Religious People Are Trusted Because They Are Viewed as Slow Life-History Strategists

Measurement Invariance Testing Works

Psychometricians have argued that measurement invariance (MI) testing is needed to know if the same psychological constructs are measured in different groups. Data from five experiments allowed that position to be tested. In the first, participants answered questionnaires on belief in free will and either the meaning of life or the meaning of a nonsense concept called "gavagai." Since the meaning of life and the meaning of gavagai conceptually differ, MI should have been violated when groups were treated like their measurements were identical. MI was severely violated, indicating the questionnaires were interpreted differently. In the second and third experiments, participants were randomized to watch treatment videos explaining figural matrices rules or task-irrelevant control videos. Participants then took intelligence and figural matrices tests. The intervention worked and the experimental group had an additional influence on figural matrix performance in the form of knowing matrix rules, so their performance on the matrices tests violated MI and was anomalously high for their intelligence levels. In both experiments, MI was severely violated. In the fourth and fifth experiments, individuals were exposed to growth mindset interventions that a twin study revealed changed the amount of genetic variance in the target mindset measure without affecting other variables. When comparing treatment and control groups, MI was attainable before but not after treatment. Moreover, the control group showed longitudinal invariance, but the same was untrue for the treatment group. MI testing is likely able to show if the same things are measured in different groups.

Intuitive moral bias favors the religiously faithful

Belief in powerful supernatural agents that enforce moral norms has been theoretically linked with cooperative altruism and prosociality. Correspondingly, prior research reveals an implicit association between atheism and extreme antisociality (e.g., serial murder). However, findings centered on associations between lack of faith and moral transgression do not directly address the hypothesized conceptual association between religious belief and prosociality. Accordingly, we conducted two pre-registered experiments depicting a "serial helper" to assess biases related to extraordinary helpfulness, mirroring designs depicting a serial killer used in prior cross-cultural work. In both a predominantly religious society (the U.S., Study 1) and a predominantly secular society (New Zealand, Study 2), we successfully replicated previous research linking atheism with transgression, and obtained evidence for a substantially stronger conceptual association between religiosity and virtue. The results suggest that stereotypes linking religiosity with prosociality are both real and global in scale.

Moral disciplining: The cognitive and evolutionary foundations of puritanical morality

Why do many societies moralize apparently harmless pleasures, such as lust, gluttony, alcohol, drugs, and even music and dance? Why do they erect temperance, asceticism, sobriety, modesty, and piety as cardinal moral virtues? According to existing theories, this puritanical morality cannot be reduced to concerns for harm and fairness: It must emerge from cognitive systems that did not evolve for cooperation (e.g., disgust-based "purity" concerns). Here, we argue that, despite appearances, puritanical morality is no exception to the cooperative function of moral cognition. It emerges in response to a key feature of cooperation, namely that cooperation is (ultimately) a long-term strategy, requiring (proximately) the self-control of appetites for immediate gratification. Puritanical moralizations condemn behaviors which, although inherently harmless, are perceived as indirectly facilitating uncooperative behaviors, by impairing the self-control required to refrain from cheating. Drinking, drugs, immodest clothing, and unruly music and dance are condemned as stimulating short-term impulses, thus facilitating uncooperative behaviors (e.g., violence, adultery, free-riding). Overindulgence in harmless bodily pleasures (e.g., masturbation, gluttony) is perceived as making people slave to their urges, thus altering abilities to resist future antisocial temptations. Daily self-discipline, ascetic temperance, and pious ritual observance are perceived as cultivating the self-control required to honor prosocial obligations. We review psychological, historical, and ethnographic evidence supporting this account. We use this theory to explain the fall of puritanism in western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies, and discuss the cultural evolution of puritanical norms. Explaining puritanical norms does not require adding mechanisms unrelated to cooperation in our models of the moral mind.

