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Guo R, Liu Y, Lu HJ, Jing A. Can you accurately monitor your behaviors while multitasking? The effect of multitasking on metacognition. PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 2024; 88:580-593. [PMID: 37707650 DOI: 10.1007/s00426-023-01875-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/30/2022] [Accepted: 09/01/2023] [Indexed: 09/15/2023]
Abstract
With the pace of life accelerating, multitasking has become the norm in daily life. According to research, multiple cognitive processes, including numerical reasoning, comprehension, and writing, are negatively affected by multitasking. However, only a few studies have investigated the relationship between multitasking and metacognition. In this study, the effect of multitasking on metacognition was examined using a prospective monitoring paradigm (prediction of subsequent recall performance). In Experiment 1, the participants simultaneously studied word pairs (primary task) and differentiated between different sound pitches (secondary task) and then predicted their performance in a subsequent memory test for the studied word pairs (prospective metacognitive monitoring). The accuracy of metacognitive evaluation with multitasking was then compared with that without multitasking. In Experiment 2, sounds and icons of real-life applications were used to improve the ecological validity of the experiment in the secondary task. The results indicated that multitasking impaired metacognition in both artificial and real-life simulated scenarios. In addition, the participants who engaged in more media multitasking in their daily lives exhibited poorer metacognitive monitoring abilities in single tasks.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ruiqiao Guo
- School of Psychology, Liaoning Normal University, Dalian, 116029, People's Republic of China
- Institute of Brain and Psychological Sciences, Sichuan Normal University, Sichuan, People's Republic of China
| | - Yan Liu
- School of Psychology, Liaoning Normal University, Dalian, 116029, People's Republic of China.
| | - Hui Jing Lu
- Department of Applied Social Sciences, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong, People's Republic of China
| | - Annan Jing
- School of Psychology, Liaoning Normal University, Dalian, 116029, People's Republic of China
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2
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Elosegi P, Rahnev D, Soto D. Think twice: Re-assessing confidence improves visual metacognition. Atten Percept Psychophys 2024; 86:373-380. [PMID: 38135781 PMCID: PMC10805928 DOI: 10.3758/s13414-023-02823-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 11/17/2023] [Indexed: 12/24/2023]
Abstract
Metacognition is a fundamental feature of human behavior that has adaptive functional value. Current understanding of the factors that influence metacognition remains incomplete, and we lack protocols to improve metacognition. Here, we introduce a two-step confidence choice paradigm to test whether metacognitive performance may improve by asking subjects to reassess their initial confidence. Previous work on perceptual and mnemonic decision-making has shown that (type 1) perceptual sensitivity benefits from reassessing the primary choice, however, it is not clear whether such an effect occurs for type 2 confidence choices. To test this hypothesis, we ran two separate online experiments, in which participants completed a type 1 task followed by two consecutive confidence choices. The results of the two experiments indicated that metacognitive sensitivity improved after re-evaluation. Since post-decisional evidence accumulation following the first confidence choice is likely to be minimal, this metacognitive improvement is better accounted for by an attenuation of metacognitive noise during the process of confidence generation. Thus, here we argue that metacognitive noise may be filtered out by additional post-decisional processing, thereby improving metacognitive sensitivity. We discuss the ramifications of these findings for models of metacognition and for developing protocols to train and manipulate metacognitive processes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Patxi Elosegi
- Basque Center on Cognition, Brain and Language, San Sebastian, Spain.
- University of the Basque Country- UPV/EHU, Basque, Spain.
