Impact of rating and praise campaigns on local government environmental governance efficiency: Evidence from the campaign of establishment of national sanitary cities in China

Assessing the impact of China's river chief system on enterprise pollution discharge

The River Chief System (RCS), a pivotal environmental governance policy promoted by the Chinese government, has far-reaching implications for public health. This study aims to comprehensively assess the impact of RCS on corporate pollution emissions, emphasizing its role in improving environmental quality and safeguarding public health. Utilizing a database of industrial enterprises and data from heavily polluting enterprises spanning 2003 to 2013. Manual collation of RCS policy implementation across prefecture-level cities during the same period. Application of the DID method to verify the impact of RCS on the extent of corporate pollution emissions. RCS significantly reduces pollution emissions from enterprises. Heterogeneity analysis reveals RCS to be more effective in addressing visible pollutants in rivers, non-provincial capitals, and heavily polluting industries, resulting in a notable reduction in pollution emissions. Mechanism testing underscores the importance of increasing government attention to environmental protection and strengthening environmental regulation as key factors contributing to RCS's success in reducing pollution emissions from enterprises. Additionally, the study finds that improving the business environment of enterprises, measured through the marketization index, enhances the effectiveness of RCS in improving river pollution by enterprises. This study introduces a new perspective on examining the pollution reduction and abatement effects of RCS, addressing a gap in micro-level research. The findings not only contribute to the understanding of RCS's impact on pollution but also offer valuable insights for governments and policymakers in promoting the further development and implementation of RCS policies. The results of this research are of significant importance in strengthening environmental governance and safeguarding public health. By effectively controlling corporate pollution emissions, RCS contributes positively to improving environmental quality and, consequently, enhancing public health outcomes.

The Interaction Mechanism of Fiscal Pressure, Local Government Behavioral Preferences and Environmental Governance Efficiency: Evidence from the Yangtze River Delta Region of China

In environmental governance, local governments are the main actors, and their behavioral preferences between economic growth competition (EGC) and environmental regulation (ER) affect the inputs and outputs of environmental governance. Most studies discuss the relationship between government behaviors and the environment from the fiscal decentralization perspective, with few studies from the fiscal pressure (FP) perspective. Importantly, the bidirectional interaction mechanism is easily ignored. This study measured local government FP, EGC, ER, and environmental governance efficiency (EGE) in China's Yangtze River Delta (YRD) region from 2000 to 2020. Moran's I index was used to identify the change characteristics of local government behavioral preferences. The interaction mechanism was analyzed by a panel vector autoregression (PVAR) model. The results show that (1) from 2000 to 2020, FP was generally strengthened. EGE generally showed fluctuating and rising change characteristics, with more obvious fluctuating and rising characteristics before 2012 and after 2012, respectively. Local governments shifted from a strong alternative preference to a weak synergistic preference. (2) FP had a self-reinforcing effect. EGC and ER had a self-weakening effect. EGE had not only a self-weakening effect but also a weak self-dependence. (3) There is a double negative interaction mechanism between FP and local government behavioral preferences. FP made local governments prefer to reduce EGC and relax ER, but in fact, EGC and ER were conducive to alleviating FP. (4) There is a negative transitive influence mechanism between FP, local government behavioral preferences and EGE. The negative effect of FP on EGE can be transmitted by reducing EGC and ER. This paper provides a scientific basis for improving EGE in the YRD region and understanding the behavioral logic of local governments' environmental governance and a reference for other rapidly industrializing and urbanizing regions.