Complexity and accountability: the witches' brew of psychiatric genetics

Enacting biosocial complexity: Stress, epigenetic biomarkers and the tools of postgenomics

This article analyses attempts to enact complexity in postgenomic experimentations using the case of epigenetic research on biomarkers of psychosocial stress. Enacting complexity in this research means dissecting multiple so-called biosocial processes of health differentiation in the face of stressful experiences. To characterize enactments of biosocial complexity, the article develops the concepts of complexity work and complexification. The former emphasizes the social, technical, and material work that goes into the production of mixed biological and social representations of stress in epigenetics. The latter underlines how complexity can be assembled differently across distinct configurations of experimental work. Specifically, complexification can be defined as producing, stabilizing, and normalizing novel experimental systems that are supposed to improve techno-scientific enactments of complexity. In the case of epigenetics, complexification entails a reconfiguration of postgenomic experimental systems in ways that some actors deem 'better' at enacting health as a biosocial process. This study of complexity work and complexification shows that biosocial complexity is hardly a univocal enterprise in epigenetics. Consequently, the article calls for abandoning analysis of these research practices using clear-cut dichotomies of reductionism vs. holism, as well as simplicity vs. complexity. More broadly, the article suggests the relevance of a sociology of complexification for STS approaches to complexity in scientific practices. Complementing the existing focus on complexity as instrumental rhetoric in contemporary sciences, complexification directs analytical attention to the pragmatic opportunities that alternative (biosocial) complexities offer to collective, societal, and political thinking about science in society.

Negotiating Novelty: Constructing the Novel within Scientific Accounts of Epigenetics

Epigenetics is regarded by many as a compelling domain of biomedicine. The purported novelty of epigenetics has begun to have various societal ramifications, particularly in relation to processes of responsibilisation. Within sociology, it has stimulated hopeful debate about conceptual rapprochements between the biomedical and social sciences. This article is concerned with how novelty is socially produced and negotiated. The article engages directly with scientists' talk and writings about epigenetics (as process and field of study). I aim to advance an explicitly sociological analysis about the novelty of epigenetics that underscores its social production rather than an account which participates in its reification. I attend to definitional skirmishes, comparisons with genetics, excitement and intrigue, and considerations of the ethical dimensions of epigenetics. Any assertions that epigenetics is exciting or important should not inadvertently elide reflexive consideration of how such characterisations might be part of the machinery by which they become real.

The rare and the common: scale and the genetic imaginary in Alzheimer's disease drug development

In this paper I examine how the promissory value of genetics is constituted through processes of scale and scaling, focussing on the relationship between "rare" and "common" forms of disease. I highlight the bodies and spaces involved in the production of post-genomic knowledge and technologies of Alzheimer's disease and the development of new disease-modifying drugs. I focus on the example of the development of a monoclonal antibody therapy for Alzheimer's disease. I argue that the process of therapeutic innovation, from genetic studies and animal models to phase III clinical trials, reflects the persistent importance of a genetic imaginary and a mutually constitutive relationship between the rare and the common in in shaping visions of Alzheimer's disease medicine. Approaching this relationship as a question of scale, I suggest the importance of attending to how and where genomic knowledge is "scaled" or proves resistant to scaling.

Psychiatry and the Sociology of Novelty: Negotiating the US National Institute of Mental Health "Research Domain Criteria" (RDoC)

In the United States, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) is seeking to encourage researchers to move away from diagnostic tools like the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (the DSM). A key mechanism for this is the "Research Domain Criteria" (RDoC) initiative, closely associated with former NIMH Director Thomas Insel. This article examines how key figures in US (and UK) psychiatry construct the purpose, nature, and implications of the ambiguous RDoC project; that is, how its novelty is constituted through discourse. In this paper, I explore and analyze these actors' accounts of what is new, important, or (un)desirable about RDoC, demonstrating how they are constituted through institutional context and personal affects. In my interviews with mental health opinion leaders, RDoC is presented as overly reliant on neurobiological epistemologies, distant from clinical imaginaries and imperatives, and introduced in a top-down manner inconsistent with the professional norms of scientific research. Ultimately, the article aims to add empirical depth to current understandings about the epistemological and ontological politics of contemporary (US) psychiatry and to contribute to science and technology studies (STS) debates about "the new" in technoscience. Accordingly, I use discussions about RDoC as a case study in the sociology of novelty.

Fraught claims at the intersection of biology and sociality: Managing controversy in the neuroscience of poverty and adversity

In this article, I examine how a subfield of researchers studying the impact of poverty and adversity on the developing brain, cognitive abilities and mental health respond to criticism that their research is racist and eugenicist, and implies that affected children are broken on a biological level. My interviewees use a number of strategies to respond to these resurfacing criticisms. They maintain that the controversy rests upon a fundamental misunderstanding of their work. In addition, they use what I term 'plasticity talk', a form of anti-determinist discourse, to put forth what they believe is a hopeful conception of body and brain as fundamentally malleable. They draw attention to their explicit intentions to use scientific inquiry to mitigate inequality and further social justice - in fact, they believe their studies are powerful evidence that add to the literature on the social determinants of health. Though they may be interested in improving lives, they argue that their aims and means have little in common with programs trying to 'improve' the genetic stock of the population. I argue that theirs is a fraught research terrain, where any claims-making is potentially treacherous. Just as their studies of development refuse dualistic models, so too do their responses defy dichotomous categorization.

