The developmental origins of moral concern: An examination of moral boundary decision making throughout childhood

Who gives? Characteristics of those who have taken the Giving What We Can pledge

OBJECTIVE

In the current project, we focus on another group of unusual altruists: people who have taken the Giving What We Can (GWWC) pledge to donate at least 10% of their income to charity. Our project aims to understand what is unique about this population.

BACKGROUND

Many people care about helping, but in recent years there has been a surge of research examining those whose moral concern for others goes far beyond that of the typical population. These unusual altruists (also termed extraordinary or extreme altruists or moral exemplars) make great personal sacrifices to help others-such as donating their kidneys to strangers or participating in COVID-19 vaccine challenge trials.

METHOD

In a global study (N = 536) we examine a number of cognitive and personality traits of GWWC pledgers and compare them to a country-matched comparison group.

RESULTS

In accordance with our predictions, GWWC pledgers were better at identifying fearful faces, more morally expansive and higher in actively open-minded thinking, need for cognition and two subscales of utilitarianism and, tentatively, lower in social dominance orientation. Against our predictions, they were lower in maximizing tendency. Finally, we found an inconclusive relationship between pledger status and empathy/compassion that we believe warrants further examination.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings offer initial insights into the characteristics that set apart those who have made the decision to donate a substantial portion of their income to help others.

Children Value Animals More Than Adults Do: A Conceptual Replication and Extension

Recent psychological research finds that U.S. American children have a weaker tendency than U.S. American adults to value humans more than animals. We aimed to conceptually replicate and extend this finding in a preregistered study (N = 412). We investigated whether 6- to 9-year-old Polish children (Study 1a) are less likely to prioritize humans over animals than Polish adults are (Studies 1b and 1c). We presented participants with moral dilemmas where they had to prioritize either humans or animals (dogs or chimpanzees) in situations that involved harming (i.e., a trolley problem) or benefiting (i.e., giving a snack). We found that Polish children prioritized humans over animals less than Polish adults did. This was the case both in dilemmas that involved preventing harm and in dilemmas that involved providing snacks. Both children and adults prioritized humans over chimpanzees more than humans over dogs.

Children's judgments on the acceptability of prejudice

By middle childhood, children become aware that discriminatory behavior is unacceptable; however, the development of their anti-prejudice sentiments is largely unknown. Across two studies, 333 Australian 5- to 10-year-olds (51% female, majority White) were asked how acceptable they thought it was to have prejudicial sentiments toward 25 different targets. Children responded privately through a novel digital paradigm designed to minimize social-desirability biases. With age, children were more likely to display anti-prejudice sentiments toward targets who are prosocial, vulnerable, and of minority race and linguistic backgrounds. In contrast, they judged prejudice as "okay" for targets who are antisocial and negatively regarded in society. These findings suggest that children's perceptions of prejudice become increasingly nuanced and adult-like across the primary school years.

Human's moral judgements towards different social actors: A cross-sectional study

The proliferation of artificial intelligence may pose new challenges to people's moral judgements. We examined moral judgements towards different social actors and their influencing factors in children, adolescents and adults. Moral judgements were measured with ship problems which will ask participants whether they would choose to save humans, dogs, humanoid robots or animaloid robots. Results showed that (1) both adolescents and adults considered humans morally most important, followed by dogs, humanoid robots and animaloid robots. Children have not yet developed the tendency to morally prioritize humanoid robots over animaloid robots; (2) Individuals' moral judgements are influenced by their age, anthropomorphism and animacy of social actors; (3) With the development of individuals, animacy of social actors always have a greater impact on individuals' moral judgements than anthropomorphism of social actors. Findings indicated that the concept of moral judgement is more complex in the era of artificial intelligence and requires more attention from developmental psychology researchers.

Autonomy, the moral circle, and the limits of ownership

Why can't we own people? Boyer proposes that the key consideration concerns inclusion in the moral circle. I propose an alternative, which is that specific mental capacities, especially the capacity for autonomy, play a key role in determining judgments about human and animal ownership. Autonomous beings are viewed as owning themselves, which precludes them from being owned by others.