Cooperation as a signal of time preferences

Many evolutionary models explain why we cooperate with non-kin, but few explain why cooperative behaviour and trust vary. Here, we introduce a model of cooperation as a signal of time preferences, which addresses this variability. At equilibrium in our model (i) future-oriented individuals are more motivated to cooperate, (ii) future-oriented populations have access to a wider range of cooperative opportunities, and (iii) spontaneous and inconspicuous cooperation reveal stronger preference for the future, and therefore inspire more trust. Our theory sheds light on the variability of cooperative behaviour and trust. Since affluence tends to align with time preferences, results (i) and (ii) explain why cooperation is often associated with affluence, in surveys and field studies. Time preferences also explain why we trust others based on proxies for impulsivity, and, following result (iii), why uncalculating, subtle and one-shot cooperators are deemed particularly trustworthy. Time preferences provide a powerful and parsimonious explanatory lens, through which we can better understand the variability of trust and cooperation.

Belief in karma is associated with perceived (but not actual) trustworthiness

Believers of karma believe in ethical causation where good and bad outcomes can be traced to past moral and immoral acts. Karmic belief may have important interpersonal consequences. We investigated whether American Christians expect more trustworthiness from (and are more likely to trust) interaction partners who believe in karma. We conducted an incentivized study of the trust game where interaction partners had different beliefs in karma and God. Participants expected more trustworthiness from (and were more likely to trust) karma believers. Expectations did not match actual behavior: karmic belief was not associated with actual trustworthiness. These findings suggest that people may use others’ karmic belief as a cue to predict their trustworthiness but would err when doing so.

Men are less religious in more gender-equal countries

Sex differences in religiosity are cross-culturally common and robust, yet it is unclear why sex differences in some cultures are larger than in others. Although women are more religious than men in most countries, religions frequently provide asymmetrical benefits to men at the expense of women. Two global analyses (51 countries and 74 countries) found that country-level gender equality was consistently and negatively associated with religiousness (i.e. religious attendance, reported importance of God and frequency of prayer) for men, more than for women, leading to a larger sex difference in religiousness in more gender-equal countries. Results were especially robust for religious attendance, and hold accounting for country-level wealth, as well as individuals' religious affiliation, the moralization of sexuality, age and education level. We interpret results through a rational choice lens, which assumes that people are more drawn to religion when it is consistent with their reproductive goals.

Men's Mate Value Correlates with a Less Restricted Sociosexual Orientation: A Meta-Analysis

Men, relative to women, can benefit their total reproductive success by engaging in short-term pluralistic mating. Yet not all men enact such a mating strategy. It has previously been hypothesized that high mate value men should be most likely to adopt a short-term mating strategy, with this prediction being firmly grounded in some important mid-level evolutionary psychological theories. Yet evidence to support such a link has been mixed. This paper presents a comprehensive meta-analysis of 33 published and unpublished studies (N = 5928) in which we find that that self-reported mate value accounts for roughly 6% of variance in men's sociosexual orientation. The meta-analysis provides evidence that men's self-perceived mate value positively predicts their tendency to engage in short-term mating, but that the total effect size is small.

Stereotypes of nihilists are overwhelmingly negative

Existential nihilism is on the rise in modern societies, but no previous work has investigated the social psychology of seeing no meaning in life. In the current research, five studies (N = 1,634) show that targets' existential nihilist beliefs elicit a range of negative stereotypes about personality traits, commonly valued social traits, and targets' ability to perform basic adaptive social tasks. Results demonstrate that these negative stereotypes are mediated by belief that the target is depressed more than the belief the target is non-religious or that the target does not plan for the future. Unlike atheists, who are seen as competent, no positive stereotypes emerged for nihilists, suggesting both future research and interventions aimed at updating false beliefs about nihilists.

The new trinity of religious moral character: the Cooperator, the Crusader, and the Complicit

Does religion make people good or bad? We suggest that there are at least three distinct profiles of religious morality: the Cooperator, the Crusader, and the Complicit. Cooperators forego selfishness to benefit others, crusaders harm outgroups to bolster their own religious community, and the complicit use religion to justify selfish behavior and reduce blame. Different aspects of religion motivate each character: religious reverence makes people cooperators, religious tribalism makes people crusaders, and religious absolution makes people complicit. This framework makes sense of previous research by explaining when and how religion can make people more or less moral.

Why are world religions so concerned with sexual behavior?

