Young children fail to generate an additive ratchet effect in an open-ended construction task

Copying fideliy of functional and non-functional features in ni-Vanuatu children: A transmission chain study

Observational learning plays a key role in cultural transmission. Previous transmission chain experiments have shown that children are able to maintain information across multiple generations through observational learning. It still remains unclear how the transmission of functional vs. non-functional information and the effect of being observed unfold across age in different communities. Here, we examine children's copying fidelity in observational learning of 5- to 13-year-olds from five different communities in Vanuatu, both individually (n = 263, 144 boys) and throughout a transmission chain of five to six children (n = 324, 178 boys). We additionally varied the functionality of the feature being copied (shape vs. color) and the copying context (observed vs. unobserved). Further, we also study developmental and cultural variation in the interaction of features and conditions. We find that children transmit the functional feature shape more faithfully than the non-functional feature color, both in the dyadic transitions as well as the transmission chains with an increasing tendency to do so as they get older. The age patterns show greater variation between communities for color than for shape. Overall, we find that being observed shows no uniform effects but influences transmission differently across communities. Our study shows that children are prone to passing on a functional feature across multiple generations of peers. Children copy non-functional features as well, but with lower fidelity. In sum, our results show children's high propensity and developing abilities for observational learning, ultimately allowing for effective cultural transmission.

Bringing cumulative technological culture beyond copying versus reasoning

The dominant view of cumulative technological culture suggests that high-fidelity transmission rests upon a high-fidelity copying ability, which allows individuals to reproduce the tool-use actions performed by others without needing to understand them (i.e., without causal reasoning). The opposition between copying versus reasoning is well accepted but with little supporting evidence. In this article, we investigate this distinction by examining the cognitive science literature on tool use. Evidence indicates that the ability to reproduce others' tool-use actions requires causal understanding, which questions the copying versus reasoning distinction and the cognitive reality of the so-called copying ability. We conclude that new insights might be gained by considering causal understanding as a key driver of cumulative technological culture.

Technical reasoning bolsters cumulative technological culture through convergent transformations

Understanding the evolution of human technology is key to solving the mystery of our origins. Current theories propose that technology evolved through the accumulation of modifications that were mostly transmitted between individuals by blind copying and the selective retention of advantageous variations. An alternative account is that high-fidelity transmission in the context of cumulative technological culture is supported by technical reasoning, which is a reconstruction mechanism that allows individuals to converge to optimal solutions. We tested these two competing hypotheses with a microsociety experiment, in which participants had to optimize a physical system in partial- and degraded-information transmission conditions. Our results indicated an improvement of the system over generations, which was accompanied by an increased understanding of it. The solutions produced tended to progressively converge over generations. These findings show that technical reasoning can bolster high-fidelity transmission through convergent transformations, which highlights its role in the cultural evolution of technology.

Restricted Access to Working Memory Does Not Prevent Cumulative Score Improvement in a Cultural Evolution Task

Some theories propose that human cumulative culture is dependent on explicit, system-2, metacognitive processes. To test this, we investigated whether access to working memory is required for cumulative cultural evolution. We restricted access to adults’ working-memory (WM) via a dual-task paradigm, to assess whether this reduced performance in a cultural evolution task, and a metacognitive monitoring task. In total, 247 participants completed either a grid search task or a metacognitive monitoring task in conjunction with a WM task and a matched control. Participants’ behaviour in the grid search task was then used to simulate the outcome of iterating the task over multiple generations. Participants in the grid search task scored higher after observing higher-scoring examples, but could only beat the scores of low-scoring example trials. Scores did not differ significantly between the control and WM distractor blocks, although more errors were made when under WM load. The simulation showed similar levels of cumulative score improvement across conditions. However, scores plateaued without reaching the maximum. Metacognitive efficiency was low in both blocks, with no indication of dual-task interference. Overall, we found that taxing working-memory resources did not prevent cumulative score improvement on this task, but impeded it slightly relative to a control distractor task. However, we found no evidence that the dual-task manipulation impacted participants’ ability to use explicit metacognition. Although we found minimal evidence in support of the explicit metacognition theory of cumulative culture, our results provide valuable insights into empirical approaches that could be used to further test predictions arising from this account.

