Mitochondrial Functioning and Its Relation to Higher-Order Cognitive Processes

One of the most replicated findings in psychology is the positive manifold between cognitive ability measures (Jensen 1998; Spearman 1904) [...].

The impact of environmental interventions among mouse siblings on the heritability and malleability of general cognitive ability

General cognitive ability can be highly heritable in some species, but at the same time, is very malleable. This apparent paradox could potentially be explained by gene-environment interactions and correlations that remain hidden due to experimental limitations on human research and blind spots in animal research. Here, we shed light on this issue by combining the design of a sibling study with an environmental intervention administered to laboratory mice. The analysis included 58 litters of four full-sibling genetically heterogeneous CD-1 male mice, for a total of 232 mice. We separated the mice into two subsets of siblings: a control group (maintained in standard laboratory conditions) and an environmental-enrichment group (which had access to continuous physical exercise and daily exposure to novel environments). We found that general cognitive ability in mice has substantial heritability (24% for all mice) and is also malleable. The mice that experienced the enriched environment had a mean intelligence score that was 0.44 standard deviations higher than their siblings in the control group (equivalent to gains of 6.6 IQ points in humans). We also found that the estimate of heritability changed between groups (55% in the control group compared with non-significant 15% in the enrichment group), analogous to findings in humans across socio-economic status. Unexpectedly, no evidence of gene-environment interaction was detected, and so the change in heritability might be best explained by higher environmental variance in the enrichment group. Our findings, as well as the 'sibling intervention procedure' for mice, may be valuable to future research on the heritability, mechanisms and evolution of cognition.This article is part of the theme issue 'Causes and consequences of individual differences in cognitive abilities'.

Dopamine D1 receptor density in the mPFC responds to cognitive demands and receptor turnover contributes to general cognitive ability in mice

In both humans and mice, performance on tests of intelligence or general cognitive ability (GCA) is related to dopamine D1 receptor-mediated activity in the prelimbic cortex, and levels of DRD1 mRNA predict the GCA of mice. Here we assessed the turnover rate of D1 receptors as well as the expression level of the D1 chaperone protein (DRiP78) in the medial PPC (mPFC) of mice to determine whether rate of receptor turnover was associated with variations in the GCA of genetically heterogeneous mice. Following assessment of GCA (aggregate performance on four diverse learning tests) mice were administered an irreversible dopamine receptor antagonist (EEDQ), after which the density of new D1 receptors were quantified. GCA was positively correlated with both the rate of D1 receptor recovery and levels of DRiP78. Additionally, the density of D1 receptors was observed to increase within 60 min (or less) in response to intense demands on working memory, suggesting that a pool of immature receptors was available to accommodate high cognitive loads. These results provide evidence that innate general cognitive abilities are related to D1 receptor turnover rates in the prefrontal cortex, and that an intracellular pool of immature D1 receptors are available to accommodate cognitive demands.

Evolution, brain size, and variations in intelligence

Across taxonomic subfamilies, variations in intelligence (G) are sometimes related to brain size. However, within species, brain size plays a smaller role in explaining variations in general intelligence (g), and the cause-and-effect relationship may be opposite to what appears intuitive. Instead, individual differences in intelligence may reflect variations in domain-general processes that are only superficially related to brain size.

The evolution of intelligence in mammalian carnivores

Although intelligence should theoretically evolve to help animals solve specific types of problems posed by the environment, it is unclear which environmental challenges favour enhanced cognition, or how general intelligence evolves along with domain-specific cognitive abilities. The social intelligence hypothesis posits that big brains and great intelligence have evolved to cope with the labile behaviour of group mates. We have exploited the remarkable convergence in social complexity between cercopithecine primates and spotted hyaenas to test predictions of the social intelligence hypothesis in regard to both cognition and brain size. Behavioural data indicate that there has been considerable convergence between primates and hyaenas with respect to their social cognitive abilities. Moreover, compared with other hyaena species, spotted hyaenas have larger brains and expanded frontal cortex, as predicted by the social intelligence hypothesis. However, broader comparative study suggests that domain-general intelligence in carnivores probably did not evolve in response to selection pressures imposed specifically in the social domain. The cognitive buffer hypothesis, which suggests that general intelligence evolves to help animals cope with novel or changing environments, appears to offer a more robust explanation for general intelligence in carnivores than any hypothesis invoking selection pressures imposed strictly by sociality or foraging demands.

