Equipment, supplies, and pharmaceuticals: how much might it cost to achieve basic surge capacity?

Radiation and Chemical Program Research for Multi-Utility and Repurposed Countermeasures: A US Department of Health and Human Services Agencies Perspective

Although chemical and radiological agents cause toxicity through different mechanisms, the multiorgan injuries caused by these threats share similarities that convene on the level of basic biological responses. This publication will discuss these areas of convergence and explore "multi-utility" approaches that could be leveraged to address common injury mechanisms underlying actions of chemical and radiological agents in a threat-agnostic manner. In addition, we will provide an overview of the current state of radiological and chemical threat research, discuss the US Government's efforts toward medical preparedness, and identify potential areas for collaboration geared toward enhancing preparedness and response against radiological and chemical threats. We also will discuss previous regulatory experience to provide insight on how to navigate regulatory paths for US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval/licensure/clearance for products addressing chemical or radiological/nuclear threats. This publication follows a 2022 trans-agency meeting titled, "Overlapping Science in Radiation and Sulfur Mustard Exposures of Skin and Lung: Consideration of Models, Mechanisms, Organ Systems, and Medical Countermeasures," sponsored by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), a part of the National Institutes of Health (NIH). Discussions from this meeting explored the overlapping nature of radiation and chemical injury and spurred increased interest in how preparedness for one threat leads to preparedness for the other. Herein, subject matter experts from the NIAID and the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA), a part of the Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response (ASPR), summarize the knowledge gained from recently funded biomedical research, as well as insights from the 2022 meeting. These topics include identification of common areas for collaboration, potential use of biomarkers of injury to identify injuries caused by both hazards, and common and widely available treatments that could treat damage caused by radiological or chemical threats.

A decision support system to reorganize medical service network in pandemic

The advent of the Covid-19 pandemic has posed severe challenges to health care networks in various countries. The overcrowding of hospitals and the lack of medical staff and beds in multiple wards are among the main problems of governments. A new virus wave also exacerbates these problems. Also, the lack of information and the variability of the incidence rate and severity of the disease in different waves make it difficult to estimate the number of patients accurately. In this respect, this study develops a mixed-integer linear programming model to reorganize the medical service network. A fuzzy approach is employed to estimate the number of patients in each period. The result obtained from the model, apart from preventing the shortage of hospital beds, demonstrates a 60% reduction in visits to these centers.

Hospital Staffing during the COVID-19 Pandemic in Sweden

Staff management challenges in the healthcare system are inherently different during pandemic conditions than under normal circumstances. Surge capacity must be rapidly increased, particularly in the intensive care units (ICU), to handle the increased pressure, without depleting the rest of the system. In addition, sickness or fatigue among the staff can become a critical issue. This study explores the lessons learned by first- and second-line managers in Sweden with regard to staff management during the COVID-19 pandemic. A mixed-methods approach was used, with preliminary qualitative interview (n = 38) and principal quantitative questionnaire (n = 272) studies, based on principal component and multiple regression analyses. The results revealed that the pandemic created four types of challenges relating to staff management: staff movement within hospitals; addition of external staff; addition of hours for existing staff through overtime and new shift schedules; and avoidance of lost hours due to sickness or fatigue. Furthermore, the effects of these managerial challenges were different in the first wave than in later waves, and they significantly differed between the ICU and other units. Therefore, a greater proactive focus on staff management would be beneficial in future pandemic situations.

Disaster Preparedness: Hospital Pharmacy Strategy for Prioritized Inventory Management and Drug Procurement on Vancouver Island

Disaster events can increase demand for medication supplies and interfere with supply chains, leading to compromised care in hospitals. Providing an organized response to an additional surge of disaster-related patients requires pre-planned emergency management procedures. Hospital pharmacists can address this with prioritized drug procurement and inventory management strategies which may improve the availability of key medications for a disaster response. Previous disaster events have provided insight on medications used to treat disaster-related injuries and exacerbations of medical conditions in emergency departments. This article provides a detailed description of Vancouver Island's hospital pharmacy strategy for the procurement and minimum stock levels of high priority medications in preparation for a disaster.

