A game-theoretic model of lymphatic filariasis prevention

The effect of heterogeneity of relative vaccine costs on the mean population vaccination rate with mpox as an example

Mpox (formerly known as monkeypox) is a neglected tropical disease that became notorious during its 2022-2023 worldwide outbreak. The vaccination was available, but there were inequities in vaccine access. In this paper, we extend existing game-theoretic models to study a population that is heterogeneous in the relative vaccination costs. We consider a population with two groups. We determine the Nash equilibria (NE), i.e., optimal vaccination rates, for each of the groups. We show that the NE always exists and that, for a narrow range of parameter values, there can be multiple NEs. We focus on comparing the mean optimal vaccination rate in the heterogeneous population with the optimal vaccination rate in the corresponding homogeneous population. We show that there is a critical size for the group with lower relative costs and the mean optimal vaccination in the heterogeneous population is more than in the homogeneous population if and only if the group is larger than the critical size.

A dynamic game of lymphatic filariasis prevention by voluntary use of insecticide treated nets

Lymphatic filariasis (LF) has been targeted for elimination as a public health concern by 2030 with a goal to keep the prevalence of LF infections under the 1% threshold. While mass drug administration (MDA) is a primary strategy recommended by WHO, the use of insecticide treated nets (ITN) plays a crucial role as an alternative strategy when MDA cannot be used. In this paper, we use imitation dynamics to incorporate human behavior and voluntary use of ITN into the compartmental epidemiological model of LF transmission. We find the equilibrium states of the dynamics and the ITN usage as it depends on epidemiological parameters and the cost of ITNs. We investigate the conditions under which the voluntary use of ITNs can keep the LF prevalence under the 1% threshold. We found that when the cost of using the ITNs is about 105 smaller than the perceived cost of LF, then the voluntary use of ITNs will eliminate LF as a public health concern. Furthermore, when the ITNs are given away for free, our model predicts that over 80% of the population will use them which would eliminate LF completely in regions where Anopheles are the primary vectors.

Mathematical model of voluntary vaccination against schistosomiasis

Human schistosomiasis is a chronic and debilitating neglected tropical disease caused by parasitic worms of the genus Schistosoma. It is endemic in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Although there is currently no vaccine available, vaccines are in development. In this paper, we extend a simple compartmental model of schistosomiasis transmission by incorporating the vaccination option. Unlike previous models of schistosomiasis transmission that focus on control and treatment at the population level, our model focuses on incorporating human behavior and voluntary individual vaccination. We identify vaccination rates needed to achieve herd immunity as well as optimal voluntary vaccination rates. We demonstrate that the prevalence remains too high (higher than 1%) unless the vaccination costs are sufficiently low. Thus, we can conclude that voluntary vaccination (with or without mass drug administration) may not be sufficient to eliminate schistosomiasis as a public health concern. The cost of the vaccine (relative to the cost of schistosomiasis infection) is the most important factor determining whether voluntary vaccination can yield elimination of schistosomiasis. When the cost is low, the optimal voluntary vaccination rate is high enough that the prevalence of schistosomiasis declines under 1%. Once the vaccine becomes available for public use, it will be crucial to ensure that the individuals have as cheap an access to the vaccine as possible.

Modeling the "F" in "SAFE": The dynamic game of facial cleanliness in trachoma prevention

Trachoma, a neglected tropical disease (NTDs) caused by bacterium Chlamydia trachomatis, is a leading cause of infectious blindness. Efforts are underway to eliminate trachoma as a public health problem by using the "SAFE" strategy. While mathematical models are now standard tools used to support elimination efforts and there are a variety of models studying different aspects of trachoma transmission dynamics, the "F" component of the strategy corresponding to facial cleanliness has received very little attention so far. In this paper, we incorporate human behavior into a standard epidemiological model and develop a dynamical game during which individuals practice facial cleanliness based on their epidemiological status and perceived benefits and costs. We found that the number of infectious individuals generally increases with the difficulty to access a water source. However, this increase happens only during three transition periods and the prevalence stays constant otherwise. Consequently, improving access to water can help eliminate trachoma, but the improvement needs to be significant enough to cross at least one of the three transition thresholds; otherwise the improved access will have no noticeable effect.