Understanding emotion dysregulation from infancy to toddlerhood with a multilevel perspective: The buffering effect of maternal sensitivity

Challenges with childhood emotion regulation may have origins in infancy and forecast later social and cognitive developmental delays, academic difficulties, and psychopathology. This study tested whether markers of emotion dysregulation in infancy predict emotion dysregulation in toddlerhood, and whether those associations depended on maternal sensitivity. When children (N = 111) were 7 months, baseline respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA), RSA withdrawal, and distress were collected during the Still Face Paradigm (SFP). Mothers' reports of infant regulation and orientation and maternal sensitivity were also collected at that time. Mothers' reports of toddlers' dysregulation were collected at 18 months. A set of hierarchical regressions indicated that low baseline RSA and less change in RSA from baseline to stressor predicted greater dysregulation at 18 months, but only for infants who experienced low maternal sensitivity. Baseline RSA and RSA withdrawal were not significantly associated with later dysregulation for infants with highly sensitive mothers. Infants who exhibited low distress during the SFP and who had lower regulatory and orienting abilities at 7 months had higher dysregulation at 18 months regardless of maternal sensitivity. Altogether, these results suggest that risk for dysregulation in toddlerhood has biobehavioral origins in infancy but may be buffered by sensitive caregiving.

Measuring attitudes as a complex system: Structured thinking and support for the Canadian carbon tax

We test a method for applying a network-based approach to the study of political attitudes. We use cognitive-affective mapping, an approach that visually represents attitudes as networks of concepts that an individual associates with a given issue. Using a software tool called Valence, we asked a sample of Canadians (n = 111) to draw a cognitive-affective map (CAM) of their views on the carbon tax. We treat these networks as a series of undirected graphs and examine the extent to which support for the tax can be predicted based on each graph's emotional and structural properties. We find evidence that the emotional but not the structural properties significantly predict individuals' attitudes toward the carbon tax. We also find associations between CAMs' structural properties (density and centrality) and several measures of political interest. Our results provide preliminary evidence for the efficacy of CAMs as a tool for studying political attitudes. The study data are available at https://osf.io/qwpvd/?view_only=6834a1c442224e72bf45e7641880a17f.

Lost in Datafication? - A Typology of (Emotion) Data Contextualization

This article elaborates on the meaning of "context" for data created in interdisciplinary research on emotions. Particularly with regard to the potential reuse of scientific data, the elicitation of contexts can contribute to a better assessment of emotion data. Beyond a discussion of social scientific conceptualizations of "context" focusing on the situational and cultural contexts and their respective interrelations, this article presents the findings of an empirical study on datafication processes in interdisciplinary emotion research. Based on 123 survey responses and 15 in-depth interviews, a multitude of contextual dimensions will be reviewed. The typology of contexts, ranging from method-specific aspects and researchers' subjectivities to the contextual embeddedness of the research objects, provides a schema suitable for various epistemological approaches. The proposed typology can serve as a framework for emotion researchers to reflect on their research practice and interactions with research participants. The empirical findings also show the limitations of contextualization pertaining to tacit knowledge, implicit knowledge, embodied emotions and ethical considerations. The article concludes with suggestions for further research, pointing to intercultural settings, the integration of contexts and particular scenarios for data reuse.

Self-construal differences in neural responses to negative social cues

Cultures differ substantially in representations of the self. Whereas individualistic cultural groups emphasize an independent self, reflected in processing biases towards centralized salient objects, collectivistic cultures are oriented towards an interdependent self, attending to contextual associations between visual cues. It is unknown how these perceptual biases may affect brain activity in response to negative social cues. Moreover, while some studies have shown that individual differences in self-construal moderate cultural group comparisons, few have examined self-construal differences separate to culture. To investigate these issues, a final sample of a group of healthy participants high in trait levels of collectivistic self-construal (n=16) and individualistic self-construal (n=19), regardless of cultural background, completed a negative social cue evaluation task designed to engage face/object vs context-specific neural processes whilst undergoing fMRI scanning. Between-group analyses revealed that the collectivistic group exclusively engaged the parahippocampal gyrus (parahippocampal place area) - a region critical to contextual integration - during negative face processing - suggesting compensatory activations when contextual information was missing. The collectivist group also displayed enhanced negative context dependent brain activity involving the left superior occipital gyrus/cuneus and right anterior insula. By contrast, the individualistic group did not engage object or localized face processing regions as predicted, but rather demonstrated heightened appraisal and self-referential activations in medial prefrontal and temporoparietal regions to negative contexts - again suggesting compensatory processes when focal cues were absent. While individualists also appeared more sensitive to negative faces in the scenes, activating the right middle cingulate gyrus, dorsal prefrontal and parietal activations, this activity was observed relative to the scrambled baseline, and given that prefrontal and occipital regions were also engaged to neutral stimuli, may suggest an individualistic pattern to processing all social cues more generally. These findings suggest that individual differences in self-construal may be an important organizing framework facilitating perceptual processes to emotionally salient social cues, beyond the boundary of cultural group comparisons.