Many religions emphasize the importance of sexual morality. This article argues mating strategies are central to understanding religion. I highlight the reproductive-religiosity model, which suggests that religious behavior is partly motivated by preferences for restricted mating strategies. I then discuss how religion can lead to reproductive benefits. Specifically, religions can make parenting a relatively safer strategy by increasing paternal certainty, which drives men toward parental investment, and alloparenting, which reduces offspring mortality rates. Next, I discuss the social implications of reproductive-religiosity, including mate selection and trust. Finally, I discuss the potential role of mating strategies in the evolution and cultural evolution of religion and discuss future directions for developing an approach to religion rooted in mating interests.

Life History and Multi-Partner Mating: A Novel Explanation for Moral Stigma Against Consensual Non-monogamy

Life history theory (LHT) predicts that individuals vary in their sexual, reproductive, parental, familial, and social behavior according to the physical and social challenges imposed upon them throughout development. LHT provides a framework for understanding why non-monogamy may be the target of significant moral condemnation: individuals who habitually form multiple romantic or sexual partnerships may pursue riskier, more competitive interpersonal strategies that strain social cooperation. We compared several indices of life history (i.e., the Mini-K, the High-K Strategy Scale, pubertal timing, sociosexuality, disease avoidance, and risk-taking) between individuals practicing monogamous and consensually non-monogamous (CNM) romantic relationships. Across several measures, CNM individuals reported a faster life history strategy than monogamous individuals, and women in CNM relationships reported earlier pubertal development. CNM individuals also reported more social and ethical risk-taking, less aversion to germs, and greater interest in short-term mating (and less interest in long-term mating) than monogamous individuals. From these data, we discuss a model to explain how moral stigma toward non-monogamy evolved and how these attitudes may be mismatched to the modern environment. Specifically, we argue that the culture of sexual ethics that pervades contemporary CNM communities (e.g., polyamory, swinging) may attenuate risky interpersonal behaviors (e.g., violent intrasexual competition, retributive jealousy, partner/child abandonment, disease transmission) that are relatively more common among those who pursue multi-partner mating.

Distrust persists after subverting atheist stereotypes

Antiatheist prejudice appears to be common. This prejudice may stem from distrust. However, the factors influencing distrust are not fully understood. The current research identified common stereotypes about atheists, tested the intuitiveness of those stereotypes, and determined whether distrust toward atheists depends more on the label “atheist” or the attributes atheists are thought to possess. Study 1 ( N = 100) and Study 2 ( N = 149) identified several attributes thought to be most characteristic of atheists and least characteristic of Christians (or vice versa). Study 3 ( N = 219) demonstrated that atheists and Christians are intuitively associated with the respective traits identified in Studies 1 and 2. Study 4 ( N = 274) and Study 5 ( N = 259) used fake social media profiles to manipulate target religious identification (atheist, Christian, or unspecified) and attributes (stereotypically atheist or stereotypically Christian) to determine the effect on trust ratings. Overall, the results of these studies indicate that atheists and Christians are explicitly and implicitly associated with different attributes and that, even when atheists possess stereotypically Christian attributes, Christians trust atheists significantly less than other Christians. These findings suggest that antiatheist prejudice is relatively insensitive to individual differences of the target.

Is Nothing Sacred? Religion, Sex, and Reproductive Strategies

Religion has often been conceptualized as a collection of beliefs, practices, and proscriptions that lift people’s thoughts and behaviors out of the metaphorical gutter of sex and selfishness toward lives full of meaning, contemplation, and community service. But religious beliefs and behaviors may serve selfish, sexual motivations in ways that are not always obvious or consciously intended. We review two lines of research illustrating nonobvious links between the mundane and the religious. First, contrary to long-held assumptions that religious upbringing causes sexually restrictive attitudes and behaviors, several large data sets now suggest a reverse causal arrow—people’s preferred mating strategies determining their attraction toward, or repulsion from, religion. Second, other recent findings suggest that distrust of nonreligious individuals is almost completely erased by knowledge that they are following a restricted monogamous lifestyle. Thus, reproductive strategies often underlie apparently sacred concerns. We close with a consideration of ways in which reproductive interests might underlie a broad range of benefits associated with religious affiliation.