| | - Dobromir Rahnev
- School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, USA
| | - David Soto
- Basque Center on Cognition, Brain and Language, San Sebastian, Spain
- Ikerbasque, Basque Foundation for Science, Bilbao, Spain
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3
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Corlazzoli G, Desender K, Gevers W. Feeling and deciding: Subjective experiences rather than objective factors drive the decision to invest cognitive control. Cognition 2023; 240:105587. [PMID: 37597356 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105587] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/03/2023] [Revised: 07/20/2023] [Accepted: 08/02/2023] [Indexed: 08/21/2023]
Abstract
When presented with the choice to invest cognitive control in a task, several signals are monitored to reach a decision. Leading theoretical frameworks argued that the investment of cognitive control is determined by a cost-benefit computation. However, previous accounts remained silent on the potential role of subjective experience in this computation. We experience confidence when giving an answer, feel the excitement of an anticipated reward, and reflect on how much effort is required for successful task performance. Two questions are investigated in the present work: how objective task parameters give rise to subjective experience and whether these drive the decision to allocate cognitive control. To this end, we designed a task in which we manipulated three objective parameters in the same sequence of events (stimulus uncertainty, physical effort, and reward prediction error). We asked participants to report their subjective experiences associated with these manipulations: confidence, subjective physical effort, and reward satisfaction. At the end of each trial, participants indicated whether they wanted to repeat that trial on the next day. In response to the first question, we demonstrate that subjective ratings are reliable and selective. Subjective experiences closely mirrored their objective manipulations. In response to the second question, we demonstrate that subjective experiences provide a better fit for the decisions on future control investments. While objective task parameters are considered when deciding, they do not always produce the expected changes in subjective experience, and when dissociations occur, it is the subjective experience that better explains the decision to allocate cognitive control.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gaia Corlazzoli
- Center for Research in Cognition and Neurosciences (CRCN) - Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Brussels, Belgium.
| | | | - Wim Gevers
- Center for Research in Cognition and Neurosciences (CRCN) - Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Brussels, Belgium; Neurosciences Institute (UNI), Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Brussels, Belgium
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Klever L, Beyvers MC, Fiehler K, Mamassian P, Billino J. Cross-modal metacognition: Visual and tactile confidence share a common scale. J Vis 2023; 23:3. [PMID: 37140913 PMCID: PMC10166118 DOI: 10.1167/jov.23.5.3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/05/2023] Open
Abstract
Humans can judge the quality of their perceptual decisions-an ability known as perceptual confidence. Previous work suggested that confidence can be evaluated on an abstract scale that can be sensory modality-independent or even domain-general. However, evidence is still scarce on whether confidence judgments can be directly made across visual and tactile decisions. Here, we investigated in a sample of 56 adults whether visual and tactile confidence share a common scale by measuring visual contrast and vibrotactile discrimination thresholds in a confidence-forced choice paradigm. Confidence judgments were made about the correctness of the perceptual decision between two trials involving either the same or different modalities. To estimate confidence efficiency, we compared discrimination thresholds obtained from all trials to those from trials judged to be relatively more confident. We found evidence for metaperception because higher confidence was associated with better perceptual performance in both modalities. Importantly, participants were able to judge their confidence across modalities without any costs in metaperceptual sensitivity and only minor changes in response times compared to unimodal confidence judgments. In addition, we were able to predict cross-modal confidence well from unimodal judgments. In conclusion, our findings show that perceptual confidence is computed on an abstract scale and that it can assess the quality of our decisions across sensory modalities.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lena Klever
- Experimental Psychology, Justus Liebig University Giessen, Giessen, Germany
- Center for Mind, Brain, and Behavior (CMBB), University of Marburg and Justus Liebig University Giessen, Giessen, Germany
| | | | - Katja Fiehler
- Experimental Psychology, Justus Liebig University Giessen, Giessen, Germany
- Center for Mind, Brain, and Behavior (CMBB), University of Marburg and Justus Liebig University Giessen, Giessen, Germany
| | - Pascal Mamassian
- Laboratoire des Systèmes Perceptifs, Département d'études Cognitives, École Normale Supérieure, PSL University, Paris, France
| | - Jutta Billino
- Experimental Psychology, Justus Liebig University Giessen, Giessen, Germany
- Center for Mind, Brain, and Behavior (CMBB), University of Marburg and Justus Liebig University Giessen, Giessen, Germany
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5
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Metacognition tracks sensitivity following involuntary shifts of visual attention. Psychon Bull Rev 2022:10.3758/s13423-022-02212-y. [PMCID: PMC9668230 DOI: 10.3758/s13423-022-02212-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 10/24/2022] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
AbstractSalient, exogenous cues have been shown to induce a temporary boost of perceptual sensitivity in their immediate vicinity. In two experiments involving uninformative exogenous cues presented at various times before a target stimulus, we investigated whether human observers (N = 100) were able to monitor the involuntary increase in performance induced by such transients. We found that an increase of perceptual sensitivity (in a choice task) and encoding precision (in a free-estimation task) occurred approximately 100 ms after cue onset, and was accompanied by an increase in confidence about the perceptual response. These simultaneous changes in sensitivity and confidence resulted in stable metacognition across conditions. These results suggest that metacognition efficiently tracks the effects of a reflexive attentional mechanism known to evade voluntary control, and illustrate a striking ability of high-level cognition to capture fleeting, low-level sensory modulations.
