Self-Serving Dishonesty Partially Substitutes Fairness in Motivating Cooperation When People Are Treated Fairly

Fairness is a key expectation in social interactions. Its violation leads to adverse reactions, including non-cooperation and dishonesty. The present study aimed to examine how (1) fair (unfair) treatment may drive cooperation (defection) and honesty (self-serving dishonesty), (2) dishonesty primes further moral disengagement and reduced cooperation, and (3) dishonesty weakens (substitutes) the effect of fairness on cooperation. The prisoner’s dilemma (Experiment 1 and 2) and die-rolling task (Experiment 2) were employed for capturing cooperation and dishonest behaviors, respectively. To manipulate perceived unfairness, participants were randomly assigned to play the prisoner’s dilemma game, where players either choose more cooperation (fair condition) or defection (unfair condition). Results of Experiment 1 (n = 102) suggested that participants perceive higher unfairness and behave less cooperatively when the other player primarily chooses defection. Results of Exp. 2 (n = 240) (a) confirmed Exp. 1 results, (b) showed that players in the unfair condition also show more self-serving dishonest behavior, and (c) that dishonest behavior weakens the effect of fairness on cooperation. Together, these results extended previous work by highlighting the self-serving lies when the opponent is fair trigger higher cooperation, presumably as a means to alleviate self-reflective moral emotions or restore justice.

Brain variability in dynamic resting-state networks identified by fuzzy entropy: a scalp EEG study

Objective.Exploring the temporal variability in spatial topology during the resting state attracts growing interest and becomes increasingly useful to tackle the cognitive process of brain networks. In particular, the temporal brain dynamics during the resting state may be delineated and quantified aligning with cognitive performance, but few studies investigated the temporal variability in the electroencephalogram (EEG) network as well as its relationship with cognitive performance.Approach.In this study, we proposed an EEG-based protocol to measure the nonlinear complexity of the dynamic resting-state network by applying the fuzzy entropy. To further validate its applicability, the fuzzy entropy was applied into simulated and two independent datasets (i.e. decision-making and P300).Main results.The simulation study first proved that compared to the existing methods, this approach could not only exactly capture the pattern dynamics in time series but also overcame the magnitude effect of time series. Concerning the two EEG datasets, the flexible and robust network architectures of the brain cortex at rest were identified and distributed at the bilateral temporal lobe and frontal/occipital lobe, respectively, whose variability metrics were found to accurately classify different groups. Moreover, the temporal variability of resting-state network property was also either positively or negatively related to individual cognitive performance.Significance.This outcome suggested the potential of fuzzy entropy for evaluating the temporal variability of the dynamic resting-state brain networks, and the fuzzy entropy is also helpful for uncovering the fluctuating network variability that accounts for the individual decision differences.

Moral labels increase cooperation and costly punishment in a Prisoner's Dilemma game with punishment option

To determine the role of moral norms in cooperation and punishment, we examined the effects of a moral-framing manipulation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a costly punishment option. In each round of the game, participants decided whether to cooperate or to defect. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game was identical for all participants with the exception that the behavioral options were paired with moral labels (“I cooperate” and “I cheat”) in the moral-framing condition and with neutral labels (“A” and “B”) in the neutral-framing condition. After each round of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, participants had the opportunity to invest some of their money to punish their partners. In two experiments, moral framing increased moral and hypocritical punishment: participants were more likely to punish partners for defection when moral labels were used than when neutral labels were used. When the participants’ cooperation was enforced by their partners’ moral punishment, moral framing did not only increase moral and hypocritical punishment but also cooperation. The results suggest that moral framing activates a cooperative norm that specifically increases moral and hypocritical punishment. Furthermore, the experience of moral punishment by the partners may increase the importance of social norms for cooperation, which may explain why moral framing effects on cooperation were found only when participants were subject to moral punishment.

The effects of social comparison and depressive mood on adolescent social decision-making

BACKGROUND

Based on social comparison theory, two experiments were conducted to explore the effects of depression and social comparison on adolescents, using the ultimatum game (UG).

METHODS

Before the formal experiment began, a preliminary experiment tested the effectiveness of social comparison settings. This study used the UG paradigm to explore adolescents' social decision-making in the context of gain and loss through two experiments. These experiments were designed as a 2 (group: depressive mood group, normal mood group) × 2 (social comparison: upward, downward) × 3 (fairness level: fair 5:5, unfair 3:7, extremely unfair 1:9) three-factor hybrid study.

RESULTS

(1) The fairer the proposal was, the higher the sense of fairness participants felt, and the higher their acceptance rate. (2) The acceptance rate of the participants for downward social comparison was significantly higher than that for upward social comparison, but there was no difference in fairness perception between the two social comparisons. (3) Under the context of gain, the acceptance rate of the depressive mood group was higher than that of the normal mood group, but there was no difference in the acceptance rate between the depressive mood group and the normal mood group under the loss context. Depressive mood participants had more feelings of unfairness in the contexts of both gain and loss. (4) The effects of depressive mood, social comparison and the fairness level of distribution on social decision-making interact.

