The Impact Of Price Regulation On The Availability Of New Drugs In Germany

The influence of the national drug price negotiation policy reform on the medical expenses of patients in Xuzhou City: an interrupted time series analysis

Background

To reduce the burden of patients' medical care, the Xuzhou Municipal Government has initiated an exploratory study on the supply model and categorized management of nationally negotiated drugs. This study aims to understand the extent to which Xuzhou's 2021 reform of the National Drug Price Negotiation (NDPN) policy has had a positive impact on the healthcare costs of individuals with different types of health insurance.

Methods

The Interrupted Time Series Analysis method was adopted, and the changes in average medical expenses per patient, average medical insurance payment cost per patient and actual reimbursement ratio were investigated by using the data of single-drug payments in Xuzhou from October 2020 to October 2022.

Results

Following the implementation of the policy, there was a significant decrease in the average medical expenses per patient of national drug negotiation in Xuzhou, with a reduction of 62.42 yuan per month (p < 0.001). Additionally, the average medical insurance payment cost per patient decreased by 44.13 yuan per month (p = 0.01). Furthermore, the average medical expenses per patient of urban and rural medical insurance participants decreased by 63.45 yuan (p < 0.001), and the average monthly medical insurance payment cost per patient decreased by 57.56 yuan (p < 0.04). However, the mean total medical expenditures for individuals enrolled in employee medical insurance decreased by 63.41 yuan per month (p < 0.001), whereas the monthly decrease was 22.11 yuan per month (p = 0.21). On the other hand, there was no discernible change in the actual reimbursement ratio.

Conclusion

After the adoption of the NDPN policy, a noticeable decline has been observed in the average medical expenses per patient and the mean cost of the average medical insurance payment per patient, although to a limited extent. Notably, the reduction in employee medical insurance surpasses that of urban and rural medical insurance.

Dynamic HTA for digital health solutions: opportunities and challenges for patient-centered evaluation

OBJECTIVES

Germany's 2019 Digital Healthcare Act (Digitale-Versorgung-Gesetz, or DVG) created a number of opportunities for the digital transformation of the healthcare delivery system. Key among these was the creation of a reimbursement pathway for patient-centered digital health applications (digitale Gesundheitsanwendungen, or DiGA). Worldwide, this is the first structured pathway for "prescribable" health applications at scale. As of October 10, 2023, 49 DiGA were listed in the official directory maintained by Germany's Federal Institute for Drugs and Medical Devices (BfArM); these are prescribable by physicians and psychotherapists and reimbursed by the German statutory health insurance system for all its 73 million beneficiaries. Looking ahead, a major challenge facing DiGA manufacturers will be the generation of the evidence required for ongoing price negotiations and reimbursement. Current health technology assessment (HTA) methods will need to be adapted for DiGA.

METHODS

We describe the core issues that distinguish HTA in this setting: (i) explicit allowance for more flexible research designs, (ii) the nature of initial evidence generation, which can be delivered (in its final form) up to one year after becoming reimbursable, and (iii) the dynamic nature of both product development and product evaluation. We present the digital health applications in the German DiGA scheme as a case study and highlight the role of RWE in the successful evaluation of DiGA on an ongoing basis.

RESULTS

When a DiGA is likely to be updated and assessed regularly, full-scale RCTs are infeasible; we therefore make the case for using real-world data and real-world evidence (RWE) for dynamic HTAs.

CONCLUSIONS

Continous evaluation using RWD is a regulatory innovation that can help improve the quality of DiGAs on the market.

Incorporating Added Therapeutic Benefit and Domestic Reference Pricing Into Medicare Payment for Expensive Part B Drugs

OBJECTIVES

Identify expensive Part B drugs and evidence for each drug's added benefit and model a reimbursement policy for Medicare that integrates added benefit assessment and domestic reference pricing.

