Cognition as Morphological/Morphogenetic Embodied Computation In Vivo

Cognition, historically considered uniquely human capacity, has been recently found to be the ability of all living organisms, from single cells and up. This study approaches cognition from an info-computational stance, in which structures in nature are seen as information, and processes (information dynamics) are seen as computation, from the perspective of a cognizing agent. Cognition is understood as a network of concurrent morphological/morphogenetic computations unfolding as a result of self-assembly, self-organization, and autopoiesis of physical, chemical, and biological agents. The present-day human-centric view of cognition still prevailing in major encyclopedias has a variety of open problems. This article considers recent research about morphological computation, morphogenesis, agency, basal cognition, extended evolutionary synthesis, free energy principle, cognition as Bayesian learning, active inference, and related topics, offering new theoretical and practical perspectives on problems inherent to the old computationalist cognitive models which were based on abstract symbol processing, and unaware of actual physical constraints and affordances of the embodiment of cognizing agents. A better understanding of cognition is centrally important for future artificial intelligence, robotics, medicine, and related fields.

Relationships Organize Information in Mind and Nature: Empirical Findings of Action–Reaction Relationships (R) in Cognitive and Material Complexity

Diverse phenomena such as feedback, interconnectedness, causality, network dynamics, and complexity are all born from Relationships. They are fundamentally important, as they are transdisciplinary and synonymous with connections, links, edges, and interconnections. The foundation of systems thinking and systems themselves consists of four universals, one of which is action–reaction Relationships. They are also foundational to the consilience of knowledge. This publication gives a formal description of and predictions of action–reaction Relationships (R) or “R-rule”. There are seven original empirical studies presented in this paper. For these seven studies, experiments for the subjects were created on software (unless otherwise noted). The experiments had the subjects complete a task and/or answer a question. The samples are generalizable to a normal distribution of the US population and they vary for each study (ranging from N = 407 to N = 34,398). With high statistical significance the studies support the predictions made by DSRP Theory regarding action–reaction Relationships including its universality as an observable phenomenon in both nature (ontological complexity) and mind (cognitive complexity); mutual dependencies on other universals (i.e., Distinctions, Systems, and Perspectives); role in structural predictions; internal structures and dynamics; efficacy as a metacognitive skill. In conclusion, these data suggest the observable and empirical existence, parallelism (between cognitive and ontological complexity), universality, and efficacy of action–reaction Relationships (R).

Perspectives Organize Information in Mind and Nature: Empirical Findings of Point-View Perspective (P) in Cognitive and Material Complexity

The importance of perspective-taking crosses disciplines and is foundational to diverse phenomena such as point-of-view, scale, mindset, theory of mind, opinion, belief, empathy, compassion, analysis, and problem solving, etc. This publication gives predictions for and a formal description of point-view Perspectives (P) or the “P-rule”. This makes the P-rule foundational to systems, systems thinking and the consilience of knowledge. It is one of four universals of the organization of information as a whole. This paper presents nine empirical studies in which subjects were asked to complete a task and/or answer a question. The samples vary for each study (ranging from N = 407 to N = 34,398) and are generalizable to a normal distribution of the US population. As was evident in Cabrera, “These studies support—with high statistical significance—the predictions made by DSRP Theory (Distinctions, Systems Relationships, Perspectives) point-view Perspectives including its: universality as an observable phenomenon in both mind (cognitive complexity) and nature (material complexity) (i.e., parallelism); internal structures and dynamics; mutual dependencies on other universals (i.e., Distinctions, Systems, and Relationships); role in structural predictions; and, efficacy as a metacognitive skill”. These data suggest that point-view Perspectives (P) observably and empirically exist, and that universality, efficacy, and parallelism (between cognitive and material complexity) exist as well. The impact of this paper is that it provides empirical evidence for the phenomena of point-view perspective taking (“P-rule”) as a universal pattern/structure of systems thinking, a field in which scholarly debate is often based on invalidated opinioned frameworks; this sets the stage for theory building in the field.