Human cumulative culture and the exploitation of natural phenomena

Cumulative cultural evolution (CCE)-defined as the process by which beneficial modifications are culturally transmitted and progressively accumulated over time-has long been argued to underlie the unparalleled diversity and complexity of human culture. In this paper, I argue that not just any kind of cultural accumulation will give rise to human-like culture. Rather, I suggest that human CCE depends on the gradual exploitation of natural phenomena, which are features of our environment that, through the laws of physics, chemistry or biology, generate reliable effects which can be exploited for a purpose. I argue that CCE comprises two distinct processes: optimizing cultural traits that exploit a given set of natural phenomena (Type I CCE) and expanding the set of natural phenomena we exploit (Type II CCE). I argue that the most critical features of human CCE, including its open-ended dynamic, stems from Type II CCE. Throughout the paper, I contrast the two processes and discuss their respective socio-cognitive requirements. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'The emergence of collective knowledge and cumulative culture in animals, humans and machines'.

A New Look at Infant Problem-Solving: Using DeepLabCut to Investigate Exploratory Problem-Solving Approaches

When confronted with novel problems, problem-solvers must decide whether to copy a modeled solution or to explore their own unique solutions. While past work has established that infants can learn to solve problems both through their own exploration and through imitation, little work has explored the factors that influence which of these approaches infants select to solve a given problem. Moreover, past work has treated imitation and exploration as qualitatively distinct, although these two possibilities may exist along a continuum. Here, we apply a program novel to developmental psychology (DeepLabCut) to archival data (Lucca et al., 2020) to investigate the influence of the effort and success of an adult's modeled solution, and infants' firsthand experience with failure, on infants' imitative versus exploratory problem-solving approaches. Our results reveal that tendencies toward exploration are relatively immune to the information from the adult model, but that exploration generally increased in response to firsthand experience with failure. In addition, we found that increases in maximum force and decreases in trying time were associated with greater exploration, and that exploration subsequently predicted problem-solving success on a new iteration of the task. Thus, our results demonstrate that infants increase exploration in response to failure and that exploration may operate in a larger motivational framework with force, trying time, and expectations of task success.

Cognitive prerequisites for cumulative culture are context-dependent: Children's potential for ratcheting depends on cue longevity

Human cumulative culture has been suggested to depend on human-unique cognitive mechanisms, explaining its apparent absence in other species. We show that the potential for exhibiting cumulative culture depends on the cognitive abilities of the agents and the demands associated with using information generated by others' activity. 154 children aged 3-6 years played a searching game ("Find the Treasure"), taking their turn after a puppet demonstrator. The puppet's attempt revealed information about the contents of the locations searched, which could be exploited to target rewarded locations, and avoid unrewarded ones. Two conditions were presented, intended to capture realistic variation in the transience of the cues generated by another individual's activity. In one condition, the puppet's demonstration provided transient information - boxes were opened, seen to be rewarded or not, and then closed. In the other condition the puppet's chosen boxes remained partially open, providing an enduring visible cue as to whether that location was rewarded. Children undertook three trials of varying demonstration success, and we used patterns of performance to infer the potential for improvement over multiple generations of transmission. In the Enduring Cues condition, children's performance demonstrated the potential for cumulative culture. In contrast, in the Transient Information condition, only older children showed improved performances following higher success demonstrations and overall performance was not compatible with the possibility of improvements over generations of social transmission. We conclude that under certain conditions cumulative culture could occur in many species, but in a broader range of contexts in humans.

The Pedagogue, the Engineer, and the Friend : From Whom Do We Learn?

Humans can follow different social learning strategies, sometimes oriented toward the models' characteristics (i.e., who-strategies). The goal of the present study was to explore which who-strategy is preferentially followed in the technological context based on the models' psychological characteristics. We identified three potential who-strategies: Copy the pedagogue (a model with high theory-of-mind skills), copy the engineer (a model with high technical-reasoning skills), and copy the friend (a model with high level of prosocialness). We developed a closed-group micro-society paradigm in which participants had to build the highest possible towers. Participants began with an individual building phase. Then, they were gathered to discuss the best solutions to increase tower height. After this discussion phase, they had to make a new building attempt, followed by another discussion phase, and so forth for a total of six building phases and five discussion rounds. This methodology allowed us to create an attraction score for each participant (the more an individual was copied in a group, the greater the attraction score). We also assessed participants' theory-of-mind skills, technical-reasoning skills, and prosocialness to predict participants' attraction scores based on these measures. Results show that we learn from engineers (high technical-reasoning skills) because they are the most successful. Their attraction power is not immediate, but after they have been identified as attractors, their technique is copied irrespective of their pedagogy (theory-of-mind skills) or friendliness (prosocialness). These findings open avenues for the study of the cognitive bases of human technological culture.

Motor constraints influence cultural evolution of rhythm

While widely acknowledged in the cultural evolution literature, ecological factors-aspects of the physical environment that affect the way in which cultural productions evolve-have not been investigated experimentally. Here, we present an experimental investigation of this type of factor by using a transmission chain (iterated learning) experiment. We predicted that differences in the distance between identical tools (drums) and in the order in which they are to be used would cause the evolution of different rhythms. The evidence confirms our predictions and thus provides a proof of concept that ecological factors-here a motor constraint-can influence cultural productions and that their effects can be experimentally isolated and measured. One noteworthy finding is that ecological factors can on their own lead to more complex rhythms.