METHODS

A retrospective analysis using a 20% nationally representative sample of 2015 to 2019 traditional Medicare Part B claims. Expensive drugs were defined as having average annual spending per beneficiary exceeding the average annual social security benefit ($17 532 in 2019). For expensive drugs identified in 2019, added benefit assessments conducted by the French Haute Autorité de Santé were collected. For expensive drugs with a low added benefit rating, comparator drugs were identified in French Haute Autorité de Santé reports. For each comparator, average annual spending per beneficiary in Part B was computed. Potential savings from 2 reference pricing scenarios were calculated: reimbursing expensive Part B drugs with low added benefit at the level of each drug's (1) lowest cost comparator and (2) beneficiary-weighted-average cost of all comparators.

RESULTS

The number of expensive Part B drugs grew from 56 in 2015 to 92 in 2019. Of the 92 expensive drugs in 2019, 34 offer low added benefit. Implementing reference pricing for these expensive drugs with low added benefit could have saved an estimated $2.1 billion if prices were set based on spending for their lowest cost comparator, or $1 billion if prices were set based on the weighted average of spending for comparators.

CONCLUSION

Reference pricing based on added benefit assessment could be used to address the launch prices for expensive Part B drugs with low added benefit.

Does health technology assessment compromise access to pharmaceuticals?

In response to rapidly rising pharmaceutical costs, many countries have introduced health technology assessment (HTA) as a 'fourth hurdle'. We evaluated the causal effect of HTA based regulation on access to pharmaceuticals by using the introduction of Germany's HTA system (AMNOG) in 2011. We obtained launch data on pharmaceuticals for 30 European countries from the IQVIA (formerly IMS) database. Using difference-in-difference models, we estimated the effect of AMNOG on launch delay, the ranking order of launch delays, and the availability of pharmaceuticals. We then compared the results for Germany to Austria, Czechia, Italy, Portugal, and the UK. Across all six countries, launch delays decreased from the pre-AMNOG period (25.01 months) to the post-AMNOG period (14.34 months). However, the introduction of AMNOG consistently reduced the magnitude of the decrease in launch delay in Germany compared to the comparator countries (staggered DiD: + 4.31 months, p = 0.05). Our logit results indicate that the availability of pharmaceuticals in Germany increased as a result of AMNOG (staggered logit: + 5.78%, p = 0.009). We provide evidence on the trade-off between regulation and access. This can help policymakers make better-informed decisions to strike the right balance between cost savings achieved through HTA based regulation and access to pharmaceuticals.

Negotiating Drug Prices in the US-Lessons From Europe

This Viewpoint describes European drug price negotiation practices and compares them with practices in the US.

Assessing US Pharmaceutical Policy and Pricing Reform Legislation in Light of European Price and Cost Control Strategies

This article compares the pharmaceutical pricing policies employed by public and private insurers in the United States with seven price and spending control strategies employed in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Differences between American and European policies explain why American pharmaceutical prices and per capita spending are higher than in European nations. The article then analyzes two recent bills as examples of significant American reform ideas-H.R. 3, the Elijah E. Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act (introduced in 2019) and the Build Back Better Act (BBBA, introduced in 2021)-and compares them with European cost control strategies. Key drug price provisions of the BBBA were incorporated into the recently enacted Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). H.R. 3 would have used an international (mostly European) price index to cap U.S. prices; the BBBA would cap Medicare prices at a discount from average U.S. market prices. Neither bill would employ the key cost control strategies that European nations do. Both bills would have significantly less impact on prices than legislation that employs European-style cost controls. This article proposes steps that Congress could take in line with European strategies to lower purchase prices and costs for patients. These measures would have to overcome political obstacles that currently stymie reform.

Availability of New Medicines in the US and Germany From 2004 to 2018

IMPORTANCE

Germany's unique approach to coverage determination and pricing has ensured that effective medicines remain on the market, often at prices reduced through negotiation. However, less is known about trade-offs of this approach with regard to initial availability of medicines.

