The selective allure of neuroscientific explanations

Bio-behavioral scientific evidence alters judges' sentencing decision-making: A quantitative analysis

The present study surveyed judges to examine how they consider and apply scientific information during sentencing determinations. Judges in criminal courts are increasingly asked to assess and make decisions based on evidence surrounding psychiatric disorders, with unclear results on sentencing outcomes. We qualitatively interviewed 34 judges who have presided over criminal cases in 16 different states and also administered vignette surveys during the interviews. We asked them to make sentencing decisions for hypothetical defendants in cases presenting evidence of either no psychiatric disorder, an organic brain disorder, or past trauma, as well as to rate the importance of different goals of sentencing for each case. Results indicated that the case presenting no evidence of a mental health condition received significantly more severe sentences as compared to either psychiatric condition. Judges' ratings of sentencing goals showed that the importance of retribution was a significant mediator of this relationship. Trauma was not deemed to be as mitigating as an organic brain disorder. These results provide unique insights into how judges assess cases and consider sentencing outcomes when presented with scientific information to explicate defendants' behavior. We propose ways forward that may help better integrate scientific understandings of behavior into criminal justice decision-making.

Neuroscience explanations really do satisfy: A systematic review and meta-analysis of the seductive allure of neuroscience

Extraneous neuroscience information improves ratings of scientific explanations, and affects mock juror decisions in many studies, but others have yielded little to no effect. To establish the magnitude of this effect, we conducted a random-effects meta-analysis using 60 experiments from 28 publications. We found a mild but highly significant effect, with substantial heterogeneity. Planned subgroup analyses revealed that within-subjects studies, where people can compare the same material with and without neuroscience, and those using text, have stronger effects than between-subjects designs, and studies using brain image stimuli. We serendipitously found that effect sizes were stronger on outcomes of evaluating satisfaction or metacomprehension, compared with jury verdicts or assessments of convincingness. In conclusion, there is more than one type of neuroscience explanations effect. Irrelevant neuroscience does have a seductive allure, especially on self-appraised satisfaction and understanding, and when presented as text.

The explanation-polarisation model: Pseudoscience spreads through explanatory satisfaction and group polarisation

This article presents an integrative model for the endorsement of pseudoscience: the explanation-polarisation model. It is based on a combination of perceived explanatory satisfaction and group polarisation, offering a perspective different from the classical confusion-based conception, in which pseudoscientific beliefs would be accepted through a lack of distinction between science and science mimicry. First, I discuss the confusion-based account in the light of current evidence, pointing out some of its explanatory shortcomings. Second, I develop the explanation-polarisation model, showing its explanatory power in connection with recent research outcomes in cognitive and social psychology.

The Einstein effect provides global evidence for scientific source credibility effects and the influence of religiosity

People tend to evaluate information from reliable sources more favourably, but it is unclear exactly how perceivers' worldviews interact with this source credibility effect. In a large and diverse cross-cultural sample (N = 10,195 from 24 countries), we presented participants with obscure, meaningless statements attributed to either a spiritual guru or a scientist. We found a robust global source credibility effect for scientific authorities, which we dub 'the Einstein effect': across all 24 countries and all levels of religiosity, scientists held greater authority than spiritual gurus. In addition, individual religiosity predicted a weaker relative preference for the statement from the scientist compared with the spiritual guru, and was more strongly associated with credibility judgements for the guru than the scientist. Independent data on explicit trust ratings across 143 countries mirrored our experimental findings. These findings suggest that irrespective of one's religious worldview, across cultures science is a powerful and universal heuristic that signals the reliability of information.

