Changes in Online Moral Discourse About Public Figures During #MeToo

During the #MeToo movement, the perceived morality of public figures changed in light of sexual assault allegations against them. Here, we asked how these changes were influenced by the perceived severity of alleged actions and by how well-known and well-liked were the public figures. Perceived morality was assessed by measuring (im)moral language usage in 1.4 million tweets about 50 male public figures accused of sexual assault. Using natural language processing to analyze the tweets, we found that liking of public figures mitigated perceived immorality for less severe allegations, but had little effect on perceived immorality for more severe allegations. The persistence of negative perceptions 1 year later was related to liking and familiarity for the public figure, not allegation severity. These results suggest that in real-world contexts, we can forgive less harmful actions for people we like, but may not be able to if their actions are more harmful; over time, however, liking for others predicts lasting negative impressions of their moral misdeeds.

Rating the Honesty of White and Black Children via Implicit and Explicit Measures: Implications for Child Victims in the Criminal Justice System

The present study explored implicit and explicit honesty perceptions of White and Black children and whether these perceptions predicted legal decisions in a child abuse case. Participants consisted of 186 younger and 189 older adults from the online Prolific participant pool. Implicit racial bias was measured via a modified Implicit Association Test and explicit perceptions through self-reports. Participants read a simulated legal case where either a Black or White child alleged physical abuse against their sports coach, and they rated the honesty of the child's testimony and rendered a verdict. Participants were implicitly biased to associate honesty with White children over Black children, and this bias was stronger among older adults. In the legal vignette, for participants who read about a Black child victim, greater implicit racial bias predicted less trust in the child's testimony and a lower likelihood of convicting the coach of abusing the child. In contrast to their implicit bias, participants self-reported Black children as being more honest than White children, suggesting a divergence in racial attitudes across implicit and explicit measures. Implications for child abuse victims are discussed.

A 3D framework of implicit attitude change

According to early theories, implicit (automatic) social attitudes are difficult if not impossible to change. Although this view has recently been challenged by research relying on experimental, developmental, and cultural approaches, relevant work remains siloed across research communities. As such, the time is ripe to systematize and integrate disparate (and seemingly contradictory) findings and to identify gaps in existing knowledge. To this end, we introduce a 3D framework classifying research on implicit attitude change by levels of analysis (individual vs. collective), sources of change (experimental, ontogenetic, and cultural), and timescales (short term vs. long term). This 3D framework highlights where evidence for implicit attitude change is more versus less well established and pinpoints directions for future research, including at the intersection of fields.

Attribution Impacts Implicit (And Explicit) Evaluations

Two studies examined whether the attributional framing of negative events affected explicit evaluations, as measured by differences in liking, and implicit evaluations, as measured by the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al., 1998). In Study 1, participants read negative information about a novel target ordered to elicit internal or external attributions. Participants in the internal attribution condition evaluated the target more negatively than did those in the external attribution condition on both implicit and explicit measures. Study 2 replicated these results and tested the effects of attribution on recently formed negative evaluations. Participants who evaluated targets before and after receiving additional negative information about them demonstrated implicit and explicit evaluative change consistent with the attributional framing of that information. This research provides clear evidence that attribution influences the formation and change of implicit evaluations; however, these effects were weaker than those on explicit measures of evaluation.

The influence of fake news on face-trait learning

Humans spontaneously attribute a wide range of traits to conspecifics based on their facial appearance. Unsurprisingly, previous findings indicate that this 'person evaluation' is affected by information provided about the target's past actions and behaviours. Strikingly, many news items shared on social media sites (e.g., Twitter) describe the actions of individuals who are often shown in accompanying images. This kind of material closely resembles that encountered by participants in previous studies of face-trait learning. We therefore sought to determine whether Twitter posts that pair facial images with favourable and unfavourable biographical information also modulate subsequent trait evaluation of the people depicted. We also assessed whether the effects of this information-valence manipulation were attenuated by the presence of the "disputed tag", introduced by Twitter as a means to combat the influence of fake-news. Across two preregistered experiments, we found that fictional tweets that paired facial images with details of the person's positive or negative actions affected the extent to which readers subsequently judged the faces depicted to be trustworthy. When the rating phase followed immediately after the study phase, the presence of the disputed tag attenuated the effect of the behavioural information (Experiment 1: N = 128; Mage = 34.06; 89 female, 36 male, 3 non-binary; 116 White British). However, when the rating phase was conducted after a 10-minute delay, the presence of the disputed tag had no significant effect (Experiment 2: N = 128; Mage = 29.12; 78 female, 44 male, 4 non-binary, 2 prefer not to say; 110 White British). Our findings suggest that disputed tags may have relatively little impact on the long-term face-trait learning that occurs via social media. As such, fake news stories may have considerable potential to shape users' person evaluation.

