Externalities and Taxation of Supplemental Insurance: A Study of Medicare and Medigap

A welfare analysis of Medicaid and recidivism

We present conservative estimates for the marginal value of public funds (MVPF) associated with providing Medicaid to inmates exiting prison. The MVPF measures the ratio between a policy's social benefits and its governmental costs. Our MVPF estimates suggest that every additional $1 the government spends on providing inmates exiting prison with Medicaid coverage can result in social benefits ranging between $3.45 and $10.62. A large proportion of the benefits we consider stems from the reduced future criminal involvement among former inmates who receive Medicaid. Employing a difference-in-differences approach, we find that Medicaid expansions reduce the average number of times a released inmate is reimprisoned within 1 year by approximately 11.5%. By combining this estimate with key values reported elsewhere (e.g., victimization costs, data on victimization and incarceration), we quantify specific benefits arising from the policy. These encompass diminished criminal harm due to lower reoffense rates, direct benefits to former inmates through Medicaid coverage, increased employment opportunities, and reduced loss of liberty resulting from fewer future reimprisonments. Net-costs consist of the cost of providing Medicaid net of changes in the governmental cost of imprisonment, changes in the tax revenue due to increased employment, and changes in spending on other public assistance programs. We interpret our estimates as conservative since we deliberately err on the side of under-estimating benefits and over-estimating costs when data on specific items are imprecise or incomplete. Our findings align closely with others in the sparse literature investigating the crime-related welfare impacts of Medicaid access, underscoring the substantial indirect benefits public health insurance programs can offer through crime reduction, in addition to their direct health-related advantages.

Effects of private health insurance on healthcare services during the MERS Pandemic: Evidence from Korea

This study investigates how private health insurance impacted healthcare services during the MERS pandemic in Korea. Using the Korea Health Panel Study (KHPS), this study examines the difference in healthcare utilization between insured and uninsured individuals during the pandemic. If insured individuals use fewer healthcare services than the uninsured during the MERS pandemic, it could be evidence of moral hazard. During the MERS outbreak, the probability of outpatient medical services utilization was lower by 19 % than during non-pandemic periods. All individuals decreased the number of outpatient visits by 7 %. Insured individuals reduced outpatient visits more than the uninsured in response to the MERS pandemic. The increased outpatient utilization by private health insurance could be attributed to both moral hazard and adverse selection. However, given that people with poor health cannot enroll in private health insurance due to the insurance company's screening process, moral hazard leads to increase healthcare utilization rather than adverse selection.

Pricing regulations in individual health insurance: Evidence from Medigap

I compare two pricing regulations that protect those with health conditions-"community rating," which requires insurers to charge uniform premiums, and "guaranteed renewal," which requires insurers to increase future premiums uniformly. Using individual-level Medigap data from 2006-2010, I compare individuals within 25 miles of borders between 3 community rating and 6 guaranteed renewal states. Relative to guaranteed renewal, community rating (with guaranteed issue) leads to a decrease in Medigap enrollment of 9.70 pp (29.7%), or 26.8-33.7% for low-spending conditions (diabetes, heart disease) and 21.9-29.9% for high-spending conditions (cancer, kidney disease); an increase in annual Medigap premiums of $276 (10.1%); a decrease in the likelihood of an earlier purchase of 7.99 pp (50.3%); and an increase in purchase delay of 1.08 years (17.0%).

Generic Price Regulation and Drug Expenditures: Evidence From Canada

OBJECTIVES

Rapid growth in pharmaceutical spending is a major challenge in Canada. To control rising costs, the Canadian government implemented a generic pricing policy in 2013, which reduced prices for some prescription generic drugs by roughly 50%. This article explores the effects of the Canadian pricing policy on drug expenditures and drug utilization among seniors.

METHODS

Using a unique prescription claims data, this article adopts a difference-in-differences methodology to estimate the policy effects, and it further investigates the mechanisms by exploring the demand-side incentives and the role of health insurance design with a triple-difference approach.

RESULTS

Exploiting the policy variation across drugs and provinces, the results suggest that the policy has reduced drug expenditure per capita, largely because of the inelastic demand among seniors. Although the policy leads to lower out-of-pocket costs for seniors facing coinsurance than for those with a fixed copayment, individual utilization and total demand display no differences across cost sharing.

CONCLUSIONS

The price regulation in Canada was successful in reducing drug expenditures per capita. The success rests on the interaction with demand-side regulations and demand incentives. The evidence of cost containment in Canada can provide some insights to other countries with similar needs and priority.

An Empirical Model of Medicare Costs: The Role of Health Insurance, Employment, and Delays in Medicare Enrollment

Medicare is one of the largest federal social insurance programs in the United States and the secondary payer for Medicare beneficiaries covered by employer-provided health insurance (EPHI). However, an increasing number of individuals are delaying their Medicare enrollment when they first become eligible at age 65. Using administrative data from the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS), this paper estimates the effects of EPHI, employment, and delays in Medicare enrollment on Medicare costs. Given the administrative nature of the data, we are able to disentangle and estimate the Medicare as secondary payer (MSP) effect and the work effects on Medicare costs, as well as to construct delay enrollment indicators. Using Heckman’s sample selection model, we estimate that MSP and being employed are associated with a lower probability of observing positive Medicare spending and a lower level of Medicare spending. This paper quantifies annual savings of $5.37 billion from MSP and being employed. Delays in Medicare enrollment generate additional annual savings of $10.17 billion. Owing to the links between employment, health insurance coverage, and Medicare costs presented in this research, our findings may be of interest to policy makers who should take into account the consequences of reforms on the Medicare system.

Incentives to use primary care and their impact on healthcare utilization: Evidence using a public health insurance dataset in China

Large hospitals in China are overcrowded, while primary care tends to be underutilized, resulting in inefficient allocation of resources. This paper examines the impacts of a policy change in a mandatory public employee health insurance program in China designed to encourage the utilization of primary care by reducing patient cost-sharing. We use a unique administrative insurance claim dataset from the Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI) scheme between 2013 and 2015. The sample includes 40,024 individuals. We conduct an event-study analysis controlling for individual fixed effects and find that the change in cost-sharing increased primary care utilization, decreased non-primary care utilization, and increased total outpatient utilization without impacting total spending. In addition, the policy change did not affect the likelihood of having avoidable inpatient admissions. Further, patients with hypertension or diabetes increased their primary care utilization even when using additional coverage for patients with chronic diseases, the cost-sharing rates for which did not change during the period of our study, rather than their standard UEBMI benefits. This study provides evidence that changes in cost-sharing can affect healthcare utilization, suggesting that supply-side incentives can play an important role in building a primary care-based integrated healthcare delivery system in China.