United States medical preparedness for nuclear and radiological emergencies

With the end of the Cold War in 1991, U.S. Government (USG) investments in radiation science and medical preparedness were phased out; however, the events of 11 September, which involved a terroristic attack on American soil, led to the re-establishment of funding for both radiation preparedness and development of approaches to address injuries. Similar activities have also been instituted worldwide, as the global threat of a radiological or nuclear incident continues to be a concern. Much of the USG's efforts to plan for the unthinkable have centred on establishing clear lines of communication between agencies with responsibility for triage and medical response, and external stakeholders. There have also been strong connections made between those parts of the government that establish policies, fund research, oversee regulatory approval, and purchase and stockpile necessary medical supplies. Progress made in advancing preparedness has involved a number of subject matter meetings and tabletop exercises, publication of guidance documents, assessment of available resources, clear establishment of anticipated concepts of operation for multiple radiation and nuclear scenarios, and identification/mobilization of resources. From a scientific perspective, there were clear research gaps that needed to be addressed, which included the need to identify accurate biomarkers and design biodosimetry devices to triage large numbers of civilians, develop decorporation agents that are more amenable for mass casualty use, and advance candidate products to address injuries caused by radiation exposure and thereby improve survival. Central to all these activities was the development of several different animal constructs, since efficacy testing of these approaches requires extensive work in research models that accurately simulate what would be expected in humans. Recent experiences with COVID-19 have provided an opportunity to revisit aspects of radiation preparedness, and leverage those lessons learned to enhance readiness for a possible future radiation public health emergency.

Scientific research and product development in the United States to address injuries from a radiation public health emergency

The USA has experienced one large-scale nuclear incident in its history. Lessons learned during the Three-Mile Island nuclear accident provided government planners with insight into property damage resulting from a low-level release of radiation, and an awareness concerning how to prepare for future occurrences. However, if there is an incident resulting from detonation of an improvised nuclear device or state-sponsored device/weapon, resulting casualties and the need for medical treatment could overwhelm the nation's public health system. After the Cold War ended, government investments in radiation preparedness declined; however, the attacks on 9/11 led to re-establishment of research programs to plan for the possibility of a nuclear incident. Funding began in earnest in 2004, to address unmet research needs for radiation biomarkers, devices and products to triage and treat potentially large numbers of injured civilians. There are many biodosimetry approaches and medical countermeasures (MCMs) under study and in advanced development, including those to address radiation-induced injuries to organ systems including bone marrow, the gastrointestinal (GI) tract, lungs, skin, vasculature and kidneys. Biomarkers of interest in determining level of radiation exposure and susceptibility of injury include cytogenetic changes, 'omics' technologies and other approaches. Four drugs have been approved by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for the treatment of acute radiation syndrome (ARS), with other licensures being sought; however, there are still no cleared devices to identify radiation-exposed individuals in need of treatment. Although many breakthroughs have been made in the efforts to expand availability of medical products, there is still work to be done.

Disaster preparedness and response capacity of regional hospitals in Tanzania: a descriptive cross-sectional study

Background

Tanzania has witnessed several disasters in the past decade, which resulted in substantial mortality, long-term morbidity, and significant socio-economic losses. Health care facilities and personnel are critical to disaster response. We assessed the current state of disaster preparedness and response capacity among Tanzanian regional hospitals.

Methods

This descriptive cross-sectional survey was conducted in all Tanzanian regional hospitals between May 2012 and December 2012. Data were prospectively collected using a structured questionnaire based on the World Health Organization National Health Sector Emergency Preparedness and Response Tool. Trained medical doctors conducted structured interviews and direct observations in each hospital.

