Partial blindness: Visual experience is not rich, but not sparse

Is our perceptual experience constrained by an information bottleneck (i.e., the limited capacity for cognitive access), and if so, how? To answer these questions, we investigated observers' perceptual resolution for an individual face when they saw either a single face or multiple faces simultaneously. We characterized perceptual resolution by measuring how accurately observers detected the degradation of a face. In two experiments, we found that the resolution of perception decreased when seeing multiple faces compared to when seeing a single face, which mainly resulted from the neglect of degradation. Importantly, this degradation neglect was based on partial blindness rather than complete blindness to a face, indicating that perceptual experience is limited by an information bottleneck as a form of partial blindness to an individual item. Together, our findings suggest that perceptual experience at a glance might be sparser than retinal resolution or perceptual resolution measured under conditions where the target stimulus is the sole focus of attention; however, it might be richer than a small handful of items.

Peripheral vision is mainly for looking rather than seeing

Vision includes looking and seeing. Looking, mainly via gaze shifts, selects a fraction of visual input information for passage through the brain's information bottleneck. The selected input is placed within the attentional spotlight, typically in the central visual field. Seeing decodes, i.e., recognizes and discriminates, the selected inputs. Hence, peripheral vision should be mainly devoted to looking, in particular, deciding where to shift the gaze. Looking is often guided exogenously by a saliency map created by the primary visual cortex (V1), and can be effective with no seeing and limited awareness. In seeing, peripheral vision not only suffers from poor spatial resolution, but is also subject to crowding and is more vulnerable to illusions by misleading, ambiguous, and impoverished visual inputs. Central vision, mainly for seeing, enjoys the top-down feedback that aids seeing in light of the bottleneck which is hypothesized to starts from V1 to higher areas. This feedback queries for additional information from lower visual cortical areas such as V1 for ongoing recognition. Peripheral vision is deficient in this feedback according to the Central-peripheral Dichotomy (CPD) theory. The saccades engendered by peripheral vision allows looking to combine with seeing to give human observers the impression of seeing the whole scene clearly despite inattentional blindness.

Thematic Contents of Mental Imagery are Shaped by Concurrent Task-Irrelevant Music

Imagination plays a key role in evidence-based, cognitive therapies, and recent research highlights that music - a perceptual stimulus imbued with affective and social meaning - can influence some aspects of imagination, such as vividness and emotional tone. However, little is known about music's capability to facilitate specific imagery themes that may be relevant for therapy. Here, we examine whether the quantity and quality (related to themes of affect, social dynamics, and confidence) of people's imagery is affected by the presence of task-irrelevant background music. One hundred participants imagined the continuation of a figure's journey while listening to different musical excerpts or silence. Written reports of imagined journeys underwent linguistic analysis to reveal the number of words belonging to the themes of interest. Bayesian Mixed Effects models revealed that music (vs. silence) led to longer reports and predicted imagery characterised by affect, social dynamics, and confidence. Implications for therapy are discussed.

Processing of complex morphosyntactic structures in French: ERP evidence from native speakers

This event-related brain potentials (ERP) study investigated the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying the auditory processing of verbal complexity in French illustrated by the prescriptive present subjunctive mode. Using a violation paradigm, ERPs of 32 French native speakers were continuously recorded while they listened to 200 ecological French sentences selected from the INTEFRA oral corpus (2006). Participants performed an offline acceptability judgement task on each sentence, half of which contained a correct present subjunctive verbal agreement (reçoive) and the other half an incorrect present indicative one (peut). Critically, the present subjunctive mode was triggered either by verbs (Ma mère desire que j'apprenneMy mother wants me to learn) or by subordinating conjunctions (Pour qu'elle reçoiveSo that she receives). We found a delayed anterior negativity (AN) due to the length of the verbal forms and a P600 that were larger for incongruent than for congruent verbal agreement in the same time window. While the two effects were left lateralized for subordinating conjunctions, they were right lateralized for both structures with a larger effect for subordinating conjunctions than for verbs. Moreover, our data revealed that the AN/P600 pattern was larger in late position than in early ones. Taken together, these results suggest that morphosyntactic complexity conveyed by the French subjunctive involves at least two neurocognitive processes thought to support an initial morphosyntactic analysis (AN) and a syntactic revision and repair (posterior P600). These two processes may be modulated as a function of both the element (i.e., subordinating conjunction vs verb) that triggers the subjunctive mode and the moment at which this element is used while sentence processing.