Systems Organize Information in Mind and Nature: Empirical Findings of Part-Whole Systems (S) in Cognitive and Material Complexity

Part-whole Systems (S) structure is foundational to a diverse array of phenomena such as belonging and containment, networks, statistics, reductionism, holism, etc. and is extremely similar if not synonymous with sets, sorts, groups, combinations and combinatorics, clusters, etc. In Cabrera (1998), part-whole Systems (S) or “S-rule” is established as one of four universals for the organization of information and thus is foundational to systems and systems thinking as well as the consilience of knowledge. In this paper, seven empirical studies are presented in which (unless otherwise noted) subjects completed a task. Ranging from n = 407 to n = 34,398, the sample sizes vary for each study but are generalizeable to a normal distribution of the US population. With high statistical significance, the results of these studies support the predictions made by DSRP Theory regarding part-whole Systems (a.k.a., “S-rule”) including: the universality of S-rule as an observable phenomenon in both mind (cognitive complexity) and nature (ontological complexity) (i.e., parallelism); the internal structures and dynamics of S-rule; S-rule’s mutual dependencies on other universals of DSRP (Distinctions, Systems, Relationships, and Perspectives (i.e., Distinctions, Relationships, and Perspectives); the role S-rule plays in making structural predictions; and, S-rule’s efficacy as a metacognitive skill. In conclusion, these data suggest the observable and empirical existence, universality, efficacy, and parallelism (between cognitive and ontological complexity) of part-whole Systems (S).

Distinctions Organize Information in Mind and Nature: Empirical Findings of Identity–Other Distinctions (D) in Cognitive and Material Complexity

The transdisciplinary importance of distinctions is well-established as foundational to such diverse phenomena as recognition, identification, individual and social identity, marginalization, externalities, boundaries, concept formation, etc., and synonymous general ideas, such as thingness, concepts, nodes, objects, etc. Cabrera provides a formal description of and predictions for identity–other distinctions (D) or “D-rule” as one of four universals for the organization of information that is foundational to systems and systems thinking, as well as the consilience of knowledge. This paper presents seven empirical studies in which (unless otherwise noted) software was used to create an experiment for subjects to complete a task and/or answer a question. The samples varied for each study (ranging from N = 407 to N = 34,398) and were generalizable to a normal distribution of the US population. These studies support—with high statistical significance—the predictions made by DSRP theory regarding identity–other distinctions including its: universality as an observable phenomenon in both mind (cognitive complexity) and nature (ontological complexity) (i.e., parallelism); internal structures and dynamics; mutual dependencies on other universals (i.e., relationships, systems, and perspectives); role in structural predictions; and efficacy as a metacognitive skill. In conclusion, these data suggest the observable and empirical existence, universality, efficacy, and parallelism (between cognitive and ontological complexity) of identity–other distinctions (D).

The “Fish Tank” Experiments: Metacognitive Awareness of Distinctions, Systems, Relationships, and Perspectives (DSRP) Significantly Increases Cognitive Complexity

In the field of systems thinking, there are far too many opinioned frameworks and far too few empirical studies. This could be described as a “gap” in the research but it is more like a dearth in the research. More theory and empirical validation of theory are needed if the field and the phenomenon of systems thinking holds promise and not just popularity. This validation comes in the form of both basic (existential) and applied (efficacy) research studies. This article presents efficacy data for a set of empirical studies of DSRP Theory. According to Cabrera, Cabrera, and Midgley, DSRP Theory has equal or more empirical evidence supporting it than any existing systems theories (including frameworks, which are not theories). Four separate studies show highly statistically relevant findings for the effect of a short (less than one minute) treatment of D, S, R, and P. Subjects’ cognitive complexity and the systemic nature of their thinking increased in all four studies. These findings indicate that even a short treatment in DSRP is effective in increasing systems thinking skills. Based on these results, a longer, more in-depth treatment—such as a one hour or semester long training, such is the norm—would therefore likely garner transformative results and efficacy.

DSRP Theory: A Primer

DSRP Theory is now over 25 years old with more empirical evidence supporting it than any other systems thinking framework. Yet, it is often misunderstood and described in ways that are inaccurate. DSRP Theory describes four patterns and their underlying elements—identity (i) and other (o) for Distinctions (D), part (p) and whole (w) for Systems (S), action (a) and reaction (r) for Relationships (R), and point (ρ) and view (v) for Perspectives (P)—that are universal in both cognitive complexity (mind) and material complexity (nature). DSRP Theory provides a basis for systems thinking or cognitive complexity as well as material complexity (systems science). This paper, as a relatively short primer on the theory, provides clarity to those wanting to understand DSRP and its implications.

