solved. Reaching such consensus could lead to greater synergy across different laboratories, faster progress, and increased focus on solving important problems rather than pursuing isolated, niche efforts. Here, 26 researchers from the field of visual metacognition reached consensus on four long-term and two medium-term common goals. We describe the process that we followed, the goals themselves, and our plans for accomplishing these goals. If this effort proves successful within the next few years, such consensus building around common goals could be adopted more widely in psychological science.

Neuroscientific Evidence for Processing Without Awareness

The extent to which we are affected by perceptual input of which we are unaware is widely debated. By measuring neural responses to sensory stimulation, neuroscientific data could complement behavioral results with valuable evidence. Here we review neuroscientific findings of processing of high-level information, as well as interactions with attention and memory. Although the results are mixed, we find initial support for processing object categories and words, possibly to the semantic level, as well as emotional expressions. Robust neural evidence for face individuation and integration of sentences or scenes is lacking. Attention affects the processing of stimuli that are not consciously perceived, and such stimuli may exogenously but not endogenously capture attention when relevant, and be maintained in memory over time. Sources of inconsistency in the literature include variability in control for awareness as well as individual differences, calling for future studies that adopt stricter measures of awareness and probe multiple processes within subjects.

The No-Report Paradigm: A Revolution in Consciousness Research?

In the cognitive neuroscience of consciousness, participants have commonly been instructed to report their conscious content. This, it was claimed, risks confounding the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) with their preconditions, i.e., allocation of attention, and consequences, i.e., metacognitive reflection. Recently, the field has therefore been shifting towards no-report paradigms. No-report paradigms draw their validity from a direct comparison with no-report conditions. We analyze several examples of such comparisons and identify alternative interpretations of their results and/or methodological issues in all cases. These go beyond the previous criticism that just removing the report is insufficient, because it does not prevent metacognitive reflection. The conscious mind is fickle. Without having much to do, it will turn inward and switch, or timeshare, between the stimuli on display and daydreaming or mind-wandering. Thus, rather than the NCC, no-report paradigms might be addressing the neural correlates of conscious disengagement. This observation reaffirms the conclusion that no-report paradigms are no less problematic than report paradigms.

Expanding the discussion: Revision of the fundamental assumptions framing the study of the neural correlates of consciousness

The way one asks a question is shaped by a-priori assumptions and constrains the range of possible answers. We identify and test the assumptions underlying contemporary debates, models, and methodology in the study of the neural correlates of consciousness, which was framed by Crick and Koch's seminal paper (1990). These premises create a sequential and passive conception of conscious perception: it is considered the product of resolved information processing by unconscious mechanisms, produced by a singular event in time and place representing the moment of entry. The conscious percept produced is then automatically retained to be utilized by post-conscious mechanisms. Major debates in the field, such as concern the moment of entry, the all-or-none vs graded nature, and report vs no-report paradigms, are driven by the consensus on these assumptions. We show how removing these assumptions can resolve some of the debates and challenges and prompt additional questions. The potential non-sequential nature of perception suggests new ways of thinking about consciousness as a dynamic and dispersed process, and in turn about the relationship between conscious and unconscious perception. Moreover, it allows us to present a parsimonious account for conscious perception while addressing more aspects of the phenomenon.

The Neural Correlates of Access Consciousness and Phenomenal Consciousness Seem to Coincide and Would Correspond to a Memory Center, an Activation Center and Eight Parallel Convergence Centers

An increasing number of authors suggest that the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) have no selective, executive, or metacognitive function. It is believed that attention unconsciously selects the contents that will become conscious. Consciousness would have only the fundamental function of transforming the selected contents into a format easily used by high-level processors, such as working memory, language, or autobiographical memory. According to Dehaene, the neural correlates (NC) of access consciousness (AC; cognitive consciousness) constitute a widespread network in the frontal, parietal, and temporal cortices. While Tononi localized the correlates of phenomenal consciousness (PC; subjective consciousness) to a posterior “hot zone” in the temporo-parietal cortex. A careful examination of the works of these two groups leads to the conclusion that the correlates of access and PC coincide. The two consciousnesses are therefore two faces of the same single consciousness with both its cognitive and subjective contents. A review of the literature of the pathology called “neglect” confirms that the common correlates include 10: a memory center, an activation center, and eight parallel centers. From study of the “imagery” it can be deduced that these eight parallel centers would operate as points of convergence in the third person linking the respective eight sensory-motor-emotional areas activated by external perceptions and the corresponding memories of these perceptions deposited in the memory center. The first four centers of convergence appear in the most evolved fish and gradually reach eight in humans.

