Reconciling the opposing effects of neurobiological evidence on criminal sentencing judgments

Bio-behavioral scientific evidence alters judges' sentencing decision-making: A quantitative analysis

The present study surveyed judges to examine how they consider and apply scientific information during sentencing determinations. Judges in criminal courts are increasingly asked to assess and make decisions based on evidence surrounding psychiatric disorders, with unclear results on sentencing outcomes. We qualitatively interviewed 34 judges who have presided over criminal cases in 16 different states and also administered vignette surveys during the interviews. We asked them to make sentencing decisions for hypothetical defendants in cases presenting evidence of either no psychiatric disorder, an organic brain disorder, or past trauma, as well as to rate the importance of different goals of sentencing for each case. Results indicated that the case presenting no evidence of a mental health condition received significantly more severe sentences as compared to either psychiatric condition. Judges' ratings of sentencing goals showed that the importance of retribution was a significant mediator of this relationship. Trauma was not deemed to be as mitigating as an organic brain disorder. These results provide unique insights into how judges assess cases and consider sentencing outcomes when presented with scientific information to explicate defendants' behavior. We propose ways forward that may help better integrate scientific understandings of behavior into criminal justice decision-making.

Neuroscience explanations really do satisfy: A systematic review and meta-analysis of the seductive allure of neuroscience

Extraneous neuroscience information improves ratings of scientific explanations, and affects mock juror decisions in many studies, but others have yielded little to no effect. To establish the magnitude of this effect, we conducted a random-effects meta-analysis using 60 experiments from 28 publications. We found a mild but highly significant effect, with substantial heterogeneity. Planned subgroup analyses revealed that within-subjects studies, where people can compare the same material with and without neuroscience, and those using text, have stronger effects than between-subjects designs, and studies using brain image stimuli. We serendipitously found that effect sizes were stronger on outcomes of evaluating satisfaction or metacomprehension, compared with jury verdicts or assessments of convincingness. In conclusion, there is more than one type of neuroscience explanations effect. Irrelevant neuroscience does have a seductive allure, especially on self-appraised satisfaction and understanding, and when presented as text.

The use of neurobiological evidence in sentencing mitigation

Neurobiological evidence has grown increasingly relevant in U.S. criminal proceedings, particularly during sentencing. Neuroimaging, such as functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging and Positron Emission Tomography scans, may be introduced by defense counsel to demonstrate brain abnormalities to argue for more lenient sentencing. This practice is common for penalty mitigation in cases eligible for capital punishment. This article reviews the history of the use of neuroscience in criminal cases from the early 20th Century to present, noting pertinent legal and ethical considerations for the use of such evidence. The authors review important empirical research conducted in recent years regarding the use of neurobiological evidence in legal proceedings (such as mock-juror studies) and guidance from the federal sentencing guidelines and the American Bar Association. The discussion also notes relevant case law in which neuroimaging, behavioral genetics, or other neurobiological data were introduced in criminal proceedings, particularly precedent-setting U.S. Supreme Court cases.

Genetic essentialist beliefs about criminality predict harshness of recommended punishment

Genetic essentialism is a set of beliefs holding that certain categories have a heritable, intrinsic, and biological basis. The current studies explore people's genetic essentialist beliefs about criminality, how such essentialism relates to beliefs about appropriate punishment, and the kinds of judgments and motivations that underlie these associations. Study 1 validated a novel task, in which respondents estimated how possible it would be for a child to inherit criminal behavior from a sperm donor with whom they had no contact. Studies 2-4 used this task to address how genetic essentialist beliefs related to the harmfulness of a crime and the harshness of recommended punishment. Results indicated a tendency to essentialize both low- and high-harm crimes, though genetic essentialism was higher for more harmful crimes. Moreover, genetic essentialist beliefs predicted recommendations for harsher punishments, with retributive and protective motivations, as well as perceptions of recidivism risk, partially mediating this association. Further, Studies 3 and 4 found that genetic essentialism positively predicted support for harsh punishments such as the death penalty, as well as support for directing financial resources more toward law enforcement and less toward social support. Lay theories about criminality may have profound implications for decisions about appropriate punishment for wrongdoers, as well as broader policy decisions about crime, punishment, and resource allocation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

The effect of neuroscientific evidence on sentencing depends on how one conceives of reasons for incarceration

Neuroscientific evidence is increasingly utilized in criminal legal proceedings, prompting discussions about how such evidence might influence legal decisions. The effect of neuroscientific testimony on legal decisions remains uncertain, with some studies finding no effect, others reporting that neuroscience has a mitigating impact, and some indicating neuroscience evidence has an aggravating effect. The present study attempts to explain these divergent findings by showing that the effect of neuroscience evidence on sentencing interacts with beliefs about the goals of the criminal legal system. Using a between-subjects design, participants (N = 784) were asked to assume different rationales for imprisonment, before receiving neuroscientific evidence about antisocial behavior and its potential relation to the defendant. Participants recommended a sentence for the defendant prior to and after reading the neuroscientific evidence. Participants who were given the rationale of retribution as the primary goal of imprisonment significantly decreased their sentencing recommendations. When the goal of imprisonment was to protect the public from dangerous people, participants provided longer post-testimony sentences. Lastly, when the goal was to rehabilitate wrongdoers, participants also increased sentences from pre to post. Thus, the impact of neuroscientific evidence is not monolithic, but can lead to either mitigated or aggravated sentences by interacting with penal philosophy.

