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Resnik DB, Stewart CN, Williams F, Thiele C, Yamada KM, Barker K. Ethical decision-making and role conflict in managing a scientific laboratory. Account Res 2024; 31:1198-1221. [PMID: 37482770 PMCID: PMC10822020 DOI: 10.1080/08989621.2023.2236553] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/07/2023] [Accepted: 07/11/2023] [Indexed: 07/25/2023]
Abstract
Scientists who manage research laboratories often face ethical dilemmas related to conflicts between their different roles, such as researcher, mentor, entrepreneur, and manager. It is not known how often uncertainty about conflicting role obligations leads scientists to engage in unethical conduct, but this probably occurs more often than many people would like to think. In this paper, we reflect on ethical decision-making in scientific laboratory management with special attention to how different roles create conflicting obligations and expectations that may produce moral uncertainty and lead to violations of research norms, especially when combined with self-interest and other factors that increase the risk of misbehavior. We also offer some suggestions and guidance for investigators and research institutions.
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Affiliation(s)
- David B. Resnik
- National Institutes of Environmental Health Sciences, National Institutes of Health, NC, USA
| | - C. Neal Stewart
- Department of Plant Sciences and Center for Agricultural Synthetic Biology, University of Tennessee
| | - Faustine Williams
- National Institute of Minority Health and Health Disparities, National Institutes of Health
| | - Carol Thiele
- National Cancer Institute, National Institutes of Health
| | - Kenneth M. Yamada
- National Institute of Dental and Craniofacial Research, National Institutes of Health
| | - Kathy Barker
- School of Public Health, University of Washington
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2
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Greene D, Cerles A, Casagrande R. Characterizing the Private Sector in US Human Pathogen Research. Health Secur 2024; 22:402-407. [PMID: 39393922 DOI: 10.1089/hs.2024.0003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/13/2024] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Daniel Greene
- Daniel Greene, PhD, and Audrey Cerles, MS, are Senior Consultants; and Rocco Casagrande, PhD, is Managing Director; all at Deloitte Consulting, Rosslyn, VA. The authors completed the research and manuscript writing when they were employed at Gryphon Scientific, LLC, Takoma Park, MD
| | - Audrey Cerles
- Daniel Greene, PhD, and Audrey Cerles, MS, are Senior Consultants; and Rocco Casagrande, PhD, is Managing Director; all at Deloitte Consulting, Rosslyn, VA. The authors completed the research and manuscript writing when they were employed at Gryphon Scientific, LLC, Takoma Park, MD
| | - Rocco Casagrande
- Daniel Greene, PhD, and Audrey Cerles, MS, are Senior Consultants; and Rocco Casagrande, PhD, is Managing Director; all at Deloitte Consulting, Rosslyn, VA. The authors completed the research and manuscript writing when they were employed at Gryphon Scientific, LLC, Takoma Park, MD
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3
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Resnik DB. Biosafety, biosecurity, and bioethics. Monash Bioeth Rev 2024; 42:137-167. [PMID: 39078602 PMCID: PMC11368980 DOI: 10.1007/s40592-024-00204-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 07/04/2024] [Indexed: 07/31/2024]
Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the importance of biosafety in the biomedical sciences. While it is often assumed that biosafety is a purely technical matter that has little to do with philosophy or the humanities, biosafety raises important ethical issues that have not been adequately examined in the scientific or bioethics literature. This article reviews some pivotal events in the history of biosafety and biosecurity and explores three different biosafety topics that generate significant ethical concerns, i.e., risk assessment, risk management, and risk distribution. The article also discusses the role of democratic governance in the oversight of biosafety and offers some suggestions for incorporating bioethics into biosafety practice, education, and policy.
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Affiliation(s)
- David B Resnik
- National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, National Institutes of Health, 111 Alexander Drive, Research Triangle Park, NC, 27709, USA.