OBJECTIVE

To examine differences in the timing and scope of new medicines available in Germany and the US.

DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS

This retrospective cohort study analyzed initial availability of new medicines approved by regulatory agencies in Germany and the US between January 1, 2004, and December 31, 2018, and followed up through December 31, 2019. Data analysis was conducted from January 1, 2020, to July 1, 2022. A total of 599 novel approvals were reviewed. Generic, biosimilar, vaccine, and combination medicines were excluded.

EXPOSURES

US Food and Drug Administration approvals were reviewed for therapies categorized as new molecular entities or new active ingredients. German approvals were reviewed from secondary administrative data of authorized medicines that determine availability in Germany, including data presented by the European Medicines Agency.

MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES

Approvals were analyzed to determine the percentage of medicines approved and available in the US, Germany, or both countries and compare the times to reach the market.

RESULTS

Analysis of 599 new medicines demonstrated that fewer were available in Germany compared with the US (80% vs 92% of all potential therapies) and that the median difference in time to market was 4 months (95% CI, -44.40 to 44.76 months). Forty-nine medicines were approved in Germany but not in the US, 75% of which were rejected by the US Food and Drug Administration, were withdrawn, or had US equivalent agents.

CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE

In this cohort study, fewer new medicines were available in Germany compared with the US between 2004 and 2018. In addition, drugs entered the German market later than in the US.

Strategies to Manage Drugs and Devices Approved Based on Limited Evidence: Results of a Modified Delphi Panel

Prescription drugs and medical devices are increasingly coming to market through expedited US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) pathways that require only limited evidence of safety and efficacy, such as nonrandomized, unblinded trial data in small numbers of patients, or the use of surrogate end points. Reliance on more limited evidence means that there is often greater uncertainty about risks and benefits. Using a modified Delphi process, we sought to identify promising policy approaches that address physician-patient decision-making needs about the use of such drugs and medical devices. We convened 13 national leaders from academia, government, nonprofits, payors, and industry who had expertise in medical product regulation, payor policymaking, bioethics, physician practice, patient advocacy, public health expertise/advocacy, clinical trials, the pharmaceutical and device industry, institutional review board oversight, and real-world evidence. Through multiple rounds of voting and meetings focused on evaluating the feasibility and impact of various interventions, the 13 participants reached the broadest consensus on 4 interventions: strengthening FDA post-approval study requirements to ensure postmarket evidence is generated in a timely manner, better informing patients about the risks and benefits and level of evidence supporting therapies via simplified and patient-centered product information "boxes" modeled on nutrition labels, limiting prices for drugs and medical devices approved based on surrogate end point data until confirmatory clinical evidence is generated, and improving health professional education about FDA regulation to better support clinician use of drugs and devices as well as communication with patients.

German Pharmaceutical Pricing: Lessons for the United States

To control pharmaceutical spending and improve access, the United States could adopt strategies similar to those introduced in Germany by the 2011 German Pharmaceutical Market Reorganization Act. In Germany, manufacturers sell new drugs immediately upon receiving marketing approval. During the first year, the German Federal Joint Committee assesses new drugs to determine their added medical benefit. It assigns them a score indicating their added benefit. New drugs comparable to drugs in a reference price group are assigned to that group and receive the same reimbursement, unless they are therapeutically superior. The National Association of Statutory Health Insurance Funds then negotiates with manufacturers the maximum reimbursement starting the 13th month, consistent with the drug's added benefit assessment and price caps in other European countries. In the absence of agreement, an arbitration board sets the price. Manufacturers accept the price resolution or exit the market. Thereafter, prices generally are not increased, even for inflation. US public and private insurers control prices in diverse ways, but typically obtain discounts by designating certain drugs as preferred and by restricting patient access or charging high copayment for nonpreferred drugs. This article draws 10 lessons for drug pricing reform in US federal programs and private insurance.