The Subjunctive as a Model of Grammatical Complexity: An Integrative Review of Issues Based on Combined Evidence from Mental Chronometry and Neurosciences

The acquisition of a second language requires the construction or reconstruction of linguistic knowledge about the new language system. Learners of a second language have to acquire the linguistic structures of the second language by constructing or reassessing their own knowledge in the light of the new one. Some of these new linguistic structures may be more or less complex to process and/or difficult to acquire. In this review, we focus on an example of linguistic complexity in French, namely, the subjunctive. Through a discussion of some selected studies on the second language acquisition of the French subjunctive, our purpose is to argue that these findings, considered from a psycholinguistic perspective, could be fruitful for further research employing neuroscience techniques, such as electroencephalography or neuroimaging in order to better understand the neurocognitive processing of this complex structure both in French native speakers and in learners of French. Hence, we aim to contribute to exploring the question of linguistic transfer in the field of second language acquisition, the typological distance/relation between L1-L2, the syntactic acquisition of complex structures in adult second language learners, and the potential contributions of electroencephalography and functional magnetic resonance imaging to the processing of the subjunctive, selected as an example of linguistic complexity that has not yet received much attention.

The Action Cycle Theory of Perception and Mental Imagery

The Action Cycle Theory (ACT) is an enactive theory of the perception and a mental imagery system that is comprised of six modules: Schemata, Objects, Actions, Affect, Goals and Others' Behavior. The evidence supporting these six connected modules is reviewed in light of research on mental imagery vividness. The six modules and their interconnections receive empirical support from a wide range of studies. All six modules of perception and mental imagery are influenced by individual differences in vividness. Real-world applications of ACT show interesting potential to improve human wellbeing in both healthy people and patients. Mental imagery can be applied in creative ways to make new collective goals and actions for change that are necessary to maximize the future prospects of the planet.

Effects of Differing Exercise Intensities on the Response Time of Gymnasts and Nongymnasts in a Mental Body Rotation Task

The purpose of the present study was to examine the effect of different levels of exercise intensity on mental rotation performance in gymnasts versus nongymnasts. A group of elite gymnasts and a group of nongymnasts performed a mental body rotation task at rest and then performed the same task preceded by short bouts of intense exercise at 60%, 80%, 100%, and 120% of their maximum aerobic speed. The analyses of response times showed that gymnasts performed the mental rotation task faster after bouts of intense exercise than in rest condition, but nongymnasts performed equally in rest and after exercise. This finding highlights the specific physical expertise as a variable that can affect the influence of exercise on cognitive processing.

Visual mental imagery engages the left fusiform gyrus, but not the early visual cortex: A meta-analysis of neuroimaging evidence

The dominant neural model of visual mental imagery (VMI) stipulates that memories from the medial temporal lobe acquire sensory features in early visual areas. However, neurological patients with damage restricted to the occipital cortex typically show perfectly vivid VMI, while more anterior damages extending into the temporal lobe, especially in the left hemisphere, often cause VMI impairments. Here we present two major results reconciling neuroimaging findings in neurotypical subjects with the performance of brain-damaged patients: (1) A large-scale meta-analysis of 46 fMRI studies, of which 27 investigated specifically visual mental imagery, revealed that VMI engages fronto-parietal networks and a well-delimited region in the left fusiform gyrus. (2) A Bayesian analysis showed no evidence for imagery-related activity in early visual cortices. We propose a revised neural model of VMI that draws inspiration from recent cytoarchitectonic and lesion studies, whereby fronto-parietal networks initiate, modulate, and maintain activity in a core temporal network centered on the fusiform imagery node, a high-level visual region in the left fusiform gyrus.

Effect of task complexity on ipsilateral motor response programming to physically presented and imagined stimuli

It is unclear whether task representation generated in imagery simulates performance demands in reacting to stimuli. This study investigated whether perceptual and motor control processes used to react to unpredictable stimuli and initiate an ipsilateral movement were replicated during imagery. Fifty-nine undergraduate students (M_age = 27.01 years, SD = 8.30) completed 30 simple, two-choice congruent and two-choice incongruent ipsilateral finger-foot movement trials in response to a physically presented or imagined stimulus. The results appear to indicate that participants were reacting to imagined and actual stimuli, as the ipsilateral finger-foot programming rule was maintained and reaction time initially slowed as task difficulty increased. These findings support theoretical similarities between imagery and physical performance of reaction tasks, with imagers generating and reacting to unpredictable stimuli. Slower imagery performance than physical performance on the two-choice incongruent task may indicate that task complexity is limited during imagery. Variation in results between the imagery and physical conditions potentially supports that imagers were able to react to the imagined stimulus. However, exploratory processes used to react to stimuli were not replicated during imagery. The present findings have potentially significant implications for the functional and applied use of imagery for skill acquisition.

