Personal Goal-Related Mental Time Travel and Its Association With Resting-State Functional Connectivity in Individuals With High Schizotypal Traits

BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS

Mental time travel (MTT) is a crucial ability for daily life. Personal goal-related MTT events has stronger phenomenological characteristics than personal goal-unrelated ones, ie, the "personal goal-advantage effect". However, it remains unclear whether this effect is impacted in individuals with high schizotypal traits (HST) and the neural correlates of this effect have yet to be elucidated. The present study aimed to fill these knowledge gaps. We hypothesized that HST would show a reduced "personal goal-advantage effect" in MTT and would exhibit altered relationships with resting-state functional connectivity.

STUDY DESIGN

In Study 1, 37 HST and 40 individuals with low schizotypal traits (LST) were recruited. Participants generated MTT events with personal goal-related and personal goal-unrelated cues. In Study 2, 39 HST and 38 LST were recruited, they completed the same behavioral task and resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scanning.

STUDY RESULTS

Both Study 1 and Study 2 revealed that HST exhibited reduced "personal goal-advantage effect" on MTT specificity. Moreover, Study 2 showed that compared with LST, HST exhibited altered association between the "personal goal-advantage effect" and functional connectivity (ie, between the right precuneus and the left postcentral gyrus and "personal goal-advantage effect" on emotional valence, between the left hippocampus and the right temporal fusiform gyrus and "personal goal-advantage effect" on emotional intensity).

CONCLUSIONS

These findings suggest that HST exhibit a reduced "personal goal-advantage effect" in MTT specificity and altered neural correlates related to this effect. The "personal goal-advantage effect" may be a potential target for intervention in HST.

Uncertainty salience reduces the accessibility of episodic future thoughts

We live in uncertain times and how this pervasive sense of uncertainty affects our ability to think about the future remains largely unexplored. This study aims to investigate the effects of uncertainty salience on episodic future thinking-the ability to mentally represent specific future events. Experiment 1 assessed the impact of uncertainty on the accessibility of episodic future thoughts using an event fluency task. Participants were randomly assigned to either an uncertainty induction or control condition, and then were asked to imagine as many future events as possible that could happen in different time periods. The results showed that participants in the uncertainty condition produced fewer events, suggesting that uncertainty salience reduced the accessibility of episodic future thoughts. Experiment 2 investigated in further detail the mechanisms of production of episodic future thoughts that are affected by uncertainty. The results showed that uncertainty primarily reduced the accessibility of previously formed future thoughts (i.e., memories of the future) rather than affecting the ability to generatively think about the future and construct events. These findings shed new light on the impact of uncertainty on episodic future thinking, paving the way to further investigation into its implications for decision-making and future-oriented behavior.

Goal characteristics predict the occurrence of goal-related events through belief in future occurrence

While previous studies have highlighted the role of episodic future thinking in goal pursuit, the underlying cognitive mechanisms remain unexplored. Episodic future thinking may promote goal pursuit by shaping the feeling that imagined events will (or will not) happen in the future - referred to as belief in future occurrence. We investigated whether goal self-concordance (Experiment 1) and other goal characteristics identified as influential in goal pursuit (Experiment 2) modulate belief in the future occurrence of goal-related events and predict the actual occurrence of these events. Results showed that goal self-concordance, engagement, and expectancy had an indirect effect on the actual occurrence of events, which was (partially) mediated by belief in future occurrence. The mediating role of belief supports the view that belief in future occurrence when imagining events conveys useful information, allowing us to make informed decisions and undertake adaptive actions in the process of goal pursuit.

Repeated simulation increases belief in the future occurrence of uncertain events

The feeling that an imagined event will or will not occur in the future - referred to as belief in future occurrence - plays a key role in guiding our decisions and actions. Recent research suggests that this belief may increase with repeated simulation of future events, but the boundary conditions for this effect remain unclear. Considering the key role of autobiographical knowledge in shaping belief in occurrence, we suggest that the effect of repeated simulation only occurs when prior autobiographical knowledge does not clearly support or contradict the occurrence of the imagined event. To test this hypothesis, we investigated the repetition effect for events that were either plausible or implausible due to their coherence or incoherence with autobiographical knowledge (Experiment 1), and for events that initially appeared uncertain because they were not clearly supported or contradicted by autobiographical knowledge (Experiment 2). We found that all types of events became more detailed and took less time to construct after repeated simulation, but belief in their future occurrence increased only for uncertain events; repetition did not influence belief for events already believed or considered implausible. These findings show that the effect of repeated simulation on belief in future occurrence depends on the consistency of imagined events with autobiographical knowledge.