Disclosing political partisanship polarizes first impressions of faces

Americans’ increasing levels of ideological polarization contribute to pervasive intergroup tensions based on political partisanship. Cues to partisanship may affect even the most basic aspects of perception. First impressions of faces constitute a widely-studied basic aspect of person perception relating to intergroup tensions. To understand the relation between face impressions and political polarization, two experiments were designed to test whether disclosing political partisanship affected face impressions based on perceivers’ political ideology. Disclosed partisanship more strongly affected people’s face impressions than actual, undisclosed, categories (Experiment 1). In a replication and extension, disclosed shared and opposing partisanship also engendered, respectively, positive and negative changes in face impressions (Experiment 2). Partisan disclosure effects on face impressions were paralleled by the extent of people’s partisan threat perceptions (Experiments 1 and 2). These findings suggest that partisan biases appear in basic aspects of person perception and may emerge concomitant with perceived partisan threat.

Revising mental representations of faces based on new diagnostic information

Extending evidence for the rapid revision of mental representations of what other people are like, we explored whether people also rapidly revise their representations of what others look like. After learning to ascribe positive or negative behavioral information to a target person and generating a visualization of their face in a reverse-correlation task, participants learned new information that was (a) counter-attitudinal and diagnostic about the person's character or (b) neutral and non-diagnostic, and then they generated a second visualization. Ratings of these visualizations in separate samples of participants consistently revealed revision effects: Time 2 visualizations assimilated to the counter-attitudinal information. Weaker revision effects also emerged after learning neutral information, suggesting that the evaluative extremity of visualizations may dilute when encountering any additional information. These findings indicate that representations of others' appearance may change upon learning more about them, particularly when this new information is counter-attitudinal and diagnostic.

How Adolescents and Adults Learn About Changes in the Trustworthiness of Others Through Dynamic Interaction

Whether to trust or distrust another individual is a complex interpersonal challenge, especially when such individuals behave inconsistently. It is still unclear as to how individuals learn and adapt to fluctuations in the trustworthiness of others and how this process changes from adolescence to adulthood. To address these issues, we implemented repeated rounds of a trust game within the context of a complicated and changeable interpersonal environment. Specifically, adolescents and adults played the role of trustors who had to decide whether to invest money in two anonymous partners carrying the risk of no reciprocation. Unbeknownst to participants, these two partners had different trustworthiness profiles: one partner initially yielded a higher initial return rate (70%) while the other initially yielded a lower initial return rate (30%). Crucially, over repeated rounds, these two partners gradually changed their responses to the point where, finally, return rates were both neutral (50%). Results indicated that all participants showed less updating in the negative direction in response to good-to-neutral partners while more updating in the positive direction in response to the bad-to-neutral partner. Compared to adults, this behavioral disparity in responses to good-to-neutral and bad-to-neutral partners was less pronounced in adolescents. Based on the computational modeling approach, the potential mechanisms underlying their behavioral patterns were revealed: the higher learning rate promoted flexible adaptions in participants to untrustworthy trustees as they changed to neutral. The less pronounced distinction between good-to-neutral and bad-to-neutral partners in adolescents was related to their lower learning rate. Overall, our study extends the understanding of trust behavior to a fluctuating social context and highlights the role of social learning in social emotion and interaction.

Competence-based social status and implicit preference modulate the ability to coordinate during a joint grasping task

Studies indicate that social status influences people's social perceptions. Less information is available about whether induced social status influences dyadic coordination during motor interactions. To explore this issue, we designed a study in which two confederates obtained high or low competence-based status by playing a game together with the participant, while the participant always occupied the middle position of the hierarchy. Following this status-inducing phase, participants were engaged in a joint grasping task with the high- and low-status confederates in different sessions while behavioural (i.e., interpersonal asynchrony and movement start time) indexes were measured. Participants' performance in the task (i.e., level of interpersonal asynchrony) when interacting with the low-status partner was modulated by their preference for him. The lower participants' preference for a low- relative to a high-status confederate, the worse participants' performance when interacting with the low-status confederate. Our results show that participants' performance during motor interactions changes according to the social status of the interaction partner.