Brain network mechanisms of visual shape completion

Visual shape completion recovers object shape, size, and number from spatially segregated edges. Despite being extensively investigated, the process’s underlying brain regions, networks, and functional connections are still not well understood. To shed light on the topic, we scanned (fMRI) healthy adults during rest and during a task in which they discriminated pac-man configurations that formed or failed to form completed shapes (illusory and fragmented condition, respectively). Task activation differences (illusory-fragmented), resting-state functional connectivity, and multivariate patterns were identified on the cortical surface using 360 predefined parcels and 12 functional networks composed of such parcels. Brain activity flow mapping (ActFlow) was used to evaluate the likely involvement of resting-state connections for shape completion. We identified 36 differentially-active parcels including a posterior temporal region, PH, whose activity was consistent across 95% of observers. Significant task regions primarily occupied the secondary visual network but also incorporated the frontoparietal dorsal attention, default mode, and cingulo-opercular networks. Each parcel’s task activation difference could be modeled via its resting-state connections with the remaining parcels (r=.62, p<10⁻⁹), suggesting that such connections undergird shape completion. Functional connections from the dorsal attention network were key in modelling task activation differences in the secondary visual network. Dorsal attention and frontoparietal connections could also model activations in the remaining networks. Taken together, these results suggest that shape completion relies upon a sparsely distributed but densely interconnected network coalition that is centered in the secondary visual network, coordinated by the dorsal attention network, and inclusive of at least three other networks.

Windows of Integration Hypothesis Revisited

In the ongoing research of the functions of consciousness, special emphasis has been put on integration of information: the ability to combine different signals into a coherent, unified one. Several theories of consciousness hold that this ability depends on - or at least goes hand in hand with - conscious processing. Yet some empirical findings have suggested otherwise, claiming that integration of information could take place even without awareness. Trying to reconcile this apparent contradiction, the "windows of integration" (WOI) hypothesis claims that conscious access enables signal processing over large integration windows. The hypothesis applies to integration windows defined either temporally, spatially, or semantically. In this review, we explain the hypothesis and re-examine it in light of new studies published since it was suggested. In line with the hypothesis, these studies provide compelling evidence for unconscious integration, but also demonstrate its limits with respect to time, space, and semantic distance. The review further highlights open questions that still need to be pursued to demonstrate the applicability of the WOI hypothesis as a guiding principle for understanding the depth and scope of unconscious processes.

Pre-stimulus alpha predicts inattentional blindness

Pre- and post-stimulus oscillatory activity between 8 and 12 hertz, referred to as the alpha-band, correlates with conscious visual awareness of stimuli across a variety of psychophysical tasks. Within an EEG-adapted inattentional blindness task, the current study sought to examine whether this relationship holds for conscious awareness of stimuli under conditions of inattentional blindness. Noticing rates of the task-irrelevant unexpected stimulus were correlated with a significant decrease in alpha power over bilateral parietal-occipital areas during the pre-stimulus interval, and a significant decrease in alpha power over parietal-occipital regions in the right hemisphere during the post-stimulus interval. Findings are taken to imply alpha-band neural activity represents a valid correlate of consciousness that is not confounded by task relevancy or the need for report.

Implicit processing during inattentional blindness: A systematic review and meta-analysis

The occurrence of implicit processing of visual stimuli during inattentional blindness is still a matter of debate. To assess the evidence available in this debate, we conducted a systematic review of articles that explored whether unexpected visual stimuli presented during inattentional blindness are implicitly processed despite not being reported. Additionally, we employed meta-analysis to combine 59 behavioral experiments and investigate the statistical support for such implicit processing across experiments. Results showed that visual stimuli can be processed when unattended and unnoticed. Additionally, we reviewed the measures used to assess participants' awareness of the unexpected stimuli. We also employed meta-analysis to search for differences in awareness of the unexpected stimuli that may result from adopting distinct criteria to categorize participants as aware or unaware. The results showed that the overall effect of awareness changed depending on whether more demanding or less demanding measures of awareness were employed. This suggests that the choice of awareness measure may influence conclusions about whether processing of the US is implicit or explicit. We discuss the implications of these results for the study of implicit processing and the role of attention in visual cognition.