Roles of Technical Reasoning, Theory of Mind, Creativity, and Fluid Cognition in Cumulative Technological Culture

Cumulative technological culture can be defined as the progressive diversification, complexification, and enhancement of technological traits through generations. An outstanding issue is to specify the cognitive bases of this phenomenon. Based on the literature, we identified four potential cognitive factors: namely, theory-of-mind, technical-reasoning, creativity, and fluid-cognitive skills. The goal of the present study was to test which of these factors-or a combination thereof-best predicted the cumulative performance in two experimental, micro-society conditions (Communication and Observation conditions; n = 100 each) differing in the nature of the interaction (verbal, visual) allowed between participants. The task was to build the highest possible tower. Participants were also assessed on the four aforementioned cognitive factors in order to predict cumulative performance (tower height) and attractiveness. Our findings indicate that technical-reasoning skills are the best predictor of cumulative performance (tower height), even if their role may be restricted to the specific technological domain. Theory-of-mind skills may have a facilitator role, particularly in the Communication condition. Creativity can also help in the generation of novel ideas, but it is not sufficient to support innovation. Finally, fluid cognition is not involved in cumulative technological culture. Taken together, these findings suggest that domain-specific knowledge (i.e., technical-reasoning skills) remains critical for explaining cumulative technological culture.

A cognitive developmental approach is essential to understanding cumulative technological culture

Osiurak and Reynaud argue that children are not a good methodological choice to examine cumulative technological culture (CTC). However, the paper ignores other current work that suggests that young children do display some aspects of creative problem-solving. We argue that using multiple methodologies and examining how technical-reasoning develops in children will provide crucial support for a cognitive approach to CTC.

The elephant in the room: What matters cognitively in cumulative technological culture

Cumulative technological culture (CTC) refers to the increase in the efficiency and complexity of tools and techniques in human populations over generations. A fascinating question is to understand the cognitive origins of this phenomenon. Because CTC is definitely a social phenomenon, most accounts have suggested a series of cognitive mechanisms oriented toward the social dimension (e.g., teaching, imitation, theory of mind, and metacognition), thereby minimizing the technical dimension and the potential influence of non-social, cognitive skills. What if we have failed to see the elephant in the room? What if social cognitive mechanisms were only catalyzing factors and not the sufficient and necessary conditions for the emergence of CTC? In this article, we offer an alternative, unified cognitive approach to this phenomenon by assuming that CTC originates in non-social cognitive skills, namely technical-reasoning skills which enable humans to develop the technical potential necessary to constantly acquire and improve technical information. This leads us to discuss how theory of mind and metacognition, in concert with technical reasoning, can help boost CTC. The cognitive approach developed here opens up promising new avenues for reinterpreting classical issues (e.g., innovation, emulation vs. imitation, social vs. asocial learning, cooperation, teaching, and overimitation) in a field that has so far been largely dominated by other disciplines, such as evolutionary biology, mathematics, anthropology, archeology, economics, and philosophy.

Experimental assessment of capacities for cumulative culture: Review and evaluation of methods

In the current literature, there are few experimental tests of capacities for cumulative cultural evolution in nonhuman species. There are even fewer examples of such tests in young children. This limited evidence is noteworthy given widespread interest in the apparent distinctiveness of human cumulative culture, and the potentially significant theoretical implications of identifying related capacities in nonhumans or very young children. We evaluate experimental methods upon which claims of capacities for cumulative culture, or lack thereof, have been based. Although some of the established methods (those simulating generational succession) have the potential to identify positive evidence that fulfills widely accepted definitions of cumulative culture, the implementation of these methods entails significant logistical challenges. This is particularly true for testing populations that are difficult to access in large numbers, or those not amenable to experimental control. This presents problems for generating evidence that would be sufficient to support claims of capacities for cumulative culture, and these problems are magnified for establishing convincing negative evidence. We discuss alternative approaches to assessing capacities for cumulative culture, which circumvent logistical problems associated with experimental designs involving chains of learners. By inferring the outcome of repeated transmission from the input–output response patterns of individual subjects, sample size requirements can be massively reduced. Such methods could facilitate comparisons between populations, for example, different species, or children of a range of ages. We also detail limitations and challenges of this alternative approach, and discuss potential avenues for future research.

This article is categorized under:

Cognitive Biology > Evolutionary Roots of Cognition

Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development

Psychology > Comparative Psychology