A dynamic game of lymphatic filariasis prevention by voluntary use of insecticide treated nets

Lymphatic filariasis (LF) has been targeted for elimination as a public health concern by 2030 with a goal to keep the prevalence of LF infections under the 1% threshold. While mass drug administration (MDA) is a primary strategy recommended by WHO, the use of insecticide treated nets (ITN) plays a crucial role as an alternative strategy when MDA cannot be used. In this paper, we use imitation dynamics to incorporate human behavior and voluntary use of ITN into the compartmental epidemiological model of LF transmission. We find the equilibrium states of the dynamics and the ITN usage as it depends on epidemiological parameters and the cost of ITNs. We investigate the conditions under which the voluntary use of ITNs can keep the LF prevalence under the 1% threshold. We found that when the cost of using the ITNs is about 105 smaller than the perceived cost of LF, then the voluntary use of ITNs will eliminate LF as a public health concern. Furthermore, when the ITNs are given away for free, our model predicts that over 80% of the population will use them which would eliminate LF completely in regions where Anopheles are the primary vectors.

Should fiscal policies be centralized in a monetary union? A dynamic game approach

In this paper we analyze dynamic interactions in a monetary union with three fiscal players (the governments of the countries concerned) and a common central bank in the presence of exogenous shocks. The model is calibrated for the euro area and includes a fiscally more solid core block denoted as country 1 as well as a fiscally less solid periphery block represented by countries 2 and 3. Introducing two periphery countries allows us to capture different attitudes of the periphery countries towards the goal of sustainable fiscal performance. Moreover, different coalition scenarios are modelled in this study including a fiscal union, a coalition of periphery countries and a coalition of fiscal-stability oriented countries. The exogenous shocks are calibrated in such a way as to describe the last major crises in the euro area, namely the financial crisis, the European sovereign debt crisis, the Covid-19 crisis, and the Ukraine war (energy price) crisis. Using the OPTGAME algorithm we calculate a cooperative Pareto and non-cooperative feedback Nash equilibrium solutions for the modelled scenarios. The fully cooperative solution yields the best results. The different non-cooperative scenarios allow insights into the underlying trade-off between economic growth, price stability and fiscal stability.

Vaccination games in prevention of infectious diseases with application to COVID-19

Vaccination coverage is crucial for disease prevention and control. An appropriate combination of compulsory vaccination with voluntary vaccination is necessary to achieve the goal of herd immunity for some epidemic diseases such as measles and COVID-19. A mathematical model is proposed that incorporates both compulsory vaccination and voluntary vaccination, where a decision of voluntary vaccination is made on the basis of game evaluation by comparing the expected returns of different strategies. It is shown that the threshold of disease invasion is determined by the reproduction numbers, and an over-response in magnitude or information interval in the dynamic games could induce periodic oscillations from the Hopf bifurcation. The theoretical results are applied to COVID-19 to find out the strategies for protective immune barrier against virus variants.

Optimal water distribution system based on water rights transaction with administrative management, marketization, and quantification of sediment transport value: A case study of the Yellow River Basin, China

Water rights transaction has proved to be an effective method for constructing an efficient water distribution system (WDS) in various regions of the Yellow River Basin (YRB). In this study, an optimal WDS in the YRB is proposed by considering the comprehensive value of water resources, administrative management system, and market-based system. To accurately quantify the comprehensive value of water resources, the work analysis method of suspended load and bedload based on the emergy theory and time-averaged motion equation is introduced, and the quantification process of sediment transport value in the river course is formulated in the YRB. Based on this, an administrative and market-based game for water rights transaction is formulated. In this double-layer game model, the administrative authorities of the basin (Yellow River Conservancy Commission) and the corresponding regions (Water Resources Department) seek to maximize their own target revenue function/comprehensive value of the water resources. Then, the optimal trading quantity of water in each region and the bargain price can be solved. A case study is presented in the YRB to verify the effectiveness of this method. The results reveal that (1) the error rate of the riverbed shear stress as well as the sediment transport rate between the theoretical value and the calculated value does not exceed 8.76%, which indicates the rationality of the calculation method of sediment transport value; (2) the proposed dynamic differential game and pricing game perform well in determining the optimal trading quantity of water in each region. They also reveal the bargain price with optimal results of ¥ 4151.1456 half yearly and ¥ 8197.3466 per year in 2018, outperforming other methodologies.