Theory Before the Test: How to Build High-Verisimilitude Explanatory Theories in Psychological Science

Drawing on the philosophy of psychological explanation, we suggest that psychological science, by focusing on effects, may lose sight of its primary explananda: psychological capacities. We revisit Marr's levels-of-analysis framework, which has been remarkably productive and useful for cognitive psychological explanation. We discuss ways in which Marr's framework may be extended to other areas of psychology, such as social, developmental, and evolutionary psychology, bringing new benefits to these fields. We then show how theoretical analyses can endow a theory with minimal plausibility even before contact with empirical data: We call this the theoretical cycle. Finally, we explain how our proposal may contribute to addressing critical issues in psychological science, including how to leverage effects to understand capacities better.

Temporal Structure in Haptic Signaling Under a Cooperative Task

Haptic communication between humans plays an important role in society. Although this form of communication is ubiquitous at all levels of society and of human development, little is known about how synchronized coordination of motion between two persons leads to higher-order cognitive functions used in communication. In this study, we developed a novel experimental paradigm of a coin-collecting task in which participants used their hands to control a rod to jointly collect the coins on the screen. We characterized the haptic interactions between paired participants while they were taking part in a cooperative task. The individual participants first completed this task on their own and then with a randomly assigned partner for the cooperative task. Single participant experiments were used as a baseline to compare results of the paired participants. Forces applied to the rod were translated to four possible haptic states which encode the combination of the haptic interactions. As a next step, pairs of consecutive haptic states were then combined into 16 possible haptic signals which were classified in terms of their temporal patterns using a Tsallis q-exponential function. For paired participants, 80% of the haptic signals could be fit by the Tsallis q-exponential. On the other hand, only 30% of the signals found in the single-participant trials could be fit by the Tsallis q-exponential. This shows a clear difference in the temporal structures of haptic signals when participants are interacting with each other and when they are not. We also found a large difference in the number of haptic signals used by paired participants and singles. Single participants only used 1/4 of the possible haptic signals. Paired participants, on the other hand, used more than half of the possible signals. These results suggest that temporal structures present in haptic communication could be linked to the emergence of language at an evolutionary level.

Rethinking situated and embodied social psychology

This article aims to explore the scope of a Situated and Embodied Social Psychology (ESP). At first sight, social cognition seems embodied cognition par excellence. Social cognition is first and foremost a supra-individual, interactive, and dynamic process (Semin & Smith, 2013). Radical approaches in Situated/Embodied Cognitive Science (Enactivism) claim that social cognition consists in an emergent pattern of interaction between a continuously coupled organism and the (social) environment; it rejects representationalist accounts of cognition (Hutto & Myin, 2013). However, mainstream ESP (Barsalou, 1999, 2008) still takes a rather representation-friendly approach that construes embodiment in terms of specific bodily formatted representations used (activated) in social cognition. We argue that mainstream ESP suffers from vestiges of theoretical solipsism, which may be resolved by going beyond internalistic spirit that haunts mainstream ESP today.

Social connection through joint action and interpersonal coordination

The pull to coordinate with other individuals is fundamental, serving as the basis for our social connectedness to others. Discussed is a dynamical and ecological perspective to joint action, an approach that embeds the individual's mind in a body and the body in a niche, a physical and social environment. Research on uninstructed coordination of simple incidental rhythmic movement, along with research on goal-directed, embodied cooperation, is reviewed. Finally, recent research is discussed that extends the coordination and cooperation studies, examining how synchronizing with another, and how emergent social units of perceiving and acting are reflected in people's feelings of connection to others.

Embodiment in Children’s Choice

In the traditional framework of cognitive psychology, the brain—viewed as a device for manipulating arbitrary symbols—remains the organ of decision making. However, the dimension of embodiment should not be ignored in investigations of decision-making processes in tasks involving a motor response. Experimental research in developmental psychology has shown that perceptual-motor constraints affect the explicit choices infants and toddlers make in some tasks. In these situations, the ability to make action choices that were previously thought to be highly abstract now appears to be attributable to an embodied-cognition approach. These developments concerning embodiment in children’s choice, and their implication for our understanding of human voluntary action, form the subject of this article.