CONCLUSIONS

The interaction of social comparison, depressive mood and proposal type demonstrates that besides one's emotion, cognitive biases and social factors can also have an effect on social decision-making. These findings indicate that behavioral decision boosting may provide an avenue for appropriate interventions in helping to guide adolescents to make social decisions.

Age-related differences in decision-making process in the context of healthy aging

During aging cognitive functions change differently from others. Unlike most of the body systems, there is no clear decline pattern in cognitive processes. One of the most significant cognitive processes is decision-making, which defines social interactions, economical relationships, and risky behavior. Among factors influence decisionmaking process, individual lifelong experience is considered to be an important one. Obviously, older adults have more life experience, than the younger groups. However, the former often do not tend to rational choices and beneficial strategies. In this case it is important to assess how aging processes in brain contribute into searching for the most beneficial option during decision-making. On the basis of today’s studies about risky behavior, judgement of fairness, financial games, and modern neuroimaging data this review will observe and discuss age-related differences in decision-making. Thus, a correct cognitive profile of older adult in decision-making context can be determined.

Cognitive Bias, Entrepreneurial Emotion, and Entrepreneurship Intention

Although numerous studies have explored the factors influencing entrepreneurial activity, there is a lack of a theoretical basis for linking these factors to entrepreneurship behavioral intention. The current study uses the theory of self-regulating attitude to construct a theoretical model of examining the relationship among cognitive bias, entrepreneurial emotion, and entrepreneurship intention. A total of 312 valid samples were collected from college students at a Chinese university. The bootstrapping method was used to test the multi-mediation hypotheses. Our research found that positive entrepreneurial emotion plays a mediating role in the relationship between optimism and entrepreneurship intention, whereas negative entrepreneurial emotion plays a mediating role in the relationship between overconfidence and entrepreneurship intention. These findings underline the importance of a correct understanding of cognitive bias and entrepreneurial emotion in the process of entrepreneurship.

The fair decision-making of children and adolescents with high-functioning autism spectrum disorder from the perspective of dual-process theories

BACKGROUND

Fairness has received much attention in our society. At present, the findings regarding fair decision-making in high-functioning autism spectrum disorder (HF-ASD) are inconsistent. Previous studies have shown that the fair decision-making of typically developing children is influenced by theory of mind (ToM) and executive functioning (EF). As those with HF-ASD have defects in both domains, this study aims to explore the differences in fair decision-making between children and adolescents with HF-ASD and those with typical development (TD).

METHODS

We used a simple ultimatum game (UG) to explore 31 children and adolescents with HF-ASD and 38 children and adolescents with TD. T tests and chi-square tests were used to compare group differences, and Pearson correlation analysis and stepwise regression analysis were used to analyse the mechanisms influencing the two groups' unfair acceptance rates.

RESULTS

The results show that children with HF-ASD are more likely to accept unfair offers, but for adolescents, the difference is not significant. Regression analysis showed that the interaction between the behavior regulation index (BRI) and age could negatively predict the unfair acceptance rate of children and adolescents with HF-ASD. Working memory and ToM can negatively predict the unfair acceptance rate of those with TD.

CONCLUSION

This study concluded that the development of fair decision-making by children and adolescents with HF-ASD falls far behind that of those with TD. Intuition processes play a dominant role in the fair decision-making processes of children and adolescents with HF-ASD, and we believe that comorbidity, age, experience and emotional management are important factors influencing the fair decision-making of individuals with HF-ASD.

Outcomes versus intentions in fairness-related decision making: School-aged children's decisions are just like those of adults

The notion of what constitutes fairness has been assumed to change during childhood, in line with a marked shift from outcome-based to intention-based moral reasoning. However, the precise developmental profile of such a shift is still subject to debate. This study sought to determine the age at which the perceived intentions of others begin to influence fairness-related decision making in children (aged 6-8 and 9-11 years) and adolescents (aged 14 and 15 years) in the context of the mini-ultimatum game. The mini-ultimatum game has a forced-choice design, whereby a proposer needs to select one of two predetermined offers that a responder can either accept or reject. Due to these constraints, the procedure measures sensitivity to unfair intentions in addition to unfair outcomes. Participants needed to make judgments about how likely they would be to reject various offers, how fair they judged these offers to be, and the emotion they experienced when thinking about the offers. Contrary to previous published reports, we found that even 6- to 8-year-olds employed a sophisticated notion of fairness that took into account the alternatives the proposer had available. Crucially, decision making did not differ as a function of age. A further, and novel, aim was to trace the developmental origins of temporal asymmetries in judgments ab out fairness by testing the implications of adopting a past or future temporal perspective. Across all ages, we found no evidence that fairness-based decision making varies as a function of temporal location.