The value of banknotes: relevance of size, colour and design

In the current study, we evaluate the relevance of three physical features when people retrieve the monetary value of banknotes. To this end, three monetary comparison tasks were designed in which in each trial a pair of banknotes were presented and participants selected the one with higher monetary value. In each task, a different banknote feature (size, colour and design) was examined and a congruent and an incongruent condition (the value of the physical feature corresponded or not to its actual value, respectively) were compared to a neutral condition (no information about the physical feature was provided). We found a pattern of facilitation and interference effects which suggests that size is the most relevant physical feature for accessing the monetary value of banknotes followed by colour. However, the availability of a variety of designs across banknotes seemed not to facilitate the performance of the task, but rather the opposite, hindering the monetary comparison task.

Does food deprivation affect perceived size?

Exposure to food-related stimuli could lead to the triggering of a set of biological, emotional and cognitive responses. Such responses can be pronounced following food deprivation. Indeed, previous research showed that even a moderate period of food deprivation is sufficient to increase perceptual precision to detect changes along food size and to change the processing style of food-related stimuli. It is unclear, however, whether food deprivation also leads to systematic biases along the perception of food size. Here, we used two classic psychophysical methods, the method of constant stimuli and the method of adjustment, adapted to the field of food perception, to study the effect of food deprivation on average perceived food size. In two experiments, food deprived and non-deprived participants were asked to compare a series of food and non-food visual stimuli along their size. The results were inconsistent and depended upon the method used. When found, small bias effects resulted in food stimuli perceived as bigger following food deprivation. The results show that unlike the reliable effects motivational factors have on perceptual precision and on perceptual processing style, they have an inconsistent influence on average perceived food size.

Rewarding objects appear larger but not brighter

Whether reward can accentuate the perception of visual objects, that is, makes them appear larger than they really are, is a long-standing and controversial question. Here, we revisit this issue with a novel two-alternative forced-choice paradigm combining asymmetric reward schedule and task reversal. In a first experiment, participants (n = 27) choose the larger of two unequally rewarded objects in some sessions and the smaller one in other sessions. Response biases toward the most rewarding object differ significantly between the reversed tasks, revealing an influence of reward on perceived sizes. In a second experiment, participants (n = 27) indicate either the brighter or darker object. In contrast with the first experiment, response biases are similar between those reversed tasks, indicating that the perceived luminance is immune to reward manipulation. Together, these results reveal that if two objects are associated with different amounts of reward, participants will perceive the more rewarded object to be slightly larger, but not brighter, than the less rewarded one.

Cognitive penetration of early vision in face perception

Cognitive and affective penetration of perception refers to the influence that higher mental states such as beliefs and emotions have on perceptual systems. Psychological and neuroscientific studies appear to show that these states modulate the visual system at the visuomotor, attentional, and late levels of processing. However, empirical evidence showing that similar consequences occur in early stages of visual processing seems to be scarce. In this paper, I argue that psychological evidence does not seem to be either sufficient or necessary to argue in favour of or against the cognitive penetration of perception in either late or early vision. In order to do that we need to have recourse to brain imaging techniques. Thus, I introduce a neuroscientific study and argue that it seems to provide well-grounded evidence for the cognitive penetration of early vision in face perception. I also examine and reject alternative explanations to my conclusion.

Predictions penetrate perception: Converging insights from brain, behaviour and disorder

It is argued that during ongoing visual perception, the brain is generating top-down predictions to facilitate, guide and constrain the processing of incoming sensory input. Here we demonstrate that these predictions are drawn from a diverse range of cognitive processes, in order to generate the richest and most informative prediction signals. This is consistent with a central role for cognitive penetrability in visual perception. We review behavioural and mechanistic evidence that indicate a wide spectrum of domains-including object recognition, contextual associations, cognitive biases and affective state-that can directly influence visual perception. We combine these insights from the healthy brain with novel observations from neuropsychiatric disorders involving visual hallucinations, which highlight the consequences of imbalance between top-down signals and incoming sensory information. Together, these lines of evidence converge to indicate that predictive penetration, be it cognitive, social or emotional, should be considered a fundamental framework that supports visual perception.