A jury of scientists: Formal education in biobehavioral sciences reduces the odds of punitive criminal sentencing

This study examines how formal education in biological and behavioral sciences may impact punishment intuitions (views on criminal sentencing, free will, responsibility, and dangerousness) in cases involving neurobiological evidence. In a survey experiment, we compared intuitions between biobehavioral science and non-science university graduates by presenting them with a baseline case without a neurobiological explanation for offending followed by one of two cases with a neurobiological explanation (described as either innate or acquired biological influences to offending). An ordinal logistic regression indicated that both science and non-science graduates selected significantly more severe punishments for the baseline case as compared to when an innate neurobiological explanation for offending was provided. However, across all cases, science graduates selected significantly less severe sentences than non-science graduates, and only science graduates' decisions were mediated by free will and responsibility attributions. Findings are discussed in relation to scientific understandings of behavior, the impact of science education on attitudes towards punishment, and potential criminal-legal implications.

Morally excused but socially excluded: Denying agency through the defense of mental impairment

Defendants can deny they have agency, and thus responsibility, for a crime by using a defense of mental impairment. We argue that although this strategy may help defendants evade blame, it may carry longer-term social costs, as lay people’s perceptions of a person’s agency might determine some of the moral rights they grant them. Three randomized between-group experiments (N = 1601) used online vignettes to examine lay perceptions of a hypothetical defendant using a defense of mental impairment (versus a guilty plea). We find that using a defense of mental impairment significantly reduces responsibility, blame, and punitiveness relative to a guilty plea, and these judgments are mediated by perceptions of reduced moral agency. However, after serving their respective sentences, those using the defense are sometimes conferred fewer rights, as reduced agency corresponds to an increase in perceived dangerousness. Our findings were found to be robust across different types of mental impairment, offences/sentences, and using both manipulated and measured agency. The findings have implications for defendants claiming reduced agency through legal defenses, as well as for the broader study of moral rights and mind perception.

Deep Learning-Based Intelligent Robot in Sentencing

This work aims to explore the application of deep learning-based artificial intelligence technology in sentencing, to promote the reform and innovation of the judicial system. First, the concept and the principles of sentencing are introduced, and the deep learning model of intelligent robot in trials is proposed. According to related concepts, the issues that need to be solved in artificial intelligence sentencing based on deep learning are introduced. The deep learning model is integrated into the intelligent robot system, to assist in the sentencing of cases. Finally, an example is adopted to illustrate the feasibility of the intelligent robot under deep learning in legal sentencing. The results show that the general final trial periods for cases of traffic accidents, copyright information, trademark infringement, copyright protection, and theft are 1,049, 796, 663, 847, and 201 days, respectively; while the final trial period under artificial intelligence evaluation based on the restricted Boltzmann deep learning model is 458, 387, 376, 438, and 247 days, respectively. The accuracy of trials is above 92%, showing a high application value. It can be observed that expect theft cases, the final trial period for others cases has been effectively reduced. The intelligent robot assistance under the restricted Boltzmann deep learning model can shorten the trial period of cases. The deep learning intelligent robot has a certain auxiliary role in legal sentencing, and this outcome provides a theoretical basis for the research of artificial intelligence technology in legal sentencing.

Autonomy and the folk concept of valid consent

Consent governs innumerable everyday social interactions, including sex, medical exams, the use of property, and economic transactions. Yet little is known about how ordinary people reason about the validity of consent. Across the domains of sex, medicine, and police entry, Study 1 showed that when agents lack autonomous decision-making capacities, participants are less likely to view their consent as valid; however, failing to exercise this capacity and deciding in a nonautonomous way did not reduce consent judgments. Study 2 found that specific and concrete incapacities reduced judgments of valid consent, but failing to exercise these specific capacities did not, even when the consenter makes an irrational and inauthentic decision. Finally, Study 3 showed that the effect of autonomy on judgments of valid consent carries important downstream consequences for moral reasoning about the rights and obligations of third parties, even when the consented-to action is morally wrong. Overall, these findings suggest that laypeople embrace a normative, domain-general concept of valid consent that depends consistently on the possession of autonomous capacities, but not on the exercise of these capacities. Autonomous decisions and autonomous capacities thus play divergent roles in moral reasoning about consent interactions: while the former appears relevant for assessing the wrongfulness of consented-to acts, the latter plays a role in whether consent is regarded as authoritative and therefore as transforming moral rights.