Is Visual Creativity Embodied? Thinking Aloud While Performing the Creative Mental Synthesis Task

Over time, the view that creativity is embodied has emerged. In order to explore if visual creativity is supported by embodied mechanisms, the simulation approach was used as a framework of reference. The idea that visual creativity relies on mental representations that implement motor processes was faced. Participants were instructed to think aloud while carrying out the Creative Mental Synthesis Task, which allows to form pre-inventive structures and interpret them according to a specific category. Two independent judges scored verbal protocols in terms of the number of motor, spatial, and visual thoughts reported during the pre-inventive and inventive phases, and also evaluated the final objects according to originality and appropriateness. Originality was predicted positively by inventive motor thoughts and by pre-inventive spatial thoughts, but negatively by inventive spatial thoughts; appropriateness was only predicted by inventive visual thoughts. These results suggest that actions for future object utilization were simulated while interpreting pre-inventive structures, increasing originality of objects. In addition, spatial transformations are useful to construct the pre-inventive structures, but not to interpret them. Yet, thinking of the pictorial details of the object is also essential to classify it in a given category. Limitations and future research directions are discussed.

Reinterpretation in visual imagery is possible without visual cues: a validation of previous research

Is visual reinterpretation of bistable figures (e.g., duck/rabbit figure) in visual imagery possible? Current consensus suggests that it is in principle possible because of converging evidence of quasi-pictorial functioning of visual imagery. Yet, studies that have directly tested and found evidence for reinterpretation in visual imagery, allow for the possibility that reinterpretation was already achieved during memorization of the figure(s). One study resolved this issue, providing evidence for reinterpretation in visual imagery (Mast and Kosslyn, Cognition 86:57-70, 2002). However, participants in that study performed reinterpretations with aid of visual cues. Hence, reinterpretation was not performed with mental imagery alone. Therefore, in this study we assessed the possibility of reinterpretation without visual support. We further explored the possible role of haptic cues to assess the multimodal nature of mental imagery. Fifty-three participants were consecutively presented three to be remembered bistable 2-D figures (reinterpretable when rotated 180°), two of which were visually inspected and one was explored hapticly. After memorization of the figures, a visually bistable exemplar figure was presented to ensure understanding of the concept of visual bistability. During recall, 11 participants (out of 36; 30.6%) who did not spot bistability during memorization successfully performed reinterpretations when instructed to mentally rotate their visual image, but additional haptic cues during mental imagery did not inflate reinterpretation ability. This study validates previous findings that reinterpretation in visual imagery is possible.

The role of gesture as simulated action in reinterpretation of mental imagery

In two experiments, we examined the role of gesture in reinterpreting a mental image. In Experiment 1, we found that participants gestured more about a figure they had learned through manual exploration than about a figure they had learned through vision. This supports claims that gestures emerge from the activation of perception-relevant actions during mental imagery. In Experiment 2, we investigated whether such gestures have a causal role in affecting the quality of mental imagery. Participants were randomly assigned to gesture, not gesture, or engage in a manual interference task as they attempted to reinterpret a figure they had learned through manual exploration. We found that manual interference significantly impaired participants' success on the task. Taken together, these results suggest that gestures reflect mental imaginings of interactions with a mental image and that these imaginings are critically important for mental manipulation and reinterpretation of that image. However, our results suggest that enacting the imagined movements in gesture is not critically important on this particular task.

The format of mental imagery: from a critical review to an integrated embodied representation approach

The issue of the format of mental imagery is still an open debate. The classical analogue (depictive)-propositional (descriptive) debate has not provided definitive conclusions. Over the years, the debate has shifted within the frame of the embodied cognition approach, which focuses on the interdependence of perception, cognition and action. Although the simulation approach still retains the concept of representation, the more radical line of the embodied cognition approach emphasizes the importance of action and clearly disregards the concept of representation. In particular, the enactive approach focuses on motor procedures that allow the body to interact with the environment, whereas the sensorimotor approach focuses on the possession and exercise of sensorimotor knowledge about how the sensory input changes as a function of movement. In this review, the embodied approaches are presented and critically discussed. Then, in an attempt to show that the format of mental imagery varies according to the ability and the strategy used to represent information, the role of individual differences in imagery ability (e.g., vividness and expertise) and imagery strategy (e.g., object vs. spatial imagers) is reviewed. Since vividness is mainly associated with perceptual information, reflecting the activation level of specific imagery systems, whereas the preferred strategy used is mainly associated with perceptual (e.g., object imagery) or amodal and motor information (e.g., spatial imagery), the format of mental imagery appears to be based on dynamic embodied representations, depending on imagery abilities and imagery strategies.