Big Money: The Effect of Money Size on Value Perceptions and Saving Motivation

Motivated perception has been shown to affect people's estimates of money (e.g., perceiving coins as larger than real size). In the present research, we examine whether simply varying the size of a picture of money can affect its perceived value and subsequent decisions. Participants presented with a picture of money enlarged by 15% perceived the depicted money as more valuable compared with those seeing a real-size picture (Study 1). When told to imagine their own cash and banked money in the depicted form, participants presented with a picture enlarged by 15% felt more subjectively wealthy and reported fewer intentions to conserve their money compared with those seeing a real-size picture of the same money (Study 2). Together, these studies suggest that judgments about money and even attitudes toward personal spending can be influenced by manipulating the size of a picture of money.

Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for “top-down” effects

What determines what we see? In contrast to the traditional “modular” understanding of perception, according to which visual processing is encapsulated from higher-level cognition, a tidal wave of recent research alleges that states such as beliefs, desires, emotions, motivations, intentions, and linguistic representations exert direct, top-down influences on what we see. There is a growing consensus that such effects are ubiquitous, and that the distinction between perception and cognition may itself be unsustainable. We argue otherwise: None of these hundreds of studies – either individually or collectively – provides compelling evidence for true top-down effects on perception, or “cognitive penetrability.” In particular, and despite their variety, we suggest that these studies all fall prey to only a handful of pitfalls. And whereas abstract theoretical challenges have failed to resolve this debate in the past, our presentation of these pitfalls is empirically anchored: In each case, we show not only how certain studies could be susceptible to the pitfall (in principle), but also how several alleged top-down effects actually are explained by the pitfall (in practice). Moreover, these pitfalls are perfectly general, with each applying to dozens of other top-down effects. We conclude by extracting the lessons provided by these pitfalls into a checklist that future work could use to convincingly demonstrate top-down effects on visual perception. The discovery of substantive top-down effects of cognition on perception would revolutionize our understanding of how the mind is organized; but without addressing these pitfalls, no such empirical report will license such exciting conclusions.

An Embodied Approach to Perception: By What Units Are Visual Perceptions Scaled?

When humans perceive the environment, angular units of visual information must be transformed into units appropriate for the specification of such parameters of surface layout as extent, size, and orientation. Our embodied approach to perception proposes that these scaling units derive from the body. For example, hand size is relevant for scaling the size of a strawberry, whereas an extent across a meadow is scaled by the amount of walking required to traverse it. In his article, Firestone (2013, this issue) argued that our approach is wrong; in fact, he argued that it must be wrong. This reply to Firestone's critique is organized into three parts, which address the following questions: (a) What is the fundamental question motivating our approach? (b) How does our approach answer this question? (c) How can we address Firestone's arguments against our approach? A point-by-point critique of Firestone's arguments is presented. Three conclusions are drawn: (a) Most of Firestone's arguments reflect a misunderstanding of our approach, (b) none of his arguments are the fatal flaws in our approach that he believes them to be, and (c) there are good reasons to believe that perception-just like any other biological function-is a phenotypic expression.

Out of sight, out of mind: cognitive states alter the focus of attention

People in an impulsive state are influenced mainly by the immediate incentive value of appetitive stimuli, whereas people in a reflective state usually also consider the (sometimes negative) long-term consequences of such stimuli. In order to consider all information, we hypothesize that, people in reflective states distribute their attention over all available information, whereas people in impulsive states focus their attention on the most salient information. We measured cognitive states using eye-blink rate (Experiment 1) or induced them with a procedural priming manipulation (Experiments 2 and 3). In eye-tracking Experiments 1 and 2, we established that people in an impulsive state indeed focus their attention on the salient information, whereas people in a reflective state distribute their attention. Moreover, we show that this attentional difference extends to evaluative judgments (Experiment 3), which could potentially contribute to people's increased propensity to risk in impulsive states.

Resource security impacts men's female breast size preferences

It has been suggested human female breast size may act as signal of fat reserves, which in turn indicates access to resources. Based on this perspective, two studies were conducted to test the hypothesis that men experiencing relative resource insecurity should perceive larger breast size as more physically attractive than men experiencing resource security. In Study 1, 266 men from three sites in Malaysia varying in relative socioeconomic status (high to low) rated a series of animated figures varying in breast size for physical attractiveness. Results showed that men from the low socioeconomic context rated larger breasts as more attractive than did men from the medium socioeconomic context, who in turn perceived larger breasts as attractive than men from a high socioeconomic context. Study 2 compared the breast size judgements of 66 hungry versus 58 satiated men within the same environmental context in Britain. Results showed that hungry men rated larger breasts as significantly more attractive than satiated men. Taken together, these studies provide evidence that resource security impacts upon men’s attractiveness ratings based on women’s breast size.