Awareness and Stimulus-Driven Spatial Attention as Independent Processes

To investigate the relation between attention and awareness, we manipulated visibility/awareness and stimulus-driven attention capture among metacontrast-masked visual stimuli. By varying the time interval between target and mask, we manipulated target visibility measured as target discrimination accuracies (ACCs; Experiments 1 and 2) and as subjective awareness ratings (Experiment 3). To modulate stimulus-driven attention capture, we presented the masked target either as a color-singleton (the target stands out by its unique color among homogeneously colored non-singletons), as a non-singleton together with a distractor singleton elsewhere (an irrelevant distractor has a unique color, whereas the target is colored like the other stimuli) or without a singleton (no stimulus stands out; only in Experiment 1). As color singletons capture attention in a stimulus-driven way, we expected target visibility/discrimination performance to be best for target singletons and worst with distractor singletons. In Experiments 1 and 2, we confirmed that the masking interval and the singleton manipulation influenced ACCs in an independent way and that attention capture by the singletons, with facilitated performance in target-singleton compared to distractor-singleton conditions, was found regardless of the interval-induced (in-)visibility of the targets. In Experiment 1, we also confirmed that attention capture was the same among participants with worse and better visibility/discrimination performance. In Experiment 2, we confirmed attention capture by color singletons with better discrimination performance for probes presented at singleton position, compared to other positions. Finally, in Experiment 3, we found that attention capture by target singletons also increased target awareness and that this capture effect on subjective awareness was independent of the effect of the masking interval, too. Together, results provide new evidence that stimulus-driven attention and awareness operate independently from one another and that stimulus-driven attention capture can precede awareness.

Lack of awareness despite complex visual processing: Evidence from event-related potentials in a case of selective metamorphopsia

Visual awareness is thought to result from integration of low- and high-level processing; instances of integration failure provide a crucial window into the cognitive and neural bases of awareness. We present neurophysiological evidence of complex cognitive processing in the absence of awareness, raising questions about the conditions necessary for visual awareness. We describe an individual with a neurodegenerative disease who exhibits impaired visual awareness for the digits 2 to 9, and stimuli presented in close proximity to these digits, due to perceptual distortion. We identified robust event-related potential responses indicating 1) face detection with the N170 component and 2) task-dependent target-word detection with the P3b component, despite no awareness of the presence of faces or target words. These data force us to reconsider the relationship between neural processing and visual awareness; even stimuli processed by a workspace-like cognitive system can remain inaccessible to awareness. We discuss how this finding challenges and constrains theories of visual awareness.

Fleeting Perceptual Experience and the Possibility of Recalling Without Seeing

We explore an intensely debated problem in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy: the degree to which the "phenomenological consciousness" of the experience of a stimulus is separable from the "access consciousness" of its reportability. Specifically, it has been proposed that these two measures are dissociated from one another in one, or both directions. However, even if it was agreed that reportability and experience were doubly dissociated, the limits of dissociation logic mean we would not be able to conclusively separate the cognitive processes underlying the two. We take advantage of computational modelling and recent advances in state-trace analysis to assess this dissociation in an attentional/experiential blink paradigm. These advances in state-trace analysis make use of Bayesian statistics to quantify the evidence for and against a dissociation. Further evidence is obtained by linking our finding to a prominent model of the attentional blink - the Simultaneous Type/Serial Token model. Our results show evidence for a dissociation between experience and reportability, whereby participants appear able to encode stimuli into working memory with little, if any, conscious experience of them. This raises the possibility of a phenomenon that might be called sight-blind recall, which we discuss in the context of the current experience/reportability debate.

Visual Functions Generating Conscious Seeing

Visual functions are reviewed that coincide with conscious as opposed to unconscious vision. Four stages of vision are identified, going from the fully invisible, to subjectively invisible, unattended, and clearly visible. It is proposed that feature extraction, categorization, and some aspects of visual inference occur during full and subjective invisibility. Functions related to perceptual organization, such as grouping and figure-ground segregation, occur during inattention as well as full visibility. It is argued that perceptual organization is the function that is central to understanding the transition from unconscious to conscious seeing. It is discussed what this implies for theories of consciousness such as Recurrent Processing Theory, Higher Order Thought Theory, Integrated Information Theory, and Global Neuronal Workspace Theory.