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Rahnev D, Balsdon T, Charles L, de Gardelle V, Denison R, Desender K, Faivre N, Filevich E, Fleming SM, Jehee J, Lau H, Lee ALF, Locke SM, Mamassian P, Odegaard B, Peters M, Reyes G, Rouault M, Sackur J, Samaha J, Sergent C, Sherman MT, Siedlecka M, Soto D, Vlassova A, Zylberberg A. Consensus Goals in the Field of Visual Metacognition. PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2022; 17:1746-1765. [PMID: 35839099 PMCID: PMC9633335 DOI: 10.1177/17456916221075615] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
Despite the tangible progress in psychological and cognitive sciences over the last several years, these disciplines still trail other more mature sciences in identifying the most important questions that need to be solved. Reaching such consensus could lead to greater synergy across different laboratories, faster progress, and increased focus on solving important problems rather than pursuing isolated, niche efforts. Here, 26 researchers from the field of visual metacognition reached consensus on four long-term and two medium-term common goals. We describe the process that we followed, the goals themselves, and our plans for accomplishing these goals. If this effort proves successful within the next few years, such consensus building around common goals could be adopted more widely in psychological science.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Tarryn Balsdon
- Laboratoire des systèmes perceptifs, Département d’études cognitives, École normale supérieure, PSL University, CNRS, Paris, France
| | - Lucie Charles
- Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, UK
| | | | - Rachel Denison
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Boston University, USA
| | | | - Nathan Faivre
- Univ. Grenoble Alpes, Univ. Savoie Mont Blanc, CNRS, LPNC, 38000 Grenoble, France
| | - Elisa Filevich
- Bernstein Center for Computational Neuroscience Berlin, Philippstraβe 13 Haus 6, 10115 Berlin, Germany
| | - Stephen M. Fleming
- Department of Experimental Psychology and Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, UK
| | | | | | - Alan L. F. Lee
- Department of Applied Psychology and Wofoo Joseph Lee Consulting and Counselling Psychology Research Centre, Lingnan University, Hong Kong
| | - Shannon M. Locke
- Laboratoire des systèmes perceptifs, Département d’études cognitives, École normale supérieure, PSL University, CNRS, Paris, France
| | - Pascal Mamassian
- Laboratoire des systèmes perceptifs, Département d’études cognitives, École normale supérieure, PSL University, CNRS, Paris, France
| | - Brian Odegaard
- Department of Psychology, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL USA
| | - Megan Peters
- Department of Cognitive Sciences, University of California Irvine, Irvine, CA USA
| | - Gabriel Reyes
- Facultad de Psicología, Universidad del Desarrollo, Santiago, Chile
| | - Marion Rouault
- Département d’Études Cognitives, École Normale Supérieure, Université Paris Sciences & Lettres (PSL University), Paris, France
| | - Jerome Sackur
- Département d’Études Cognitives, École Normale Supérieure, Université Paris Sciences & Lettres (PSL University), Paris, France
| | - Jason Samaha
- Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz
| | - Claire Sergent
- Université de Paris, INCC UMR 8002, 75006, Paris, France
| | - Maxine T. Sherman
- Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
| | - Marta Siedlecka
- Consciousness Lab, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland
| | - David Soto
- Basque Center on Cognition Brain and Language, San Sebastián, Spain. Ikerbasque, Basque Foundation for Science, Bilbao, Spain
| | - Alexandra Vlassova
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Ariel Zylberberg
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, University of Rochester, USA
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Frömer R, Shenhav A. Filling the gaps: Cognitive control as a critical lens for understanding mechanisms of value-based decision-making. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2022; 134:104483. [PMID: 34902441 PMCID: PMC8844247 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.12.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/15/2021] [Revised: 12/01/2021] [Accepted: 12/04/2021] [Indexed: 12/26/2022]
Abstract