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4
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Pavone S, Iscaro C, Giammarioli M, Beato MS, Righi C, Petrini S, Costarelli S, Feliziani F. Biological Containment for African Swine Fever (ASF) Laboratories and Animal Facilities: The Italian Challenge in Bridging the Present Regulatory Gap and Enhancing Biosafety and Biosecurity Measures. Animals (Basel) 2024; 14:454. [PMID: 38338097 PMCID: PMC10854939 DOI: 10.3390/ani14030454] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/13/2023] [Revised: 01/22/2024] [Accepted: 01/26/2024] [Indexed: 02/12/2024] Open
Abstract
The African Swine Fever Virus (ASFV) is a DNA virus of the Asfarviridae family, Asfivirus genus. It is responsible for massive losses in pig populations and drastic direct and indirect economic impacts. The ever-growing handling of ASFV pathological material in laboratories, necessary for either diagnostic or research activities, requires particular attention to avoid accidental virus release from laboratories and its detrimental economic and environmental effects. Recently, the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/689 of 17 December 2019 repealed the Commission Decision of 26 May 2003 reporting an ASF diagnostic manual (2003/422/EC) with the minimum and supplementary requirements for ASF laboratories. This decision generated a regulatory gap that has not been addressed yet. This paper aims to describe the Italian National Reference Laboratory (NRL) efforts to develop an effective and reliable biological containment tool for ASF laboratories and animal facilities. The tool consists of comprehensive and harmonized structural and procedural requirements for ASF laboratories and animal facilities that have been developed based on both current and repealed legislation, further entailing a risk assessment and internal audit as indispensable tools to design, adjust, and improve biological containment measures.
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Affiliation(s)
- Silvia Pavone
- National Reference Laboratory for Pestivirus and Asfivirus, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale dell’Umbria e delle Marche “Togo Rosati” (IZSUM), Via G. Salvemini 1, 06126 Perugia, Italy; (C.I.); (M.G.); (M.S.B.); (C.R.); (S.P.); (F.F.)
| | - Carmen Iscaro
- National Reference Laboratory for Pestivirus and Asfivirus, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale dell’Umbria e delle Marche “Togo Rosati” (IZSUM), Via G. Salvemini 1, 06126 Perugia, Italy; (C.I.); (M.G.); (M.S.B.); (C.R.); (S.P.); (F.F.)
| | - Monica Giammarioli
- National Reference Laboratory for Pestivirus and Asfivirus, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale dell’Umbria e delle Marche “Togo Rosati” (IZSUM), Via G. Salvemini 1, 06126 Perugia, Italy; (C.I.); (M.G.); (M.S.B.); (C.R.); (S.P.); (F.F.)
| | - Maria Serena Beato
- National Reference Laboratory for Pestivirus and Asfivirus, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale dell’Umbria e delle Marche “Togo Rosati” (IZSUM), Via G. Salvemini 1, 06126 Perugia, Italy; (C.I.); (M.G.); (M.S.B.); (C.R.); (S.P.); (F.F.)
| | - Cecilia Righi
- National Reference Laboratory for Pestivirus and Asfivirus, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale dell’Umbria e delle Marche “Togo Rosati” (IZSUM), Via G. Salvemini 1, 06126 Perugia, Italy; (C.I.); (M.G.); (M.S.B.); (C.R.); (S.P.); (F.F.)
| | - Stefano Petrini
- National Reference Laboratory for Pestivirus and Asfivirus, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale dell’Umbria e delle Marche “Togo Rosati” (IZSUM), Via G. Salvemini 1, 06126 Perugia, Italy; (C.I.); (M.G.); (M.S.B.); (C.R.); (S.P.); (F.F.)
| | - Silva Costarelli
- Animal Health Diagnostic Laboratory, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale dell’Umbria e delle Marche “Togo Rosati” (IZSUM), Via G. Salvemini 1, 06126 Perugia, Italy;
| | - Francesco Feliziani
- National Reference Laboratory for Pestivirus and Asfivirus, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale dell’Umbria e delle Marche “Togo Rosati” (IZSUM), Via G. Salvemini 1, 06126 Perugia, Italy; (C.I.); (M.G.); (M.S.B.); (C.R.); (S.P.); (F.F.)