Challenges for theories of consciousness: seeing or knowing, the missing ingredient and how to deal with panpsychism

Significant progress has been made in the study of consciousness. Promising theories have been developed and a wealth of experimental data has been generated, both guiding us towards a better understanding of this complex phenomenon. However, new challenges have surfaced. Is visual consciousness about the seeing or the knowing that you see? Controversy about whether the conscious experience is better explained by theories that focus on phenomenal (P-consciousness) or cognitive aspects (A-consciousness) remains, and the debate seems to reach a stalemate. Can we ever resolve this? A further challenge is that many theories of consciousness seem to endorse high degrees of panpsychism-the notion that all beings or even lifeless objects have conscious experience. Should we accept this, or does it imply that these theories require further ingredients that would put a lower bound on beings or devices that have conscious experience? If so, what could these 'missing ingredients' be? These challenges are discussed, and potential solutions are offered.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

Downgraded phenomenology: how conscious overflow lost its richness

Our in-the-moment experience of the world can feel vivid and rich, even when we cannot describe our experience due to limitations of attention, memory or other cognitive processes. But the nature of visual awareness is quite sparse, as suggested by the phenomena of failures of awareness, such as change blindness and inattentional blindness. I will argue that once failures of memory or failures of comparison are ruled out as explanations for these phenomena, they present strong evidence against rich awareness. To accommodate and explain these massive failures of awareness, any theory of phenomenal consciousness must downgrade phenomenology to a degree where it is functionless or, ironically, does not reflect what we experience.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

Neural activity in human visual cortex is transformed by learning real world size

The way that our brain processes visual information is directly affected by our experience. Repeated exposure to a visual stimulus triggers experience-dependent plasticity in the visual cortex of many species. Humans also have the unique ability to acquire visual knowledge through instruction. We introduced human participants to the real-world size of previously unfamiliar species, and to the functional motion of novel tools, during a functional magnetic resonance imaging scan. Using machine learning, we compared activity patterns evoked by images of the new items, before and after participants learned the animals' real-world size or tools' motion. We found that, after acquiring size information, participants' visual activity patterns for the new animals became more confusable with activity patterns evoked by similar-sized known animals in early visual cortex, but not in ventral temporal cortex, reflecting an influence of new size knowledge on posterior, but not anterior, components of the ventral stream. In contrast, learning the functional motion of new tools did not lead to an equivalent change in recorded activity. Finally, the time-points marked by evidence of new size information in early visual cortex were more likely to show size information and greater activation in the right angular gyrus, a key hub of semantic knowledge and spatial cognition. Overall, these findings suggest that learning an item's real-world size by instruction influences subsequent activity in visual cortex and in a region that is central to semantic and spatial brain systems.

Illusory Form Perception and Perceptual Grouping Operations under Conditions of Restricted Visual Awareness

In the present study, we conducted two experiments (Experiment 1: 35 participants, M = 29; SD = 8.4; Experiment 2: 36 participants, M = 25; SD = 6.1) with the intention to explore whether underlying perceptual grouping operations and illusory form perception generate dissociable priming effects when Kanizsa-like figures are presented as primes and the rotated inducers as controls under conditions of restricted awareness. Using five different stimulus onset asynchronies (SOA conditions, Experiment 1: 27, 40 and 53 ms; Experiment 2: 27, 80 and 227 ms), we displayed masked illusory and groping primes that could be congruent or incongruent in their orientation with subsequent probe stimuli (vertical vs. horizontal). We found significant priming effects in both Experiment 1 and 2 (p < .001, η2p = .31 and p = .016, η2p = .16, respectively), but, crucially, no significant priming differences between illusory and grouping primes across SOA conditions. Overall, our results are important in showing that a dissociation of the percept generated by the grouping of the inducers from that generated by the illusory form is crucial in the study of illusory form perception under conditions of restricted awareness. In addition, they provide further evidence of perceptual organization operations occurring under very restrictive awareness conditions.

