Moral foundations elicit shared and dissociable cortical activation modulated by political ideology

Moral foundations theory (MFT) holds that moral judgements are driven by modular and ideologically variable moral foundations but where and how these foundations are represented in the brain and shaped by political beliefs remains an open question. Using a moral vignette judgement task (n = 64), we probed the neural (dis)unity of moral foundations. Univariate analyses revealed that moral judgement of moral foundations, versus conventional norms, reliably recruits core areas implicated in theory of mind. Yet, multivariate pattern analysis demonstrated that each moral foundation elicits dissociable neural representations distributed throughout the cortex. As predicted by MFT, individuals' liberal or conservative orientation modulated neural responses to moral foundations. Our results confirm that each moral foundation recruits domain-general mechanisms of social cognition but also has a dissociable neural signature malleable by sociomoral experience. We discuss these findings in view of unified versus dissociable accounts of morality and their neurological support for MFT.

Disgust and disgust-driven moral concerns predict support for restrictions on transgender bathroom access

Many U.S. states have proposed policies that restrict bathroom access to an individual's birth sex. These policies have had widespread effects on safety for transgender and gender-nonconforming people, as well as on state economies. In this registered report, we assessed the role of disgust in support for policies that restrict transgender bathroom access. We found that sensitivity to pathogen disgust was positively associated with support for bathroom restrictions; sexual and injury disgust were unrelated. We also examined the role of disgust-driven moral concerns, known as purity concerns, as well as harm-related moral concerns in support for bathroom restrictions. While concerns about harm to cisgender and transgender people predicted support for bathroom restrictions, purity was a much stronger predictor. Also, purity partially mediated the link between pathogen disgust and support for bathroom restrictions, even after accounting for harm concerns. Findings and implications are discussed.

Personal Values and Moral Foundations: Examining Relations and Joint Prediction of Moral Variables

I examined the relationship between personal values and moral foundations by conducting a mini meta-analysis of the values–foundations links in five large-scale cross-cultural samples (overall N = 32,492). I further tested whether the two theories predicted unique variance in moral variables. I found support for values and foundations as unique constructs with consistent and theoretically meaningful relationships. Broadly, self-transcendence versus self-enhancement values dimensions were associated with individualizing foundations, whereas conservation versus openness-to-change values dimensions were associated with binding foundations. Links between values and foundations categories followed the expected theoretical values theory circumplex structure sinusoidal pattern. Dimensions of the two theories predicted unique variance in morality attitudes, behavior, and individual differences. All materials, data sets, and code are available on https://osf.io/6qs5g/ .

What Are the Irreducible Basic Elements of Morality? A Critique of the Debate Over Monism and Pluralism in Moral Psychology

The debate between monists and pluralists in moral psychology has been framed as an argument over the number of “irreducible basic elements” that can be used to describe the extent of the moral domain: Do all moral values ultimately reduce to one principle (i.e., monism), or are there multiple irreducibly distinct moral values (i.e., pluralism)? I critique the premise of this debate, arguing that the breadth of the moral domain cannot be adequately represented, understood, or explained in terms of moral values. Instead, an adequate account of moral psychology must explain moral phenomena in terms of more basic elements: ontological frames.

Specks of Dirt and Tons of Pain: Dosage Distinguishes Impurity From Harm

Levels of moral condemnation often vary with outcome severity (e.g., extreme destruction is morally worse than moderate damage), but this is not always true. We investigated whether judgments of purity transgressions are more or less sensitive to variation in dosage than judgments of harm transgressions. In three studies, adults ( N = 426) made moral evaluations of harm and purity transgressions that systematically varied in dosage (frequency or magnitude). Pairs of low-dosage and high-dosage transgressions were presented such that the same sets of modifiers (e.g., “occasionally” vs. “regularly,” “small” vs. “large”) or amounts (e.g., “millimeter” vs. “centimeter”) were reused across moral domains. Statistical interactions between domain and dosage indicated robust distinctions between the perceived wrongness of high-dosage and low-dosage harms, whereas moral evaluations of impure acts were considerably less influenced by dosage. Our findings support the existence of a cognitive distinction between purity-based and harm-based morals and challenge current wisdom regarding relationships between intentions and outcomes in moral judgment.

Many moral buttons or just one? Evidence from emotional facial expressions

We investigated whether moral violations involving harm selectively elicit anger, whereas purity violations selectively elicit disgust, as predicted by the Moral Foundations Theory (MFT). We analysed participants' spontaneous facial expressions as they listened to scenarios depicting moral violations of harm and purity. As predicted by MFT, anger reactions were elicited more frequently by harmful than by impure actions. However, violations of purity elicited more smiling reactions and expressions of anger than of disgust. This effect was found both in a classic set of scenarios and in a new set in which the different kinds of violations were matched on weirdness. Overall, these findings are at odds with predictions derived from MFT and provide support for "monist" accounts that posit harm at the basis of all moral violations. However, we found that smiles were differentially linked to purity violations, which leaves open the possibility of distinct moral modules.

Moral Framing and Charitable Donation: Integrating Exploratory Social Media Analyses and Confirmatory Experimentation

Do appeals to moral values promote charitable donation during natural disasters? Using Distributed Dictionary Representation, we analyze tweets posted during Hurricane Sandy to explore associations between moral values and charitable donation sentiment. We then derive hypotheses from the observed associations and test these hypotheses across a series of preregistered experiments that investigate the effects of moral framing on perceived donation motivation (Studies 2 & 3), hypothetical donation (Study 4), and real donation behavior (Study 5). Overall, we find consistent positive associations between moral care and loyalty framing with donation sentiment and donation motivation. However, in contrast with people’s perceptions, we also find that moral frames may not actually have reliable effects on charitable donation, as measured by hypothetical indications of donation and real donation behavior. Overall, this work demonstrates that theoretically constrained, exploratory social media analyses can be used to generate viable hypotheses, but also that such approaches should be paired with rigorous controlled experiments.

Disconfirming Moral Foundations Theory on Its Own Terms

People see immorality in sin and sex, but is “purity” a unique type of moral content, with unique cognition? Domain-general accounts—and parsimony—suggest that all moral content is processed similarly and that “purity” is merely a descriptive label. Conversely, domain-specific theories (e.g., moral foundations theory [MFT]) argue for a special purity module. Consistent with domain-general accounts, we demonstrated that purity concerns are not distinguished from harm concerns—in either MFT or naturalistic scenarios—and that controlling for domain-general dimensions eliminates effects previously ascribed to moral “modules.” Here, we reaffirm the strength of our data, exploring how issues raised by Graham reflect only weaknesses in MFT. Importantly, we identify several clear contradictions between Graham’s comment and past-published accounts of MFT. To the extent that MFT stands by its published stimuli, methodologies, and theoretical assumptions, we believe that we have disconfirmed MFT on its own terms.