Distinct neurocomputational mechanisms support informational and socially normative conformity

Co-perceiving: Bringing the social into perception

Humans and other animals possess the remarkable ability to effectively navigate a shared perceptual environment by discerning which objects and spaces are perceived by others and which remain private to themselves. Traditionally, this capacity has been encapsulated under the umbrella of joint attention or joint action. In this comprehensive review, we advocate for a broader and more mechanistic understanding of this phenomenon, termed co-perception. Co-perception encompasses the sensitivity to the perceptual engagement of others and the capability to differentiate between objects perceived privately and those perceived commonly with others. It represents a distinct concept from mere simultaneous individual perception. Moreover, discerning between private and common objects doesn't necessitate intricate mind-reading abilities or mutual coordination. The act of perceiving objects as either private or common provides a comprehensive account for social scenarios where individuals simply share the same context or may even engage in competition. This conceptual framework encourages a re-examination of classical paradigms that demonstrate social influences on perception. Furthermore, it suggests that the impacts of shared experiences extend beyond affective responses, also influencing perceptual processes. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Attention Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science Philosophy > Psychological Capacities.

Understanding the cognitive and neuroimaging bases underlying the detrimental impact of sleep deprivation on reciprocity

Although the impact of sleep loss on social behaviors has been widely observed in recent years, the mechanisms underpinning these impacts remain unclear. In this study, we explored the detrimental effects of sleep deprivation on reciprocity behavior as well as its underlying psychological and neuroimaging mechanisms by combining sleep manipulation, an interpersonal interactive game, computational modeling and neuroimaging. Our results suggested that after sleep deprivation, individuals showed reduced reciprocity behavior, mainly due to their reduced weights on communal concern when making social decisions. At neural level, we demonstrated that sleep deprivation's effects were observed in the precuneus (hyperactivity) and temporoparietal junction, dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (both hypoactivity), and reduced reciprocity was also accounted for by increased precuneus-thalamus connectivity and DLPFC-thalamus connectivity. Our findings contributed to the understanding of the psychological and neuroimaging bases underlying the deleterious impact of sleep deprivation on social behaviors.

The social transmission of empathy relies on observational reinforcement learning

Theories of moral development propose that empathy is transmitted across individuals. However, the mechanisms through which empathy is socially transmitted remain unclear. Here, we combine computational learning models and functional MRI to investigate whether, and if so, how empathic and non-empathic responses observed in others affect the empathy of female observers. The results of three independent studies showed that watching empathic or non-empathic responses generates a learning signal that respectively increases or decreases empathy ratings of the observer. A fourth study revealed that the learning-related transmission of empathy is stronger when observing human rather than computer demonstrators. Finally, we show that the social transmission of empathy alters empathy-related responses in the anterior insula, i.e., the same region that correlated with empathy baseline ratings, as well as its functional connectivity with the temporoparietal junction. Together, our findings provide a computational and neural mechanism for the social transmission of empathy that accounts for changes in individual empathic responses in empathic and non-empathic social environments.

Disentangling the contribution of individual and social learning processes in human advice-taking behavior

The study of social learning examines how individuals learn from others by means of observation, imitation, or compliance with advice. However, it still remains largely unknown whether social learning processes have a distinct contribution to behavior, independent from non-social trial-and-error learning that often occurs simultaneously. 153 participants completed a reinforcement learning task, where they were asked to make choices to gain rewards. Advice from an artificial teacher was presented in 60% of the trials, allowing us to compare choice behavior with and without advice. Results showed a strong and reliable tendency to follow advice (test-retest reliability ~0.73). Computational modeling suggested a unique contribution of three distinct learning strategies: (a) individual learning (i.e., learning the value of actions, independent of advice), (b) informed advice-taking (i.e., learning the value of following advice), and (c) non-informed advice-taking (i.e., a constant bias to follow advice regardless of outcome history). Comparing artificial and empirical data provided specific behavioral regression signatures to both informed and non-informed advice taking processes. We discuss the theoretical implications of integrating internal and external information during the learning process.

A frontopolar-temporal circuit determines the impact of social information in macaque decision making

When choosing, primates are guided not only by personal experience of objects but also by social information such as others' attitudes toward the objects. Crucially, both sources of information-personal and socially derived-vary in reliability. To choose optimally, one must sometimes override choice guidance by personal experience and follow social cues instead, and sometimes one must do the opposite. The dorsomedial frontopolar cortex (dmFPC) tracks reliability of social information and determines whether it will be attended to guide behavior. To do this, dmFPC activity enters specific patterns of interaction with a region in the mid-superior temporal sulcus (mSTS). Reversible disruption of dmFPC activity with transcranial ultrasound stimulation (TUS) led macaques to fail to be guided by social information when it was reliable but to be more likely to use it when it was unreliable. By contrast, mSTS disruption uniformly downregulated the impact of social information on behavior.