Results

We surveyed 25 regional hospitals (100% capture) in mainland Tanzania, in which interviews were conducted with 13-hospital doctors incharge, 9 matrons and 4 heads of casualty. All the hospitals were found to have inadequate numbers of all cadres of health care providers to support effective disaster response. 92% of hospitals reported experiencing a disaster in the past 5 years; with the top three being large motor vehicle accidents 22 (87%), floods 7 (26%) and infectious disease outbreaks 6 (22%). Fifteen hospitals (60%) had a disaster committee, but only five (20%) had a disaster plan. No hospital had all components of surge capacity. Although all had electricity and back-up generators, only 3 (12%) had a back-up communication system.

Conclusion

This nationwide survey found that hospital disaster preparedness is at an early stage of development in Tanzania, and important opportunities exist to better prepare regional hospitals to respond to disasters.

Surge capacity principles: care of the critically ill and injured during pandemics and disasters: CHEST consensus statement

BACKGROUND

This article provides consensus suggestions for expanding critical care surge capacity and extension of critical care service capabilities in disasters or pandemics. It focuses on the principles and frameworks for expansion of intensive care services in hospitals in the developed world. A companion article addresses surge logistics, those elements that provide the capability to deliver mass critical care in disaster events. The suggestions in this article are important for all who are involved in large-scale disasters or pandemics with injured or critically ill multiple patients, including front-line clinicians, hospital administrators, and public health or government officials.

METHODS

The Surge Capacity topic panel developed 23 key questions focused on the following domains: systems issues; equipment, supplies, and pharmaceuticals; staffing; and informatics. Literature searches were conducted to identify evidence on which to base key suggestions. Most reports were small scale, were observational, or used flawed modeling; hence, the level of evidence on which to base recommendations was poor and did not permit the development of evidence-based recommendations. Therefore, the panel developed expert opinion-based suggestions using a modified Delphi process. Suggestions from the previous task force were also included for validation by the expert panel.

RESULTS

This article presents 10 suggestions pertaining to the principles that should guide surge capacity and capability planning for mass critical care, including the role of critical care in disaster planning; the surge continuum; targets of surge response; situational awareness and information sharing; mitigating the impact on critical care; planning for the care of special populations; and service deescalation/cessation (also considered as engineered failure).

CONCLUSIONS

Future reports on critical care surge should emphasize population-based outcomes as well as logistical details. Planning should be based on the projected number of critically ill or injured patients resulting from specific scenarios. This should include a consideration of ICU patient care requirements over time and must factor in resource constraints that may limit the ability to provide care. Standard ICU management forms and patient data forms to assess ICU surge capacity impacts should be created and used in disaster events.

Primary healthcare system capacities for responding to storm and flood-related health problems: a case study from a rural district in central Vietnam

BACKGROUND

As a tropical depression in the East Sea, Vietnam is greatly affected by climate change and natural disasters. Knowledge of the current capacity of the primary healthcare system in Vietnam to respond to health issues associated with storms and floods is very important for policy making in the country. However, there has been little scientific research in this area.

OBJECTIVE

This research was to assess primary healthcare system capacities in a rural district in central Vietnam to respond to such health issues.

DESIGN

This was a cross-sectional descriptive study using quantitative and qualitative approaches. Quantitative methods used self-administered questionnaires. Qualitative methods (in-depth interviews and focus groups discussions) were used to broaden understanding of the quantitative material and to get additional information on actions taken.

RESULTS

1) Service delivery: Medical emergency services, especially surgical operations and referral systems, were not always available during the storm and flood seasons. 2) Governance: District emergency plans focus largely on disaster response rather than prevention. The plans did not clearly define the role of primary healthcare and had no clear information on the coordination mechanism among different sectors and organizations. 3) Financing: The budget for prevention and control of flood and storm activities was limited and had no specific items for healthcare activities. Only a little additional funding was available, but the procedures to get this funding were usually time-consuming. 4) Human resources: Medical rescue teams were established, but there were no epidemiologists or environmental health specialists to take care of epidemiological issues. Training on prevention and control of climate change and disaster-related health issues did not meet actual needs. 5) Information and research: Data that can be used for planning and management (including population and epidemiological data) were largely lacking. The district lacked a disease early-warning system. 6) Medical products and technology: Emergency treatment protocols were not available in every studied health facility.