The tendency for social submission predicts superior cognitive performance in previously isolated male mice

The imposition of subordination may negatively impact cognitive performance in common social settings (e.g., the classroom), and likewise, laboratory studies of animals indicate that the stress associated with social defeat can impair cognitive performance. It is less clear whether an animal's predisposition for social subordination (i.e., a tendency that is expressed prior to experience with social defeat) is related to its cognitive abilities (e.g., "general" intelligence). Using genetically diverse CD-1 male mice, here we determined that in the absence of adult experience with social hierarchies or social defeat, the predisposition for social subordination was associated with superior general cognitive ability (aggregate performance across a battery of five learning tasks). The tendency for social subordination was not dependent on the mice' body weight, but both general cognitive ability and the tendency for social subordination were directly related to high stress reactivity (i.e., free corticosterone elevations induced by mild stress). This pattern of results suggests that submissive behavior and sensitivity to stress may be associated with superior cognitive potential, and this can reflect a native predisposition that precedes exposure to social pressures. More broadly, these results raise the possibility that socially subordinate animals evolved compensatory strategies to facilitate their survival, and that absent the imposition of subordination, normally submissive individuals may be better prepared for cognitive/academic achievement.

Innovativeness as an emergent property: a new alignment of comparative and experimental research on animal innovation

Innovation and creativity are key defining features of human societies. As we face the global challenges of the twenty-first century, they are also facets upon which we must become increasingly reliant. But what makes Homo sapiens so innovative and where does our high innovation propensity come from? Comparative research on innovativeness in non-human animals allows us to peer back through evolutionary time and investigate the ecological factors that drove the evolution of innovativeness, whereas experimental research identifies and manipulates underpinning creative processes. In commenting on the present theme issue, I highlight the controversies that have typified this research field and show how a paradigmatic shift in our thinking about innovativeness will contribute to resolving these tensions. In the past decade, innovativeness has been considered by many as a trait, a direct product of cognition, and a direct target of selection. The evidence I review here suggests that innovativeness will be hereon viewed as one component, or even an emergent property of a larger array of traits, which have evolved to deal with environmental variation. I illustrate how research should capitalize on taxonomic diversity to unravel the full range of psychological processes that underpin innovativeness in non-human animals.

The evolution of general intelligence

The presence of general intelligence poses a major evolutionary puzzle, which has led to increased interest in its presence in nonhuman animals. The aim of this review is to critically evaluate this question and to explore the implications for current theories about the evolution of cognition. We first review domain-general and domain-specific accounts of human cognition in order to situate attempts to identify general intelligence in nonhuman animals. Recent studies are consistent with the presence of general intelligence in mammals (rodents and primates). However, the interpretation of a psychometric g factor as general intelligence needs to be validated, in particular in primates, and we propose a range of such tests. We then evaluate the implications of general intelligence in nonhuman animals for current theories about its evolution and find support for the cultural intelligence approach, which stresses the critical importance of social inputs during the ontogenetic construction of survival-relevant skills. The presence of general intelligence in nonhumans implies that modular abilities can arise in two ways, primarily through automatic development with fixed content and secondarily through learning and automatization with more variable content. The currently best-supported model, for humans and nonhuman vertebrates alike, thus construes the mind as a mix of skills based on primary and secondary modules. The relative importance of these two components is expected to vary widely among species, and we formulate tests to quantify their strength.

Individual differences in behavioural plasticities

Interest in individual differences in animal behavioural plasticities has surged in recent years, but research in this area has been hampered by semantic confusion as different investigators use the same terms (e.g. plasticity, flexibility, responsiveness) to refer to different phenomena. The first goal of this review is to suggest a framework for categorizing the many different types of behavioural plasticities, describe examples of each, and indicate why using reversibility as a criterion for categorizing behavioural plasticities is problematic. This framework is then used to address a number of timely questions about individual differences in behavioural plasticities. One set of questions concerns the experimental designs that can be used to study individual differences in various types of behavioural plasticities. Although within-individual designs are the default option for empirical studies of many types of behavioural plasticities, in some situations (e.g. when experience at an early age affects the behaviour expressed at subsequent ages), 'replicate individual' designs can provide useful insights into individual differences in behavioural plasticities. To date, researchers using within-individual and replicate individual designs have documented individual differences in all of the major categories of behavioural plasticities described herein. Another important question is whether and how different types of behavioural plasticities are related to one another. Currently there is empirical evidence that many behavioural plasticities [e.g. contextual plasticity, learning rates, IIV (intra-individual variability), endogenous plasticities, ontogenetic plasticities) can themselves vary as a function of experiences earlier in life, that is, many types of behavioural plasticity are themselves developmentally plastic. These findings support the assumption that differences among individuals in prior experiences may contribute to individual differences in behavioural plasticities observed at a given age. Several authors have predicted correlations across individuals between different types of behavioural plasticities, i.e. that some individuals will be generally more plastic than others. However, empirical support for most of these predictions, including indirect evidence from studies of relationships between personality traits and plasticities, is currently sparse and equivocal. The final section of this review suggests how an appreciation of the similarities and differences between different types of behavioural plasticities may help theoreticians formulate testable models to explain the evolution of individual differences in behavioural plasticities and the evolutionary and ecological consequences of individual differences in behavioural plasticities.