Moderators of the Liking Bias in Judgments of Moral Character

Hypocrisy moderates self-interest bias in moral character judgments

Self-interest bias describes an observer's tendency to judge moral transgression leniently when they benefit from it. However, what factors moderate the self-interest bias is an open empirical question. Here, we investigated to what extent hypocrisy moderates the self-interest bias. Preregistered Study 1a (N = 194) and replication in Study 1b (N = 193) demonstrated that observers' interest impacts moral character judgments of hypocritical transgressors. This effect was explained by observers' goal attainment due to transgression (Study 2, N = 713) and agreement to aid observers' or ingroup interests (Study 3, N = 634). Importantly, transgressors' hypocrisy moderated the impact of observers' interests in moral character judgments (Studies 2 & 3). In summary, when judging hypocritical transgressors, peoples' moral character judgments tend to be biased by their or their group's interests. However, in comparison to non-hypocritical transgressors, this impact is less pronounced.

Specificity Versus Generality: A Meta-Analytic Review Of The Association Between Trait Disgust Sensitivity And Moral Judgment

Disgust seems to play an important role in moral judgment. However, it is unclear whether the role of disgust in moral judgment is limited to certain kinds of moral domains (versus many) and/or certain types of disgust (versus many). To clarify these questions, we conducted a multilevel meta-analysis ( k = 512; N = 72,443) on relations between trait disgust sensitivity and moral judgment (disgust-immorality association). Main analyses revealed a significant overall mean disgust-immorality association ( r = .23). Additionally, moderator analyses revealed significant specificity in disgust type and moral domain (grounded in Moral Foundations Theory): effects were stronger for (a) sexual disgust compared to pathogen disgust, (b) sanctity moral judgments compared to other domains of moral judgments, and (c) sexual-sanctity associations compared to other disgust type-moral domain pairings.

The boundary conditions of the liking bias in moral character judgments

Recent research has shown that moral character judgments are prone to the liking bias-well-liked people are seen as morally superior to disliked or neutral ones. However, whether moral information about their past behavior would moderate the liking bias is still an open empirical question addressed in present studies. In Study 1 (N = 653), participants updated their biased moral character impressions when moral information about the target was introduced after the liking induction. In preregistered Study 2 (N = 601), when moral information about the target was presented before the liking induction, moral information had a stronger impact on moral character judgments than liking. Study 3 (N = 398) showed that moral character impression updating was three times greater when moral information was presented after (vs. before) the attitude induction. Further analyses of changes in participants' moral judgments certainty revealed that moral information reduced their uncertainty stronger than attitudes. In effect, the latter were more amenable to updating than information-based judgments. Thus, we present evidence that moral information updates moral character impressions biased by liking. Nevertheless, liking also, but to a lesser extent, updates moral character impressions initially grounded on moral information. We propose that certainty about others' moral character explains when and how moral information limits the impact of attitudinal influences on moral character judgments.