CONCLUSIONS

The primary care system capacity in rural Vietnam is inadequate for responding to storm and flood-related health problems in terms of preventive and treatment healthcare. Developing clear facility preparedness plans, which detail standard operating procedures during floods and identify specific job descriptions, would strengthen responses to future floods. Health facilities should have contingency funds available for emergency response in the event of storms and floods. Health facilities should ensure that standard protocols exist in order to improve responses in the event of floods. Introduction of a computerized health information system would accelerate information and data processing. National and local policies need to be strengthened and developed in a way that transfers into action in local rural communities.

Critical resources for hospital surge capacity: an expert consensus panel

Background: Hospital surge capacity (HSC) is dependent on the ability to increase or conserve resources. The hospital surge model put forth by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) estimates the resources needed by hospitals to treat casualties resulting from 13 national planning scenarios. However, emergency planners need to know which hospital resource are most critical in order to develop a more accurate plan for HSC in the event of a disaster. Objective: To identify critical hospital resources required in four specific catastrophic scenarios; namely, pandemic influenza, radiation, explosive, and nerve gas. Methods: We convened an expert consensus panel comprised of 23 participants representing health providers (i.e., nurses and physicians), administrators, emergency planners, and specialists. Four disaster scenarios were examined by the panel. Participants were divided into 4 groups of five or six members, each of which were assigned two of four scenarios. They were asked to consider 132 hospital patient care resources- extracted from the AHRQ's hospital surge model- in order to identify the ones that would be critical in their opinion to patient care. The definition for a critical hospital resource was the following: absence of the resource is likely to have a major impact on patient outcomes, i.e., high likelihood of untoward event, possibly death. For items with any disagreement in ranking, we conducted a facilitated discussion (modified Delphi technique) until consensus was reached, which was defined as more than 50% agreement. Intraclass Correlation Coefficients (ICC) were calculated for each scenario, and across all scenarios as a measure of participant agreement on critical resources. For the critical resources common to all scenarios, Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to measure the distribution of scores across all scenarios. Results: Of the 132 hospital resources, 25 were considered critical for all four scenarios by more than 50% of the participants. The number of hospital resources considered to be critical by consensus varied from one scenario to another; 58 for the pandemic influenza scenario, 51 for radiation exposure, 41 for explosives, and 35 for nerve gas scenario. Intravenous crystalloid solution was the only resource ranked by all participants as critical across all scenarios. The agreement in ranking was strong in nerve agent and pandemic influenza (ICC= 0.7 in both), and moderate in explosives (ICC= 0.6) and radiation (ICC= 0.5). Conclusion: In four disaster scenarios, namely, radiation, pandemic influenza, explosives, and nerve gas scenarios; supply of as few as 25 common resources may be considered critical to hospital surge capacity. The absence of any these resources may compromise patient care. More studies are needed to identify critical hospital resources in other disaster scenarios.

Refining Surge Capacity: Conventional, Contingency, and Crisis Capacity

Health care facility surge capacity has received significant planning attention recently, but there is no commonly accepted framework for detailed, phased surge capacity categorization and implementation. This article proposes a taxonomy within surge capacity of conventional capacity (implemented in major mass casualty incidents and representing care as usually provided at the institution), contingency capacity (using adaptations to medical care spaces, staffing constraints, and supply shortages without significant impact on delivered medical care), and crisis capacity (implemented in catastrophic situations with a significant impact on standard of care). Suggested measurements used to gauge a quantifiable component of surge capacity and adaptive strategies for staff and supply challenges are proposed. The use of refined definitions of surge capacity as it relates to space, staffing, and supply concerns during a mass casualty incident may aid phased implementation of surge capacity plans at health care facilities and enhance the consistency of terminology and data collection between facilities and regions. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 1):S59–S67)

Health systems' "surge capacity": state of the art and priorities for future research

CONTEXT

Over the past decade, a number of high-impact natural hazard events, together with the increased recognition of pandemic risks, have intensified interest in health systems' ability to prepare for, and cope with, "surges" (sudden large-scale escalations) in treatment needs. In this article, we identify key concepts and components associated with this emerging research theme. We consider the requirements for a standardized conceptual framework for future research capable of informing policy to reduce the morbidity and mortality impacts of such incidents. Here our objective is to appraise the consistency and utility of existing conceptualizations of health systems' surge capacity and their components, with a view to standardizing concepts and measurements to enable future research to generate a cumulative knowledge base for policy and practice.

