Self-relevance does not moderate choice blindness in adolescents and children

The right face at the wrong place: How motor intentions can override outcome monitoring

The concept of intentions is often taken for granted in the cognitive and neural sciences, and comparing outcomes with internal goals is seen as critical for our sense of agency. We created an experiment where participants decided which face they preferred, and we either created outcome errors by covertly switching the position of the chosen face or induced motor errors by deviating the mouse cursor, or we did both at the same time. In the final case, participants experienced a motor error, but the outcome ended up correct. The result showed that when they received the right face, but at the wrong place, participants rejected the outcome they actually wanted in a majority of the trials. Thus, contrary to common belief, higher-order outcomes do not always regulate our actions. Instead, motor "wrongness" might sometimes override goal "rightness" and lead us to reject the outcome we actually want.

People confabulate with high confidence when their decisions are supported by weak internal variables

People can introspect on their internal state and report the reasons driving their decisions but choice blindness (CB) experiments suggest that this ability can sometimes be a retrospective illusion. Indeed, when presented with deceptive cues, people justify choices they did not make in the first place, suggesting that external cues largely contribute to introspective processes. Yet, it remains unclear what are the respective contributions of external cues and internal decision variables in forming introspective report. Here, using a brain–computer interface, we show that internal variables continue to be monitored but are less impactful than deceptive external cues during CB episodes. Moreover, we show that deceptive cues overturn the classical relationship between confidence and accuracy: introspective failures are associated with higher confidence than genuine introspective reports. We tracked back the origin of these overconfident confabulations by revealing their prominence when internal decision evidence is weak and variable. Thus, introspection is neither a direct reading of internal variables nor a mere retrospective illusion, but rather reflects the integration of internal decision evidence and external cues, with CB being a special instance where internal evidence is inconsistent.