Contour interpolation: A case study in Modularity of Mind

In his monograph Modularity of Mind (1983), philosopher Jerry Fodor argued that mental architecture can be partly decomposed into computational organs termed modules, which were characterized as having nine co-occurring features such as automaticity, domain specificity, and informational encapsulation. Do modules exist? Debates thus far have been framed very generally with few, if any, detailed case studies. The topic is important because it has direct implications on current debates in cognitive science and because it potentially provides a viable framework from which to further understand and make hypotheses about the mind's structure and function. Here, the case is made for the modularity of contour interpolation, which is a perceptual process that represents non-visible edges on the basis of how surrounding visible edges are spatiotemporally configured. There is substantial evidence that interpolation is domain specific, mandatory, fast, and developmentally well-sequenced; that it produces representationally impoverished outputs; that it relies upon a relatively fixed neural architecture that can be selectively impaired; that it is encapsulated from belief and expectation; and that its inner workings cannot be fathomed through conscious introspection. Upon differentiating contour interpolation from a higher-order contour representational ability ("contour abstraction") and upon accommodating seemingly inconsistent experimental results, it is argued that interpolation is modular to the extent that the initiating conditions for interpolation are strong. As interpolated contours become more salient, the modularity features emerge. The empirical data, taken as a whole, show that at least certain parts of the mind are modularly organized.

There Is an 'Unconscious,' but It May Well Be Conscious

Depth psychology finds empirical validation today in a variety of observations that suggest the presence of causally effective mental processes outside conscious experience. I submit that this is due to misinterpretation of the observations: the subset of consciousness called “meta-consciousness” in the literature is often mistaken for consciousness proper, thereby artificially creating space for an “unconscious.” The implied hypothesis is that all mental processes may in fact be conscious, the appearance of unconsciousness arising from our dependence on self-reflective introspection for gauging awareness. After re-interpreting the empirical data according to a philosophically rigorous definition of consciousness, I show that two well-known phenomena corroborate this hypothesis: (a) experiences that, despite being conscious, aren’t re-represented during introspection; and (b) dissociated experiences inaccessible to the executive ego. If consciousness is inherent to all mentation, it may be fundamental in nature, as opposed to a product of particular types of brain function.

Global shape integration and illusory form perception in the absence of awareness

Previous research on perceptual organization operations still provides contradictory evidence on whether the integration of sparse local elements into coherently unified shapes and the construction of the illusory form are accomplished without the need of awareness. In the present study, three experiments were conducted in which participants were presented with masked (Experiment 1, SOA=27ms; Experiment 2; SOA=53ms) and unmasked (Experiment 3) primes consisting of geometric shapes (a square or a diamond) that could be congruent or incongruent with subsequent probe stimuli (square vs. diamond). Furthermore, the primes were divided into: a grouping condition (where local elements may group together into global shapes), an illusory condition (where the arrangement of local elements produced illusory shapes) and a hybrid condition (where both operations were presented simultaneously). While no priming effects were found for the shortest SOA (27ms), both grouping and illusory primes produced significant priming effects in the longer SOA (53ms). On the other hand, results in Experiment 3 (unmasked) showed strong priming effects for the grouping of the inducers in both the grouping and the hybrid conditions, and also a significant but weaker priming effect for the illusory condition. Overall, our results support the possibility of the integration of local visual features into a global shape in the absence of awareness and, likewise, they suggest an early -subliminal- construction of the illusory shape, implying that feedback projections from higher to lower visual areas are not crucial in the construction of the illusory form.

Perceptual integration without conscious access

The visual system has the remarkable ability to integrate fragmentary visual input into a perceptually organized collection of surfaces and objects, a process we refer to as perceptual integration. Despite a long tradition of perception research, it is not known whether access to consciousness is required to complete perceptual integration. To investigate this question, we manipulated access to consciousness using the attentional blink. We show that, behaviorally, the attentional blink impairs conscious decisions about the presence of integrated surface structure from fragmented input. However, despite conscious access being impaired, the ability to decode the presence of integrated percepts remains intact, as shown through multivariate classification analyses of electroencephalogram (EEG) data. In contrast, when disrupting perception through masking, decisions about integrated percepts and decoding of integrated percepts are impaired in tandem, while leaving feedforward representations intact. Together, these data show that access consciousness and perceptual integration can be dissociated.

