What is the role of episodic foresight in planning for future needs? Theory and two experiments

"These pretzels are making me thirsty" so I'll have water tomorrow: A partial replication and extension of adults' induced-state episodic foresight

The ability to consider the future under the influence of an induced current state is known as induced-state episodic foresight. One study to date has examined adults' induced episodic foresight and found that adults' (like children's) preferences for the future are related to their current state such that they predicted wanting water (vs. pretzels) in the future when experiencing a current state of thirst [1]. We attempted to replicate these findings in adults. In Study 1, adults (N = 198) in a laboratory selected pretzels for tomorrow at the same rate (around 20%) in an experimental condition (thirst induced) and a control condition (thirst not induced). In a lecture, 32% of adults preferred pretzels for tomorrow without thirst induction (Study 2, N = 63). Partially replicating Kramer et al. [1], we found that a minority of adults preferred pretzels (vs. water) when experiencing a current state of thirst. However, in contrast to their findings, our results showed that when thirst was not induced, a minority of adults also preferred pretzels for tomorrow. Thus, adults' future preference was similar regardless of thirst induction. We also tested thirst as a mechanism for adults' preference for the future and found that across conditions adults' thirst predicted their choice of water (vs. pretzels) for the future. In sum, our results partially replicated Kramer et al. [1] by showing the current state, regardless of thirst induction, predicts adults' choices for the future.

Stranger or a clone? Future self-connectedness depends on who you ask, when you ask, and what dimension you focus on

A fast-growing body of evidence suggests that people have difficulties in envisioning how their future selves will look like and behave. So, what determines that one's future self feels like a dissimilar stranger or exactly the same person? Here, we review relevant work and propose a three-factor framework in an effort to organize and highlight important findings. Our review suggests that who we are, what dimension we focus on, as well as the cognitive and affective states we are in, impact the way we envision our future self being similar or different from our current self. We conclude with remaining questions that are yet to be explored.

The effect of episodic future simulation and motivation on young children's induced-state episodic foresight

Future simulation and motivation are two strategies that might help children improve their induced-state episodic foresight. In Study 1, 3- to 5-year-old children (N = 96) consumed pretzels (to induce thirst) and were asked what they would prefer the next day, pretzels or water. Children were randomly assigned to an experimental condition: (1) a standard thirsty condition, (2) an episodic simulation condition where they imagined being hungry the next day, (3) a motivation condition where children chose between a cupcake and water, or (4) a control condition (thirst was not induced). Future preferences did not differ by age and children were less likely to choose water (vs. a cupcake) in the motivation condition compared to the standard thirsty condition. Study 2 found that 3- to 5-year-old children (N = 22) were also less likely to choose water for right now versus a cupcake when thirst was induced.

Children's future-oriented cognition

Children's future-oriented cognition has become a well-established area of research over the last decade. Future-oriented cognition encompasses a range of processes, including those involved in conceiving the future, imagining and preparing for future events, and making decisions that will affect how the future unfolds. We consider recent empirical advances in the study of such processes by outlining key findings that have yielded a clearer picture of how future thinking emerges and changes over childhood. Our interest in future thinking stems from a broader interest in temporal cognition, and we argue that a consideration of developmental changes in how children understand and represent time itself provides a valuable framework in which to study future-oriented cognition.