Commentary on “Penetrating the ‘Black Box’: Financial Incentives for Enhancing the Quality of Physician Services,” by Douglas A. Conrad and Jon B. Christianson

Physician practice responses to financial incentive programs: exploring the concept of implementation mechanisms

PURPOSE

To develop a framework for studying financial incentive program implementation mechanisms, the means by which physician practices and physicians translate incentive program goals into their specific office setting. Understanding how new financial incentives fit with the structure of physician practices and individual providers' work may shed some insight on the variable effects of physician incentives documented in numerous reviews and meta-analyses.

DESIGN/METHODOLOGY/APPROACH

Reviewing select articles on pay-for-performance evaluations to identify and characterize the presence of implementation mechanisms for designing, communicating, implementing, and maintaining financial incentive programs as well as recognizing participants' success and effects on patient care.

FINDINGS

Although uncommonly included in evaluations, evidence from 26 articles reveals financial incentive program sponsors and participants utilized a variety of strategies to facilitate communication about program goals and intentions, to provide feedback about participants' progress, and to assist-practices in providing recommended services. Despite diversity in programs' geographic locations, clinical targets, scope, and market context, sponsors and participants deployed common strategies. While these methods largely pertained to communication between program sponsors and participants and the provision of information about performance through reports and registries, they also included other activities such as efforts to engage patients and ways to change staff roles.

LIMITATIONS

This review covers a limited body of research to develop a conceptual framework for future research; it did not exhaustively search for new articles and cannot definitively link particular implementation mechanisms to outcomes.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

Our results underscore the effects implementation mechanisms may have on how practices incorporate new programs into existing systems of care which implicates both the potential rewards from small changes as well as the resources which may be required to obtain buy-in and support.

ORIGINALITY/VALUE

We identify gaps in previous research regarding actual changes occurring in physician practices in response to physician incentive programs. We offer suggestions for future evaluation by proposing a framework for understanding implementation. Our model will assist future scholars in translating site-specific experiences with incentive programs into more broadly relevant guidance for practices by facilitating comparisons across seemingly disparate programs.

Primary care physicians' decisions about discharging patients from their practices

OBJECTIVE

There are few data available about factors which influence physicians' decisions to discharge patients from their practices. To study general internists' and family medicine physicians' attitudes and experiences in discharging patients from their practices.

DESIGN

A cross-sectional mailed survey was used.

PARTICIPANTS

One thousand general internists and family medicine physicians participated in this study.

MEASUREMENTS AND MAIN RESULTS

We studied the likelihood physicians would discharge 12 hypothetical patients from their practices, and whether they had actually discharged such patients. The effect of demographic data on the number of scenarios in which patients were likely to be discharged, and the number of patients actually discharged were analyzed via ANOVA and multiple logistic regression analysis. Of 977 surveys received by subjects, 526 (54%) were completed and returned. A majority of respondents were willing to discharge patients in 5 of 12 hypothetical scenarios. Eighty-five percent had actually discharged at least one patient from their practices. Most respondents (71%) had discharged 10 or fewer patients, but 14% had discharged 11 to 200 patients. Respondents who were in private practice (p < 0.000001) were more likely to discharge both hypothetical and actual patients from their practices. Older physicians (> or =48 years old) were more likely to discharge actual patients from their practices (p = 0.005) as were physicians practicing in rural settings (p = 0.003).

CONCLUSIONS

Most physicians in our sample were willing to discharge actual and hypothetical patients from their practices. This tendency may have significant implications for the initiation of pay-for-performance programs. Physicians should be educated about the importance of the patient-physician relationship and their fiduciary obligations to the patient.