Evaluating Perceived Probability of Threat-Relevant Outcomes and Temporal Orientation in Flying Phobia

Expectations of objective threats and aversive feelings in specific fears

Mistaken beliefs about danger posed by feared stimuli are considered a key factor causing and maintaining fears. Such beliefs are intriguing because many fearful people express them, but acknowledge they are untrue in reality. While previous research indicates fearful individuals may not wholly endorse their beliefs about objective threats (e.g., the spider will bite), expectations of negative subjective consequences (e.g., I will feel terrible) are also likely to be important. We investigated the extent to which participants' expectations of objective and subjective threats were sensitive to manipulations that encouraged them to consider whether their expectations were likely to happen in reality. Across five online experiments (N = 560, or 727 with more liberal inclusion criteria), such manipulations produced lower expectancy ratings for objective but not subjective threats (versus participants who gave ratings without the manipulation). Most participants reported that anticipation of negative feelings was more concerning than actual danger. Hence, numerous fear-relevant expectations about objective threat-considered central in understanding why people are irrationally afraid-respond to small cognitive manipulations. Additionally, expectations of negative subjective experiences during fear-provoking encounters appear to be more consistently endorsed, and feature prominently in fearful individuals' concerns about what will happen in a fear-relevant situation.

Reducing Probability Overestimation of Threatening Events: An Italian Study on the Efficacy of Cognitive Techniques in Non-Clinical Subjects

OBJECTIVE

Our study was aimed at evaluating the efficacy and stability of the "Pie Technique", "Cumulative Probability" and "Inverted Pyramid", cognitive techniques applied in a clinical context to reduce overestimation of the probability of threatening events.

METHOD

319 healthy participants were randomly assigned to one of 8 groups. Groups differed on the level of trait anxiety (high vs. low), and on the cognitive techniques they were to receive (Pie Technique, Cumulative Probability, Inverted Pyramid, Control task). All groups were exposed to an intervention aimed at reassigning the initial probability estimate.

RESULTS

In both high and low trait anxiety individuals, all the techniques successfully produced a statistically significant reduction in the estimation of the perceived probability, while no significant outcome was found in the control task group. This effect was significantly maintained at a 4 week follow up.

CONCLUSIONS

Our study shows that the Pie Technique, the Cumulative Probability and the Inverted Pyramid reduce the estimation of the perceived probability of negative events occurring in both high and low trait anxiety individuals. This effect was considerably maintained at a 4 week follow up. The reduction should mainly be attributed to the technique's power in contrasting the cognitive mechanism of hyper-focalization. The present study takes into account only general threatening events, and not threats specifically related to the different disorders. Moreover, it demonstrates that all the techniques are useful to reduce danger overestimation but in a group of non-clinical individuals. We can't thus generalize our results to anxious patients.

The impact of affect labelling on responses to aversive flying-cues

Individuals with flying phobia experience increases in subjective anxiety in response to flying-related cues. However, the cognitive processes that contribute to cue-reactive anxiety in individuals with flying-related anxiety remain poorly understood. Preliminary research suggests that changes in visual imagery and volitional control may contribute to this cue-reactive anxiety. Engaging in affect labelling during exposure therapy has been shown to reduce cue-reactive anxiety in individuals with fears relating to a variety of stimuli but has not been investigated in the fear of flying. The present study recruited 110 participants with a range of flying-related anxiety scores to complete an online cue-reactivity experiment. The study sought to evaluate whether an aversive flying cue triggered changes in imagery, volitional control and anxiety, and whether changes in imagery and volitional control predicted level of cue-reactive anxiety. Participants were randomly allocated to an affect labelling or non-affect labelling condition to additionally assess whether engaging in labelling one's emotion following exposure to an aversive flying cue would attenuate cue-reactive changes in anxiety relative to a group who did not. Significant cue-reactive changes in anxiety, and volitional control were observed from neutral to aversive flying cue were observed. After accounting for the effects of flying anxiety severity, only volitional control significantly improved the prediction of cue-reactive anxiety. Participants in the affect labelling condition reported significantly smaller increases in anxiety than the non-affect labelling group following exposure to the aversive flight cue. This is the first study to indicate affect labelling may help to regulate aspects of cue-reactive anxiety in response to aversive flying stimuli.