Time to Pay Attention? Information Search Explains Amplified Framing Effects Under Time Pressure

Attention biases the process of risky decision-making: Evidence from eye-tracking

Attention determines what kind of option information is processed during risky choices owing to the limitation of visual attention. This paper reviews research on the relationship between higher-complexity risky decision-making and attention as illustrated by eye-tracking to explain the process of risky decision-making by the effect of attention. We demonstrate this process from three stages: the pre-phase guidance of options on attention, the process of attention being biased, and the impact of attention on final risk preference. We conclude that exogenous information can capture attention directly to salient options, thereby altering evidence accumulation. In particular, for multi-attribute risky decision-making, attentional advantages increase the weight of specific attributes, thus biasing risk preference in different directions. We highlight the significance of understanding how people use available information to weigh risks from an information-processing perspective via process data.

Prosocial decision-making under time pressure: Behavioral and neural mechanisms

The present study employed a novel paradigm and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to uncover the specific regulatory mechanism of time pressure and empathy trait in prosocial decision-making, compared to self-decision making. Participants were instructed to decide whether to spend their own monetary interest to alleviate themselves (or another person) from unpleasant noise threats under high and low time pressures. On the behavioral level, results showed that high time pressure had a significant effect on reducing participants' willingness to spend money on relieving themselves from the noise, while there is a similar but not significant trend in prosocial decision-making. On the neural level, for self-concerned decision-making, low time pressure activated the bilateral insula more strongly than high time pressure. For prosocial decision-making, high time pressure suppressed activations in multiple brain regions related to empathy (temporal pole, middle temporal gyrus, and inferior frontal gyrus), valuation (medial orbitofrontal cortex), and emotion (putamen). The functional connectivity strength among these regions, especially the connectivity between the medial orbitofrontal cortex and putamen, significantly predicted the effect of time pressure on prosocial decision-making at the behavioral level. Additionally, we discovered the activation of the medial orbitofrontal cortex partially mediated the effect of empathy trait scores on prosocial decision-making. These findings suggest that (1) there are different neural underpinnings for the modulation of time pressure for self and prosocial decision-making, and (2) the empathy trait plays a crucial role in the latter.

A systematic review of risky-choice framing effects

Classic decision theory requires that rational agents show description invariance: which description is chosen should not matter for judgments, preferences, or choices given the descriptions are co-extensive. Framing research has amply demonstrated a failure of description invariance by showing that the choice of the description has a systematic effect on judgments, preferences, and choices. Specifically, framing research has shown that linguistically different descriptions of seemingly equivalent options frequently lead to preference reversals. I summarize the research on framing in situations entailing risk. This includes the characterization of different research designs used, the size and robustness of the framing effects reported for those designs, and the theoretical accounts put forward to explain framing effects. The theoretical accounts are evaluated with respect to their merits, empirically and theoretically. I end by providing the implications of framing research. My central point is that the existence of framing effects points to the adaptiveness of the processes underlying human judgment and choice rather than simply showing human irrationality.

Deliberative control is more than just reactive: Insights from sequential sampling models

Activating relevant responses is a key function of automatic processes in De Neys's model; however, what determines the order or magnitude of such activation is ambiguous. Focusing on recently developed sequential sampling models of choice, we argue that proactive control shapes response generation but does not cleanly fit into De Neys's automatic-deliberative distinction, highlighting the need for further model development.

A minute makes a difference: Apply countdown timers to cognitive well-being surveys

This paper implemented the use of countdown timers in online subjective well-being (SWB) surveys via an online experiment. The study involved 600 US residents who were equally divided into two groups: a control group and an experimental group. Both groups were posed with the same question, "All things considered; how do you rate your own life satisfaction?" However, the experimental group was subjected to a 1-minute countdown timer before submitting their responses, while the control group was not. Our findings indicate that incorporating timers into online surveys can effectively prevent participants from mis-responding by distinguishing between their affective and cognitive well-being. Furthermore, the use of timers resulted in more comprehensive responses, as participants were able to engage in deeper reflection on their life and consider a wider range of factors.