On Neuroeducation: Why and How to Improve Neuroscientific Literacy in Educational Professionals

New findings from the neurosciences receive much interest for use in the applied field of education. For the past 15 years, neuroeducation and the application of neuroscience knowledge were seen to have promise, but there is presently some lack of progress. The present paper states that this is due to several factors. Neuromyths are still prevalent, and there is a confusion of tongues between the many neurodisciplines and the domains of behavioral and educational sciences. Second, a focus upon cognitive neuroimaging research has yielded findings that are scientifically relevant, but cannot be used for direct application in the classroom. A third factor pertains to the emphasis which has been on didactics and teaching, whereas the promise of neuroeducation for the teacher may lie more on pedagogical inspiration and support. This article states that the most important knowledge and insights have to do with the notion of brain plasticity; the vision that development is driven by an interaction between a person's biology and the social system. This helps individuals to select and process information, and to adapt to the personal environment. The paper describes how brain maturation and neuropsychological development extend through the important period of adolescence and emergent adulthood. Over this long period, there is a major development of the Executive Functions (EFs) that are essential for both cognitive learning, social behavior and emotional processing and, eventually, personal growth. The paper describes the basic neuroscience knowledge and insights - or "neuroscientific literacy" - that the educational professional should have to understand and appreciate the above-described themes. The authors formulate a proposal for four themes of neuroscience content "that every teacher should know." These four themes are based on the Neuroscience Core Concepts formulated by the Society for Neuroscience. The authors emphasize that integrating neuroscientific knowledge and insights in the field of education should not be a one-way street; attempts directed at improving neuroscientific literacy are a transdisciplinary undertaking. Teacher trainers, experts from the neuroscience fields but also behavioral scientists from applied fields (notable applied neuropsychologists) should all contribute to for the educational innovations needed.

Opposition to abortion related to inaccurate beliefs about fetal pain perception in utero

BACKGROUND

Misinformation about abortion and pregnancy is common. Restrictions on abortion access at and beyond 20 weeks are frequently justified using the claim that a fetus can experience pain before the third trimester. The current medical consensus is that it is unlikely that fetal pain perception is possible before the 29th or 30th weeks of pregnancy.

AIMS

To examine the relationship between abortion attitudes and beliefs about when a fetus develops the capacity to perceive pain in utero.

METHODS AND MATERIALS

We used Amazon's Mechanical Turk to recruit participants residing in the United States (N = 374) and used an online questionnaire to assess their beliefs about abortion and the ability of a fetus to perceive pain.

RESULTS

Anti-choice participants were more likely than pro-choice participants to believe that a fetus in utero can perceive pain before the 23rd week of pregnancy (63.4 vs. 48.5%, P = 0.010) and in the first trimester (40.1 vs. 15.8%, P < 0.000). Most Black and Catholic participants, along with those with advanced degrees, believed that fetal pain is not possible before the third trimester.

CONCLUSIONS

Most participants believed that a fetus develops the capacity to perceive pain earlier than developmental reality, and this belief correlates with anti-choice views.

Neurophilia is stronger for educators than students in Brazil

BACKGROUND

Educational products claiming to be "brain-based" are common. Due to neurophilia, including a brain in a product's marketing can enhance perceptions. However, schooling background may play a protective role.

OBJECTIVE

As previous neuromarketing research has been conducted predominantly in English speakers, we examined whether the effects of neurophilia extend to a Portuguese-speaking Brazilian population.

METHOD

Teachers and students (N = 262) viewed one of four advertisements for a hypothetical product translating to ''Right Brain'' or ''Right Start'' Training; half the advertisements contained an MRI brain image. Participants rated their perceptions of interest, efficacy, and scientific rationale.

RESULTS

The presence of a brain image or the word 'brain' did not influence responses. However, occupation had a significant effect: teachers' ratings were higher than students' ratings. Importantly, teachers were more susceptible to neurocontent, rating "Right Brain" training significantly higher than students.

CONCLUSION

These results thus highlight the need to improve teachers' neuroscience literacy.