While often seeming to investigate rather different problems, research into value-based decision making and cognitive control have historically offered parallel insights into how people select thoughts and actions. While the former studies how people weigh costs and benefits to make a decision, the latter studies how they adjust information processing to achieve their goals. Recent work has highlighted ways in which decision-making research can inform our understanding of cognitive control. Here, we provide the complementary perspective: how cognitive control research has informed understanding of decision-making. We highlight three particular areas of research where this critical interchange has occurred: (1) how different types of goals shape the evaluation of choice options, (2) how people use control to adjust the ways they make their decisions, and (3) how people monitor decisions to inform adjustments to control at multiple levels and timescales. We show how adopting this alternate viewpoint offers new insight into the determinants of both decisions and control; provides alternative interpretations for common neuroeconomic findings; and generates fruitful directions for future research.
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Affiliation(s)
- R Frömer
- Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences, Carney Institute for Brain Science, Brown University, Providence, RI, United States.
| | - A Shenhav
- Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences, Carney Institute for Brain Science, Brown University, Providence, RI, United States.
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Xue K, Shekhar M, Rahnev D. Examining the robustness of the relationship between metacognitive efficiency and metacognitive bias. Conscious Cogn 2021; 95:103196. [PMID: 34481178 PMCID: PMC8560567 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103196] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/02/2021] [Revised: 08/16/2021] [Accepted: 08/16/2021] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
Abstract
We recently found a positive relationship between estimates of metacognitive efficiency and metacognitive bias. However, this relationship was only examined on a within-subject level and required binarizing the confidence scale, a technique that introduces methodological difficulties. Here we examined the robustness of the positive relationship between estimates of metacognitive efficiency and metacognitive bias by conducting two different types of analyses. First, we developed a new within-subject analysis technique where the original n-point confidence scale is transformed into two different (n-1)-point scales in a way that mimics a naturalistic change in confidence. Second, we examined the across-subject correlation between metacognitive efficiency and metacognitive bias. Importantly, for both types of analyses, we not only established the direction of the effect but also computed effect sizes. We applied both techniques to the data from three tasks from the Confidence Database (N > 400 in each). We found that both approaches revealed a small to medium positive relationship between metacognitive efficiency and metacognitive bias. These results demonstrate that the positive relationship between metacognitive efficiency and metacognitive bias is robust across several analysis techniques and datasets, and have important implications for future research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kai Xue
- School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, United States.
| | - Medha Shekhar
- School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Dobromir Rahnev
- School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, United States
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Aguilar-Lleyda D, de Gardelle V. Confidence guides priority between forthcoming tasks. Sci Rep 2021; 11:18320. [PMID: 34526576 PMCID: PMC8443637 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-021-97884-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/13/2020] [Accepted: 08/10/2021] [Indexed: 11/09/2022] Open
Abstract
Humans can estimate confidence in their decisions, and there is increasing interest on how this feeling of confidence regulates future behavior. Here, we investigate whether confidence in a perceptual task affects prioritizing future trials of that task, independently of task performance. To do so, we experimentally dissociated confidence from performance. Participants judged whether an array of differently colored circles was closer to blue or red, and we manipulated the mean and variability of the circles' colors across the array. We first familiarized participants with a low mean low variability condition and a high mean high variability condition, which were matched in performance despite participants being more confident in the former. Then we made participants decide in which order to complete forthcoming trials for both conditions. Crucially, prioritizing one condition was associated with being more confident in that condition compared to the other. This relationship was observed both across participants, by correlating inter-individual heterogeneity in prioritization and in confidence, and within participants, by assessing how changes in confidence with accuracy, condition and response times could predict prioritization choices. Our results suggest that confidence, above and beyond performance, guides prioritization between forthcoming tasks, strengthening the evidence for its role in regulating behavior.