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5
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Lee YCJ, Chen X, Marwaha S. The Need for Biosecurity Education in Biotechnology Curricula. BIODESIGN RESEARCH 2023; 5:0008. [PMID: 37849455 PMCID: PMC10085291 DOI: 10.34133/bdr.0008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/22/2022] [Accepted: 01/30/2023] [Indexed: 10/19/2023] Open
Abstract
The growth of biotechnology in recent decades and the dual-use nature of most bioscience research are making their misuse, or accidental misuse or release, more likely and present as threats to biosecurity. A proactive approach is through educating the next generation of scientists to be more security conscious. However, current educational and professional programs in biosecurity are lacking. In this perspective, we recommend that biosecurity educational opportunities should be implemented and expanded for undergraduate and graduate students who will likely use one or more methods in the field of biotechnology. We then propose that biosecurity education is a key factor in a path toward sustainable and safe research. Finally, a set of 17 biosecurity competencies organized into 6 distinct themes is outlined.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ying-Chiang J. Lee
- Department of Molecular Biology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA
| | - Xuanqi Chen
- Department of Chemical and Biological Engineering, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, 08544, USA
| | - Siddharth Marwaha
- Department of Molecular Biology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA
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Greene D, Palmer MJ, Relman DA. Motivating Proactive Biorisk Management. Health Secur 2023; 21:46-60. [PMID: 36633603 PMCID: PMC9940813 DOI: 10.1089/hs.2022.0101] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/15/2022] [Revised: 10/29/2022] [Accepted: 11/03/2022] [Indexed: 01/13/2023] Open
Abstract
Scholars and practitioners of biosafety and biosecurity (collectively, biorisk management or BRM) have argued that life scientists should play a more proactive role in monitoring their work for potential risks, mitigating harm, and seeking help as necessary. However, most efforts to promote proactive BRM have focused on training life scientists in technical skills and have largely ignored the extent to which life scientists wish to use them (ie, their motivation). In this article, we argue that efforts to promote proactive BRM would benefit from a greater focus on life scientists' motivation. We review relevant literature on life scientists' motivation to practice BRM, offer examples of successful interventions from adjacent fields, and outline ideas for possible interventions to promote proactive BRM, along with strategies for iterative development, testing, and scaling.
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Affiliation(s)
- Daniel Greene
- Daniel Greene, PhD, is a Senior Analyst, Biosafety, Biosecurity & Emerging Technologies, Gryphon Scientific, Takoma Park, MD. Daniel Greene is also a Postdoctoral Fellow, Center for International Security and Cooperation; Stanford University, Stanford, CA
| | - Megan J. Palmer
- Megan J. Palmer, PhD, is Executive Director, Bio Policy & Leadership Initiatives, and an Adjunct Professor, Department of Bioengineering; Stanford University, Stanford, CA
| | - David A. Relman
- David A. Relman, MD, is a Senior Fellow, Center for International Security and Cooperation; Stanford University, Stanford, CA. David A. Relman is also the Thomas C. and Joan M. Merigan Professor, Departments of Medicine, and of Microbiology and Immunology, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, CA
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Shang L, Mprah M, Ravi I, Dando M. Key issues in the implementation of the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for codes of conduct for scientists: A survey of biosecurity education projects. BIOSAFETY AND HEALTH 2022. [DOI: 10.1016/j.bsheal.2022.08.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/27/2022] Open
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8
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Pei L, Garfinkel M, Schmidt M. Bottlenecks and opportunities for synthetic biology biosafety standards. Nat Commun 2022; 13:2175. [PMID: 35449163 PMCID: PMC9023567 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-022-29889-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/30/2021] [Accepted: 04/06/2022] [Indexed: 11/09/2022] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Lei Pei
- Biofaction KG, Vienna, Austria
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Joseph T, Phyu S, Se-Thoe SY, Chu JJH. Biorisk Management for SARS-CoV-2 Research in a Biosafety Level-3 Core Facility. Methods Mol Biol 2022; 2452:441-464. [PMID: 35554920 DOI: 10.1007/978-1-0716-2111-0_24] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/15/2023]
Abstract
The emerging severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) presents hazards to researchers and other laboratory personnel in research settings where the live virus is stored and handled. The Biosafety Level-3 (BSL-3) Core Facility (CF) at Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine in National University of Singapore (NUS Medicine) has implemented a biorisk management (BRM) system to ensure that biorisk to employees, the public, or the environment are consistently minimized to an acceptable level while working with SARS-CoV-2. This chapter summarizes how a BRM system can be implemented in academic institutions based on international standards in the context of existing local legislations/regulations and institutional policies/guidelines to minimize the risk of laboratory-acquired infections and deliberate misuse of the newly emerged virus, SARS-CoV-2 in BSL-3 laboratories. The BRM programs prioritize performing risk assessments prior to implementation of work processes and reassessing the risk portfolio of the facilities from time to time, determining root causes and prevention of recurrences. Focusing on awareness-raising and educating the laboratory users in biosafety and biosecurity, and identifying opportunities for improvement are the other key factors for a sustainable and successful BRM system in the NUS Medicine BSL-3 CF.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tessy Joseph
- BSL-3 Core Facility, Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore.