Moderating Impact of Dispositional Mindfulness in the Relationship Between Future Expectancies and Psychological Well-Being

OBJECTIVES

Mindfulness has been studied under cultivated or dispositional divisions where the latter has strong implications for psychological well-being in meditators and non-meditators alike. In addition, future expectations, or prospections, regarding the occurrence of important events in a person's future have recently been hypothesized to be the main cause behind symptoms of major depression. There is, however, a lack of empirical research looking at possible links between dispositional mindfulness, as understood in its facet structure, and future expectations as understood via perceived risk of occurrence and vividness of mental imagery when prompted to imagine a given list of positive and negative prospective event item lists. Therefore, this research aimed at examining how dispositional mindfulness may be related to probabilistic risk assessments of positive and negative future events (Stage I); and how mental imagery vividness may be moderated by mindfulness facets (Stage II).

METHODS

Both stages included healthy participants and incorporated the PROCESS macro for moderated regression analysis done with the SPSS software. Stage I included 204 voluntary college students, and Stage II was conducted online with a public sample of 110 adults.

RESULTS

Although no interaction effect was found in Stage I, nonreactivity to inner experience facet of dispositional mindfulness moderated the relationship between negative imagery vividness and psychological distress in Stage II (F_(1,103) = 4.00, R² change=.018, p <.05).

CONCLUSIONS

This is a novel finding that could inform a future line of research looking into the relationship between prospection and mindfulness, holding a potential for informing research on mindfulness-based interventions.

A long time ago in a galaxy far, far away: How temporal are episodic contents?

A prominent feature of mental event (i.e. 'episodic') simulations is their temporal orientation: human adults can generate episodic representations directed towards the past or the future. Here, we investigated how the temporal orientation of imagined events relates to the contents of these events. Is there something intrinsically temporal about episodic contents? Or does their temporality rely on a distinct set of representations? In three experiments (N = 360), we asked participants to generate and later recall a series of imagined events differing in (1) location, (2) time of day, (3) temporal orientation, and (4) weekday. We then tested to what extent successful recall of episodic content (i.e. (1) and (2)) would predict recall of temporality and/or weekday information. Results showed that recall of temporal orientation was only weakly predicted by recall of episodic contents. Nonetheless, temporal orientation was more strongly predicted by content recall than weekday recall. This finding suggests that episodic simulations are unlikely to be intrinsically temporal in nature. Instead, similar to other forms of temporal information, temporal orientation might be determined from such contents by reconstructive post-retrieval processes. These results have implications for how the human ability to 'mentally travel' in time is cognitively implemented.

Zooming In and Out on One's Life: Autobiographical Representations at Multiple Time Scales

The ability to decouple from the present environment and explore other times is a central feature of the human mind. Research in cognitive psychology and neuroscience has shown that the personal past and future is represented at multiple timescales and levels of resolution, from broad lifetime periods that span years to short-time slices of experience that span seconds. Here, I review this evidence and propose a theoretical framework for understanding mental time travel as the capacity to flexibly navigate hierarchical layers of autobiographical representations. On this view, past and future thoughts rely on two main systems-event simulation and autobiographical knowledge-that allow us to represent experiential contents that are decoupled from sensory input and to place these on a personal timeline scaffolded from conceptual knowledge of the content and structure of our life. The neural basis of this cognitive architecture is discussed, emphasizing the possible role of the medial pFC in integrating layers of autobiographical representations in the service of mental time travel.

Deliberating trade-offs with the future

Many fundamental choices in life are intertemporal: they involve trade-offs between sooner and later outcomes. In recent years there has been a surge of interest into how people make intertemporal decisions, given that such decisions are ubiquitous in everyday life and central in domains from substance use to climate change action. While it is clear that people make decisions according to rules, intuitions and habits, they also commonly deliberate over their options, thinking through potential outcomes and reflecting on their own preferences. In this Perspective, we bring to bear recent research into the higher-order capacities that underpin deliberation-particularly those that enable people to think about the future (prospection) and their own thinking (metacognition)-to shed light on intertemporal decision-making. We show how a greater appreciation for these mechanisms of deliberation promises to advance our understanding of intertemporal decision-making and unify a wide range of otherwise disparate choice phenomena.

Predicted and remembered emotion: tomorrow's vividness trumps yesterday's accuracy

People rely on predicted and remembered emotion to guide important decisions. But how much can they trust their mental representations of emotion to be accurate, and how much do they trust them? In this investigation, participants (N = 957) reported their predicted, experienced, and remembered emotional response to the outcome of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. They also reported how accurate and vivid they perceived their predictions and memories to be, and the importance of the election. Participants remembered their emotional responses more accurately than they predicted them. But, strikingly, they perceived their predictions to be more accurate than their memories. This perception was explained by the greater importance and vividness of anticipated versus remembered experience. We also assessed whether individuals with Highly Superior Autobiographical Memory for personal and public events (N = 33) showed superior ability to predict or remember their emotional responses to events. They did not and, even for this group, predicting emotion was a more intense experience than remembering emotion. These findings reveal asymmetries in the phenomenological experience of predicting and remembering emotion. The vividness of predicted emotion serves as a powerful subjective signal of accuracy even when predictions turn out to be wrong.