The Number of Senders and Total Judgments Matter More Than Sample Size in Deception-Detection Experiments

Introducing the high-context communication style interview protocol to detect deception in pairs

In four experiments, we examined whether pairs of truth tellers could be distinguished from pairs of lie tellers by taking advantage of the fact that only pairs of truth tellers can refer to shared events by using brief expressions (high-context communication style). In Experiments 1 and 2, pairs of friends and pairs of strangers pretending to be friends answered (i) questions they likely had expected to be asked (e.g., 'How did you first meet'?) and (ii) unexpected questions (e.g., 'First, describe a shared event in a few words. Then elaborate on it'). Pairs were interviewed individually (Experiment 1, N = 134 individuals) or collectively (Experiment 2, N = 130 individuals). Transcripts were coded for the verbal cues details, complications, plausibility, predictability, and overlap (Experiment 1 only) or repetitions (Experiment 2 only). In two lie detection experiments observers read the individual transcripts in Experiment 3 (N = 146) or the collective transcripts in Experiment 4 (N = 138). The verbal cues were more diagnostic of veracity and observers were better at distinguishing between truths and lies in the unexpected than in the expected questions condition, but only when the pair members were interviewed individually.

Self and other-perceived deception detection abilities are highly correlated but unassociated with objective detection ability: Examining the detection consensus effect

Subjective lying rates are often strongly and positively correlated. Called the deception consensus effect, people who lie often tend to believe others lie often, too. The present paper evaluated how this cognitive bias also extends to deception detection. Two studies (Study 1: N = 180 students; Study 2: N = 250 people from the general public) had participants make 10 veracity judgments based on videotaped interviews, and also indicate subjective detection abilities (self and other). Subjective, perceived detection abilities were significantly linked, supporting a detection consensus effect, yet they were unassociated with objective detection accuracy. More overconfident detectors-those whose subjective detection accuracy was greater than their objective detection accuracy-reported telling more white and big lies, cheated more on a behavioral task, and were more ideologically conservative than less overconfident detectors. This evidence supports and extends contextual models of deception (e.g., the COLD model), highlighting possible (a)symmetries in subjective and objective veracity assessments.

Is It the Judge, the Sender, or Just the Individual Message? Disentangling Person and Message Effects on Variation in Lie-Detection Judgments

Research suggests that people differ more in their ability to lie than in their ability to detect lies. However, because studies have not treated senders and messages as separate entities, it is unclear whether some senders are generally more transparent than others or whether individual messages differ in their transparency of veracity regardless of senders. Variance attributable to judges, senders, and messages was estimated simultaneously using multiple messages from each sender (totaling more than 45,000 judgments). The claim that the accuracy of a veracity judgment depends on the sender was not supported. Messages differed in their detectability (21% explained variance), but senders did not. Message veracity accounted for most message variation (16.8% of the total variance), but other idiosyncratic message characteristics also contributed significantly. Consistent with the notion that a (mis)match between sender demeanor and veracity determines accuracy, lie and truth detectability differed individually within senders. Judges primarily determined variance in lie-versus-truth classifications (12%) and in confidence (46%) but played no role regarding judgment accuracy (< 0.01%). This work has substantial implications for the design and direction of future research and underscores the importance of separating senders and messages when developing theories and testing derived hypotheses.

Some Evidence That Truth-Tellers Are More Attractive Than Liars

Despite the prevalence of deception, people rarely doubt others' sincerity. However, indirect evaluations of liars and truth-tellers may differ even in the absence of suspicion about veracity. Across three studies, we provide evidence for the truth attraction effect in two samples of target stimuli and three samples of participant judges. Target people are perceived as more attractive when telling the truth versus when they lie, an effect mediated by target warmth and openness. The truth attraction effect is stronger for female targets (vs. males); however, it is unaffected by the gender of the judge. Findings suggest people may be more likely to approach truth-tellers versus liars, even when not actively judging veracity. We discuss the challenges and benefits of treating both targets and participants as random factors in linear mixed-effect analyses and join the chorus of calls to increase the number of target stimuli in deception research.

Adult's veracity judgments of Black and White children's statements: the role of perceiver and target race and prejudice-related concerns

Introduction

Seldom has work investigated systematic biases in adults' truth and lie judgments of children's reports. Research demonstrates that adults tend to exhibit a bias toward believing a child is telling the truth, but it is unknown whether this truth bias applies equally to all children. Given the pervasiveness of racial prejudice and anti-Black racism in the United States, the current study examined whether adults are more or less likely to believe a child is telling the truth based on the race of the child (Black or White), the race of the adult perceiver (Black or White), and the perceiver's concerns regarding appearing unprejudiced.

Methods

Using an online data-collection platform, 593 Black and White American adults reviewed fictitious vignettes in which a child denied committing a misbehavior at school (e.g., damaging a laptop). The race of the child in the vignette was manipulated using an AI-generated photo of either a Black child or a White child. After reading each story, participants provided a categorical veracity judgment by indicating whether they believed the child in the story was lying (and therefore committed the misdeed) or telling the truth (and was innocent), as well as rated how honest or deceptive the child was being on a continuous scale. Participants also completed questionnaires assessing their internal (personal) and external (normative) motivations to respond in non-prejudiced ways.

Results and discussion

Results indicated that systematic racial biases occur in adults' veracity judgments of children's statements. Both Black and White participants exhibited a truth bias in their veracity judgments of Black children, but not when evaluating the deceptiveness of White children. Consistent with the prejudice-related concerns hypothesis, the observed truth bias toward Black children was moderated by individual differences in participants' desire to respond without prejudice and whether those motivations stem from external or internal sources. The current findings present novel evidence regarding racial bias and prejudice-related concerns as potential barriers to making veracity judgments of children's statements and, ultimately, successful lie detection.

The use-the-best heuristic facilitates deception detection

Decades of research have shown that people are poor at detecting deception. Understandably, people struggle with integrating the many putative cues to deception into an accurate veracity judgement. Heuristics simplify difficult decisions by ignoring most of the information and relying instead only on the most diagnostic cues. Here we conducted nine studies in which people evaluated honest and deceptive handwritten statements, video transcripts, videotaped interviews or live interviews. Participants performed at the chance level when they made intuitive judgements, free to use any possible cue. But when instructed to rely only on the best available cue (detailedness), they were consistently able to discriminate lies from truths. Our findings challenge the notion that people lack the potential to detect deception. The simplicity and accuracy of the use-the-best heuristic provides a promising new avenue for deception research.

Challenges in detecting proximal effects of existential threat on lie detection accuracy

The present work documents our investigation of proximal (i.e., immediate) effects of existential threat on the process of lie detection. Specifically, we hypothesized that lie detection accuracy will be higher in a mortality salience (MS) condition compared with the control condition. In two lab-based studies (N = 120; N = 109) and one internet study (N = 1294), we did not find any evidence for this hypothesis, that is, MS effects on lie detection accuracy were constantly not significant. However, these null findings should not be overstated. Instead, the present contribution aims to reveal the theoretical and methodological challenges in properly testing proximal MS effects on lie detection accuracy. First, we make transparent that our theoretical assumptions regarding the underlying mechanisms changed during the research process from MS-induced vigilance (Studies 1 and 2) to MS-induced negative affect (Study 3) and remain speculative. Moreover, we show how and why we adapted the operationalization from study to study to optimize adequate testing of the idea. In sum, this work aims to be informative for conducting future research rather than to provide conclusive evidence against or in favor of the investigated idea.