Impact of an Artificial Intelligence Research Frame on the Perceived Credibility of Educational Research Evidence

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is attracting a great deal of attention and it is important to investigate the public perceptions of AI and their impact on the perceived credibility of research evidence. In the literature, there is evidence that people overweight research evidence when framed in neuroscience findings. In this paper, we present the findings of the first investigation of the impact of an AI frame on the perceived credibility of educational research evidence. In an experimental study, we allocated 605 participants including educators to one of three conditions in which the same educational research evidence was framed within one of: AI, neuroscience, or educational psychology. The results demonstrate that when educational research evidence is framed within AI research, it is considered as less credible in comparison to when it is framed instead within neuroscience or educational psychology. The effect is still evident when the subjects’ familiarity with the framing discipline is controlled for. Furthermore, our results indicate that the general public perceives AI to be: less helpful in assisting us to understand how children learn, lacking in adherence to scientific methods, and to be less prestigious compared to neuroscience and educational psychology. Considering the increased use of AI technologies in Educational settings, we argue that there should be significant attempts to recover the public image of AI being less scientifically robust and less prestigious than educational psychology and neuroscience. We conclude the article suggesting that AI in Education community should attempt to be more actively engaged with key stakeholders of AI and Education to help mitigate such effects.

Asymmetrical genetic attributions for prosocial versus antisocial behaviour

Genetic explanations of human behavior are increasingly common. While genetic attributions for behavior are often considered relevant for assessing blameworthiness, it has not yet been established whether judgments about blameworthiness can themselves impact genetic attributions. Across six studies, participants read about individuals engaging in prosocial or antisocial behavior and rated the extent to which they believed that genetics played a role in causing the behavior. Antisocial behavior was consistently rated as less genetically influenced than prosocial behavior. This was true regardless of whether genetic explanations were explicitly provided or refuted. Mediation analyses suggested that this asymmetry may stem from people’s motivating desire to hold wrongdoers responsible for their actions. These findings suggest that those who seek to study or make use of genetic explanations’ influence on evaluations of (e.g., antisocial) behavior should consider whether such explanations are accepted in the first place, given the possibility of motivated causal reasoning.

Thought as a determinant of political opinion

Recent political events around the world, including the apparently sudden rise of populism and decline of democratic zeal, have surprised many of us and offered a window onto how people form beliefs and attitudes about the wider world. Cognitive scientists have tended to view belief and attitude formation from one of three perspectives: as a process of deliberative reasoning, as a gut reaction modulated by feelings, or as a cultural phenomenon grounded in partisan relationships. This special issue on the cognitive science of political thought brings a variety of voices to bear on the issue. The upshot is that each perspective captures part of the dynamics of opinion change, but the underlying processes operate in an integrated way. Individuals' affective reactions are conditioned by the social world, and therefore reflect their community norms. They often precede processes of reasoning, but not always. In turn, reasoning is generally motivated in the service of transmitting beliefs acquired from citizens' communities of belief. Cognition is largely a filter for attending to and sharing community norms.

People's explanatory preferences for scientific phenomena

Previous work has found that people are drawn to explanations of psychological phenomena when these explanations contain neuroscience information, even when that information is irrelevant. This preference may be due to a general preference for reductive explanations; however, prior work has not investigated whether people indeed prefer such explanations or whether this preference varies by scientific discipline. The current study asked 82 participants to choose which methods would be most appropriate for investigating topics in six scientific fields. Participants generally preferred methods that either matched the field of investigation (e.g., biology for biology) or that came from the immediately more reductive field (e.g., chemistry for biology). Both of these patterns were especially evident for the pairing of psychology and neuroscience. Additionally, participants selected significantly more methods as being useful for explaining neuroscience phenomena. These results suggest that people’s sense of the relations among scientific fields are fairly well calibrated but display some general attraction to neuroscience.

At Least Bias Is Bipartisan: A Meta-Analytic Comparison of Partisan Bias in Liberals and Conservatives

Both liberals and conservatives accuse their political opponents of partisan bias, but is there empirical evidence that one side of the political aisle is indeed more biased than the other? To address this question, we meta-analyzed the results of 51 experimental studies, involving over 18,000 participants, that examined one form of partisan bias-the tendency to evaluate otherwise identical information more favorably when it supports one's political beliefs or allegiances than when it challenges those beliefs or allegiances. Two hypotheses based on previous literature were tested: an asymmetry hypothesis (predicting greater partisan bias in conservatives than in liberals) and a symmetry hypothesis (predicting equal levels of partisan bias in liberals and conservatives). Mean overall partisan bias was robust ( r = .245), and there was strong support for the symmetry hypothesis: Liberals ( r = .235) and conservatives ( r = .255) showed no difference in mean levels of bias across studies. Moderator analyses reveal this pattern to be consistent across a number of different methodological variations and political topics. Implications of the current findings for the ongoing ideological symmetry debate and the role of partisan bias in scientific discourse and political conflict are discussed.

