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Montandon ML, Rodriguez C, Herrmann FR, Eytan A, Pegna AJ, Haller S, Giannakopoulos P. Patterns of multiple brain network activation in dot perspective task. Sci Rep 2023; 13:6793. [PMID: 37100844 PMCID: PMC10133244 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-023-33427-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/06/2022] [Accepted: 04/12/2023] [Indexed: 04/28/2023] Open
Abstract
In this functional MRI (fMRI) study on 82 healthy adults using the dot perspective task, inconsistency of perspectives was associated with a significant increase of the mean reaction time and number of errors both in Self and Other conditions. Unlike the Arrow (non-mentalizing), the Avatar (mentalizing) paradigm was characterized by the recruitment of parts of the mentalizing and salience networks. These data provide experimental evidence supporting the fMRI distinction between mentalizing and non-mentalizing stimuli. A widespread activation of classical theory of mind (ToM) areas but also of salience network and decision making areas was observed in the Other compared to Self-conditions. Compared to Self-Consistent, Self-Inconsistent trials were related to increased activation in the lateral occipital cortex, right supramarginal and angular gyrus as well as inferior, superior and middle frontal gyri. Compared to the Other-Consistent, Other-Inconsistent trials yielded strong activation in the lateral occipital cortex, precuneus and superior parietal lobule, middle and superior precentral gyri and left frontal pole. These findings reveal that altercentric interference relies on areas involved in self-other distinction, self-updating and central executive functions. In contrast, egocentric interference needs the activation of the mirror neuron system and deductive reasoning, much less related to pure ToM abilities.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marie-Louise Montandon
- Department of Psychiatry, Faculty of Medicine, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland.
- Department of Rehabilitation and Geriatrics, Geneva University Hospitals and University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland.
| | - Cristelle Rodriguez
- Department of Psychiatry, Faculty of Medicine, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
- Division of Institutional Measures, Medical Direction, Geneva University Hospitals, Geneva, Switzerland
| | - François R Herrmann
- Department of Rehabilitation and Geriatrics, Geneva University Hospitals and University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
| | - Ariel Eytan
- Department of Psychiatry, Faculty of Medicine, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
- Division of Institutional Measures, Medical Direction, Geneva University Hospitals, Geneva, Switzerland
| | - Alan J Pegna
- School of Psychology, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia
| | - Sven Haller
- CIMC - Centre d'Imagerie Médicale de Cornavin, Geneva, Switzerland
- Department of Surgical Sciences, Radiology, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden
- Faculty of Medicine of the University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
- Department of Radiology, Beijing Tiantan Hospital, Capital Medical University, Beijing, China
| | - Panteleimon Giannakopoulos
- Department of Psychiatry, Faculty of Medicine, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
- Division of Institutional Measures, Medical Direction, Geneva University Hospitals, Geneva, Switzerland
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Gatzia DE, Arnaud S. Loving Objects: Can Autism Explain Objectophilia? ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 2022; 51:2117-2133. [PMID: 35536491 DOI: 10.1007/s10508-021-02281-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/11/2019] [Revised: 12/18/2021] [Accepted: 12/22/2021] [Indexed: 06/14/2023]
Abstract
Objectophilia (also known as objectum-sexuality) involves romantic and sexual attraction to specific objects. Objectophiles often develop deep and enduring emotional, romantic, and sexual relations with specific inanimate (concrete or abstract) objects such as trains, bridges, cars, or words. The determinants of objectophilia are poorly understood. The aim of this paper is to examine the determining factors of objectophilia. We examine four hypotheses about the determinants of objectophilia (pertaining to fetishism, synesthesia, cross-modal mental imagery, and autism) and argue that the most likely determining factors of objectophilia are the social and non-social features of autism. Future studies on the determinants of objectophilia could enhance our understanding and potentially lessen the marginalization experienced by objectophiles.
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Affiliation(s)
- Dimitria Electra Gatzia
- Philosophy Department, The University of Akron, Akron, OH, USA
- Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic
| | - Sarah Arnaud
- Centre for Philosophical Psychology, University of Antwerp, Stadscampus - Gebouw D, D416, Grote Kauwenberg 18, Antwerp, 2000, Belgium.
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Anthropomorphizing Technology: A Conceptual Review of Anthropomorphism Research and How it Relates to Children's Engagements with Digital Voice Assistants. Integr Psychol Behav Sci 2021; 56:709-738. [PMID: 34811705 PMCID: PMC9334403 DOI: 10.1007/s12124-021-09668-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 11/07/2021] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
‘Anthropomorphism’ is a popular term in the literature on human-technology engagements, in general, and child-technology engagements, in particular. But what does it really mean to ‘anthropomorphize’ something in today’s world? This conceptual review article, addressed to researchers interested in anthropomorphism and adjacent areas, reviews contemporary anthropomorphism research, and it offers a critical perspective on how anthropomorphism research relates to today’s children who grow up amid increasingly intelligent and omnipresent technologies, particularly digital voice assistants (e.g., Alexa, Google Assistant, Siri). First, the article reviews a comprehensive body of quantitative as well as qualitative anthropomorphism research and considers it within three different research perspectives: descriptive, normative and explanatory. Following a brief excursus on philosophical pragmatism, the article then discusses each research perspective from a pragmatistic viewpoint, with a special emphasis on child-technology and child-voice-assistant engagements, and it also challenges some popular notions in the literature. These notions include descriptive ‘as if’ parallels (e.g., child behaves ‘as if’ Alexa was a friend), or normative assumptions that human-human engagements are generally superior to human-technology engagements. Instead, the article reviews different examples from the literature suggesting the nature of anthropomorphism may change as humans’ experiential understandings of humanness change, and this may particularly apply to today’s children as their social cognition develops in interaction with technological entities which are increasingly characterized by unprecedented combinations of human and non-human qualities.