Have we seen the geneticisation of society? Expectations and evidence

Abby Lippman's geneticisation thesis, of the early 1990s, argued and anticipated that with the rise of genetics, increasing areas of social and health related activities would come to be understood and defined in genetic terms leading to major changes in society, medicine and health care. We review the considerable literature on geneticisation and consider how the concept stands both theoretically and empirically across scientific, clinical, popular and lay discourse and practice. Social science scholarship indicates that relatively little of the original claim of the geneticisation thesis has been realised, highlighting the development of more complex and dynamic accounts of disease in scientific discourse and the complexity of relationships between bioscientific, clinical and lay understandings. This scholarship represents a shift in social science understandings of the processes of sociotechnical change, which have moved from rather simplistic linear models to an appreciation of disease categories as multiply understood. Despite these shifts, we argue that a genetic imaginary persists, which plays a performative role in driving investments in new gene-based developments. Understanding the enduring power of this genetic imaginary and its consequences remains a key task for the social sciences, one which treats ongoing genetic expectations and predictions in a sceptical yet open way.

The Ethics of Translational Science: Imagining Public Benefit in Gene-Environment Interaction Research

Biomedical research is increasingly informed by expectations of "translation," which call for the production of scientific knowledge that can be used to create services and products that improve health outcomes. In this paper, we ask how translation, in particular the idea of social responsibility, is understood and enacted in the post-genomic life sciences. Drawing on theories examining what constitutes "good science," and interviews with 35 investigators who study the role of gene-environment interactions in the etiology of cancer, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease, we describe the dynamic and unsettled ethics of translational science through which the expected social value of scientific knowledge about complex disease causation is negotiated. To describe how this ethics is formed, we first discuss the politics of knowledge production in interdisciplinary research collectives. Researchers described a commitment to working across disciplines to examine a wide range of possible causes of disease, but they also pointed to persistent disciplinary and ontological divisions that rest on the dominance of molecular conceptions of disease risk. The privileging of molecular-level causation shapes and constrains the kinds of knowledge that can be created about gene-environment interactions. We then turn to scientists' ideas about how this knowledge should be used, including personalized prevention strategies, targeted therapeutics, and public policy interventions. Consensus about the relative value of these anticipated translations was elusive, and many scientists agreed that gene-environment interaction research is part of a shift in biomedical research away from considering important social, economic, political and historical causes of disease and disease disparities. We conclude by urging more explicit engagement with questions about the ethics of translational science in the post-genomic life sciences. This would include a consideration of who will benefit from emerging scientific knowledge, how benefits will accrue, and the ways in which normative assumptions about the public good come to be embedded in scientific objects and procedures.

Problematisations of Complexity: On the Notion and Production of Diverse Complexities in Healthcare Interventions and Evaluations

Within the literature on the evaluation of health (policy) interventions, complexity is a much-debated issue. In particular, many claim that so-called 'complex interventions' pose different challenges to evaluation studies than apparently 'simple interventions' do. Distinct ways of doing evaluation entail particular ontologies and epistemologies of complexity. They differ in terms of whether they define complexity as a quantitative trait of interventions, whether they see evaluation as part of or outside the intervention, and whether complexity can be regarded as an emergent property of the intervention and its evaluation. In practice, evaluators and commissioners of large health care improvement programmes rely on different, sometimes contradictory, repertoires about what it means to conduct a 'good' evaluation. This is an ongoing matter negotiated between and among commissioners, researchers, and-sometimes-programme managers. In particular, notions of evaluability, usefulness and distance/independence are problematised in different ways and with diverse consequences, which, in turn, produce other notions and layers of complexity such as temporal, institutional and affective complexities. When (social science) researchers claim that one method or another is better able to grasp complexity, they elide the issue that any methodological choice emphasises some complexities and lets others fade into the background. Analysing the practicalities and emotions involved in evaluation studies opens up the notion of complexity to analytical scrutiny, and suggests a basis for co-theorising between biomedical, public health and social scientists (including Science and Technology Studies scholars).

Mapping the new molecular landscape: social dimensions of epigenetics

Epigenetics is the study of changes in gene expression caused by mechanisms other than changes in the DNA itself. The field is rapidly growing and being widely promoted, attracting attention in diverse arenas. These include those of the social sciences, where some researchers have been encouraged by the resonance between imaginaries of development within epigenetics and social theory. Yet, sustained attention from science and technology studies (STS) scholars to epigenetics and the praxis it propels has been lacking. In this article, we reflexively consider some of the ways in which epigenetics is being constructed as an area of biomedical novelty and discuss the content and logics underlying the ambivalent promises being made by scientists working in this area. We then reflect on the scope, limits and future of engagements between epigenetics and the social sciences. Our discussion is situated within wider literatures on biomedicine and society, the politics of "interventionist STS," and on the problems of "caseness" within empirical social science.

Troubling "environments": postgenomics, Bajan wheezing, and Lévi-Strauss

Postgenomics is intended to move beyond the search for genes to explore disease as a result of genes interacting with their environment, revealing how they have relevance for health. This addition of environment confers genomic research with new cultural life, making it relevant to public health discourse, government interventions, and health disparities. Drawing on ethnographic research following an American genetics of asthma study conducted in Barbados, I explore the ways environment gets construed by the multiple communities involved-U.S. researchers, Bajan officials, medical practitioners, and patient participants. I draw on Lévi-Strauss to argue that plural competing environments give mana to the American postgenomic project as intervention on racial injustice, household practices, pollution, and other aspects of asthma.

Genetics and psychiatry: a proposal for the application of the precautionary principle

The paper suggests an application of the precautionary principle to the use of genetics in psychiatry focusing on scientific uncertainty. Different levels of uncertainty are taken into consideration--from the acknowledgement that the genetic paradigm is only one of the possible ways to explain psychiatric disorders, via the difficulties related to the diagnostic path and genetic methods, to the value of the results of studies carried out in this field. Considering those uncertainties, some measures for the use of genetics in psychiatry are suggested. Some of those measures are related to the conceptual limits of the genetic paradigm; others are related to present knowledge and should be re-evaluated.