Individual differences moderate effects in an Unusual Disease paradigm: A psychophysical data collection lab approach and an online experiment

We report two studies investigating individual intuitive-deliberative cognitive-styles and risk-styles as moderators of the framing effect in Tversky and Kahneman's famous Unusual Disease problem setting. We examined framing effects in two ways: counting the number of frame-inconsistent choices and comparing the proportions of risky choices depending on gain-loss framing. Moreover, in addition to gain-loss frames, we systematically varied the number of affected people, probabilities of surviving/dying, type of disease, and response deadlines. Study 1 used a psychophysical data collection approach and a sample of 43 undergraduate students, each performing 480 trials. Study 2 was an online study incorporating psychophysical elements in a social science approach using a larger and more heterogeneous sample, i.e., 262 participants performed 80 trials each. In both studies, the effect of framing on risky choice proportions was moderated by risk-styles. Cognitive-styles measured on different scales moderated the framing effect only in study 2. The effects of disease type, probability of surviving/dying, and number of affected people on risky choice frequencies were also affected by cognitive-styles and risk-styles but different for both studies and to different extents. We found no relationship between the number of frame-inconsistent choices and cognitive-styles or risk-styles, respectively.

Time Pressure Weakens Social Norm Maintenance in Third-Party Punishment

Decision-making under time pressure may better reflect an individual's response preference, but few studies have examined whether individuals choose to be more selfish or altruistic in a scenario where third-party punishment is essential for maintaining social norms. This study used a third-party punishment paradigm to investigate how time pressure impacts on individuals' maintenance of behavior that follows social norms. Thirty-one participants observed a Dictator Game and had to decide whether to punish someone who made what was categorized as a high unfair offer by spending their own Monetary units to reduce that person's payoff. The experiment was conducted across different offer conditions. The study results demonstrated that reaction times were faster under time pressure compared with no time pressure. Time pressure was also correlated with less severe punishment. Specifically, participants were less likely to punish the dictator under time pressure compared with no time pressure when the offer was categorized as a high unfair. The findings suggested that individuals in these game conditions and under time pressure do not overcome their pro-selves and that time pressure weakens an individual's willingness to punish high unfair offers.

Thinking more or thinking differently? Using drift-diffusion modeling to illuminate why accuracy prompts decrease misinformation sharing

Recent experiments have found that prompting people to think about accuracy reduces misinformation sharing intentions. The process by which this effect operates, however, remains unclear. Do accuracy prompts cause people to "stop and think," increasing deliberation? Or do they change what people think about, drawing attention to accuracy? Since these two accounts predict the same behavioral outcomes (i.e., increased sharing discernment following a prompt), we used computational modeling of sharing decisions with response time data, as well as out-of-sample ratings of headline perceived accuracy, to test the accounts' divergent predictions across six studies (N = 5633). The results suggest that accuracy prompts do not increase the amount of deliberation people engage in. Instead, they increase the weight participants put on accuracy while deliberating. By showing that prompting people makes them think better even without thinking more, our results challenge common dual-process interpretations of the accuracy-prompt effect. Our findings also highlight the importance of understanding how social media distracts people from considering accuracy, and provide evidence for scalable interventions that redirect people's attention.

The Games We Play: Prosocial Choices Under Time Pressure Reflect Context-Sensitive Information Priorities

Time pressure is a powerful experimental manipulation frequently used to arbitrate between competing dual-process models of prosocial decision-making, which typically assume that automatic responses yield to deliberation over time. However, the use of time pressure has led to conflicting conclusions about the psychological dynamics of prosociality. Here, we proposed that flexible, context-sensitive information search, rather than automatic responses, underlies these divergent effects of time pressure on prosociality. We demonstrated in two preregistered studies (N = 304 adults from the United States and Canada; Prolific Academic) that different prosocial contexts (i.e., pure altruism vs. cooperation) have distinct effects on information search, driving people to prioritize information differently, particularly under time pressure. Furthermore, these information priorities subsequently influence prosocial choices, accounting for the different effects of time pressure in altruistic and cooperative contexts. These findings help explain existing inconsistencies in the field by emphasizing the role of dynamic context-sensitive information search during social decision-making, particularly under time pressure.

Reframing rationality: Exogenous constraints on controlled information search

Bermúdez argues that framing effects are rational because particular frames provide goal-consistent reasons for choice and that people exert some control over the framing of a decision-problem. We propose instead that these observations raise the question of whether frame selection itself is a rational process and highlight how constraints in the choice environment severely limit the rational selection of frames.