Experimentally induced pain does not influence updating of peripersonal space and body representations following tool-use

Neuroanatomical correlates of peripersonal space: bridging the gap between perception, action, emotion and social cognition

Peripersonal space (PPS) is a construct referring to the portion of space immediately surrounding our bodies, where most of the interactions between the subject and the environment, including other individuals, take place. Decades of animal and human neuroscience research have revealed that the brain holds a separate representation of this region of space: this distinct spatial representation has evolved to ensure proper relevance to stimuli that are close to the body and prompt an appropriate behavioral response. The neural underpinnings of such construct have been thoroughly investigated by different generations of studies involving anatomical and electrophysiological investigations in animal models, and, recently, neuroimaging experiments in human subjects. Here, we provide a comprehensive anatomical overview of the anatomical circuitry underlying PPS representation in the human brain. Gathering evidence from multiple areas of research, we identified cortical and subcortical regions that are involved in specific aspects of PPS encoding.We show how these regions are part of segregated, yet integrated functional networks within the brain, which are in turn involved in higher-order integration of information. This wide-scale circuitry accounts for the relevance of PPS encoding in multiple brain functions, including not only motor planning and visuospatial attention but also emotional and social cognitive aspects. A complete characterization of these circuits may clarify the derangements of PPS representation observed in different neurological and neuropsychiatric diseases.

Knowing your boundaries: no effect of tool-use on body representation following a gather-and-sort task

Internal representations of the body have received considerable attention in recent years, particularly in the context of tool-use. Results have supported the notion that these representations are plastic and tool-use engenders an extension of the internal representation of the arm. However, the limitations of the literature underlying this tool embodiment process have not been adequately considered or tested. For example, there is some evidence that tool-use effects do not extend beyond simplistic tool-use tasks. To further clarify this issue, 66 participants engaged in a period of tool-augmented reaches in a speeded gather-and-sort task. If task characteristics inherent to simplistic tasks are relevant to putative embodiment effects, it was predicted that there would be no effect of tool-use on tactile distance judgments or forearm bisections. A Bayesian analysis found considerable support for the null hypothesis in both outcome measures, suggesting that some of the evidence for tool embodiment may be based in task characteristics inherent in the narrow range of tool-use tasks used to study them, rather than a tool incorporation process. Potential sources of influence stemming from these characteristics are discussed.

Are tools truly incorporated as an extension of the body representation?: Assessing the evidence for tool embodiment

The predominant view on human tool-use suggests that an action-oriented body representation, the body schema, is altered to fit the tool being wielded, a phenomenon termed tool embodiment. While observations of perceptual change after tool-use purport to support this hypothesis, several issues undermine their validity in this context, discussed at length in this critical review. The primary measures used as indicators of tool embodiment each face unique challenges to their construct validity. Further, the perceptual changes taken as indicating extension of the body representation only appear to account for a fraction of the tool's size in any given experiment, and do not demonstrate the covariance with tool length that the embodiment hypothesis would predict. The expression of tool embodiment also appears limited to a narrow range of tool-use tasks, as deviations from a simple reaching paradigm can mollify or eliminate embodiment effects altogether. The shortcomings identified here generate important avenues for future research. Until the source of the kinematic and perceptual effects that have substantiated tool embodiment is disambiguated, the hypothesis that the body representation changes to fit tools during tool-use should not be favored over other possibilities such as the formation of separable internal tool models, which seem to offer a more complete account of human tool-use behaviors. Indeed, studies of motor learning have observed analogous perceptual changes as aftereffects to adaptation despite the absence of handheld tool-use, offering a compelling alternative explanation, though more work is needed to confirm this possibility.