Learning from informative losses boosts the sense of agency

The enhancement of temporal binding effect after negative social feedback

The present study investigated the effect of social feedback on the experiences of our actions and the outcomes (e.g. temporal binding between an action and its outcome, reflecting individuals' causal beliefs modulated by their agency judgments). In Experiment 1a, participants freely decided (voluntary action) their action timing to cause an outcome, which was followed by social feedback. A larger temporal binding (TB) following negative vs. positive events was found. This effect appeared neither in the random context where the causal belief between the action and outcome was absent (Experiment 1b) nor in the involuntary action context where participants' action timing was instructed (Experiment 1c). Experiments 2a and 2b examined the effect when the action-outcome was occluded, including reversing the order of outcome and feedback in Experiment 2b. Experiments 3a and 3b investigated the effect with only social feedback or only action-outcome presented. Results revealed that the effect found in Experiment 1 was driven by social feedback and independent of the availability of the action-outcome and the position of social feedback. Our findings demonstrate a stronger temporal integration of the action and its outcome following negative social feedback, reflecting fluctuations in sense of agency when faced with social feedback.

Choice effects on temporal binding of action and outcomes: Examining the role of outcome focus and measures of time interval estimation

The ability to make one's own choices is vital to the experience of intentional behavior. Such agency experiences are reflected in the perceptual compression of time between actions and resulting outcomes. Whereas some studies show that choice limitations weaken temporal binding, other studies do not find such an effect. Reviewing the literature, we noted two potential factors that may moderate choice limitation effects on temporal binding: (a) the extent to which individuals represent their actions in terms of the consequences they produce; and (b) the response mode of the time interval estimation measurement where participants report numbers or use a slider to indicate time intervals. Testing these conceptual and methodological factors in two separate experiments yielded clear effects of choice limitation on temporal binding but no clear moderator role of the two factors. Interestingly, overall analyses showed that the choice limitation effect gradually vanishes over time.

Beyond peaks and troughs: Multiplexed performance monitoring signals in the EEG

With the discovery of event-related potentials elicited by errors more than 30 years ago, a new avenue of research on performance monitoring, cognitive control, and decision making emerged. Since then, the field has developed and expanded fulminantly. After a brief overview on the EEG correlates of performance monitoring, this article reviews recent advancements based on single-trial analyses using independent component analysis, multiple regression, and multivariate pattern classification. Given the close interconnection between performance monitoring and reinforcement learning, computational modeling and model-based EEG analyses have made a particularly strong impact. The reviewed findings demonstrate that error- and feedback-related EEG dynamics represent variables reflecting how performance-monitoring signals are weighted and transformed into an adaptation signal that guides future decisions and actions. The model-based single-trial analysis approach goes far beyond conventional peak-and-trough analyses of event-related potentials and enables testing mechanistic theories of performance monitoring, cognitive control, and decision making.

When Good Intention Goes Away: Social Feedback Modulates the Influence of Outcome Valence on Temporal Binding

The retrospective view of temporal binding (TB), the temporal contraction between one's actions and their effects, proposes that TB is influenced by what happens after the action. However, the role of the interaction between multiple sources of information following the action in the formation of TB has received limited attention. The current study aims to address this gap by investigating the combined influence of social feedback and outcome valence (i.e., positive or negative outcomes) on TB. In Experiment 1, the valenced outcome was followed by either positive or negative social feedback. The results showed that negative social feedback enlarged the difference between TB over negative and positive outcomes relative to positive social feedback. The modulatory effect of social feedback on TB was not observed in the absence of causal beliefs between actions and outcomes (Experiment 2). These results highlight the importance of considering the complex interplay between cognitive, emotional, and social factors in shaping our subjective temporal experience.

Implicit signatures of voluntary action reduce with repeated motor practice

The sense of controlling one's actions and their consequences is a critical aspect of successful motor activity. While motor performance typically improves with learning, it is unclear whether, how, and why higher order aspects of motor cognition are also affected. Here, we used an implicit measure of sense of agency-the 'intentional binding' effect-as participants learned to make a skilled action involving precise control of thumb adduction. These actions were predictably followed by a tone (the outcome). At pre-test, we showed the perceived time of the tone was shifted towards the thumb action, compared to a control condition in which tones occurred without actions. Next, a relevant training group learned to refine the direction of the thumb movement, while an irrelevant training group was trained on another movement. Manipulation checks demonstrated that, as expected, the relevant training group improved performance of the trained movement, while the irrelevant training group did not. Critically, while both groups still showed binding of the tone towards the thumb action at post-test, the relevant training group showed less binding than the irrelevant training group. Given the link between intentional binding and volitional control of action, we suggest our result demonstrates subjective agency over the outcome of a skilled action decreases as practice makes the skilled action more fluent. We suggest that this reduction in sense of agency over movement outcomes is consistent with the decreasing cognitive engagement, or automatization, that occurs during skill learning.

