Why we sometimes punish the innocent: The role of group entitativity in collective punishment

No one is going to recess: How children evaluate collective and targeted punishment

This study examined children's responses to targeted and collective punishment. Thirty-six 4-5-year-olds and 36 6-7-year-olds (36 females; 54 White; data collected 2018-2019 in the United States) experienced three classroom punishment situations: Targeted (only transgressing student punished), Collective (one student transgressed, all students punished), and Baseline (all students transgressed, all punished). The older children evaluated collective punishment as less fair than targeted, whereas younger children evaluated both similarly. Across ages, children distributed fewer resources to teachers who administered collective than targeted punishment, and rated transgressors more negatively and distributed fewer resources to transgressors in Collective and Targeted than Baseline. These findings demonstrate children's increasing understanding of punishment and point to the potential impact of different forms of punishment on children's social lives.

Collective Punishment and Cheating in the Die-Under-the-Cup Task

A popular tool in the experimental research on dishonest behavior is the die-under-the-cup (DUTC) task in which subjects roll a die in private and report the outcome to the experimenter after being promised a payoff which increases with the die's outcome. The present paper reports the results of incorporating collective punishment into the DUTC task. We ran two experiments, each involving two rounds of the task performed in a computer lab. Despite being asked not to cheat, the average reported outcome in the first round exceeded the statistical expectancy of 3.5. The second round of the first experiment involved the threat that if this happened again, each subject would be fined by the difference between the average reported outcome and 3.5. Nevertheless, the average reported outcome in the second round significantly exceeded that of the first round. Running a second experiment, this time without the punishment threat, we ruled out the possibility that the increased cheating in the second round of the first experiment was due to a feedback effect, concluding that the threat of collective punishment acted to encourage cheating rather than helped deterring it.

Toddlers' expectations of third-party punishments and rewards following an act of aggression

Rewarding someone who defends the victim of an unjust aggression and punishing someone who chose not to defend her may be very important acts of reciprocation in social life. This study investigates whether 21-month-olds have some expectations concerning such punishing and rewarding actions. Infants were shown simple puppet shows and were tested using the violation-of-expectation paradigm. In Experiment 1, we found that infants looked longer when they saw a bystander puppet punishing the puppet who defended the victim rather than the puppet who did not defend her. This pattern of looking times was reversed when the punishing action was replaced with a rewarding action (Experiment 2). These findings reveal early-emerging expectations about punitive and reward motivations in third-party contexts, and provide some support for theoretical claims about the hardwiring of the human mind for cooperation and prosociality.

Revenge in Couple Relationships and Their Relation to the Dark Triad

Background: This research examines how, when a romantic partner commits a perceived transgression that leads to couple break up, vengeful reactions are predicted by the type of transgression and the Dark Triad of personality. Methods: An incidental sample of 2142 participants, half male and half female aged 18 to 70, completed a questionnaire developed by the authors to assess how they had reacted after being the perceived victims of a transgression committed by their partner and a measure of the Dark Triad. Results: Results show half of the people who feel as though they are victims of a partner transgression show revenge reactions. These reactions are more emotional than rational and do not usually anticipate their consequences or success. Moreover, revenge is related primarily to psychopathy and to a lesser extent to Machiavellianism. Psychopathy is the best predictor for revenge thoughts and actions, whereas narcissism does not predict revenge when controlling for other dark traits. Conclusions: This study contributes to the explanation of revenge reactions in couple relationships in relation to the type of transgression perceived and the Dark Triad. Conflicts that arise out of revenge may have long-lasting consequences for both the perceived aggressor and victim, and our results may be useful for assessing risks, monitoring, and preventing negative consequences for partners or ex-partners.

Toddlers' expectations of corporal third-party punishments against the non-defender puppet

Recent research has demonstrated that toddlers expect individuals to approach and reward those who defend a victim from an aggressor rather than those who refuse to do so. This work focused on toddlers' expectations of corporal third-party punishments trought various actions, such as hitting with a stick or repelling someone who refused to defend a social partner following aggression. Using a violation of expectation paradigm (VoE), three experiments were carried out to investigate whether 21-month-olds expect others to apply different kinds of corporal punishments against the non-defender puppet (expected event) rather than the defender puppet (unexpected event), showing a bystander hitting with a stick (Experiment 1) or pushing strongly (Experiment 3) each of the two puppets. In both experiments, toddlers showed to be surprised whent the saw the bystander punish by hitting or pushing the defender puppet rather the non-defender puppet. In a control experiment displaying a non-social condition (Experiment 2), in which the victim puppets were replaced by two inert boxes, toddlers showed no expectation. These results uncovered that toddlers expect others to engage in different corporal punishments toward those who refuse to defend a social partner from an aggressor, by revealing that these expectations are not specific to a single type of punishment. The findings raise questions about the development of corporal third-party punishments, and have implications for the theory on ontogenetic processes underlying sociomoral development.