Social interoception: Perceiving events during cardiac afferent activity makes people more suggestible to other people's influence

Our judgements are often influenced by other people's views and opinions. Interoception also influences decision making, but little is known about its role in social influence and particularly, the extent to which other people may influence our decisions. Across two experiments, using different forms of social influence, participants judged the trustworthiness of faces presented either during the systolic phase of the cardiac cycle, when baroreceptors convey information from the heart to the brain, or during diastolic phase, when baroreceptors are quiescent. We quantified the extent to which participants changed their minds (as an index of social influence) following the social feedback, in order to compare two competing hypotheses. According to the Arousal-Confidence Hypothesis, cardiac signals create a context of heightened bodily arousal that increases confidence in perceptual judgements. People should, therefore, be less subject to social influence during systole. By contrast, according to the Uncertainty-Conformity Hypothesis, cardiac signals increase neural noise and sensory attenuation, such that people should display greater effects of social influence during systole, as they then underweight private interoceptive signals in favour of the external social information. Across two studies that used different kind of social interactions, we found that participants changed their minds more when faces were presented at systole. Our results, therefore, support the Uncertainly-Conformity hypothesis and highlight how cardiac afferent signals contribute to shape our social decision-making in different types of social interactions.

Causal role of a neural system for separating and selecting multidimensional social cognitive information

People are multi-faceted, typically good at some things but bad at others, and a critical aspect of social judgement is the ability to focus on those traits relevant for the task at hand. However, it remains unknown how the brain supports such context-dependent social judgement. Here, we examine how people represent multidimensional individuals, and how the brain extracts relevant information and filters out irrelevant information when comparing individuals within a specific dimension. Using human fMRI, we identify distinct neural representations in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and anterior insula (AI) supporting separation and selection of information for context-dependent social judgement. Causal evaluation using non-invasive brain stimulation shows that AI disruption alters the impact of relevant information on social comparison, whereas dmPFC disruption only affects the impact of irrelevant information. This neural circuit is distinct from the one supporting integration across, as opposed to separation of, different features of a multidimensional cognitive space.

Social value orientation modulates behavioral and neural responses to social influence

Substantial studies have investigated the social influence effect; however, how individuals with different social value orientations (SVOs), prosocials and proselfs, respond to different social influences remains unknown. This study examines the impact of positive and negative social information on the responses of people with different SVOs. A face-attractiveness assessment task was employed to investigate the relationships between influence probability, memory, and event-related potentials of social influence. A significant interactional effect suggested that prosocials and proselfs reacted differently to positive (group rating was more attractive) and negative (group rating was less attractive) social influences. Specifically, proselfs demonstrated significantly higher influence probability, marginally better recall performance, smaller N400, and larger late positive potential on receiving negative influence information than on receiving positive influence information, while prosocials showed no significant differences. Overall, correlations between N400/LPP, influence probability, and recall performance were significant. The above results indicate the modulating role of SVO when responding to social influence. These findings have important implications for understanding how people conform and how prosocial behavior occurs.

Brain Systems Underlying Fundamental Motivations of Human Social Conformity

From birth to adulthood, we often align our behaviors, attitudes, and opinions with a majority, a phenomenon known as social conformity. A seminal framework has proposed that conformity behaviors are mainly driven by three fundamental motives: a desire to gain more information to be accurate, to obtain social approval from others, and to maintain a favorable self-concept. Despite extensive interest in neuroimaging investigation of social conformity, the relationship between brain systems and these fundamental motivations has yet to be established. Here, we reviewed brain imaging findings of social conformity with a componential framework, aiming to reveal the neuropsychological substrates underlying different conformity motivations. First, information-seeking engages the evaluation of social information, information integration, and modification of task-related activity, corresponding to brain networks implicated in reward, cognitive control, and tasks at hand. Second, social acceptance involves the anticipation of social acceptance or rejection and mental state attribution, mediated by networks of reward, punishment, and mentalizing. Third, self-enhancement entails the excessive representation of positive self-related information and suppression of negative self-related information, ingroup favoritism and/or outgroup derogation, and elaborated mentalizing processes to the ingroup, supported by brain systems of reward, punishment, and mentalizing. Therefore, recent brain imaging studies have provided important insights into the fundamental motivations of social conformity in terms of component processes and brain mechanisms.

Social Influence Under Uncertainty in Interaction with Peers, Robots and Computers

Taking advice from others requires confidence in their competence. This is important for interaction with peers, but also for collaboration with social robots and artificial agents. Nonetheless, we do not always have access to information about others’ competence or performance. In these uncertain environments, do our prior beliefs about the nature and the competence of our interacting partners modulate our willingness to rely on their judgments? In a joint perceptual decision making task, participants made perceptual judgments and observed the simulated estimates of either a human participant, a social humanoid robot or a computer. Then they could modify their estimates based on this feedback. Results show participants’ belief about the nature of their partner biased their compliance with its judgments: participants were more influenced by the social robot than human and computer partners. This difference emerged strongly at the very beginning of the task and decreased with repeated exposure to empirical feedback on the partner’s responses, disclosing the role of prior beliefs in social influence under uncertainty. Furthermore, the results of our functional task suggest an important difference between human–human and human–robot interaction in the absence of overt socially relevant signal from the partner: the former is modulated by social normative mechanisms, whereas the latter is guided by purely informational mechanisms linked to the perceived competence of the partner.