Using three-sided dynamic game model to study regional cooperative governance of haze pollution in China from a government heterogeneity perspective

This paper constructs a three-sided dynamic game model of the regional cooperative governance of haze pollution in China from a government heterogeneity perspective. By analysing the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium from game theory, this study explores the feasible mechanisms and the necessary conditions to establish a cooperative model, as well as effective ways for Superior Government to improve administrative efficiency. As evidenced in the results, due to the heterogeneity of governments and "free-riding" behaviours, a stable cooperative model cannot be spontaneously generated between two heterogeneous local governments, so the Superior Government is compelled to supervise the two parties and punish the non-cooperative ones. At the same time, the Superior Government can improve the efficiency of the supervision mechanism by increasing the penalty for non-cooperative parties and reducing the conflict cost when local governments are non-cooperative. The biggest innovation of this paper is to describe efficiency from the perspective of probability. The probability is calculated by the ratio of input to output. If the output-stable cooperation between local governments-is constant, then the less input-the cost of supervision, the higher the efficiency of the mechanism.

Neurons and astrocytes interaction in neuronal network: A game-theoretic approach

A neuron is the fundamental unit of the nervous system and the brain, crucial for transducing information in form of trains of electrical pulses known as action potentials. The connection between neurons is through synapses, enabling communication between neurons. This communication link is one of the key elements in processing of information from a neuron to another neuron. The strength of the synapses may vary over time, a phenomenon known as synaptic plasticity. This is the process by which it is believed memory and learning is governed. Recent studies revealed environmental factors affect the strength of synapses, and the way neurons communicate to each other. This poses the question as to what extent the pre- and post- synaptic neurons sense the environmental changes, and in turn adjust their synaptic link. Here, we model the behavior of an interconnected neuronal network in various environmental conditions as a multi-agent system in a game theoretic framework. We focus on a CA1 lattice subfield as an example plastic neuronal network. Our analysis revealed the neuronal network converges to different equilibria depending on the environmental changes. The model well-predicts the behavior of the network compared to a well-known theoretical model of individual neurons.

Equilibrium population dynamics when mating is by mutual choice based on age

We consider a steady state model of mutual mate choice in which an individual's mate preferences depend on his/her age, and the preferences are over the ages of prospective mates of the opposite sex. We present a discrete time (and age) model corresponding to successive mating seasons. Males are fertile for m periods (corresponding to 'age' i=1 to m) and females for n≤m periods (they have ages j=1 to n), which is all that distinguishes the sexes. Although we can deal with arbitrary preferences, we concentrate on a simple fertility model where the common utility to a male age i and female age j who mate is the number K=min(m-i+1,n-j+1) of future periods of joint fertility. The incoming sex ratio R of age 1 males to age 1 females is given exogenously. In each period individuals are randomly (non assortatively) matched and form a mated couple by mutual consent; otherwise they go into the next period unmated and older. We derive properties of equilibrium threshold acceptance strategies and establish the existence of time-invariant age distributions. Our methods determine the age distribution of couples at marriage (mating) and the population sex ratio (OSR) at equilibrium. Since this can be determined empirically in a population, our model can be used to rule out most systems of age preferences (those not consistent with the observed distribution). This extends earlier models of mutual choice with one dimensional types of Alpern and Reyniers [1999. Strategic mating with homotypic preferences. J. Theor. Biol. 198, 71-88; 2005. Strategic mating with common preferences. J. Theor. Biol. 237, 337-354] where individuals sought, respectively, individuals with similar or high types, but in those models an individual's type was fixed over time. Under the simple fertility model, at equilibrium the maximum age of an acceptable partner is increasing in the age of the searcher. Our results relate to discussions in the literature regarding optimal parental age differences, age-related mate preferences, and to mate choice in general. We believe our model will be used as a tool in future investigations in these areas.