Reconstructing imagined letters from early visual cortex reveals tight topographic correspondence between visual mental imagery and perception

Visual mental imagery is the quasi-perceptual experience of “seeing in the mind’s eye”. While a tight correspondence between imagery and perception in terms of subjective experience is well established, their correspondence in terms of neural representations remains insufficiently understood. In the present study, we exploit the high spatial resolution of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) at 7T, the retinotopic organization of early visual cortex, and machine-learning techniques to investigate whether visual imagery of letter shapes preserves the topographic organization of perceived shapes. Sub-millimeter resolution fMRI images were obtained from early visual cortex in six subjects performing visual imagery of four different letter shapes. Predictions of imagery voxel activation patterns based on a population receptive field-encoding model and physical letter stimuli provided first evidence in favor of detailed topographic organization. Subsequent visual field reconstructions of imagery data based on the inversion of the encoding model further showed that visual imagery preserves the geometric profile of letter shapes. These results open new avenues for decoding, as we show that a denoising autoencoder can be used to pretrain a classifier purely based on perceptual data before fine-tuning it on imagery data. Finally, we show that the autoencoder can project imagery-related voxel activations onto their perceptual counterpart allowing for visually recognizable reconstructions even at the single-trial level. The latter may eventually be utilized for the development of content-based BCI letter-speller systems.

Why and how access consciousness can account for phenomenal consciousness

According to a popular distinction proposed by the philosopher Ned Block in 1995, our conscious experience would overflow the very limited set of what we can consciously report to ourselves and to others. He proposed to coin this limited consciousness 'Access Consciousness' (A-Cs) and to define 'Phenomenal Consciousness' as a much richer subjective experience that is not accessed but that would still delineate the extent of consciousness. In this article, I review and develop five major problems raised by this theory, and show how a strict A-Cs theory can account for our conscious experience. I illustrate such an A-Cs account within the global workspace (GW) theoretical framework, and revisit some seminal empirical findings and neuropsychological syndromes. In this strict A-Cs perspective, subjective reports are not conceived as the mere passive broadcasting of information to the GW, but as resulting from a dynamic and active chain of internal processes that notably include interpretative and belief attribution stages. Finally, I list a set of testable predictions, of unsolved questions and of some counterintuitive hypotheses.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

Employee imagination and implications for entrepreneurs

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to examine employee imagination and implications for entrepreneurs of China. In 2015, the European Group of Organization Studies released a call for papers highlighting poor knowledge of employee imagination in organizations. To address this need, the current study hypothesizes employee imagination consisting of seven conditions common to the organizational experience of Chinese Entrepreneurs.

Design/methodology/approach

The current paper reviews the Chinese enterprising context. Cases from China are used to illustrate the effects of proposed conditions and their value for entrepreneurs and innovators in businesses undergoing change.

Findings

Employee imagination underpins and conditions how Chinese employees make sense of their organizations and better understand the process of organizational change. From the viewpoint of human resource management, emphasis on coaching and developing imagination enables businesses to stay competitive and adapt to environmental demands such as lack of information, too much information or the need for new information.

Research limitations/implications

The proposed conditions apply to the Chinese context; however, their application to wider contexts is suggested and requires attention.

Practical implications

Employee imagination was found to be a powerful tool, which facilitates the process of organizational change management.

Originality/value

Theoretically, the research adds new insights to knowledge of a poorly understood organizational behavior topic – employee imagination. Practically, the research findings provide mangers with knowledge of conditions, which could be adopted as powerful tools in facilitating organizational change management.

Mental imagery boosts music compositional creativity

We empirically investigated the effect of mental imagery on young children’s music compositional creativity. Children aged 5 to 8 years participated in two music composition sessions. In the control session, participants based their composition on a motif that they had created using a sequence of letter names. In the mental imagery session, participants were given a picture of an animal and instructed to imagine the animal’s sounds and movements, before incorporating what they had imagined into their composition. Six expert judges independently rated all music compositions on creativity based on subjective criteria (consensual assessment). Reliability analyses indicated that the expert judges demonstrated a high level of agreement in their ratings. The mental imagery compositions received significantly higher creativity ratings by the expert judges than did the control compositions. These results provide evidence for the effectiveness of mental imagery in enhancing young children’s music compositional creativity.