The Relative Importance of Target and Judge Characteristics in Shaping the Moral Circle

People's treatment of others (humans, nonhuman animals, or other entities) often depends on whether they think the entity is worthy of moral concern. Recent work has begun to investigate which entities are included in a person's moral circle, examining how certain target characteristics (e.g., species category, perceived intelligence) and judge characteristics (e.g., empathy, political orientation) shape moral inclusion. However, the relative importance of target and judge characteristics in predicting moral inclusion remains unclear. When predicting whether a person will deem an entity worthy of moral consideration, how important is it to know who is making the judgment (i.e., characteristics of the judge), who is being judged (i.e., characteristics of the target), and potential interactions between the two factors? Here, we address this foundational question by conducting a variance component analysis of the moral circle. In two studies with participants from the Netherlands, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia (N = 836), we test how much variance in judgments of moral concern is explained by between-target differences, between-judge differences, and by the interaction between the two factors. We consistently find that all three components explain substantial amounts of variance in judgments of moral concern. Our findings provide two important insights. First, an increased focus on interactions between target and judge characteristics is needed, as these interactions explain as much variance as target and judge characteristics separately. Second, any theoretical account that aims to provide an accurate description of moral inclusion needs to consider target characteristics, judge characteristics, and their interaction.

Social value at a distance: Higher identification with all of humanity is associated with reduced social discounting

How much we value the welfare of others has critical implications for the collective good. Yet, it is unclear what leads people to make more or less equal decisions about the welfare of those from whom they are socially distant. The current research sought to explore the psychological mechanisms that might underlie welfare judgements across social distance. Here, a social discounting paradigm was used to measure the tendency for the value of a reward to be discounted as the social distance of its recipient increased. Across two cohorts (one discovery, one replication), we found that a more expansive identity with all of humanity was associated with reduced social discounting. Additionally, we investigated the specificity of this association by examining whether this relationship extended to delay discounting, the tendency for the value of a reward to be discounted as the temporal distance to its receipt increases. Our findings suggest that the observed association with identity was unique to social discounting, thus underscoring a distinction in value-based decision-making processes across distances in time and across social networks. As data were collected during the COVID-19 pandemic, we also considered how stress associated with this global threat might influence welfare judgements across social distances. We found that, even after controlling for COVID-19 related stress, correlations between identity and social discounting held. Together, these findings elucidate the psychological processes that are associated with a more equal distribution of generosity.

Young Children’s Conceptualisations of Kindness: A Thematic Analysis

Although there is much interest in the development of prosocial behaviour in young children, and many interventions that attempt to cultivate kindness in children, there is a paucity of research exploring children’s lived experiences of kindness and including their voices. In this study, children’s understanding of kindness is approached through qualitative interviews using puppets. Interviews were conducted with 33 children aged 5-6 years in 3 schools in the United Kingdom. Through thematic analysis, 4 themes were developed: (a) doing things for others, (b) relating with others, (c) rules and values, and (d) kindness affects us. These themes are examined in light of current thinking on prosocial and sociomoral development, and several key insights are highlighted, including types of prosocial behaviour, social connection, kindness-by-omission and defending, in-group bias, universal kindness versus personal safety, self-image, and a desire to improve the condition of society. These findings have implications for future research on prosocial development and for the design of kindness-based interventions, as well as providing an ecologically valid method of inquiry for use with young children.

Fear leads to suffering: Fears of compassion predict restriction of the moral boundary

Empirical investigations into the psychological drivers of more or less expansive moral thinking are lacking from the psychological literature. One potential driver that warrants deeper investigation is compassion - a prosocial motivation to both identity and alleviate suffering. The current research examined the extent to which compassion, and fears of compassion, act as a driver and inhibitor, respectively, of a morally expansive mindset. We tested these associations across three studies (N = 749) and found robust support for our predictions. Specifically, stronger compassion to others, and greater fears of extending compassion to others, were linked to enhanced and reduced moral expansiveness, respectively. Moreover, over and above empathy and mindfulness, fears of compassion and compassion uniquely predicted moral expansiveness. Finally, compassion was found to consistently mediate the relationship between fears of compassion to others and moral expansiveness. Our findings further our understanding of the psychological factors that may drive and restrict morally expansive mindsets and hold implications for the broader domains of moral decision-making and prosocial motivation as well as the application of practices that are designed to facilitate a compassionate mindset (e.g., Compassionate Mind Training).