How action selection can be embodied: intracranial gamma band recording shows response competition during the Eriksen flankers test

Recent findings in monkeys suggest that action selection is based on a competition between various action options that are automatically planned by the motor system. Here we discuss data from intracranial EEG recordings in human premotor cortex (PMC) during a bimanual version of the Eriksen flankers test that suggest that the same principles apply to human action decisions. Recording sites in the dorsal PMC show an early but undifferentiated activation, a delayed response that depends on the experimental conditions and, finally, a movement related activation during action execution. Additionally, we found that the medial part of the PMC show a significant increase in response for ipsilateral trials, suggesting a role in inhibiting the wrong response. The ventral PMC seems to be involved in action execution, rather than action selection. Together these findings suggest that the human PMC is part of a network that specifies, selects, and executes actions.

Learning of embodied interaction dynamics with recurrent neural networks: some exploratory experiments

The new tendency of artificial intelligence suggests that intelligence must be seen as a result of the interaction between brains, bodies and environments. This view implies that designing sophisticated behaviour requires a primary focus on how agents are functionally coupled to their environments. Under this perspective, we present early results with the application of reservoir computing as an efficient tool to understand how behaviour emerges from interaction. Specifically, we present reservoir computing models, that are inspired by imitation learning designs, to extract the essential components of behaviour that results from agent-environment interaction dynamics. Experimental results using a mobile robot are reported to validate the learning architectures.

Jung's "Psychology with the Psyche" and the Behavioral Sciences

The behavioral sciences and Jung's analytical psychology are set apart by virtue of their respective histories, epistemologies, and definitions of subject matter. This brief paper identifies Jung's scientific stance, notes perceptions of Jung and obstacles for bringing his system of thought into the fold of the behavioral sciences. The impact of the "science versus art" debate on Jung's stance is considered with attention to its unfolding in the fin de siècle era.

Evolutionary psychology: Neglecting neurobiology in defining the mind

Evolutionary psychology defines the human mind as comprising innate and domain-specific information-processing mechanisms that were designed to solve specific evolutionary problems of our Pleistocene past. Yet it is argued here that evolutionary psychology’s assumptions regarding the mind are often inconsistent with the neurobiological evidence; biological constraints may place limits on the kinds of hypotheses that can be made within a theoretical framework that wants to remain true to the known properties and functions of the human nervous system. Evolutionary psychology’s assumptions regarding our innate biology also shape their treatment of culture and learning in ways that may inaccurately reflect true experience–neurodevelopmental interactions. It is suggested that the mind can be adequately understood and its activities properly explained without hypothetical appeal to countless genetically pre-specified psychological programs, and in a way that remains consistent with both our neurobiology and neo-Darwinian evolution.

Self-organization takes time too

Four articles in this issue of topiCS (volume 4, issue 1) argue against a computational approach in cognitive science in favor of a dynamical approach. I concur that the computational approach faces some considerable explanatory challenges. Yet the dynamicists' proposal that cognition is self-organized seems to only go so far in addressing these challenges. Take, for instance, the hypothesis that cognitive behavior emerges when brain and body (re-)configure to satisfy task and environmental constraints. It is known that for certain systems of constraints, no procedure can exist (whether modular, local, centralized, or self-organized) that reliably finds the right configuration in a realistic amount of time. Hence, the dynamical approach still faces the challenge of explaining how self-organized constraint satisfaction can be achieved by human brains and bodies in real time. In this commentary, I propose a methodology that dynamicists can use to try to address this challenge.

Hierarchies in action and motor control

In analyses of the motor system, two hierarchies are often posited: The first-the action hierarchy-is a decomposition of an action into subactions and sub-subactions. The second-the control hierarchy-is a postulated hierarchy in the neural control processes that are supposed to bring about the action. A general assumption in cognitive neuroscience is that these two hierarchies are internally consistent and provide complementary descriptions of neuronal control processes. In this article, we suggest that neither offers a complete explanation and that they cannot be reconciled in a logical or conceptually coherent way. Furthermore, neither pays proper attention to the dynamics and temporal aspects of neural control processes. We will explore an alternative hierarchical organization in which causality is inherent in the dynamics over time. Specifically, high levels of the hierarchy encode more stable (goal-related) representations, whereas lower levels represent more transient (actions and motor acts) kinematics. If employed properly, a hierarchy based on this latter principle of temporal extension is not subject to the problems that plague the traditional accounts.

Special Section: Is Cognitive Science Changing its Mind?

Embodied embedded cognition (EEC) and neurophenomenology (NP) are slowly invading cognitive (neuro)science. We provide a short introduction of what EEC and NP are about and an overview of the papers in this special section on EEC and NP.