Biting the Bullet

The idea of unconscious fantasy plays a central role in psychoanalysis. In terms of cognitive orientation, however, the logic behind it is difficult to determine because psychoanalysis has not succeeded in establishing how and where such fantasies exist. This article introduces the reasons why psychoanalysts think in terms of unconscious fantasies: the very notion facilitates the interconnection of the analysand’s patterns of behavior and her/his emerging contents of consciousness. The authors put forward arguments in favor of an instrumentalist view of unconscious fantasies, and suggest that the talk about them abstracts the functioning of the brain. In the spirit of neuropsychoanalysis, a connection is also created between the phenomena found in clinical psychoanalytic practice and the findings of neuroscience and the empirical study of implicit knowledge.

Imagination in Vico and Hobbes: From affective sensemaking to culture

Giambattista Vico and Thomas Hobbes both are known for the particular emphasis they put on the workings of imagination in human understanding. Their respective concepts of imagination are compared in this article, with attention to the sensory basis and cultural products related to this capability. The connections and contrasts established in the analysis are contextualized by the notion of affective semiosis. An affective component can be traced at the basis of the process of image creation in both authors. The primary level of human semiotic activity where the most basic differentiation and identification processes take place must describe not only in terms of sensation but also affect, imagination, and memory. The expression of these processes on the level of culture is however understood and valued differently by Vico and Hobbes. Vico sees in myth and metaphor the necessary elements of imaginative sensemaking, for Hobbes they take the role of by-products in mind’s struggle toward rationality.

Images by the vineyard: images of addiction and substance users in the media and other culture sites/sights

This article constitutes a discovery journey into the world of drinking images, the pleasures and harms related to consuming alcoholic beverages, as well as the relationships between drinking and spirituality. These aspects are described historically and globally, over time through a series of snapshots and mini-discussions about both visual and mental images from art, classical literature and operatic music.The images are interpreted according to how they represent the drinking culture within which they were created and sustained, and how they are able to involve the spectator and the user in terms of either empathizing, accepting and including or distancing, stigmatizing and marginalizing the user.

A century of imagery research: reflections on Cheves Perky's contribution to our understanding of mental imagery

We review contemporary scientific research on the relationship between visual perception and visual mental imagery in the context of Cheves Perky's (1910) landmark article on imagery and imagination. This body of research has firmly established a strong connection between the psychology of imagery and perception and has contributed a strong voice to the imagery debate. We then use the concept of embodiment to discuss additional avenues of inquiry at which Perky's work hinted. These include a more thorough examination of the relationship between imagery and emotion, the creative, active aspects of imagery and imagination, and the methods we can bring to bear on understanding imagery and imagination as a human experience.

Visual mental imagery: what the head's eye tells the mind's eye

The demonstration of an implication of attentional/eye gaze systems in visual mental imagery might help to understand why some patients with visual neglect, who suffer from severe attentional deficits, also show neglect for mental images. When normal participants generate mental images of previously explored visual scenes, their oculomotor behavior resembles that used during visual exploration. However, this could be a case of encoding specificity, whereby the probability of retrieving an event increases if some information encoded with the event (in this case its spatial location) is present at retrieval. In the present study, normal participants were invited to conjure up a mental image of the map of France and to say whether auditorily presented towns or regions were situated left or right of Paris. A perceptual version of the task was administered after the imaginal condition. Thus, in the imaginal condition participants had to retrieve information from long-term memory. Vocal response times and, unbeknownst to participants, also eye movements were recorded. Participants tended to produce similar eye movements on the imaginal and on the perceptual conditions of the task. We concluded that some mechanisms involved in spontaneous oculomotor behavior may be shared in exploration of visuospatial mental images. Deficits of these common processes participating in the oculomotor exploration might contribute to imaginal neglect.