Are morally good actions ever free?

Research has shown that people ascribe more responsibility to morally bad actions than both morally good and neutral ones, suggesting that people do not attribute responsibility to morally good actions. The present work demonstrates that this is not so: People ascribe more free will to morally good than neutral actions (Studies 1a-1b, Mini Meta). Studies 2a-2b distinguished the underlying motives for ascribing freedom to morally good and bad actions. Free will ascriptions for immoral actions were driven predominantly by affective responses (i.e., punitive desires, moral outrage, and perceived severity of the crime). Free will judgments for morally good actions were similarly driven by affective responses (i.e., reward desires, moral uplift, and perceived generosity), but also more pragmatic considerations (perceived utility of reward, counternormativity of the action, and required willpower). Morally good actions may be more carefully considered, leading to generally weaker, but more contextually sensitive free will judgments.

Improving perceptions of cognitive-behavioral therapy with brief website exposure: Does neuroscientific allure impact attitudes?

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

The current study aimed to determine whether brief exposure to a webpage about cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) for the anxiety disorders improved knowledge and perceptions of this treatment. Further, this study tested whether participants were uniquely compelled by CBT if the mechanism of change cited neurological processes.

METHOD

Participants (N = 389) recruited online viewed a webpage screenshot that described CBT for anxiety. Participants were randomized to view a version of the webpage which either described the mechanism of change as: 1) psychological, 2) neurological, 3) combination of neurological and psychological, or 4) no mechanism described. Participants completed measures of knowledge and perception of CBT before and after viewing the webpage. Credibility ratings and symptoms were assessed after viewing the webpage.

RESULTS

Knowledge of CBT was limited and perceptions were largely neutral to somewhat positive at baseline. Both knowledge and perceptions of CBT meaningfully improved after viewing the webpage. Mechanism of change did not impact perceptions of CBT or its credibility, though in the neurological and combination conditions there was less improvement in knowledge than in the psychological or control conditions. Greater symptoms of anxiety were associated with slightly less improvement in knowledge and perceptions.

LIMITATIONS

The study did not include long-term follow up, so the durability of the effects is unknown. Further, sample homogeneity undermines broad generalizability.

CONCLUSIONS

There is significant room and capacity to improve lay-people's knowledge and perceptions of CBT. Neurological explanations did not appear to uniquely promote the perception of CBT or its credibility.

Free Will and the Brain Disease Model of Addiction: The Not So Seductive Allure of Neuroscience and Its Modest Impact on the Attribution of Free Will to People with an Addiction

Free will has been the object of debate in the context of addiction given that addiction could compromise an individual's ability to choose freely between alternative courses of action. Proponents of the brain-disease model of addiction have argued that a neuroscience perspective on addiction reduces the attribution of free will because it relocates the cause of the disorder to the brain rather than to the person, thereby diminishing the blame attributed to the person with an addiction. Others have worried that such displacement of free will attribution would make the person with a drug addiction less responsible. Using the paradigmatic literature on the seductive allure of neuroscience explanations, we tested whether neuroscience information diminishes attributions of free will in the context of addiction and whether respondent characteristics influence these attributions and modulate the effect of neuroscience information. We performed a large-scale, web-based experiment with 2,378 German participants to explore how attributions of free will in the context of addiction to either alcohol or cocaine are affected by: (1) a text with a neurobiological explanation of addiction, (2) a neuroimage showing effects of addiction on the brain, and (3) a combination of a text and a neuroimage, in comparison to a control group that received no information. Belief in free will was measured using the FAD-Plus scale and was, subsequent to factor analysis, separated into two factors: responsibility and volition. The investigated respondent characteristics included gender, age, education, self-reported knowledge of neuroscience, substance-use disorder (SUD), and having a friend with SUD. We found that attributions of volition (in the cocaine-subsample) were reduced in the text and neuroimage-treatment compared to the control group. However, respondent characteristics such as education and self-reported knowledge of neuroscience were associated with lower attributions of responsibility for both substances, and education was associated with lower attribution of volition for the alcohol sub-sample. Interaction analyses showed that knowledge of neuroscience was found to generally decrease attribution of responsibility. Further research on attribution of free will should consider the effects of context and respondent characteristics, which appeared surprisingly larger than those induced by experimental treatments.