METHODS

A systematic review of the literature on concepts of health systems' surge capacity, with a narrative summary of key concepts relevant to public health.

FINDINGS

The academic literature on surge capacity demonstrates considerable variation in its conceptualization, terms, definitions, and applications. This, together with an absence of detailed and comparable data, has hampered efforts to develop standardized conceptual models, measurements, and metrics. Some degree of consensus is evident for the components of surge capacity, but more work is needed to integrate them. The overwhelming concentration in the United States complicates the generalizability of existing approaches and findings.

CONCLUSIONS

The concept of surge capacity is a useful addition to the study of health systems' disaster and/or pandemic planning, mitigation, and response, and it has far-reaching policy implications. Even though research in this area has grown quickly, it has yet to fulfill its potential to generate knowledge to inform policy. Work is needed to generate robust conceptual and analytical frameworks, along with innovations in data collection and methodological approaches that enhance health systems' readiness for, and response to, unpredictable high-consequence surges in demand.

Pandemic influenza: implications for preparation and delivery of critical care services

In a 5-week span during the 1918 influenza A pandemic, more than 2000 patients were admitted to Cook County Hospital in Chicago, with a diagnosis of either influenza or pneumonia; 642 patients, approximately 31% of those admitted, died, with deaths occurring predominantly in patients of age 25 to 30 years. This review summarizes basic information on the biology, epidemiology, control, treatment and prevention of influenza overall, and then addresses the potential impact of pandemic influenza in an intensive care unit setting. Issues that require consideration include workforce staffing and safety, resource management, alternate sites of care surge of patients, altered standards of care, and crisis communication.

Developing a global health diplomacy supply chain--a viable option for the United States to curb extremism

This study examines the idea of developing a global health diplomacy supply chain as an important foreign policy approach with the aim of improving the lives of vulnerable populations and serving the best interests of the United States. The study was based on the review of academic literature, news events, and military communiques, and historical writings were studied to determine the feasibility of the idea and the extent of costs and benefits of such an endeavor. An integrated strategic business model, supported by a medical care delivery process, was developed to create a framework for a feasible global health diplomacy supply chain. The findings indicate that extremism can be contained by creating and efficiently executing an effective supply chain to get medical care units to those that need them. The limitations are the potential exit strategies required, the tactical abilities, and diplomatic techniques needed in order to create positive diplomatic change in aid distribution. Managers must consider how supply chains will affect other organizations giving aid and the potential public response. Moreover, determining the level of care necessary to achieve the greatest positive health diplomacy continues to require vigilant scrutiny over the potential cost/benefit analysis. The analysis is valuable to policymakers considering the impacts of health diplomacy by utilizing supply chain management.

Definitive care for the critically ill during a disaster: current capabilities and limitations: from a Task Force for Mass Critical Care summit meeting, January 26-27, 2007, Chicago, IL

In the twentieth century, rarely have mass casualty events yielded hundreds or thousands of critically ill patients requiring definitive critical care. However, future catastrophic natural disasters, epidemics or pandemics, nuclear device detonations, or large chemical exposures may change usual disaster epidemiology and require a large critical care response. This article reviews the existing state of emergency preparedness for mass critical illness and presents an analysis of limitations to support the suggestions of the Task Force on Mass Casualty Critical Care, which are presented in subsequent articles. Baseline shortages of specialized resources such as critical care staff, medical supplies, and treatment spaces are likely to limit the number of critically ill victims who can receive life-sustaining interventions. The deficiency in critical care surge capacity is exacerbated by lack of a sufficient framework to integrate critical care within the overall institutional response and coordination of critical care across local institutions and broader geographic areas.