Limitations Using Neuroimaging to Reconstruct Mental State After a Crime

Neuroimaging offers great potential to clinicians and researchers for a host of mental and physical conditions. The use of imaging has been trumpeted for forensic psychiatric and psychological evaluations to allow greater insight into the relationship between the brain and behavior. The results of imaging certainly can be used to inform clinical diagnoses; however, there continue to be limitations in using neuroimaging for insanity cases due to limited scientific backing for how neuroimaging can inform retrospective evaluations of mental state. In making this case, this paper reviews the history of the insanity defense and explains how the use of neuroimaging is not an effective way of improving the reliability of insanity defense evaluations.

Morally excused but socially excluded: Denying agency through the defense of mental impairment

Defendants can deny they have agency, and thus responsibility, for a crime by using a defense of mental impairment. We argue that although this strategy may help defendants evade blame, it may carry longer-term social costs, as lay people’s perceptions of a person’s agency might determine some of the moral rights they grant them. In this registered report protocol, we seek to expand upon preliminary findings from two pilot studies to examine how and why those using the defense of mental impairment are seen as less deserving of certain rights. The proposed study uses a hypothetical vignette design, varying the type of mental impairment, type of crime, and type of sentence. Our design for the registered study improves on various aspects of our pilot studies and aims to rigorously test the reliability and credibility of our model. The findings have implications for defendants claiming reduced agency through legal defenses, as well as for the broader study of moral rights and mind perception.

Neuroscientific evidence in the courtroom: a review

The use of neuroscience in the courtroom can be traced back to the early twentieth century. However, the use of neuroscientific evidence in criminal proceedings has increased significantly over the last two decades. This rapid increase has raised questions, among the media as well as the legal and scientific communities, regarding the effects that such evidence could have on legal decision makers. In this article, we first outline the history of neuroscientific evidence in courtrooms and then we provide a review of recent research investigating the effects of neuroscientific evidence on decision-making broadly, and on legal decisions specifically. In the latter case, we review studies that measure the effect of neuroscientific evidence (both imaging and nonimaging) on verdicts, sentencing recommendations, and beliefs of mock jurors and judges presented with a criminal case. Overall, the reviewed studies suggest mitigating effects of neuroscientific evidence on some legal decisions (e.g., the death penalty). Furthermore, factors such as mental disorder diagnoses and perceived dangerousness might moderate the mitigating effect of such evidence. Importantly, neuroscientific evidence that includes images of the brain does not appear to have an especially persuasive effect (compared with other neuroscientific evidence that does not include an image). Future directions for research are discussed, with a specific call for studies that vary defendant characteristics, the nature of the crime, and a juror’s perception of the defendant, in order to better understand the roles of moderating factors and cognitive mediators of persuasion.

Neuroscientific and Genetic Evidence in Criminal Cases: A Double-Edged Sword in Germany but Not in the United States?

Aim of the Study

The study examines how neurobiological and genetic explanations of psychopathy influence decision-making of German law students about legal and moral responsibility and sentencing of a defendant in a case of manslaughter. Previous studies from the United States and Germany have been criticized because they partly contradict legal analyses of real-world criminal cases. With a modified design, which integrates the main criticism, we re-examined the impact of biological explanations for psychopathy on decision-making in the courtroom.

Methods

We developed an improved quasi-experimental design to probe three case vignettes presenting different explanations of psychopathy in a criminal case of manslaughter. All three vignettes present the same information about a forensic expert's testimony that is said to report compelling evidence for the diagnosis of "psychopathy." The independent variable being manipulated is the type of information supporting the expert diagnosis: either no biological explanation of "psychopathy" versus a neurological explanation (brain injury) versus a genetic explanation (MAOA gene). The outcome measure is a questionnaire on legal and moral responsibility, free will, the type of custody, and the duration of the sentence. The study is adequately powered. We openly publish the data and all statistical analyses as reproducible R scripts.

Results

The answers of German law students (n = 317) indicate that the omission of a neurobiological explanation is significantly associated with higher ratings of legal responsibility while compared to no biological explanation. However, there was no significant difference on the prison sentencing and type of custody assigned. Furthermore, there was no difference in the self-reported impact of the explanation of psychopathy on the participants' decision-making.

Conclusion

Our findings from German law students corroborates previous research on German judges but is markedly distinct from studies on United States judges. Whereas in the United States, biological information seems to have a mitigating effect, it seems to increase the rate of involuntary commitment to forensic psychiatric hospitals in Germany.

Neuroscience and mental state issues in forensic assessment

Neuroscience has already changed how the law understands an individual's cognitive processes, how those processes shape behavior, and how bio-psychosocial history and neurodevelopmental approaches provide information, which is critical to understanding mental states underlying behavior, including criminal behavior. In this paper, we briefly review the state of forensic assessment of mental conditions in the relative culpability of criminal defendants, focused primarily on the weaknesses of current approaches. We then turn to focus on neuroscience approaches and how they have the potential to improve assessment, but with significant risks and limitations.