Representation and disconnection in imaginal neglect

Patients with neglect failure to detect, orient, or respond to stimuli from a spatially confined region, usually on their left side. Often, the presence of perceptual input increases left omissions, while sensory deprivation decreases them, possibly by removing attention-catching right-sided stimuli (Bartolomeo, 2007). However, such an influence of visual deprivation on representational neglect was not observed in patients while they were imagining a map of France (Rode et al., 2007). Therefore, these patients with imaginal neglect either failed to generate the left side of mental images (Bisiach & Luzzatti, 1978), or suffered from a co-occurrence of deficits in automatic (bottom-up) and voluntary (top-down) orienting of attention. However, in Rode et al.'s experiment visual input was not directly relevant to the task; moreover, distraction from visual input might primarily manifest itself when representation guides somatomotor actions, beyond those involved in the generation and mental exploration of an internal map (Thomas, 1999). To explore these possibilities, we asked a patient with right hemisphere damage, R.D., to explore visual and imagined versions of a map of France in three conditions: (1) 'imagine the map in your mind' (imaginal); (2) 'describe a real map' (visual); and (3) 'list the names of French towns' (propositional). For the imaginal and visual conditions, verbal and manual pointing responses were collected; the task was also given before and after mental rotation of the map by 180 degrees . R.D. mentioned more towns on the right side of the map in the imaginal and visual conditions, but showed no representational deficit in the propositional condition. The rightward inner exploration bias in the imaginal and visual conditions was similar in magnitude and was not influenced by mental rotation or response type (verbal responses or manual pointing to locations on a map), thus suggesting that the representational deficit was robust and independent of perceptual input in R.D. Structural and diffusion MRI demonstrated damage to several white matter tracts in the right hemisphere and to the splenium of corpus callosum. A second right-brain damaged patient (P.P.), who showed signs of visual but not imaginal neglect, had damage to the same intra-hemispheric tracts, but the callosal connections were spared. Imaginal neglect in R.D. may result from fronto-parietal dysfunction impairing orientation towards left-sided items and posterior callosal disconnection preventing the symmetrical processing of spatial information from long-term memory.

Intrusive Memories and Modality-Specific Mental Imagery in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder

Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is characterized by vivid intrusive memories of the trauma. Among these, visual sensations of the trauma are most commonly reported. However, intrusions may involve other senses as well (e.g., acoustic, olfactory, or bodily sensations). It has been proposed that enhanced mental imagery may predispose individuals with traumatic experiences to intrusions and ultimately to PTSD. A total of 58 victims of interpersonal violence with current (n = 20), past (n = 19), and no lifetime PTSD (n = 19) as well as non-traumatized controls (n = 23) were assessed with the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) and a modality-specific imagery questionnaire. Moreover, the sensory quality of the traumatic intrusions was assessed in traumatized participants. Participants with recovered PTSD displayed less overall mental imagery than the other three groups who were indistinguishable. No relation was found between the modality-specific mental imagery and the sensory quality of the intrusions. The impact of mental imagery on intrusive memories in PTSD is complex. Less mental imagery appears beneficial in the recovery process, but does not prevent the development of intrusive symptoms in the first place. Further investigation of perceptual and memory vividness as well imagery control (i.e., to sustain, modify, or terminate an image) also including trauma-related material may be important for trauma-specific interventions.

The effects of guided imagery on comfort, depression, anxiety, and stress of psychiatric inpatients with depressive disorders

This article describes the efficacy of a guided imagery intervention for decreasing depression, anxiety, and stress and increasing comfort in psychiatric inpatients with depressive disorders. A quasi-experimental design sampled 60 short-term hospitalized depressive patients selected consecutively. The experimental group listened to a guided imagery compact disk once a day for 10 days. The Psychiatric Inpatients Comfort Scale and the Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scales (DASS-21) were self-administered at two time points: prior to the intervention (T1) and 10 days later (T2). Comfort and DASS-21 were also assessed in the usual care group at T1 and T2. Repeated measures revealed that the treatment group had significantly improved comfort and decreased depression, anxiety, and stress over time.

Structured event complexes in the medial prefrontal cortex support counterfactual representations for future planning

We propose that counterfactual representations for reasoning about the past or predicting the future depend on structured event complexes (SECs) in the human prefrontal cortex (PFC; 'What would happen if X were performed in the past or enacted in the future?'). We identify three major categories of counterfactual thought (concerning action versus inaction, the self versus other and upward versus downward thinking) and propose that each form of inference recruits SEC representations in distinct regions of the medial PFC. We develop a process model of the regulatory functions these representations serve and draw conclusions about the importance of SECs for explaining the past and predicting the future.

Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience

How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We see the problem in stark form if we ask how we can tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: Find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases--when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their authority--and look to see whether those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: Do we include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the clear cases? If the answer is "Yes," then there can be no phenomenally conscious representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know if the answer is "Yes"? The suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer! This target article argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility. I argue that we can find a neural realizer of this overflow if we assume that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that this assumption is justified (other things being equal) by the explanations it allows.