Induction of Kanizsa Contours Requires Awareness of the Inducing Context

It remains unknown to what extent the human visual system interprets information about complex scenes without conscious analysis. Here we used visual masking techniques to assess whether illusory contours (Kanizsa shapes) are perceived when the inducing context creating this illusion does not reach awareness. In the first experiment we tested perception directly by having participants discriminate the orientation of an illusory contour. In the second experiment, we exploited the fact that the presence of an illusory contour enhances performance on a spatial localization task. Moreover, in the latter experiment we also used a different masking method to rule out the effect of stimulus duration. Our results suggest that participants do not perceive illusory contours when they are unaware of the inducing context. This is consistent with theories of a multistage, recurrent process of perceptual integration. Our findings thus challenge some reports, including those from neurophysiological experiments in anaesthetized animals. Furthermore, we discuss the importance to test the presence of the phenomenal percept directly with appropriate methods.

Visual Illusions Based on Processes: New Classification System Needed

Illusions have mainly been classified according to their phenomenological appearance. Here, I plead for a new classification approach based on processing areas or mechanisms. Classifying visual illusions according to processing areas or mechanisms may not only be valuable for a better understanding of the visual system but also for diagnostics of impairments, degenerative effects, and lesions (from retina to striate and extra-striate cortex).

From sensation to perception: Using multivariate classification of visual illusions to identify neural correlates of conscious awareness in space and time

An important goal of cognitive neuroscience is understanding the neural underpinnings of conscious awareness. Although the low-level processing of sensory input is well understood in most modalities, it remains a challenge to understand how the brain translates such input into conscious awareness. Here, I argue that the application of multivariate pattern classification techniques to neuroimaging data acquired while observers experience perceptual illusions provides a unique way to dissociate sensory mechanisms from mechanisms underlying conscious awareness. Using this approach, it is possible to directly compare patterns of neural activity that correspond to the contents of awareness, independent from changes in sensory input, and to track these neural representations over time at high temporal resolution. I highlight five recent studies using this approach, and provide practical considerations and limitations for future implementations.

Brief mindfulness induction reduces inattentional blindness

Prior research has linked mindfulness to improvements in attention, and suggested that the effects of mindfulness are particularly pronounced when individuals are cognitively depleted or stressed. Yet, no studies have tested whether mindfulness improves declarative awareness of unexpected stimuli in goal-directed tasks. Participants (N=794) were either depleted (or not) and subsequently underwent a brief mindfulness induction (or not). They then completed an inattentional blindness task during which an unexpected distractor appeared on the computer monitor. This task was used to assess declarative conscious awareness of the unexpected distractor's presence and the extent to which its perceptual properties were encoded. Mindfulness increased awareness of the unexpected distractor (i.e., reduced rates of inattentional blindness). Contrary to predictions, no mindfulness×depletion interaction emerged. Depletion however, increased perceptual encoding of the distractor. These results suggest that mindfulness may foster awareness of unexpected stimuli (i.e., reduce inattentional blindness).

Isolating neural correlates of conscious perception from neural correlates of reporting one's perception

To isolate neural correlates of conscious perception (NCCs), a standard approach has been to contrast neural activity elicited by identical stimuli of which subjects are aware vs. unaware. Because conscious experience is private, determining whether a stimulus was consciously perceived requires subjective report: e.g., button-presses indicating detection, visibility ratings, verbal reports, etc. This reporting requirement introduces a methodological confound when attempting to isolate NCCs: The neural processes responsible for accessing and reporting one's percept are difficult to distinguish from those underlying the conscious percept itself. Here, we review recent attempts to circumvent this issue via a modified inattentional blindness paradigm (Pitts et al., 2012) and present new data from a backward masking experiment in which task-relevance and visual awareness were manipulated in a 2 × 2 crossed design. In agreement with our previous inattentional blindness results, stimuli that were consciously perceived yet not immediately accessed for report (aware, task-irrelevant condition) elicited a mid-latency posterior ERP negativity (~200–240 ms), while stimuli that were accessed for report (aware, task-relevant condition) elicited additional components including a robust P3b (~380–480 ms) subsequent to the mid-latency negativity. Overall, these results suggest that some of the NCCs identified in previous studies may be more closely linked with accessing and maintaining perceptual information for reporting purposes than with encoding the conscious percept itself. An open question is whether the remaining NCC candidate (the ERP negativity at 200–240 ms) reflects visual awareness or object-based attention.