| | - Sabai Phyu
- Laboratory Biorisk Consultancy & Training Pte. Ltd, Singapore, Singapore
- European Union Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Centres of Excellence Regional Secretariat-South East Asia/B&S Europe, Manila, Philippines
| | - Su Yun Se-Thoe
- Biosafety Branch, Public Health Group, Ministry of Health, Singapore, Singapore
| | - Justin Jang Hann Chu
- BSL-3 Core Facility, Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
- Laboratory of Molecular RNA Virology and Antiviral Strategies, Department of Microbiology and Immunology, Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
- Infectious Diseases Translational Research Program, Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
- Collaborative and Translation Unit for HFMD, Institute of Molecular and Cell Biology, Agency for Science, Technology and Research (A*STAR), Singapore, Singapore
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10
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Xue Y, Shang L, Zhang W. Building and implementing a multi-level system of ethical code for biologists under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) of the United Nations. JOURNAL OF BIOSAFETY AND BIOSECURITY 2021; 3:108-119. [PMID: 35036858 PMCID: PMC8752047 DOI: 10.1016/j.jobb.2021.09.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/01/2021] [Accepted: 09/02/2021] [Indexed: 02/08/2023] Open
Abstract
The recent global COVID-19 pandemic has had profound economic and social impacts on the world. It has highlighted an urgent need to strengthen existing international biosecurity governance mechanisms to prevent the misuse and malicious abuse of life science research and maintain international biological arms control norms. Biologists are at the front line of biotechnology development and are key to maintaining biosecurity awareness and moral self-discipline. As an important first step, biologists need to actively participate in the formulation and implementation of relevant biosecurity policies and measures to ensure their effectiveness and sustainability. Furthermore, efforts should be made to advocate for and promote the establishment of an ethical code of conduct for biologists to share safety responsibilities for global biosecurity. To maximize the impact of this ethical code of conduct, an effective approach to implementing codes of conduct for biologists at both national and international levels should be established under the framework of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).
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Affiliation(s)
- Yang Xue
- Law School of Tianjin University, PR China,Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy, Tianjin University, PR China
| | - Lijun Shang
- School of Human Sciences, London Metropolitan University, London, United Kingdom,Biological Security Research Centre, Metropolitan University, London, United Kingdom
| | - Weiwen Zhang
- Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy, Tianjin University, PR China,School of Chemical Engineering, Tianjin University, Tianjin, PR China,Corresponding author
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Musunuri S, Sandbrink JB, Monrad JT, Palmer MJ, Koblentz GD. Rapid Proliferation of Pandemic Research: Implications for Dual-Use Risks. mBio 2021; 12:e0186421. [PMID: 34663091 PMCID: PMC8524337 DOI: 10.1128/mbio.01864-21] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/18/2022] Open
Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the world's vulnerability to biological catastrophe and elicited unprecedented scientific efforts. Some of this work and its derivatives, however, present dual-use risks (i.e., potential harm from misapplication of beneficial research) that have largely gone unaddressed. For instance, gain-of-function studies and reverse genetics protocols may facilitate the engineering of concerning SARS-CoV-2 variants and other pathogens. The risk of accidental or deliberate release of dangerous pathogens may be increased by large-scale collection and characterization of zoonotic viruses undertaken in an effort to understand what enables animal-to-human transmission. These concerns are exacerbated by the rise of preprint publishing that circumvents a late-stage opportunity for dual-use oversight. To prevent the next global health emergency, we must avoid inadvertently increasing the threat of future biological events. This requires a nuanced and proactive approach to dual-use evaluation throughout the research life cycle, including the conception, funding, conduct, and dissemination of research.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Jonas B. Sandbrink
- Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