International Reference Pricing for Prescription Drugs in the United States: Administrative Limitations and Collateral Effects

OBJECTIVES

Many countries use international (or external) reference pricing-benchmarking prices against those in other countries-to manage spending on prescription drugs. By contrast, the United States (US) allows manufacturers to set drug prices freely. In December 2019, a major bill passed the House of Representatives that would introduce international reference pricing to reduce US drug spending. In September 2020, President Trump issued an executive order to apply international reference pricing for drugs purchased under Medicare. As US policymakers consider adopting reference pricing, it is important to recognize four key administrative issues that have complicated other countries' experiences.

METHODS

We analyzed the US policy proposals and literature on international experience with international reference pricing to identify implementation challenges and potential effects of US adoption of international reference pricing.

RESULTS

Four key administrative issues were identified: lack of price transparency, delays in market approvals, the frequency of price revisions, and the prevalence of cross-referencing.

CONCLUSIONS

Failure to account for the key issues in the emerging US approach will lead to overspending from overestimation of prices. Policymakers also need to recognize the collateral effects that the US adoption of international reference pricing may have on other countries' prices. Given the size of the pharmaceutical market in the US and other market issues, US reference pricing will likely increase drug list and net prices in other countries. Because of limitations in implementation and collateral effects, US policymakers should consider international reference pricing as a supportive tool alongside other cost containment policies, such as value-based pricing or volume agreements. International reference pricing could limit drug spending in the US but faces implementation challenges and will negatively affect other countries.

Common Pharmaceutical Price and Cost Controls in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany: Lessons for the United States

To identify pharmaceutical spending-control options for the United States, we analyzed the policies of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, which encourage drugmakers to undertake innovations that improve health while controlling spending. Their main strategies today include: using legislation to set default rules that increase the insurer's bargaining position, employing health technology assessment that measures cost-effectiveness or comparative effectiveness and caps the purchase or reimbursement price, setting a single maximum price for similar drugs (reference group pricing), capping prices near prices in other European countries (external reference pricing), prohibiting price increases, contracting to obtain discounts as sales volume rises, procuring drugs through competitive bids, and requiring manufacturers to pay rebates when spending exceeds a global budget. Each strategy addresses a distinct cause of high spending and supports overall goals. Most recent US reform proposals recommend incremental changes that would not address the major sources of high and increasing pharmaceutical prices. However, some US reform proposals resemble certain European strategies and could bring more significant change. US policymakers should consider adopting each of the strategies employed in these countries.

Assessing the Added Therapeutic Benefit of Ultra-Expensive Drugs

OBJECTIVES

While the United States does not have a method for assessing the added therapeutic benefit of drugs, France, Canada, and Germany do. We examined the added therapeutic benefit of the most expensive drugs prescribed to Medicare Part D beneficiaries in the United States.

METHODS

We identified ultra-expensive drugs with annual Medicare spending that exceeded $62 794 (United States GDP per capita in 2018) using Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Spending and Utilization Data. We used added therapeutic benefit ratings assessed by health technology assessment agencies in France, Canada, and Germany.

RESULTS

We identified 122 ultra-expensive drugs in 2018. Sixty-five percent of these drugs (n = 79) were assessed by at least one of the countries. Based on these assessments, approximately 75% received a low added therapeutic benefit rating.

CONCLUSIONS

Most ultra-expensive drugs prescribed in the United States and assessed by France, Canada, and Germany provide low added therapeutic benefit. Policy reforms in the United States could use added therapeutic benefit to inform coverage and pricing decisions for ultra-expensive drugs. Similar to Germany, one approach would be to allow the company to set a market price for a limited period of time before requiring a price reduction if the added therapeutic benefit is below a certain threshold. Another approach would be to identify when drug prices are substantially more expensive in the United States and conduct an added therapeutic benefit assessment and price review on these drugs.