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Hortensius R, Kent M, Darda KM, Jastrzab L, Koldewyn K, Ramsey R, Cross ES. Exploring the relationship between anthropomorphism and theory-of-mind in brain and behaviour. Hum Brain Mapp 2021; 42:4224-4241. [PMID: 34196439 PMCID: PMC8356980 DOI: 10.1002/hbm.25542] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/07/2021] [Revised: 05/07/2021] [Accepted: 05/11/2021] [Indexed: 01/14/2023] Open
Abstract
The process of understanding the minds of other people, such as their emotions and intentions, is mimicked when individuals try to understand an artificial mind. The assumption is that anthropomorphism, attributing human‐like characteristics to non‐human agents and objects, is an analogue to theory‐of‐mind, the ability to infer mental states of other people. Here, we test to what extent these two constructs formally overlap. Specifically, using a multi‐method approach, we test if and how anthropomorphism is related to theory‐of‐mind using brain (Experiment 1) and behavioural (Experiment 2) measures. In a first exploratory experiment, we examine the relationship between dispositional anthropomorphism and activity within the theory‐of‐mind brain network (n = 108). Results from a Bayesian regression analysis showed no consistent relationship between dispositional anthropomorphism and activity in regions of the theory‐of‐mind network. In a follow‐up, pre‐registered experiment, we explored the relationship between theory‐of‐mind and situational and dispositional anthropomorphism in more depth. Participants (n = 311) watched a short movie while simultaneously completing situational anthropomorphism and theory‐of‐mind ratings, as well as measures of dispositional anthropomorphism and general theory‐of‐mind. Only situational anthropomorphism predicted the ability to understand and predict the behaviour of the film's characters. No relationship between situational or dispositional anthropomorphism and general theory‐of‐mind was observed. Together, these results suggest that while the constructs of anthropomorphism and theory‐of‐mind might overlap in certain situations, they remain separate and possibly unrelated at the personality level. These findings point to a possible dissociation between brain and behavioural measures when considering the relationship between theory‐of‐mind and anthropomorphism.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ruud Hortensius
- Department of Psychology, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands.,Institute of Neuroscience and Psychology, School of Psychology, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, Scotland, UK
| | - Michaela Kent
- Institute of Neuroscience and Psychology, School of Psychology, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, Scotland, UK.,Faculty of Neuroscience, Brain and Mind Institute, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada
| | - Kohinoor M Darda
- Institute of Neuroscience and Psychology, School of Psychology, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, Scotland, UK.,Department of Cognitive Science, Macquarie University, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
| | - Laura Jastrzab
- Institute of Neuroscience and Psychology, School of Psychology, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, Scotland, UK.,Wales Institute for Cognitive Neuroscience, School of Psychology, Bangor University, Bangor, Wales, UK
| | - Kami Koldewyn
- Wales Institute for Cognitive Neuroscience, School of Psychology, Bangor University, Bangor, Wales, UK
| | - Richard Ramsey
- Department of Psychology, Macquarie University, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
| | - Emily S Cross
- Institute of Neuroscience and Psychology, School of Psychology, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, Scotland, UK.,Department of Cognitive Science, Macquarie University, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
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Abstract
AI research is growing rapidly raising various ethical issues related to safety, risks, and other effects widely discussed in the literature. We believe that in order to adequately address those issues and engage in a productive normative discussion it is necessary to examine key concepts and categories. One such category is anthropomorphism. It is a well-known fact that AI's functionalities and innovations are often anthropomorphized (i.e., described and conceived as characterized by human traits). The general public's anthropomorphic attitudes and some of their ethical consequences (particularly in the context of social robots and their interaction with humans) have been widely discussed in the literature. However, how anthropomorphism permeates AI research itself (i.e., in the very language of computer scientists, designers, and programmers), and what the epistemological and ethical consequences of this might be have received less attention. In this paper we explore this issue. We first set the methodological/theoretical stage, making a distinction between a normative and a conceptual approach to the issues. Next, after a brief analysis of anthropomorphism and its manifestations in the public, we explore its presence within AI research with a particular focus on brain-inspired AI. Finally, on the basis of our analysis, we identify some potential epistemological and ethical consequences of the use of anthropomorphic language and discourse within the AI research community, thus reinforcing the need of complementing the practical with a conceptual analysis.
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Affiliation(s)
- Arleen Salles
- Uppsala University.,Centro de Investigaciones Filosoficas (CIF)
| | | | - Michele Farisco
- Uppsala University.,Biogem, Biology and Molecular Genetics Institute
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Social Cognition in the Age of Human–Robot Interaction. Trends Neurosci 2020; 43:373-384. [DOI: 10.1016/j.tins.2020.03.013] [Citation(s) in RCA: 44] [Impact Index Per Article: 11.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/19/2019] [Revised: 03/04/2020] [Accepted: 03/26/2020] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
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