Preferential Biases for Texts That Include Neuroscientific Jargon

The results of an experiment of preferential biases for texts that include neuroscientific jargon are presented. Such preferential bias has been reported even when the presented jargon is meaningless. In a variation of the well-known Weisberg et al. experiment, a group of undergraduate students ( N = 150; females 48%, males 52%, other 0%; M age = 22.4 year, SD = 2.6) chose between two possible explanations for a psychological phenomenon: a correct explanation or a circular restatement of facts. Unrelated neuroscientific terms were added to one of the explanations. Participants were asked to choose the correct explanation. There was a statistically significant preference for the explanation without neuroscientific terms. These findings differ from Weisberg et al.’s experiment and a number of others. The implications of this discrepancy are discussed.

Deconstructing the seductive allure of neuroscience explanations

Previous work showed that people find explanations more satisfying when they contain irrelevant neuroscience information. The current studies investigate why this effect happens. In Study 1 ( N=322), subjects judged psychology explanations that did or did not contain irrelevant neuroscience information. Longer explanations were judged more satisfying, as were explanations containing neuroscience information, but these two factors made independent contributions. In Study 2 ( N=255), subjects directly compared good and bad explanations. Subjects were generally successful at selecting the good explanation except when the bad explanation contained neuroscience and the good one did not. Study 3 ( N=159) tested whether neuroscience jargon was necessary for the effect, or whether it would obtain with any reference to the brain. Responses to these two conditions did not differ. These results confirm that neuroscience information exerts a seductive effect on people’s judgments, which may explain the appeal of neuroscience information within the public sphere.

Sciences of the brain: The long road to scientific maturity and to present-day reductionism

When examined in a long-term perspective, brain sciences demonstrate certain conceptual consistencies as well as theoretical oppositions that have lasted for centuries, ever since Ancient Greece. The neurosciences have progressed more on the basis of technological than conceptual advances, and the constant recuperation of new techniques from other sciences have led to a continually reductionist view of the brain and its functions. In a different perspective, if not opposite to the reductionism, are the psychological constructs and those that constitute the functional unity of individuals, which are still mysterious. In fact, the gap between these two approaches has never been larger than it is now. This chapter discusses the enduring nature of some of these problems and their recent consequences.

Educational neuroscience: definitional, methodological, and interpretive issues

In this study, we hope to accomplish three aims as follows: (1) provide greater clarity regarding the nature and scope of the field of educational neuroscience, (2) propose a framework for understanding when and how neuroscientific research could be informative for educational practice, and (3) describe some examples of neuroscientific findings from the domains of reading and mathematics that are informative according to this framework. We propose that psychological models of learning-related processes should be the basis of instructional decisions, and that neuroscientific evidence in combination with traditional evidence from psychological experiments should be used to decide among competing psychological models. Our review of the neuroscientific evidence for both reading and mathematics suggests that while much has been learned over the past 20 years, there is still a 'disconnect' between contemporary psychological models that emphasize higher level skills and neuroscientific studies that focus on lower level skills. Moreover, few researchers have used neuroscientific evidence to decide among psychological models, but have focused instead on identifying the brain regions that subtend component skills of reading and math. Nevertheless, neuroscientific studies have confirmed the intrinsic relationship between reading and spoken language, revealed interesting predictive relationships between anatomical structures and reading and math disabilities, and there is the potential for fruitful collaborations between neuroscientists and psychologists in the future.