The impact of drug quality ratings from health technology assessments on the adoption of new drugs by physicians in Germany

Payers are increasingly calling for the value of new drugs to be measured explicitly. We analyze how the availability of drug quality ratings by health technology assessment (HTA) agencies affects the adoption of new drugs by physicians in Germany. We combine data from drug quality ratings, promotional spending, and a physician panel. In a latent utility model, time to adoption is specified as a function of quality rating, promotional spending by manufacturers, and physician-specific variables. As expected, drugs with a positive rating were adopted faster (p < 0.001) than those without. However, our results suggest that it was the publication of the quality rating itself that affected adoption. Indeed, before a quality rating was published, drugs that went on to receive a positive quality rating were not adopted significantly faster than drugs that went on to receive a negative quality rating. In contrast, after the publication of the HTA quality rating, drugs with a positive rating were adopted significantly faster than those without (p < 0.05). The per physician value of a positive quality rating was EUR 393.50. Our results suggest that there are returns from HTAs beyond their use in price negotiations.

Accessibility of cancer drugs in Switzerland: Time from approval to pricing decision between 2009 and 2018

BACKGROUND

Approved drugs must be included on the so-called "special list" (SL) by the Federal Office for Public Health (FOPH) to be reimbursed by the social health insurance in Switzerland. The FOPH decides whether a drug may be included on SL and if so, negotiates the maximum price with the manufacturer. Time period between approval and inclusion on SL is important to evaluate accessibility of patients to drugs.

METHODS

We identified all approved cancer drugs for first indication between 2009-2018 in Switzerland and determined whether they have been included on SL, and if so, how many days passed between approval and reimbursement, i.e., inclusion on SL. Descriptive statistical analysis was performed by using R.

RESULTS

70 cancer drugs have been approved between 2009 and 2018. Among this sample, 56 (80 %) are on SL. Average time from drug approval to inclusion date on SL increased from 234 days in 2009 to 463 days in 2018, with an average time of 352 days over the full analysis period.

CONCLUSION

Time period between approval and inclusion on SL has prolonged over the past years. This impedes patients' access to cancer drugs. Prioritizing HTA and price negotiation of cancer drugs with high clinical benefit or implement a regulation that sets a maximum time period for HTA and price negotiation are possible policy implications.

Competition and price among brand-name drugs in the same class: A systematic review of the evidence

BACKGROUND

Some experts have proposed combating rising drug prices by promoting brand-brand competition, a situation that is supposed to arise when multiple US Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved brand-name products in the same class are indicated for the same condition. However, numerous reports exist of price increases following the introduction of brand-name competition, suggesting that it may not be effective. We performed a systematic literature review of the peer-reviewed health policy and economics literature to better understand the interplay between new drug entry and intraclass drug prices.

METHODS AND FINDINGS

We searched PubMed and EconLit for original studies on brand-brand competition in the US market published in English between January 1990 and April 2019. We performed a qualitative synthesis of each study's data, recording its primary objective, methodology, and results. We found 10 empirical investigations, with 1 study each on antihypertensives, anti-infectives, central nervous system stimulants for attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, disease-modifying therapies for multiple sclerosis, histamine-2 (H2) blockers, and tumor necrosis factor (TNF) inhibitors; 2 studies on cancer medications; and 2 studies on all marketed or new drugs. None of the studies reported that brand-brand competition lowers list prices of existing drugs within a class. The findings of 2 studies suggest that such competition may help restrain how new drug prices are set. Other studies found evidence that brand-brand competition was mediated by the relative quality of competing drugs and the extent to which they are marketed, with safer or more effective new drugs and greater marketing associated with higher intraclass list prices. Our investigation was limited by the studies' use of list rather than net prices and the age of some of the data.

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings suggest that policies to promote brand-brand competition in the US pharmaceutical market, such as accelerating approval of non-first-in-class drugs, will likely not result in lower drug list prices absent additional structural reforms.