The Role of Cultural Meanings and Situated Interaction in Shaping Emotion

Cultures, institutions, and social roles powerfully shape affective experience. Four types of social affect—cultural sentiments, characteristic emotions, structural emotions, and consequent emotions—characterize relations between culture, social structure, and individual affective experience within social interactions. This article briefly reviews findings from contemporary research traditions about these forms of affect and finishes with simulations comparing predictions about social emotions across cultures. The results of that simulation study illustrate how we might use data and tools from affect control theory to investigate differences in basic cultural sentiments, as well as predictions about the core types of social emotions—those associated with identities, those associated with structural relationships, and those evoked by a social event.

Author Reply: Affect Control Theory and the Sociality of Emotion

We are pleased that all the commentators seem to agree that a theory-driven integration across disciplines is a worthwhile endeavor to better understand the social constitution of emotion. In our reply, we first take up the idea of relating affect control theory (ACT) to cultural priming and suggest links to an ACT-inspired constraint satisfaction explanation of priming. Second, we address reservations concerning ACT’s capability to account for emotions with nonconceptual content and to explain stability and change in affective meanings. Third, we clarify the relation of affect control theory to psychological constructionism, in particular with regard to conceptualizations of culture and society. Finally, we suggest that computational models are an adequate tool to address multilevel issues in the study of emotion.

Comment: Constructionism is a Multilevel Framework for Affective Science

We point out that constructionist models from experimental psychology account for the sociocultural, psychological, and neural levels of analysis in emotion. Individual constructionist models form a “metamodel” that integrates the levels of analysis important to a science of emotion. By clarifying the multilevel nature of constructionism, we hope to help lay a strong foundation for future cross-disciplinary collaborations.

Comment: Growing a Multilevel Science of Emotion

This comment identifies and elaborates three assumptions that underlie the proposal made by the Rogers, Schröder, and von Scheve (2014) article. First, our theories of emotion need to take into account, and be consistent with, supported theories of social outcomes and processes. Second, a thorough understanding of affective processes requires investigation at multiple levels of analysis, which in turn requires multilevel theories—or single-level theories that interact well with theories at other levels. Third, our broad understanding of emotion will be served best when we cultivate a field of intersecting and interacting theories of emotion.

Comment: Affect Control Theory and Cultural Priming: A Perspective from Cultural Neuroscience

Affect control theory posits that emotions are constructed by social and cultural forces. Rogers, Schröder, and von Scheve (2014) introduce affect control theory as a conceptual and methodological "hub," linking theories from different disciplines across levels of analysis. To illustrate this further, we apply their framework to cultural priming, an experimental technique in cultural psychology and neuroscience for testing how exposure to cultural symbols (e.g., words and pictures) changes people's behavior, cognition, and emotion. Our analysis supports the use of affect control theory in linking different levels of analysis while leaving some opening questions for improving such a framework in future research.

Comment: Critical Questions for Affect Control Theory

Affect control theory (ACT) is a sociological theory developed for modeling and predicting emotions and social behaviors in social interaction. In this commentary, I identify a few potential problems in the theory, as presented in the target article (Rogers, Schröder, & von Scheve, 2014) and elsewhere, and in its suggested compatibility with other major emotion theories. The first problem concerns ACT’s capacity to model emotion generation insofar as emotions have nonconceptual content. The second problem focuses on the limits of modeling interaction on the basis of fixed affective meanings of identities. Finally, ACT has problems with explaining the dynamic change of affective meanings, given its tenets that people seek to maintain the established affective meanings of social roles and situations and deflections are not expressed in behavior but compensated by identity-confirming behavior.