Fast optimism, slow realism? Causal evidence for a two-step model of future thinking

Many researchers report that people have an optimistic bias when making predictions, but sometimes cautious realism is found. One resolution is that future thinking has two steps: The desired outcome is imagined first, followed by a sobering reflection on potential difficulty of getting there. Five experiments supported this two-step model (USA and Norway; N = 3213; 10,433 judgments), showing that intuitive predictions are more optimistic than reflective predictions. Participants were randomly assigned to rely on fast intuition under time-pressure or slow reflection after time-delay. In Experiment 1, participants in both conditions thought positive events were more likely to happen to them than to other people and that negative events were less likely, replicating the classic finding of "unrealistic optimism". Crucially, this optimistic tendency was significantly stronger in the intuitive condition. Participants in the intuitive condition also relied more on heuristic problem-solving (CRT). Experiments 2-3 found that participants in the intuitive condition thought they were at lower health risk than participants in the reflective condition. Experiment 4 provided a direct replication, with the additional finding that intuitive predictions were more optimistic only for oneself (and not about the average person). Experiment 5 failed to identify any intuitive difference in perceived reasons for success versus failure, but observed intuitive optimism in binary prediction of a future exercise habit. Experiment 5 also found suggestive evidence for a moderating role of social knowledge: Reflective predictions about oneself became more realistic than intuitive predictions only when the person's base-rate beliefs about other people were fairly accurate.

Time perception at resting state and during active motion: The role of anxiety and depression

BACKGROUND

Time perception and motion intensity are interrelated factors that may influence symptom expression and severity in case of various psychiatric conditions, including anxiety and depression.

AIMS

The present study aimed to 1) explore the associations between the intensity of physical activity, time perception, impulsivity, anxiety and depressive symptoms, and to 2) investigate the extent to which resting state motion intensity can be used to identify the assessed psychiatric conditions.

METHODS

20 healthy controls and 20 psychiatric patients (with either anxiety or depression-related diagnoses) were included in the study and filled out a questionnaire consisting of validated anxiety, depression and impulsivity measures. Time perception was measured by a computerized time production task, whereas motion intensity was analyzed by a motion capture and analysis software. Respondents were randomly assigned to an experimental (with active motion task) and non-experimental group (resting state conditions). Both subgroups were repeatedly assessed, in order to explore changes in motion intensity, time perception and psychiatric symptom levels.

RESULTS

Random forest regression analysis identified the level of impulsivity, depression and anxiety as the strongest predictors of resting state motion intensity, while a path analysis model indicated that controls and psychiatric patients show different pathways regarding the connection between motion intensity changes, time production ratio alterations and symptom reduction.

CONCLUSIONS

Our study implies the importance of distinguishing between clinical and subclinical severity of psychiatric symptoms when considering the association between motion intensity, time perception, anxiety and depression. Potential transdiagnostic relevance of resting state motion intensity is also addressed.

Thinking of future as an older individual increases perceived risks for age-related diseases but not for COVID-19

Actively thinking of one's future as an older individual could increase perceived risk and risk aversion. This could be particularly relevant for COVID‐19, if we consider the common representation of the risk of being infected by COVID‐19 as associated with being older. Increased perceived risk could bear consequences on the adoption of preventive behaviours. Thus, we investigated whether increasing the salience of individuals' future as an older adult would impact on their perceived risk for COVID‐19 and medical conditions varying for age‐relatedness. One hundred and forty‐four Italian adults (M_age = 27.72, range: 18–56) were randomly assigned to either a future as older adult thinking or control condition. Perceived risk for COVID‐19 and other strongly, and weakly age‐related medical conditions during the lifetime was measured. Results showed that thinking about the future as an older adult increased perceived risk for strongly and weakly age‐related diseases, but not for COVID‐19. The salience of the COVID‐19 outbreak may have raised the perceived risks in both experimental conditions, making the manipulation ineffective. In conclusion, manipulating future‐oriented thinking might be a successful communication strategy to increase people's perceived risk of common diseases, but it might not work for highly salient pathologies such as COVID‐19.

Letters to our Future Selves? High-Powered Replication Attempts Question Effects on Future Orientation, Delinquent Decisions, and Risky Investments

Enhancing people's future orientation, in particular continuity with their future selves, has been proposed as promising to mitigate self-control–related problem behavior. In two pre-registered, direct replication studies, we tested a subtle manipulation, that is, writing a letter to one's future self, in order to reduce delinquent decisions (van Gelder et al., 2013, Study 1) and risky investments (Monroe et al., 2017, Study 1). With samples of n = 314 and n = 463, which is 2.5 times the original studies' sample sizes, the results suggested that the expected effects are either non-existent or smaller than originally reported, and/or dependent on factors not examined. Vividness of the future self was successfully manipulated in Study 2, but manipulation checks overall indicated that the letter task is not reliable to alter future orientation. We discuss ideas to integrate self-affirmation approaches and to test less subtle manipulations in samples with substantial, myopia-related self-control deficits.

Cuing both positive and negative episodic foresight reduces delay discounting but does not affect risk-taking

Humans frequently create mental models of the future, allowing outcomes to be inferred in advance of their occurrence. Recent evidence suggests that imagining positive future events reduces delay discounting (the devaluation of reward with time until its receipt), while imagining negative future events may increase it. Here, using a sample of 297 participants, we experimentally assess the effects of cued episodic simulation of positive and negative future scenarios on decision-making in the context of both delay discounting (monetary choice questionnaire) and risk-taking (balloon-analogue risk task). Participants discounted the future less when cued to imagine positive and negative future scenarios than they did when cued to engage in control neutral imagery. There were no effects of experimental condition on risk-taking. Thus, although these results replicate previous findings suggesting episodic future simulation can reduce delay discounting, they indicate that this effect is not dependent on the valence of the thoughts, and does not generalise to all other forms of “impulsive” decision-making. We discuss various interpretations of these results, and suggest avenues for further research on the role of prospection in decision-making.

Are morally good actions ever free?

Research has shown that people ascribe more responsibility to morally bad actions than both morally good and neutral ones, suggesting that people do not attribute responsibility to morally good actions. The present work demonstrates that this is not so: People ascribe more free will to morally good than neutral actions (Studies 1a-1b, Mini Meta). Studies 2a-2b distinguished the underlying motives for ascribing freedom to morally good and bad actions. Free will ascriptions for immoral actions were driven predominantly by affective responses (i.e., punitive desires, moral outrage, and perceived severity of the crime). Free will judgments for morally good actions were similarly driven by affective responses (i.e., reward desires, moral uplift, and perceived generosity), but also more pragmatic considerations (perceived utility of reward, counternormativity of the action, and required willpower). Morally good actions may be more carefully considered, leading to generally weaker, but more contextually sensitive free will judgments.