Prepared to stop: how sense of agency in a preceding trial modulates inhibitory control in the current trial

Feeling in control of actions and events can enhance motivation for further actions. How this sense of agency (SoA) in fact influences flexible motor control remains poorly understood. Here, we investigated the effect of SoA on subsequent response inhibition in a modified go/no-go task with EEG recordings. We manipulated participants' SoA by varying the presence, predictability, and emotional valence of a visual outcome for a given motor action. When participants unexpectedly did not receive any visible outcome following their action on trial n - 1, they exhibited slower responses and lower hit rates to the go signal but higher rates of successful inhibition to the no-go signal on trial n, regardless of the emotional valence of the expected action outcome. Furthermore, enhanced inhibitory tendencies were accompanied by reduced N2 and P3 amplitudes, midfrontal theta power, and theta synchronization between midfrontal and medial to parietal areas, indicating that less top-down control is required for successful response inhibition on trial n after experiencing low SoA on trial n - 1. These findings suggest that feeling less in control in a preceding trial makes it easier to implement inhibitory control in the current trial, thereby providing new insights into the role of SoA in goal-directed behavior.

Depressive traits are associated with a reduced effect of choice on intentional binding

A sense of agency (SoA) over wilful actions is thought to be dependent on the level of choice and the nature of the outcome. In a preregistered study, we manipulated choice and valence of outcome to assess the relationship between SoA across the depression and psychosis continuum. Participants (N = 151) completed a Libet Clock task, in which they had either a free or forced choice to press one of two buttons and received either a rewarding or punishing outcome. Participants also completed questionnaires on depressive and psychosis-like traits. Rewarding outcomes increased intentional binding. The evidence favoured no effect of choice on average, but this was influenced by inter-individual differences. Individuals reporting more depressive traits had less of a difference in intentional binding between free and forced choice conditions. We show that implicit SoA is sensitive to outcome valence and the effect of choice differs across the depression continuum.

Mistakes strengthen the temporal binding effect in the context of goal-directed actions

Temporal binding is an illusion in which the temporal interval between two events appears compressed. In the context of intentional actions, this effect is observed as a compression of the perceived interval between these actions and their causal outcomes. This 'intentional binding effect' has been used to investigate the Sense of Agency, which is the experience of intentionally causing an outcome through volitional action. Intentional binding is reduced for negative outcomes such as error feedback, but the role of mistakes (e.g., errors of commission) for binding and agency has not been extensively studied. In our study, participants played a virtual game in which they attempted to 'splat' (hit) visual stimuli that looked like coloured bugs, using mouse clicks. On some trials, stimulus colours changed unpredictably immediately before actions were made, sometimes inducing mistakes. Actions were thus clearly identifiable as mistakes at the time of their onset before any outcome feedback had been provided. Participants reported shorter action-outcome intervals when stimuli changed, but only when this change caused a mistake according to the game's rules. This suggests that intentional binding is strengthened by errors of commission. We discuss how this effect may be accounted for by agency itself and via more general processes such as changes in arousal.

The Interplay Between Affective Processing and Sense of Agency During Action Regulation: A Review

Sense of agency is the feeling of being in control of one's actions and their perceivable effects. Most previous research identified cognitive or sensory determinants of agency experience. However, it has been proposed that sense of agency is also bound to the processing of affective information. For example, during goal-directed actions or instrumental learning we often rely on positive feedback (e.g., rewards) or negative feedback (e.g., error messages) to determine our level of control over the current task. Nevertheless, we still lack a scientific model which adequately explains the relation between affective processing and sense of agency. In this article, we review current empirical findings on how affective information modulates agency experience, and, conversely, how sense of agency changes the processing of affective action outcomes. Furthermore, we discuss in how far agency-related changes in affective processing might influence the ability to enact cognitive control and action regulation during goal-directed behavior. A preliminary model is presented for describing the interplay between sense of agency, affective processing, and action regulation. We propose that affective processing could play a role in mediating the influence between subjective sense of agency and the objective ability to regulate one's behavior. Thus, determining the interrelation between affective processing and sense of agency will help us to understand the potential mechanistic basis of agency experience, as well as its functional significance for goal-directed behavior.

Sensory attenuation of action outcomes of varying amplitude and valence

Stimuli caused by self-initiated actions are perceived as less intense than those caused externally; this effect is called sensory attenuation (SA). In two experiments, we aimed to assess the impact of the amplitude of outcomes and its affective valence on SA and explicit ratings of sense of agency. This allowed us to test the predictions of the available SA frameworks and better understand the link between SA, affect, and agency. The results indicated that SA can be reversed, and such sensory amplification is driven by low-amplitude and positive-valence outcomes. We also show that intentional action influences the perceived valence of outcomes, and that modulations of explicit sense of agency are divergent from those of SA. Our study shows that valence influences the processing of the amplitude of intentional action outcomes and suggests that none of the currently available frameworks give full justice to SA's variability.