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Affiliation(s)
- David Aguilar-Lleyda
- Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne, CNRS and Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, 112 Boulevard de l'Hôpital, 75013, Paris, France.
- RIKEN Center for Brain Science, 2-1 Hirosawa, Wako, Saitama, 351-0198, Japan.
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Recht S, de Gardelle V, Mamassian P. Metacognitive blindness in temporal selection during the deployment of spatial attention. Cognition 2021; 216:104864. [PMID: 34339907 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104864] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/28/2020] [Revised: 06/08/2021] [Accepted: 07/23/2021] [Indexed: 10/20/2022]
Abstract
How does orienting attention in space affect the quality of our confidence judgments? Orienting attention to a particular location is known to boost visual performance, but the deployment of attention is far from being instantaneous. Whether observers are able to monitor the time needed for attention to deploy remains largely unknown. To address this question, we adapted a "Wundt clocks" paradigm, asking observers (N=140) to reproduce the phase of a rotating clock at the time of an attentional cue, and to evaluate their confidence in their responses. Attention affected the latency between objective and perceived events: the average reported phase was delayed in accordance with the known latencies of voluntary and involuntary attention. Yet, we found that confidence remains oblivious to these attention-induced perceptual delays, like a 'metacognitive blind spot'. In addition, we observed weaker metacognition specifically during the deployment of voluntary attention, suggesting a tight relationship between the attentional and metacognitive systems. While previous work has considered how visual confidence adjusts to fully attended versus unattended locations, our study demonstrates that the very process of orienting attention in space can alter metacognition.
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Affiliation(s)
- Samuel Recht
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK; Laboratoire des systèmes perceptifs, Département d'études cognitives, École normale supérieure, PSL University, CNRS, Paris, France.
| | | | - Pascal Mamassian
- Laboratoire des systèmes perceptifs, Département d'études cognitives, École normale supérieure, PSL University, CNRS, Paris, France
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Abstract
Multitasking situations, such as using one's phone while driving, are increasingly common in everyday life. Experimental psychology has long documented the costs of multitasking on task performance; however, little is known of the effects it has on the metacognitive processes that monitor such performance. The present study is a step toward filling this void by combining psychophysical procedures with complex multitasking. We devised a multimodal paradigm in which participants performed a sensorimotor tracking task, a visual discrimination task, and an auditory 2-back working memory task, either separately or concurrently, while also evaluating their task performance every ~15 s. Our main finding is that multitasking decreased participants' awareness of their performance (metacognitive sensitivity) for all three tasks. Importantly, this result was independent of the multitasking cost on task performance, and could not be attributed to confidence leak, psychological refractory period, or recency effects on self-evaluations. We discuss the implications of this finding for both metacognition and multitasking research.
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Abstract
Visual confidence is the observers’ estimate of their precision in one single perceptual decision. Ultimately, however, observers often need to judge their confidence over a task in general rather than merely on one single decision. Here, we measured the global confidence acquired across multiple perceptual decisions. Participants performed a dual task on two series of oriented stimuli. The perceptual task was an orientation-discrimination judgment. The metacognitive task was a global confidence judgment: observers chose the series for which they felt they had performed better in the perceptual task. We found that choice accuracy in global confidence judgments improved as the number of items in the series increased, regardless of whether the global confidence judgment was made before (prospective) or after (retrospective) the perceptual decisions. This result is evidence that global confidence judgment was based on an integration of confidence information across multiple perceptual decisions rather than on a single one. Furthermore, we found a tendency for global confidence choices to be influenced by response times, and more so for recent perceptual decisions than earlier ones in the series of stimuli. Using model comparison, we found that global confidence is well described as a combination of noisy estimates of sensory evidence and position-weighted response-time evidence. In summary, humans can integrate information across multiple decisions to estimate global confidence, but this integration is not optimal, in particular because of biases in the use of response-time information.
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