- Medical Sciences Division, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
| | - Joshua Teperowski Monrad
- Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
- Faculty of Public Health and Policy, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, United Kingdom
- Department of Health Policy, London School of Economics, London, United Kingdom
| | - Megan J. Palmer
- Department of Bioengineering, Stanford University, Stanford, California, USA
- Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University, Stanford, California, USA
| | - Gregory D. Koblentz
- Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, USA
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Norlock SM, Okanya PW, Trataris A, Hildebrand ME, Baziki JDD, Belkourati I, Ellis M. South-to-south mentoring as a vehicle for implementing sustainable health security in Africa. ONE HEALTH OUTLOOK 2021; 3:20. [PMID: 34610850 PMCID: PMC8492092 DOI: 10.1186/s42522-021-00050-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/22/2021] [Accepted: 07/11/2021] [Indexed: 06/13/2023]
Abstract
BACKGROUND While sustainability has become a universal precept in the development of global health security systems, supporting policies often lack mechanisms to drive policies into regular practice. 'On-paper' norms and regulations are to a great extent upheld by frontline workers who often lack the opportunity to communicate their first-hand experiences to decisionmakers; their role is an often overlooked, yet crucial, aspect of a sustainable global health security landscape. Initiatives and programs developing transdisciplinary professional skills support the increased bidirectional dialogue between these frontline workers and key policy- and decisionmakers which may sustainably narrow the gap between global health security policy design and implementation. METHODS The International Federation of Biosafety Associations' (IFBA) Global Mentorship Program recruits biosafety and biosecurity champions across Africa to provide local peer mentorship to developing professionals in their geographic region. Mentors and mentees complete structured one year program cycles, where they are provided with written overviews of monthly discussion topics, and attend optional virtual interactive activities. Feedback from African participants of the 2019-2020 program cycle was collected using a virtual Exit Survey, where aspects of program impact and structure were assessed. RESULTS Following its initial call for applications, the IFBA Global Mentorship Program received considerable interest from professionals across the African continent, particularly in East and North Africa. The pilot program cycle matched a total of 62 individuals from an array of professional disciplines across several regions, 40 of which were located on the African continent. The resulting mentorship pairs shared knowledge, skills, and experiences towards translating policy objectives to action on the front lines. Mentorship pairs embraced multidisciplinary approaches to harmonize health security strategies across the human and animal health sectors. South-to-South mentorship therefore provided mentees with locally relevant support critical to translation of best technical practices to local capacity and work. CONCLUSION The IFBA's South-to-South Global Mentorship Program has demonstrated its ability to form crucial links between frontline biosafety professionals, laboratory workers, and policy- and decision-makers across several implicated sectors. By supporting regionally relevant peer mentorship programs, the gap between health security policy development and implementation may be narrowed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Stephanie Marie Norlock
- International Federation of Biosafety Associations (IFBA), Ottawa, Canada.
- Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada.
| | - Patrick W Okanya
- International Federation of Biosafety Associations (IFBA), Ottawa, Canada
- Technical University of Kenya, Nairobi, Kenya
| | - Anastasia Trataris
- National Institute for Communicable Diseases (NICD), Johannesburg, South Africa
| | | | - Jean de Dieu Baziki
- African Union - Pan African Veterinary Vaccine Centre (AU-PANVAC), Debre Zeit, Ethiopia
| | | | - Maureen Ellis
- International Federation of Biosafety Associations (IFBA), Ottawa, Canada.
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Novossiolova T, Martellini M. Promoting responsible science and CBRN security through codes of conduct and education. BIOSAFETY AND HEALTH 2019. [DOI: 10.1016/j.bsheal.2019.08.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/26/2022] Open
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