How children and adults value different animal lives

The current study modeled the attributions underlying moral concern for animals during childhood and adulthood with the aim of better understanding how concern for animals develops. In total, 241 children aged 6-10 years and 152 adults appraised a range of animals on seven appraisal dimensions and, subsequently rank-ordered which animals they would save in a medicine allocation task. Structural equation modeling revealed several developmental continuities and discontinuities in the dimensions children and adults used to evaluate animal lives. Whereas participants of all ages valued animals based on their aesthetic qualities, intelligence, and perceived similarity to humans, younger children valued animal aesthetics most of all. They also valued benevolence in animals more than older children and adults. Only older children and adults comprehended and valued animals on the basis of their utility as food for humans. Furthermore, neither younger nor older children grasped the role of sentience in the valuation of animals. Only adults factored sentience into their view of what makes animals similar to humans and worthy of moral concern. The results highlight the ways in which moral concern for animals changes across development in several important respects, reflecting an increasingly human-centric orientation.

Tree-Huggers Versus Human-Lovers: Anthropomorphism and Dehumanization Predict Valuing Nature Over Outgroups

Previous examinations of the scope of moral concern have focused on aggregate attributions of moral worth. However, because trade-offs exist in valuing different kinds of entities, tabulating total amounts of moral expansiveness may conceal significant individual differences in the relative proportions of moral valuation ascribed to various entities. We hypothesized that some individuals ("tree-huggers") would ascribe greater moral worth to animals and ecosystems than to humans from marginalized or stigmatized groups, while others ("human-lovers") would ascribe greater moral worth to outgroup members than to the natural world. Additionally, because moral valuation is often treated as being zero-sum, we hypothesized that there would be no difference in aggregate levels of moral concern between tree-huggers and human-lovers. Finally, because attributions of mental capacities substantially contribute to moral valuation, we predicted that tree-huggers and human-lovers would show different patterns of mind attribution for animals versus humans. Three studies (N = 985) yielded evidence in support of our hypotheses. First, over one-third of participants valued nature over outgroups. Second, extending moral value to animals and nature was not indicative of more expansive moral concern overall; instead, tree-huggers and human-lovers were identical in their aggregate ascriptions of moral worth. Third, tree-huggers had relatively amplified tendencies to attribute mental capacities to animals and relatively reduced tendencies to attribute mental capacities to outgroup members-thus having elevated rates of both anthropomorphism and dehumanization. These findings necessitate a reconceptualization of both the extension of moral worth and the attribution of minds.

Children Prioritize Humans Over Animals Less Than Adults Do

Is the tendency to morally prioritize humans over animals weaker in children than adults? In two preregistered studies (total N = 622), 5- to 9-year-old children and adults were presented with moral dilemmas pitting varying numbers of humans against varying numbers of either dogs or pigs and were asked who should be saved. In both studies, children had a weaker tendency than adults to prioritize humans over animals. They often chose to save multiple dogs over one human, and many valued the life of a dog as much as the life of a human. Although they valued pigs less, the majority still prioritized 10 pigs over one human. By contrast, almost all adults chose to save one human over even 100 dogs or pigs. Our findings suggest that the common view that humans are far more morally important than animals appears late in development and is likely socially acquired.

Moral expansiveness short form: Validity and reliability of the MESx

Moral expansiveness refers to the range of entities (human and non-human) deemed worthy of moral concern and treatment. Previous research has established that the Moral Expansiveness Scale (MES) is a powerful predictor of altruistic moral decision-making and captures a unique dimension of moral cognition. However, the length of the full MES may be restrictive for some researchers. Here we establish the reliability and validity of a reduced moral expansiveness scale, the MESx. Consistent with the full version, the MESx is strongly associated with (but not reducible to) theoretically related constructs, such as endorsement of universalism values, identification with all humanity, and connectedness to nature. The MESx also predicted measures of altruistic moral decision-making to the same degree as the full MES. Further, the MESx passed tests of discriminant validity, was unrelated to political conservatism (unlike the full MES), only mildly associated with the tendency to provide socially desirable responses, and produced moderate reliability over time. We conclude that the MESx is a psychometrically valid alternative for researchers requiring a short measure of moral expansiveness.