Deterrence by Collective Punishment May Work against Criminals but Never against Freedom Fighters

The main goal of collective punishment (CP) is the deterrence of future “wrong-doing” by freedom fighters or terrorists, protesters against an authoritative government, polluters, students playing pranks on their teacher, football teams lacking enthusiasm, or soldiers showing cowardice to the enemy. CP could consist of the lockout of workers, additional training units for football teams, increased control of athletes and firms, up to the shooting of fellow villagers of assassins. I investigate two classes of problems. In one class, resistance against an authority is individually costly, but enough resistance can be successful (the production of a public good, for example, higher wages after a strike). In the other case, “resistance” is individually profitable (a criminal activity as pollution) and enough “resistance” produces a public bad. We find that, in the first situation, the announcement of CP never decreases the level of resistance. In the second situation, CP can be successful.

Strike one hundred to educate one: Measuring the efficacy of collective sanctions experimentally

In this paper, we test whether sanctions applied to an entire group on account of the free-riding of one of its members can promote group cooperation. To measure the efficiency of such collective sanctions, we conducted a lab experiment based on a standard public good game. The results show that, overall, collective sanctions are ineffective. Moreover, when subjects are able to punish their peers, the level of cooperation is lower in the regime of collective sanctions than under individual sanctions. Both outcomes can be explained by a general disapproval of the collective responsibility for an individual fault: in the post-experimental survey, an absolute majority evaluated such regimes as unfair. While collective sanctions are not an effective means for boosting group compliance, there are nevertheless two insights to be gained here. First, there are differences across genders: under collective sanctions, men’s level of compliance is significantly higher than under individual sanctions, while the opposite is true for women. Second, there were intriguing differences in outcomes between the different regime types. Under collective sanctions, a person who is caught tends to comply in the future, at least in the short term. By contrast, under individual sanctions, an individual wrongdoer decreases his or her level of compliance in the next period.

Revenge among Parents Who Have Broken up Their Relationship through Family Law Courts: Its Dimensions and Measurement Proposal

This work analyzes inter-parental revenge after a breakup process, as it relates to the dark triad of personality, moral disengagement, and sex role ideology. Our objective was to test a predictive model for revenge based on these variables. Additionally, a scale to measure revenge among parents was developed. A sample of 384 participants who had minor children, had broken up their relationship, and had undergone or were undergoing problematic judicial procedures regarding their children completed a survey. They answered to measures of the dark triad of personality (Machiavellianism, narcissism, psychopathy); moral disengagement strategies; sex role ideology, and revenge. An instrument (the R scale), with adequate reliability and validity was developed to test revenge. Results show that revenge behaviors are perpetrated by 1 to 5% of participants. Revenge has three components: revenge through the child, revenge through economic manipulation, and revenge by cutting off communication. Results also show that for males, but not for females, sex role ideology mediates the relationship between the components of the dark triad, moral disengagement, and revenge. This paper aims at providing some insight for the protection of minors from manipulation by means of the Family Courts.

How Do Different Types of Alignment Affect Perceived Entity Status?

Perceptions of entitativity are thought to be influenced by salient features such as the physical proximity and physical similarity of group members (Campbell in Behav Sci 3:14-25, 1958). But social interactions among group members involve a number of low-level alignment (Pickering and Garrod in Behav Brain Sci 27:212-225, 2004) and synchronization (Marsh et al. in Top Cogn Sci 1:320-339, 2009) processes. Conversational partners, for instance, become aligned in syntax, semantics, emotion, and bodily posture. In this paper, we explore whether alignment correlates with observers' judgments of entitativity, and, moreover, which specific forms of alignment have the strongest effects on these judgments. Results revealed that only emotional alignment had on effect on judgments of entitativity. We discuss how future work may further assess the role of various dimensions in shaping the perception of group status in linguistic interaction.

Choosing victims: Human fungibility in moral decision-making

In considering moral dilemmas, people often judge the acceptability of exchanging individuals’ interests, rights, and even lives. Here we investigate the related, but often overlooked, question of how people decide who to sacrifice in a moral dilemma. In three experiments (total N = 558), we provide evidence that these decisions often depend on the feeling that certain people are fungible and interchangeable with one another, and that one factor that leads people to be viewed this way is shared nationality. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants read vignettes in which three individuals’ lives could be saved by sacrificing another person. When the individuals were characterized by their nationalities, participants chose to save the three endangered people by sacrificing someone who shared their nationality, rather than sacrificing someone from a different nationality. Participants do not show similar preferences, though, when individuals were characterized by their age or month of birth. In Experiment 3, we replicated the effect of nationality on participant’s decisions about who to sacrifice, and also found that they did not show a comparable preference in a closely matched vignette in which lives were not exchanged. This suggests that the effect of nationality on decisions of who to sacrifice may be specific to judgments about exchanges of lives.