The Case for Studying Implicit Social Cognition in Close Relationships

This review offers close relationships as a fruitful avenue to address long-lasting questions and current controversies in implicit social cognition research. Close relationships provide a unique opportunity to study strong attitudes that are formed and updated through ongoing contact with significant others and appear to have important downstream consequences. Therefore, close relationship contexts enable researchers to apply fine-grained, dyadic, longitudinal methodologies to provide unique insights regarding whether and how automatic attitudes relate to personal experience, change meaningfully and reliably over time, and predict consequential judgments and behaviors. Further, given that close relationships are critical to people's well-being and health, applying implicit social cognition theories to close relationships may also offer practical benefits regarding real-world issues related to relationship decay. In this regard, we provide guidance for future research by highlighting how continuing to refine our understanding of implicit social cognition in close relationships can inform interventions and reliably benefit society

Research With Implicit Measures: Suggestions for a New Agenda of Sub-Personal Psychology

Research with implicit measures has been criticized for an unclear meaning of the term implicit and inadequate psychometric properties, as well as problems regarding internal validity and low predictive validity of implicit measures. To these criticisms, we add an overly restrictive theoretical focus and research agenda that is limited to the narrow dichotomy between associations versus propositional beliefs. In this article, we address the last problem by introducing a new perspective of a sub-personal psychology. This broad approach expands the conceptual horizon in order to make use of the full potential that experimental paradigms can offer for assessing, explaining, predicting, and modifying human functioning and behavior. Going beyond the analysis of associations and beliefs, we highlight the use of experimental paradigms to examine and modify motivational, environmental, and episodic memory factors that influence human action.

The Naïve Utility Calculus as a unified, quantitative framework for action understanding

The human ability to reason about the causes behind other people' behavior is critical for navigating the social world. Recent empirical research with both children and adults suggests that this ability is structured around an assumption that other agents act to maximize some notion of subjective utility. In this paper, we present a formal theory of this Naïve Utility Calculus as a probabilistic generative model, which highlights the role of cost and reward tradeoffs in a Bayesian framework for action-understanding. Our model predicts with quantitative accuracy how people infer agents' subjective costs and rewards based on their observable actions. By distinguishing between desires, goals, and intentions, the model extends to complex action scenarios unfolding over space and time in scenes with multiple objects and multiple action episodes. We contrast our account with simpler model variants and a set of special-case heuristics across a wide range of action-understanding tasks: inferring costs and rewards, making confidence judgments about relative costs and rewards, combining inferences from multiple events, predicting future behavior, inferring knowledge or ignorance, and reasoning about social goals. Our work sheds light on the basic representations and computations that structure our everyday ability to make sense of and navigate the social world.

A Process Dissociation Model of Implicit Rapid Revision in Response to Diagnostic Revelations

Previous research has demonstrated that implicit evaluations can be reversed with exposure to a single impression-inconsistent behavior. But what exactly is changing when perceivers encounter diagnostic revelations about someone? One possibility is that rapid changes are occurring in the extent to which perceivers view the person positively or negatively. Another possibility is that they override the expression of initial evaluations through control-oriented processes. We conducted three studies (one preregistered) that used multinomial process trees to distinguish between these possibilities. We find consistent support across two different implicit measures that diagnostic behaviors result in rapid changes in evaluative processes. We obtained only inconsistent evidence for effects on more control-oriented processes. These findings thus help to reveal the cognitive processes underlying rapid implicit revision. Implications for theoretical perspectives on implicit attitudes are discussed.

When Small Signs of Change Add Up: The Psychology of Tipping Points

Things change, but the exact point at which they do is often unknown. After how many loveless nights is a relationship “officially” in trouble? After how many happy days has one’s depression “officially” passed? When do recurring patterns in the climate or economy “officially” warrant a response? When is a person’s identity “officially” accepted? Everyday fluctuations in oneself and the social world create ambiguities about when people will diagnose lasting, qualitative change (and therefore act). Recent research documents these tipping points of change as a psychological process, shaped by individual and situational forces. People judge tipping points asymmetrically across valence and asymmetrically across time. Here, I review discoveries and outline future directions in tipping-points research.